Locked Bedrooms as “Residential Structures”: Arizona Supreme Court Recognizes Nested Castles and Limits Co‑Occupant Invitations in Justification Law

Introduction

In State of Arizona v. John Logan Brown, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a conviction for aggravated assault after holding that a securable bedroom within a shared condominium qualifies as a “residential structure” for purposes of Arizona’s justification statutes. The Court further clarified that the statutory presumption of justification under A.R.S. § 13-419 applies when force is used to repel an unlawful or forcible entry into that room, and that a co-occupant’s invitation to a guest does not confer a “right to be in” another occupant’s locked bedroom over that occupant’s express objection. The decision resets the interface between Arizona’s castle-doctrine-like protections and modern cohabitation arrangements, clarifies the “slightest evidence” threshold for defense instructions, and reaffirms that failure to give warranted justification instructions is not harmless when it strips the State of its burden to disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

Case Background

Brown lived with his long-term partner, J.A., and their children in a two-bedroom condominium, maintaining a separate, lockable bedroom. After a prior physical altercation with M.H.—a neighbor who sometimes stayed with the couple—Brown had expressly barred M.H. from returning. A week after that altercation, J.A. invited M.H. over while Brown was at work. Brown returned, locked himself in his bedroom, and texted J.A. to leave him alone. J.A. twice forced open Brown’s bedroom door; on the second breach, both J.A. and M.H. stood at the threshold. Brown swung a microphone stand to prevent entry; in the ensuing struggle, M.H. was struck.

A jury convicted Brown of one count of aggravated assault (connected to the microphone stand incident) and acquitted on two subsequent counts. The trial court had refused Brown’s requested instructions on defense of a residential structure (§ 13-418), defense of premises (§ 13-407), and the § 13-419 presumption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

Issues Presented

Does a securable bedroom within a multi-room home qualify as a “residential structure” under A.R.S. § 13-1501(11) and (12) for justification defenses?
Does the § 13-419 presumption of justification apply when force is used against a person who forcibly enters such a bedroom over the occupant’s objection?
Is an invited guest of one co-occupant an “invitee” with a “right to be in” another co-occupant’s locked bedroom over that occupant’s explicit refusal?
Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on defense of a residential structure and defense of premises, and was any error harmless?

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

A locked bedroom is a “residential structure” because it is a place with sides and a floor, separately securable from any other structure attached to it, and adapted for human residence and lodging (A.R.S. § 13-1501(11), (12)). The statutory text permits “nested” residential structures.
Section 13-419’s presumption applies when a person uses force against another who is unlawfully or forcibly entering a residential structure. The presumption is unavailable if the person “has the right to be in” the structure, but invitee status does not extend beyond the scope of the invitation. A co-occupant’s guest has no right to enter another occupant’s bedroom over that occupant’s express objection.
Georgia v. Randolph supports the principle that a co-occupant cannot override a contemporaneous objection to entry by another co-occupant; the court of appeals misread Randolph.
Under the “slightest evidence” standard (State v. King), Brown was entitled to instructions on defense of a residential structure (§ 13-418), defense of premises (§ 13-407), and the § 13-419 presumption.
The refusal to instruct was not harmless because it removed the State’s burden to disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court vacated in part the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the trial court, vacated Brown’s conviction and sentence, and remanded for a new trial.

Detailed Analysis

1) Statutory Interpretation: What is a “Residential Structure”?

The Court interpreted A.R.S. § 13-1501(11) and (12) using ordinary meaning and context. A “residential structure” is any structure adapted for human residence and lodging. A “structure” includes any building or place with sides and a floor that is separately securable from any other attached structure and used for lodging.

Key terms unpacked by the Court (with dictionary support) include:

Residence: a dwelling place or habitation; the place one lives.
Lodging: a place to live or sleep; accommodations such as a room.
Securable: capable of being made safe—e.g., via a lock.

Applying these definitions, the Court concluded that Brown’s locked bedroom had walls and a floor, was separately securable from the rest of the condominium, and was adapted for residence and lodging—thus it is itself a residential structure. The statutes do not require that a residential structure be entirely separate from all other residential areas; apart-from-ness is not demanded by the text. The Court explicitly recognized that a residential structure can be nested within another, akin to a boarding house or hotel room within a larger building.

2) The § 13-419 Presumption: When Force Is Presumed Necessary

Section 13-419(A) creates a presumption that the threat or use of force is immediately necessary if someone is unlawfully or forcibly entering a person’s residential structure. Under § 13-419(B), such a person is presumed to pose an imminent threat of unlawful deadly harm to anyone in the structure. This presumption applies to both defense of premises (§ 13-407) and defense of a residential structure (§ 13-418).

Exception: The presumption does not apply if the person against whom force is used has “the right to be in” the residential structure (such as an owner, lessee, or invitee). But the Court emphasized that the “right to be in” is bounded by the scope of consent or invitation:

Nicoletti v. Westcor, Inc. confirms that an invitee who exceeds the scope of the invitation becomes a trespasser.
Brown did not invite M.H. into his bedroom and explicitly barred him. Even if J.A. invited M.H. into the condominium, that consent did not extend to Brown’s separately securable room over Brown’s contemporaneous objection.

Consequently, when J.A. twice forced open Brown’s locked door and M.H. stood at the threshold, M.H. was not an invitee with a “right to be in” the bedroom and the § 13-419 presumption was available to Brown.

3) Co-Occupant Consent and Georgia v. Randolph

The court of appeals relied on Georgia v. Randolph (a Fourth Amendment consent-to-search case) to conclude that J.A.’s invitation allowed M.H. to lawfully be in Brown’s bedroom. The Supreme Court rejected that reading. Randolph teaches the opposite: a co-occupant’s consent cannot override a present and objecting co-occupant’s refusal. That principle translates to civil-social authority: a co-occupant lacks authority to invite a third party into spaces another co-occupant contemporaneously forbids, especially a separately securable bedroom. Thus, Randolph supports Brown.

4) The “Slightest Evidence” Threshold for Jury Instructions

The Court reaffirmed Arizona’s low threshold for giving justification instructions: a defendant is entitled to a self-defense (or related justification) instruction if the record contains the “slightest evidence” supporting it (State v. King). Evidence here included:

Brown’s locked bedroom door was forcibly breached despite his express objections.
His intent to keep J.A. and M.H. out.
His prior physical altercation with M.H. and knowledge of M.H.’s felony conviction involving a knife.

Even apart from the statutory presumption, these facts permitted a reasonable jury to find Brown reasonably believed he faced imminent peril of death or serious physical injury (§ 13-418) and that force was immediately necessary to prevent a criminal trespass (§ 13-407). The trial court’s refusal to instruct was therefore an abuse of discretion.

5) Defense of a Residential Structure (§ 13-418) and Defense of Premises (§ 13-407)

Having found Brown’s bedroom to be a residential structure and “premises,” the Court held Brown was entitled to both instructions:

Section 13-418: With § 13-419(B)’s presumption of imminent threat applied, Brown was justified in using force to repel the unlawful/forcible entry. Even without the presumption, the “slightest evidence” standard was met.
Section 13-407: Brown, in lawful control of his premises (the bedroom), could use force if immediately necessary to prevent or terminate a criminal trespass. M.H. exceeded any invitation by J.A. when he entered Brown’s bedroom over Brown’s objection; thus, a trespass was possible and an instruction warranted.

6) Rejecting the State’s MPC Argument and Distinguishing Gardella

The State argued that Arizona’s deviation from the Model Penal Code’s burglary language (“separately secured or occupied portion thereof”) shows legislative intent not to treat rooms as separate residential structures. The Court disagreed: where the legislature did not adopt the MPC nor enact contrary language, the Court does not infer rejection. Arizona’s burglary framework differs in other ways (e.g., occupancy elevates degree but is not an element), and nothing suggests an intent to exclude bedrooms from the residential-structure definition, at least in the justification context.

The State also pointed to State v. Gardella to argue that lesser units are “subsumed” by the greater residence. The Court found Gardella distinguishable—focused on whether a commercial laundry room attached to a motel is “residential.” The “subsumed lesser structures” language was dicta, and later cases like Browning and Ekmanis involved whether nonresidential areas (garages or storage rooms) attach to a residence. This case concerns an inherently residential bedroom, separately securable within the home.

7) Legislative Policy on Domestic Violence and the “Castle”

The Court read the 2006 legislative declaration accompanying §§ 13-418 and -419 as endorsing safe and peaceful enjoyment “even from residents of the same household,” consistent with applying justification to domestic violence scenarios. Recognizing a securable bedroom as a residential structure aligns with that policy by protecting an individual’s right to exclude—even from co-residents—within a private living space.

8) Harmless Error

The failure to give the requested instructions was not harmless. Once a justification issue is properly raised, the State must disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt. By denying the instructions, the trial court effectively removed the State’s burden on justification, which is a classic case of non-harmless instructional error under State v. Slemmer and related authorities.

Precedents and Authorities Cited, and Their Influence

State v. King: “Slightest evidence” standard for justification instructions—central to granting Brown’s requested instructions.
Georgia v. Randolph: Co-occupant’s consent cannot override present objection—supports limiting a co-occupant’s power to invite a third party into another’s private, securable room.
Nicoletti v. Westcor: Invitee exceeding the scope of invitation becomes a trespasser—used to analyze M.H.’s lack of a right to be in Brown’s bedroom.
State v. Bowsher; State v. Mott; State v. Willoughby: How to treat MPC deviations—no inference of legislative rejection absent contrary language.
State v. Gardella; State v. Browning; State v. Ekmanis: Prior cases on “residential structure”—Gardella dicta distinguished; later cases focused on nonresidential ancillary areas.
Planned Parenthood v. Mayes; Nicaise v. Sundaram; In re Drummond: Textualist interpretive approach, ordinary meaning, and dictionary usage underpin the majority’s statutory analysis.
State v. Bible; State v. Henderson; Weaver v. Massachusetts; State v. Ring; State v. Slemmer: Harmless error framework and burden-shifting when justification instructions are at issue.
State v. Jackson: Recognition of self-defense as a fundamental right—supports robust application of justification statutes.

The Dissent’s View and the Majority’s Response

Chief Justice Timmer’s Dissent

A bedroom within a larger residence is not a “structure” because it is not “separately securable from any other structure attached to it” as § 13-1501(12) requires. The “attached structure” should be another securable unit (e.g., another condo or hotel room), not the remainder of the same residential unit.
“Residential structure” should generally encompass the whole self-contained living space (kitchen, bathroom, living areas), except in contexts like dorms or hotel rooms where the room itself functions as the residence.
Practical concerns: If rooms are separate residential structures, would entering multiple rooms support multiple burglaries? Would a home office be “nonresidential” for burglary? The dissent says the majority’s approach invites confusion and over-criminalization.
The domestic-violence policy statement was tied to § 13-411, not §§ 13-407 and -418; its omission suggests no legislative intent to extend those defenses to intra-residence rooms.

Majority’s Answer

The statutory text does not demand the all-or-nothing, unit-level approach proposed by the dissent; nothing in §§ 13-1501(11) and (12) requires amenities like kitchens or bathrooms.
“Separately securable” is satisfied by a lockable bedroom that can exclude entry from attached areas; the statute does not require the “attached structure” to be an independent legal unit.
Gardella’s “subsumed” language is dicta and arose in a commercial/nonresidential setting; it does not control inherently residential rooms.
Policy considerations support protecting a person’s dominion over a private, securable room within shared living arrangements; concerns about practical fallout are speculative and do not overcome clear statutory text.

Impact and Future Significance

Immediate Effects in Criminal Trials

Expanded Eligibility for Justification Instructions: Defendants in shared residences may more readily obtain instructions under §§ 13-407, 13-418, and the § 13-419 presumption by showing a separately securable bedroom and a contemporaneous objection to entry.
Burdens at Trial: Once these instructions are properly in play, the State must disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt; failure to instruct risks reversal.
Scope of Invitation: Prosecutors and defense counsel must present evidence about consent boundaries—who could invite whom, to which spaces, and whether the occupant objected in real time.

Substantive Doctrinal Developments

Nested Residential Structures: Arizona recognizes that a “residential structure” can be a lockable room within a larger home. This reframes the castle-doctrine analogy for modern cohabitation, roommates, and multigenerational housing.
Invitee Limitations: Being invited into a home by one co-occupant does not automatically confer a right to enter another co-occupant’s bedroom; the scope-of-consent principle is now firmly tied to justification presumptions.
Trespass and Premises Defense: The opinion clarifies that trespass can occur within residences when a guest exceeds consent boundaries, unlocking defense-of-premises logic even in intra-household conflicts.

Potential Ripple Effects

Burglary/Trespass Charging and Jury Instructions: Because the Court located its analysis in the definitions of § 13-1501(11), (12), the reasoning will likely inform how “residential structure” is understood in trespass and burglary prosecutions, though the Court framed its MPC discussion in the context of justification statutes. Expect litigants to test whether entry into a locked roommate’s bedroom supports residential burglary elements.
Domestic Violence Contexts: The ruling may strengthen protections for victims who secure private rooms within shared residences, consistent with the 2006 legislative policy statement. It may also influence how courts evaluate reasonableness when a victim excludes a co-resident’s guest from a private room.
College Dormitories, Rooming Houses, and Hotels: The logic readily applies to dorm rooms and hotel rooms and will likely be invoked in roommate disputes and short-term rentals where privacy boundaries are clear and securable.

Practice Pointers

For Defense Counsel: Build the evidentiary record on separate securability (locks, doors), express objections, prior incidents elevating perceived risk, and the limited scope of any invitation. Request instructions under §§ 13-407, 13-418, and 13-419 as soon as the “slightest evidence” is present.
For Prosecutors: To defeat the presumption, show that the complainant had the “right to be in” the specific room (e.g., shared room, express consent by the occupant, absence of contemporaneous objection). Alternatively, attack the reasonableness and immediacy of force or argue that entry was not unlawful or forcible.
For Trial Courts: When evidence is thin but present, err on the side of instructing; improper denial of justification instructions risks reversal for non-harmless error.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Residential Structure: A place with sides and a floor, adapted for living and sleeping, that can be secured from attached areas. A lockable bedroom qualifies.
Structure: Any building or securable place used for lodging—can be nested within a larger building.
Premises (for § 13-407): Any real property or structure adapted for residence and lodging; a bedroom counts.
Separately Securable: Capable of being closed off to exclude others—for example, via a locking door.
Invitee and Scope of Invitation: Permission to enter is limited; an invitee becomes a trespasser if they exceed the permission granted (such as entering a room that the occupant forbids).
§ 13-419 Presumption: If someone is unlawfully or forcibly entering a residential structure, the law presumes the defender’s force is immediately necessary and that the intruder poses an imminent deadly threat. The presumption is lost if the intruder had a right to be there.
Slightest Evidence Standard: A very low threshold; any evidence supporting justification requires the court to instruct the jury.
Harmless Error: An instructional error is harmless only if it had no effect on the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Removing the State’s burden to disprove justification rarely qualifies as harmless.

Unresolved Questions and Areas for Future Litigation

Granularity: Which interior spaces qualify as “separately securable” (e.g., bathrooms without locks, closets with locks)? The opinion’s logic suggests functionality and capacity to exclude will matter.
Multiplicity in Property Crimes: In burglary prosecutions, will entry into multiple locked rooms support multiple counts? The majority did not reach this, and the dissent’s concerns preview future disputes.
Consent Dynamics: How will courts weigh ambiguous or implied consent within households, especially where dominion over spaces is contested (e.g., minors’ rooms, jointly used offices)? Contemporaneous objection may be dispositive.

Conclusion

State v. Brown sets a consequential precedent: a lockable bedroom within a home is itself a “residential structure,” and Arizona’s castle-like presumptions apply when its occupant repels an unlawful or forcible entry. The Court’s text-centric approach recognizes “nested” residential structures, limits invitee status to the scope of consent, and uses Randolph to underscore that co-occupants cannot override a present objection to entry. The decision reaffirms Arizona’s “slightest evidence” threshold for justification instructions and places a meaningful burden on the State to disprove justification when those instructions are warranted. While the dissent raises pragmatic concerns about over-fragmenting homes into multiple “structures,” the majority’s holding aligns closely with legislative text and policy favoring personal security within one’s private living space—even against fellow residents’ guests. The ruling will reshape trial strategy in assault, trespass, and potentially burglary prosecutions involving shared housing, and it marks a significant development in Arizona’s justification law.

Case Disposition

The Supreme Court vacated paragraphs 12–23 and 35 of the court of appeals’ decision, affirmed the remainder, reversed the trial court, vacated Brown’s conviction and sentence, and remanded for a new trial consistent with the opinion.