Mailing, Not Receipt, Triggers FTCA’s Six‑Month Deadline; COVID-Era Office Mail Protocols Do Not Justify Equitable Tolling

Case: Margarita Marshall v. United States Post Office, United States Postal Service National Tort Center, and United States (3d Cir. No. 24-3104, Oct. 3, 2025) — Not Precedential

Introduction

This Third Circuit decision affirms a summary judgment ruling that an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was untimely when filed more than six months after the agency mailed its final denial of the administrative claim. The panel also endorses a straightforward application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d): when parties rely on materials outside the pleadings to resolve a timeliness dispute, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be converted to a Rule 56 motion so long as the parties receive notice and an opportunity to submit materials. Finally, the court holds that discovery into the details of physical delivery of the denial letter was unnecessary because, under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), the six-month limitations clock begins at mailing, not receipt or delivery.

The case arises from a 2018 slip-and-fall at a Philadelphia post office. After the United States Postal Service (USPS) mailed a certified letter denying the claimant’s administrative claim in April 2023, the plaintiff did not file suit until May 2024. She argued on appeal that (1) the district court improperly converted the government’s motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, (2) she was entitled to equitable tolling due to COVID-19 mail-handling protocols at counsel’s office and her efforts to pursue the claim, and (3) the court erred in granting judgment without allowing her to depose the mail carrier who signed for the certified letter. The Third Circuit rejected each argument and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

Conversion was proper: Because both sides relied on materials outside the complaint to address timeliness, Rule 12(d) required conversion to summary judgment. The district court gave clear notice of that intent and allowed supplemental submissions; it was not required to instruct the parties on the types of documents to submit.
Summary judgment was appropriate: The FTCA time bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) runs from the date of mailing of the agency’s denial, not receipt. Marshall filed suit more than a year after USPS mailed the denial letter; the suit was therefore untimely.
No equitable tolling: COVID-19 office-building mail protocols did not constitute extraordinary circumstances beyond counsel’s control, and the record reflected a lack of due diligence, including a year of silence before suit was filed. Thus, equitable tolling did not apply.
No abuse of discretion in denying discovery: A deposition of the mail carrier was immaterial because the statute makes “mailing” the trigger; the details of delivery or actual receipt would not affect the outcome.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC, 935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019), and Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014): Together, these cases articulate the conversion principle: if the court considers materials outside the pleadings that are not integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be converted to summary judgment. The panel used this framework to uphold conversion because the timeliness issue turned on correspondence and certified-mail records beyond the complaint.
In re Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. Securities Litigation, 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999): Sets out the three-part test for conversion (whether materials require conversion, whether adequate notice was given, and if not, whether the lack of notice was harmless). The panel found that materials plainly required conversion and that the district court provided adequate notice by announcing conversion and inviting supplemental submissions.
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 112 (3d Cir. 2019): Emphasizes that a court errs by entering summary judgment sua sponte without notice and an opportunity to respond. Cited to show that the district court here did the opposite—it gave notice and time for submissions.
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005), and D.J.S.-W. v. United States, 962 F.3d 745, 751–52 (3d Cir. 2020): Provide the Third Circuit’s two-pronged equitable-tolling test (diligence plus extraordinary circumstances) and stress that both prongs are required. The panel relied on these to conclude that pandemic mail protocols were not extraordinary and that due diligence was lacking.
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 257 (2016): Supreme Court authority clarifying that “extraordinary circumstances” must be beyond the litigant’s control. The panel quoted this standard in rejecting tolling based on office mail-handling protocols.
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1989), Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1988), and Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 510 (3d Cir. 1994): Establish that alleged premature grants of summary judgment are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The panel used this standard to hold that refusing a deposition of the mail carrier was not an abuse given the legal irrelevance of delivery to § 2401(b).

Legal Reasoning

1) Conversion to summary judgment. The court applied Rule 12(d) and Third Circuit precedent to determine that conversion was both required and properly executed. Because timeliness turned on materials outside the complaint—such as USPS mailing records, letters, and office protocols—the district court could not decide the issue under Rule 12(b)(6). It issued an order expressly converting the motion, provided a 14-day window, and invited “any additional information” the parties wanted the court to consider. The appellant argued that the court should have specified what types of materials were permissible, but the panel held no such instruction is required by Rule 12(d) or circuit law; notice and an opportunity to submit material are sufficient.

2) The FTCA limitations clock begins at mailing. Section 2401(b) provides that an FTCA action is barred unless begun “within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency.” The panel emphasized the statutory text: the trigger is “mailing,” not “receipt.” Here, USPS mailed a certified denial letter to counsel at the same address used throughout the claim’s lifecycle. The plaintiff filed suit more than six months after that mailing. The court therefore held that the claim was untimely as a matter of law. Arguments contesting delivery or receipt could not manufacture a genuine dispute of material fact because delivery is not material under the statute’s plain terms.

3) Equitable tolling does not apply. The panel applied the familiar two-pronged test from Hedges and D.J.S.-W.: the claimant must show both (a) diligence in pursuing her rights and (b) extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing. The plaintiff invoked COVID-19 office-building protocols under which certified mail was delivered to a designated suite and, per the record, signed for by a USPS carrier, with counsel later alleging non-receipt. The court held that such protocols were not extraordinary circumstances beyond counsel’s control within the meaning of Menominee Tribe: they did not prevent counsel from receiving mail or render mail sorting beyond counsel’s control. Independently, the court agreed with the district court that diligence was lacking—there was no correspondence for about a year before filing suit. Because the plaintiff failed both prongs, tolling was unavailable.

4) Denial of discovery regarding delivery was proper. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the panel concluded there was none. A deposition of the carrier who signed for the certified letter would not change the dispositive legal premise: § 2401(b) turns on the date of mailing. As a result, further discovery into delivery was immaterial, and summary judgment was not prematurely granted.

Impact and Practical Implications

Strict adherence to the mailing trigger under § 2401(b): The opinion reaffirms a text-driven rule that the six-month FTCA limitations period begins when the agency mails the final denial by certified or registered mail. Alleged non-receipt by counsel will not reset or delay the clock.
High bar for COVID-related equitable tolling: By 2023–2024, general pandemic-related office procedures—such as building-level mail bins and carrier signatures—are not “extraordinary circumstances” beyond counsel’s control. Litigants will need concrete, external impediments that truly prevented filing despite diligence.
Diligence means ongoing, documented follow-up: Courts will look for sustained efforts to monitor a claim’s status and protect filing deadlines. Year-long gaps with no communication, particularly after a known mailing of a final denial, will weigh heavily against tolling.
Conversion procedure clarified: District courts need not prescribe the “type” of summary-judgment materials parties should submit after converting under Rule 12(d); it suffices to give clear notice of conversion and a fair opportunity to supplement the record.
Discovery must be material to preclude judgment: When a statutory trigger is a legal event (mailing), factual development about delivery or receipt may be immaterial. Requests for depositions or additional discovery tied to immaterial facts may be denied without risking reversible error.
Practice pointers for FTCA claimants and counsel:
- Institute robust mail-tracking protocols, especially for certified or registered items, including internal logs and periodic checks with building management or mailrooms.
- Calendar the six-month period from the agency’s mailing date, not anticipated receipt, and consider filing suit well before the deadline.
- If non-receipt is suspected, promptly contact the agency to confirm status and request copies; document all follow-up efforts to preserve potential tolling arguments.
- Remember that if the agency fails to act within six months after the administrative claim is filed, the claim may be deemed denied and suit may be filed; do not passively wait for formal denial if deadlines are approaching.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FTCA administrative process and deadlines: Before suing the United States for torts, a claimant must present an administrative claim to the agency. If the agency denies the claim, the claimant has six months from the date the agency mails the denial to file suit. If the agency does not act within six months, the claim is “deemed denied,” and the claimant may file suit thereafter.
“Mailing” versus “receipt”: Under § 2401(b), the legal clock starts when the agency sends the final denial by certified or registered mail. Whether or when the claimant or counsel actually receives or reads the letter generally does not affect the deadline.
Equitable tolling: A safety valve that, in rare cases, extends a limitations period. To qualify, a plaintiff must show diligence (they actively pursued their rights) and extraordinary circumstances (external obstacles beyond their control) that prevented timely filing. Both must be proven.
Rule 12(d) conversion: If a court considering a motion to dismiss looks at materials outside the complaint that are not integral to it, the motion becomes one for summary judgment. The court must tell the parties and give them a chance to submit evidence.
Summary judgment: A procedural mechanism for resolving a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Facts that do not affect the legal outcome are “immaterial.”
Standards of review: “Plenary” review means the appellate court decides the legal issue anew, without deference. “Abuse of discretion” is more deferential; the appellate court will affirm unless the lower court’s decision was unreasonable or based on an error of law.
Nonprecedential disposition: The court notes that the opinion is not binding precedent under the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures. It still provides persuasive guidance on how similar issues are likely to be analyzed.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s opinion underscores three straightforward but critical principles for FTCA litigation. First, the six-month filing deadline runs from the agency’s mailing of the final denial, not from delivery or receipt. Second, equitable tolling remains a narrow remedy: general COVID-era mail protocols at counsel’s office do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances, particularly where record evidence shows a lack of sustained diligence. Third, procedural correctness matters but is not onerous: courts may convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment when extrinsic materials are considered, provided the parties are notified and afforded an opportunity to respond; courts may also deny discovery aimed at immaterial facts.

Although not precedential, the decision offers clear, practical guidance. FTCA claimants must vigilantly monitor agency correspondence and calendar deadlines from the date of mailing, while agencies and courts can rely on the statute’s plain text to resolve timeliness disputes efficiently. The case thus reinforces a predictable, text-centric approach to the FTCA limitations regime and the disciplined application of equitable tolling.