Limits on Delaware’s Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Auto Insurers in First-Party UIM Claims:
Commentary on James E. Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Supreme Court of Delaware’s December 18, 2025 decision in James E. Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, No. 155, 2025. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of a Maryland insured’s underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against his Maryland insurer, State Farm, for lack of personal jurisdiction in Delaware.

The case sits at the intersection of personal jurisdiction doctrine and automobile insurance coverage. The plaintiff, James Berry, was a Maryland resident insured under a Maryland State Farm policy with nationwide UIM coverage. He was injured in an automobile accident in Delaware and, after resolving the tort claim against the at-fault driver’s insurer, filed a first-party UIM action against State Farm in the Delaware Superior Court. State Farm challenged personal jurisdiction, and the Delaware courts agreed.

The central legal issue was whether Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), authorizes Delaware courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state auto insurer in a first-party UIM coverage dispute when:

• the insurer issued the policy in another state to a non-Delaware resident,
• the vehicle and insured were located in that other state at the time of contracting, but
• the accident giving rise to the UIM claim occurred in Delaware, and
• the policy provides nationwide coverage, including coverage for Delaware accidents.

The Delaware Supreme Court’s answer is a clear “no” on this record: Delaware’s long-arm statute does not reach an out-of-state insurer for a first-party UIM claim based solely on the fortuitous occurrence of the accident in Delaware.

The Court’s opinion crystallizes and elevates to Supreme Court authority prior Superior Court decisions denying jurisdiction in similar UIM settings, confines the “stands in the shoes” doctrine to liability insurers of tortfeasors, and limits the “dual jurisdiction” theory of § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) to traditional products cases. It also underscores strict preservation rules by refusing to consider a new § 3104(c)(6) theory not raised below.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On December 6, 2021, James Berry, a resident of Maryland, was injured in an automobile accident while driving in Delaware. At that time:

• Berry resided in Maryland.
• His vehicle was garaged/insured in Maryland.
• His automobile insurance policy was a Maryland policy issued by State Farm in Maryland.
• The policy provided UIM coverage for accidents occurring anywhere in the United States and its territories.

The tortfeasor’s liability insurer paid its $25,000 policy limits to settle Berry’s tort claims. State Farm consented to that settlement and acknowledged Berry’s contractual right to pursue a UIM claim under his policy.

Berry then sued State Farm in the Delaware Superior Court, seeking UIM benefits under his Maryland policy, based on the injuries he sustained in the Delaware accident.

B. Procedural History

1. Superior Court: State Farm moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Superior Court, relying primarily on Eaton v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., held that Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), did not confer specific jurisdiction over State Farm for a first-party UIM claim under an out-of-state policy. The complaint was dismissed.
2. Appeal: Berry appealed to the Supreme Court of Delaware, arguing primarily:
   • § 3104(c)(3) conferred jurisdiction because his claim “arose from” a tortious injury in Delaware and State Farm “stood in the shoes” of the tortfeasor; and
   • a “dual jurisdiction” theory combining § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4) also supported jurisdiction; and
   • for the first time on appeal, that § 3104(c)(6) applied because his policy insured risks to be performed in Delaware.

C. Standard of Review and Framework

The Court reviewed the personal jurisdiction issue de novo, citing Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec. Berry bore the burden of establishing a statutory basis for jurisdiction, consistent with AeroGlobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Industries, Inc.

Delaware employs a familiar two-step inquiry:

1. Does the defendant’s conduct fall within the reach of Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)?
2. If so, does exercising jurisdiction comport with federal due process?

The Court resolved the case at step one: finding no statutory basis for jurisdiction, it expressly declined to reach the constitutional due process question.

D. Holding

The Delaware Supreme Court held:

• Section 3104(c)(3) does not confer specific jurisdiction over State Farm for Berry’s first-party UIM claim because:
  • the UIM claim sounds in contract, not tort; and
  • the “stands in the shoes” concept applies to liability insurers defending tort claims, not to an insured’s first-party UIM coverage dispute with his own insurer.
• The “dual jurisdiction” theory—combining § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4)—does not apply to an insurance policy and remains confined to cases involving manufactured products, where the product itself causes injury in Delaware.
• Section 3104(c)(6) was not preserved below and therefore would not be considered under Supreme Court Rule 8, absent exceptional circumstances not present here.

Accordingly, the Superior Court’s dismissal of Berry’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute

Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), is designed to reach nonresident defendants who have certain enumerated contacts with the State. The subsections relevant in Berry’s appeal were:

• § 3104(c)(1): Transacting any business or performing any character of work or service in Delaware.
• § 3104(c)(3): Causing tortious injury in Delaware by an act or omission in Delaware.
• § 3104(c)(4): Causing tortious injury in Delaware by an act or omission outside Delaware if the defendant regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from services or things used or consumed in Delaware.
• § 3104(c)(6): Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within Delaware at the time of contracting.

The Supreme Court’s opinion focuses on (c)(3), and on the (c)(1) + (c)(4) “dual jurisdiction” theory, and then briefly addresses (c)(6) in the context of issue preservation.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. General Jurisdiction and Long-Arm Framework

• Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016): cited for the standard of review (de novo) of personal jurisdiction determinations. Cepec is also significant in Delaware for limiting general jurisdiction over corporations, reinforcing the trend that specific jurisdiction based on case-related contacts is the primary pathway for asserting jurisdiction over nonresidents.
• AeroGlobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Industries, Inc., 871 A.2d 428 (Del. 2005): cited for the principle that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the long-arm statute applies.
• LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe Co., Inc., 513 A.2d 764 (Del. 1986): and Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984): these cases supply the two-step analytical framework: first statutory reach, then due process. LaNuova also introduced the conceptual possibility of “dual jurisdiction” under § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4), later developed in product liability cases.

2. First-Party UIM / No-Fault Jurisdiction Cases

• Eaton v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2021 WL 3662451 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2021): a key Superior Court precedent upon which both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court in Berry heavily rely.
  • The plaintiff, a North Carolina driver insured under a North Carolina policy, was injured in Delaware.
  • She sued her insurer, Allstate, in Delaware for UIM benefits.
  • The court held that § 3104(c)(3) did not support specific jurisdiction because:
    • The basis of the claim was Allstate’s alleged failure to honor a contract, not the accident itself.
    • Allstate committed no act in Delaware that caused the injury.
    • The policy was negotiated and issued outside Delaware and had “no germane connection” to Delaware beyond the accident’s location.
  The Supreme Court in Berry explicitly endorses Eaton’s analysis, characterizing a UIM claim as a contract dispute, not a tort claim.
• Donaldson v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co., 2022 WL 951260 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2022), aff’d, 2022 WL 17087831 (Del. Nov. 21, 2022):
  • The Superior Court denied personal jurisdiction over a complaint seeking UIM benefits.
  • It held that even if the insured was in an accident in Delaware, the basis of the claim against the insurer is the contractual obligations owed, not the accident itself.
  • The Supreme Court’s affirmance (even if summary) lent weight to this understanding; Berry now elevates that rationale to a fully reasoned Supreme Court decision.
• Uribe v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 2015 WL 3536574 (Del. May 21, 2015):
  • The Court held that an out-of-state insurer providing first-party benefits to its insured was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware simply because the accident took place here.
  • This case anticipates the Berry holding: location of the accident alone does not confer jurisdiction over an out-of-state first-party insurer.

3. Liability Insurers “Standing in the Shoes” of Tortfeasors

Berry attempted to analogize State Farm’s position in the UIM claim to that of a liability insurer that “stands in the shoes” of the tortfeasor. The Supreme Court rejected that analogy but distinguished and preserved the separate line of “liability insurer” cases:

• Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Intermodal Transp., Inc., 1991 WL 1172907 (Del. Super. 2002):
  • An insurance guaranty association was held subject to § 3104(c)(3) jurisdiction in Delaware.
  • The association had stepped into the shoes of an insolvent insurer, which itself had stepped into the shoes of the original tortfeasor.
  • Thus, the guaranty association was effectively treated as the tortfeasor’s surrogate for jurisdictional purposes.
• State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dann, 794 A.2d 42 (Del. Super. 2002):
  • The Superior Court extended personal jurisdiction to a tortfeasor’s out-of-state liability insurer in the context of a Delaware accident.
  • This reflects the concept that, in defending and indemnifying the tortfeasor for a Delaware accident, the insurer’s obligations are intimately connected to the tort occurring in Delaware.

In Berry, the Court accepts that § 3104(c)(3) “may extend” to such liability insurers—those who agree to defend and indemnify a tortfeasor for a Delaware accident—but expressly cabins that extension to third-party liability situations. It refuses to analogize a UIM insurer’s first-party contractual obligations to the role of a liability insurer defending a tortfeasor.

4. “Dual Jurisdiction” and Products Cases

Berry’s “dual jurisdiction” argument drew on a line of cases where courts found a hybrid basis for jurisdiction under § 3104(c)(1) (transacting business) and § 3104(c)(4) (persistent conduct / deriving substantial revenue). The Supreme Court notes that such dual-jurisdiction theory has thus far been applied only in product-related cases, including:

• Robert Bosch LLC v. Alberee Products, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 665 (D. Del. 2014): wiper blades.
• Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016): heart rate monitors.
• Graphics Properties Holdings, Inc. v. ASUS Computer Int’l, 70 F. Supp. 3d 654 (D. Del. 2014): tablet computers.
• Belden Technologies, Inc. v. LS Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Del. 2010): cable products.
• Power Integrations, Inc. v. BCD Semiconductor Corp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 365 (D. Del. 2008): power supply chips.
• Wright v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 768 A.2d 518 (Del. Super. 2000): prescription drugs.
• Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150 (Del. Super. 1997), aff’d, 707 A.2d 765 (Del. 1998): asbestos.
• Diaz Cardona v. Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd., 2019 WL 449698 (Del. Super. Feb. 5, 2019): nail guns.
• LaNuova, 513 A.2d 764: roofing materials (the original seed of the dual-jurisdiction concept).

From these cases, the Court distills a two-pronged test for dual jurisdiction:

1. There must be an intent to serve the Delaware market (reflected in business activities under (c)(1) and (c)(4)); and
2. The plaintiff’s cause of action must arise from injury caused by the very product introduced into Delaware pursuant to that market-serving intent.

As Boone put it, dual jurisdiction requires “an intent to serve the Delaware market resulting in the product’s introduction to Delaware and injury there.” Berry’s attempt to analogize an insurance policy to a “product” triggering similar analysis is rejected.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One Only: Statutory Reach, Not Due Process

The Court follows the LaNuova/Waters two-step approach, but stops at step one. It determines that no subsection of § 3104(c) confers jurisdiction over State Farm on the facts presented. Having found the statutory prong unsatisfied, it expressly declines to address whether jurisdiction would comport with federal due process.

This reflects a standard judicial restraint: courts ordinarily avoid constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds, such as statutory interpretation.

2. Rejection of § 3104(c)(3) for First-Party UIM Claims

Berry’s primary theory was that his claim “arose from” a tortious injury in Delaware and that § 3104(c)(3) applied. Section 3104(c)(3) permits jurisdiction over any nonresident who:

“causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State.”

Berry tried to map this to his situation by:

• pointing to his bodily injuries from the Delaware accident (a clear tortious injury); and
• arguing that State Farm “stood in the shoes” of the tortfeasor by virtue of its UIM obligations.

The Supreme Court rejects this, emphasizing two key points:

1. The nature of a UIM claim is contractual, not tortious.
   Echoing Eaton, Donaldson, and Uribe, the Court explains:
   • The tortfeasor’s liability has already been resolved by settlement.
   • The “remaining controversy concerns State Farm’s alleged failure to perform its obligations under a Maryland policy negotiated and issued outside Delaware.”
   • Thus, the claim is a first-party contract dispute, not a tort claim.
   Because § 3104(c)(3) focuses on “tortious injury” caused by the defendant’s act or omission in Delaware, a pure contract dispute over coverage does not fit.
2. The “stands in the shoes” doctrine does not transform a first-party insurer into a tortfeasor.
   While § 3104(c)(3) may extend to liability insurers that defend and indemnify a tortfeasor for a Delaware accident (as in Tri-State and Dann), that concept is limited:
   • In those cases, the insurer’s role is intertwined with the tortfeasor’s alleged negligence—defending, indemnifying, or paying judgments arising out of tort liability in Delaware.
   • By contrast, a UIM insurer’s obligations run to its own insured, and arise under the policy terms regardless of whether the underlying tort occurred in Delaware or elsewhere.
   • The UIM insurer does not “step into the shoes” of the tortfeasor for jurisdictional purposes simply because its coverage is triggered by the tortfeasor’s underinsurance.

On this reasoning, the Court holds that Berry’s claim “sounds in contract, not tort, and therefore falls outside § 3104(c)(3).”

3. Rejection of “Dual Jurisdiction” Under § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4)

Berry’s fallback theory was “dual jurisdiction,” arguing that:

• State Farm’s nationwide auto insurance business and its broader commercial presence in Delaware demonstrate an intent to serve the Delaware market; and
• the combination of that general business activity with the Delaware accident provides a sufficient nexus to Berry’s UIM claim to support jurisdiction under a combined (c)(1)/(c)(4) theory.

The Court carefully analyzes—and confines—this approach:

1. Dual jurisdiction is a products-based doctrine.
   The Court notes that dual jurisdiction has “only” been applied in cases involving manufactured products like wiper blades, heart monitors, computers, cables, chips, prescription drugs, asbestos, nail guns, and roofing materials. In all of those cases:
   • the defendant intended to serve the Delaware market,
   • the product entered Delaware pursuant to that intent, and
   • the product itself caused injury in Delaware.
2. An insurance policy is not a “product” that causes physical injury.
   The Court “decline[s] to treat an insurance policy as such a product.” Specifically:
   • State Farm did not send an insurance “product” into Delaware for sale or use by a Delaware customer.
   • Rather, it “issued a Maryland policy to a Maryland resident.”
   • Although State Farm’s policy provided nationwide coverage and State Farm conducts business in Delaware, “the policy itself did not cause Berry’s injury; the harm was caused by the negligence of another driver.”
   The Court underscores the causation requirement: in dual-jurisdiction products cases, “plaintiff’s cause of action arises from injuries caused by that product.” Here, the “product” (the policy) caused no injury; it is, at most, a source of indemnification post-injury.
3. Even if the first prong (intent to serve Delaware) is met, the second prong (injury caused by the product) is not.
   The Court allows that Berry “may” satisfy the first prong by pointing to State Farm’s intent that its coverage follow insureds nationwide. But the second prong fails:
   • The negligent driver—not the policy—caused Berry’s bodily injury.
   • The policy’s role is only to potentially fund compensation after the fact.
   • Therefore, the injury cannot be said to have been “caused by the product introduced into Delaware,” as dual jurisdiction requires.

Result: Dual jurisdiction is unavailable. This is a significant clarification: Delaware’s dual-jurisdiction doctrine remains limited to tangible products and does not extend to service contracts such as insurance policies.

4. Issue Preservation and § 3104(c)(6)

Berry advanced yet another theory on appeal: that § 3104(c)(6) applied because his policy “afforded nationwide coverage, including accidents in Delaware,” allegedly making it a contract to insure “risks to be performed within the State.”

Section 3104(c)(6) addresses:

“contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting.”

The Supreme Court declines to consider this argument, because:

• Berry did not rely on § 3104(c)(6) or the related case law in the Superior Court.
• Under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 8, only questions fairly presented below may be raised on appeal, absent exceptional circumstances.
• The Court finds no such exceptional circumstances here—Berry can still sue in a jurisdiction (such as Maryland) that has personal jurisdiction over State Farm.

Thus, the Court does not decide whether § 3104(c)(6) could ever apply to a policy like Berry’s; it simply holds that the argument was procedurally barred.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Personal Jurisdiction (vs. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction)

• Personal jurisdiction concerns the court’s power over a particular defendant (here, State Farm).
• Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority to hear a type of case (e.g., contract disputes, tort claims).
• Berry’s case was dismissed not because Delaware courts lack authority to hear insurance disputes generally, but because Delaware courts lack power over this specific defendant in this particular claim.

2. Specific vs. General Jurisdiction

• General jurisdiction: a court can hear any and all claims against a defendant, usually where the defendant is “at home” (e.g., a corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of business).
• Specific jurisdiction: a court can hear only those claims that “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
• Berry argued only specific jurisdiction—he did not claim that State Farm was “at home” in Delaware.

3. Long-Arm Statute

• A long-arm statute is a state law that defines when courts can reach out to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
• Delaware’s long-arm statute, § 3104(c), lists specific kinds of conduct (transacting business, causing injury, insuring risks in the state, etc.) that justify jurisdiction.
• The statute is interpreted first, before any constitutional analysis under the Due Process Clause.

4. First-Party vs. Third-Party Insurance Claims

• First-party claim: The insured seeks benefits directly from their own insurer under their policy (e.g., UIM, PIP, collision coverage).
• Third-party (liability) claim: Someone injured by a policyholder (the tortfeasor) seeks compensation from that policyholder’s liability insurer.
• Berry’s UIM claim is first-party: he is suing his own insurer, State Farm, under his own policy.
• Cases like Tri-State and Dann involve third-party liability insurers defending and indemnifying tortfeasors.

5. Underinsured Motorist (UIM) Coverage

• UIM coverage is designed to protect an insured if the at-fault driver’s liability coverage is insufficient to fully compensate the insured for their injuries.
• When UIM coverage is triggered, the insured often must demonstrate:
  • fault and damages, and
  • that the tortfeasor’s policy limits have been exhausted or are inadequate.
• Even though UIM is triggered by a tort (a negligent driver injuring the insured), the actual dispute with the insurer is over contractual rights and obligations.

6. “Dual Jurisdiction” Theory

• Dual jurisdiction is a doctrinal concept developed in Delaware that combines two subsections of the long-arm statute:
  • § 3104(c)(1): transacting business in Delaware; and
  • § 3104(c)(4): causing injury in Delaware while engaging in persistent conduct or deriving substantial revenue from Delaware.
• In practice, it has been used mostly in product liability and patent cases:
  • a manufacturer intentionally serves the Delaware market,
  • its products enter the state, and
  • those products cause injury here.
• Berry demonstrates that this theory does not apply to an insurer’s service contract, where the “product” (the policy) does not cause physical injury.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Practical Consequences

1. Nonresident insureds cannot sue their out-of-state auto insurers in Delaware for first-party UIM/no-fault claims solely because the accident occurred in Delaware.
   Berry solidifies that:
   • An accident in Delaware, standing alone, does not create specific jurisdiction over a nonresident insurer in a first-party coverage dispute under an out-of-state policy.
   • The plaintiff must tie the insurer’s own conduct in Delaware (or within the statutory reach of § 3104(c)) to the claim.
2. Insureds will often need to sue in their home states.
   For non-Delaware residents with non-Delaware policies, the likely proper forum to sue their own insurer for UIM benefits will be:
   • the state where the policy was issued,
   • the insured’s home state, or
   • other fora where the insurer has sufficient, claim-related contacts consistent with that state’s long-arm statute and due process.
   Berry explicitly notes that Berry “remains free to pursue his contract claim in a jurisdiction that has personal jurisdiction over State Farm, such as Maryland.”
3. Out-of-state insurers gain jurisdictional protection in Delaware for first-party claims.
   Insurers who issue policies outside Delaware to non-Delaware residents now have strong precedent to contest personal jurisdiction in Delaware when sued on first-party coverages such as UIM and PIP, provided their only connection to Delaware is that the accident happened there.

B. Clarification and Stabilization of UIM Jurisdiction Doctrine

Before Berry, Superior Court decisions like Eaton and Donaldson, and the Delaware Supreme Court’s order in Uribe, signaled skepticism toward asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state insurers on first-party claims. Berry consolidates this line of cases into a clear Supreme Court rule:

• The situs of the accident is not enough. The mere fact that the underlying collision occurred in Delaware does not, without more, bring an out-of-state first-party insurer within § 3104(c)(3) or the dual-jurisdiction framework.
• Contract-versus-tort framing is dispositive at the statutory stage. When the live dispute is over policy obligations (coverage, limits, valuation of damages under UIM), it is treated as a contract action, not a tort action, for purposes of § 3104(c)(3).

This clarification will likely reduce litigation over jurisdictional motions in similar cases, as the governing rule is now clearly settled at the Supreme Court level.

C. Narrowing of the “Stands in the Shoes” and Dual Jurisdiction Doctrines

1. “Stands in the shoes” limited to liability insurers.
   Berry makes clear that only in the liability context—where the insurer defends and indemnifies a tortfeasor—is the insurer treated as effectively stepping into the tortfeasor’s shoes for jurisdictional purposes under § 3104(c)(3).
   • First-party insurers do not thereby become surrogate tortfeasors.
   • This distinction will matter in future cases invoking Tri-State or Dann to argue that out-of-state insurers are generally amenable to suit in Delaware whenever their insureds are in Delaware accidents.
2. Dual jurisdiction remains product-specific.
   The Court’s refusal to extend dual jurisdiction to insurance contracts draws a clear line:
   • Contracts for services, including insurance, are not “products” for dual-jurisdiction purposes.
   • Injury must be caused by the product introduced into Delaware; here, the injury was caused by the negligent driver, not by the policy.
   This limits the potential creep of dual-jurisdiction theory into other areas such as financial services, online platforms, or professional services.

D. Litigation Strategy and Pleading Implications

Berry also carries lessons about how plaintiffs must plead and preserve jurisdictional theories:

• Careful pleading of statutory hooks is essential.
  Plaintiffs suing nonresident insurers in Delaware should:
  • identify and plead specific subsections of § 3104(c) that allegedly apply,
  • allege concrete facts showing the insurer’s Delaware-directed activity that is causally related to the claim, and
  • avoid relying solely on the location of the accident or the insurer’s general nationwide presence.
• Issue preservation is critical (Rule 8).
  Berry’s attempt to raise a § 3104(c)(6) argument for the first time on appeal failed. This underscores:
  • Jurisdictional theories must be developed in the trial court.
  • Appellate courts will not rescue parties with late-raised arguments absent exceptional circumstances.

E. Open Questions and Future Directions

Although Berry answers many questions, it leaves some potential future issues:

1. The scope of § 3104(c)(6) in auto insurance cases remains unresolved.
   Because the Court declined to reach Berry’s § 3104(c)(6) argument on preservation grounds, it did not decide:
   • whether a policy that provides nationwide coverage could be deemed a contract to insure a “risk located in Delaware at the time of contracting,” or
   • whether a Delaware-registered vehicle or Delaware-resident insured, insured by an out-of-state company, might bring § 3104(c)(6) into play.
   Future litigants may test § 3104(c)(6) in different factual configurations, particularly where the insured or the insured property has a clearer Delaware nexus at the time of contracting.
2. Due process limits are still in the background.
   Because the Court resolved the case at the statutory level, it left open the constitutional question of whether due process would allow Delaware to exercise jurisdiction in analogous circumstances even if the statute were broader. Any legislative effort to expand § 3104(c) for insurance cases would still need to respect constitutional limits articulated in U.S. Supreme Court personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.

V. Conclusion

James E. Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company establishes a clear and important precedent in Delaware law:

• First-party UIM claims under out-of-state policies issued to nonresident insureds are contract disputes, not tort claims, for purposes of Delaware’s long-arm statute.
• Section 3104(c)(3) does not confer jurisdiction over such claims merely because the underlying accident occurred in Delaware, and the insurer does not “stand in the shoes” of the tortfeasor for jurisdictional purposes in the first-party context.
• The “dual jurisdiction” doctrine under § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4), which requires an intent to serve the Delaware market and injury caused by a product introduced into Delaware, remains limited to product-related cases and does not extend to insurance policies.
• Arguments based on § 3104(c)(6) must be preserved in the trial court; the Supreme Court will not entertain new jurisdictional theories on appeal absent exceptional circumstances.

In the broader legal context, Berry reinforces a cautious, text-driven approach to Delaware’s long-arm statute, aligns with the national trend of tightening personal jurisdiction doctrines, and provides insurers, insureds, and courts with a more predictable framework for resolving where first-party auto coverage disputes must be litigated. For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of careful jurisdictional analysis at the outset of any coverage lawsuit involving nonresident insurers and cross-border accidents.