Limits on Compassionate-Release Policy: Invalidating U.S.S.G. §1B1.13(b)(6) – Nonretroactivity & Separation of Powers

Introduction

United States v. Bricker; United States v. Ellis McHenry; United States v. Lois Jochinto Orta (Nos. 24-3286; 24-3289/5182) presented a consolidated appeal to the Sixth Circuit on April 22, 2025. Three federal prisoners—Jason Bricker, Ellis McHenry and Lois Orta—had sought sentence reductions under the “compassionate-release” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), based on a new Sentencing Commission policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)) treating certain nonretroactive changes in sentencing law as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release. The United States, as appellant in Bricker and appellee in McHenry and Orta, challenged the district courts’ divergent rulings. The core questions were:

Whether the Commission may override a prior Sixth Circuit interpretation of an unambiguous statute by promulgating a conflicting policy statement;
Whether allowing nonretroactive sentencing changes to count as extraordinary and compelling conflicts with Congress’s nonretroactivity clauses and upsets separation of powers; and
Whether, under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a sentence below statutorily mandated minimums by invoking compassionate release.

Summary of the Judgment

By a 2–1 vote, the Sixth Circuit held that the Sentencing Commission had exceeded its authority in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Judge Batchelder’s majority opinion (joined by Judge Readler) concluded:

Under Supreme Court precedent (Neal v. United States, National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X, et al.), once a court has construed a statutory term as unambiguous, an agency cannot promulgate a conflicting interpretation—here, the Commission cannot overrule this Circuit’s en banc holding in United States v. McCall that nonretroactive legal changes are not “extraordinary and compelling.”
The policy statement conflicts with 1 U.S.C. § 109 (barring retroactive effect of repealed statutes) and with Congress’s decision to make certain sentencing reforms nonretroactive, thus violating separation of powers and undermining statutory nonretroactivity and finality.
The Commission’s explicit carve-out for nonretroactive Guidelines amendments but not for nonretroactive statutory or case-law changes is arbitrary and unprincipled, aggrandizing Commission authority at the expense of Congress and the judiciary.
Accordingly, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid, the district court’s reduction of Bricker’s sentence must be reversed, and the denials of relief in McHenry and Orta must be affirmed.

Judge Stranch dissented, arguing that Congress had expressly delegated to the Commission the task of defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A), that the statute is ambiguous on that point, and that under established administrative-law principles (Batterton v. Francis, etc.) policy statements are binding unless arbitrary, capricious or contrary to unambiguous text. In her view, § 1B1.13(b)(6) is a reasonable exercise of the Commission’s delegated authority and should govern.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Neal v. United States (516 U.S. 284, 1996): Court held that the Sentencing Commission cannot overrule an unambiguous Supreme Court interpretation of a statute via a contrary Guideline amendment.
Brand X Internet Services (545 U.S. 967, 2005): When an agency construes an ambiguous statute that courts have construed earlier, the agency’s construction governs unless the court’s prior decision held the statute’s plain meaning to be unambiguous.
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC (467 U.S. 837, 1984) & Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo (144 S. Ct. 2244, 2024): Loper Bright overruled Chevron’s implied-delegation deference but reaffirmed that where Congress expressly delegates interpretive authority (express delegation), courts continue to defer to reasonable agency interpretations.
Mistretta v. United States (488 U.S. 361, 1989): Recognized Constitutional limits on Sentencing Commission’s quasi-legislative power within separation-of-powers framework.
Dillon v. United States (560 U.S. 817, 2010): § 3582(c)(2) requires courts to follow policy statements (USSG § 1B1.10) in deciding sentence-reduction motions.
United States v. McCall (56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022), en banc): Held that nonretroactive legal developments—standing alone or in combination—cannot constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
LaBonte (520 U.S. 751, 1997): The Commission must bow to express congressional directives; it may not interpret a statutory phrase in conflict with its unambiguous text.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s approach unfolded in several logical steps:

Express Delegation vs. Judicial Interpretation. Congress charged the Sentencing Commission with defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” But Neal and Brand X establish that if a court has interpreted a statutory phrase as unambiguous, the Commission cannot promulgate a conflicting definition by policy statement.
McCall’s Unambiguous Holding. In en banc McCall, this Circuit concluded the statute’s text—when read against background principles of finality, structure of federal sentencing law, and legislative history—unambiguously precludes nonretroactive changes from qualifying as “extraordinary and compelling.” That prior holding binds both the district courts and the Commission under Neal/Brand X.
Statutory Nonretroactivity & Finality. Section 109 of Title 1 and specific nonretroactivity clauses in sentencing-reform statutes manifest Congress’s determination that new penalties or sentencing rules generally do not apply to already-sentenced defendants. § 1B1.13(b)(6) conflicts with those statutes by effectively giving retroactive effect to selected changes.
Separation of Powers. The Commission’s attempt to override district courts and Congress in selecting which nonretroactive changes can be considered—while exempting its own Guidelines amendments—upsets the constitutional balance. Courts, not executive-branch agencies, determine statutory meaning and finality.
Mandatory Minimums & Compassionate Release. Although the Court did not decide this point definitively, the majority raised concern that allowing § 1B1.13(b)(6) to operate could enable courts to reduce defendants below statutorily mandated minimums, which § 3553(e) and (f) treat as exclusive downward-departure gateways. That further underscores the problematic scope of the policy.

Impact

This decision reshapes the landscape of compassionate-release motions:

Commission’s Limits. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid; policy statements must not contradict unambiguous statutory text or court precedent.
District Court Guidance. Until Congress or the Supreme Court directs otherwise, district courts must adhere to McCall: nonretroactive sentencing changes are not “extraordinary and compelling.”
Legislative Agenda. Congress may reconsider compassionate-release criteria or retroactivity rules if it wants the policy statement’s approach—recognizing certain nonretroactive changes—to be binding.
Separation of Powers Doctrine. Reinforces that only Congress may alter penalties and retroactivity; agencies cannot rewrite federal sentencing statutes by policy statement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). A narrow statutory carve-out allowing sentence reductions for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” on defendant’s motion, after statutory exhaustion, and consistent with policy statements and § 3553(a) factors.
Policy Statements vs. Guidelines. Policy statements (e.g. USSG § 1B1.13) are interpretive guidance that district courts must follow in § 3582(c) proceedings; Guidelines (§ 1B1.10) govern traditional sentence-reduction motions under § 3582(c)(2).
Express vs. Implied Delegation. If a statute expressly tasks an agency with defining a term, courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations unless they conflict with unambiguous text. Chevron deference (implied delegation) was curtailed by Loper Bright, but express-delegation deference remains intact.
Nonretroactivity & Finality. Congress generally makes new criminal penalties and sentencing rules apply only prospectively. 1 U.S.C. § 109 and specific provisions in each sentencing-reform act safeguard the finality of existing sentences.
Separation of Powers. Legislative power rests with Congress; only Congress can create or modify penalties and decide retroactivity. The judiciary may interpret statutes but may not enact new policy in conflict with congressional directives; administrative entities cannot usurp judicial or legislative roles.

Conclusion

United States v. Bricker, McHenry & Orta clarifies the boundaries of agency authority in federal sentencing. By invalidating U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), the Sixth Circuit reaffirms that:

Courts must respect statutory nonretroactivity and finality unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise.
Sentencing Commission policy statements cannot contradict unambiguous statutory text or a binding appellate interpretation of that text.
Separation of powers demands that only Congress may prescribe penalties and retroactivity, and courts—not agencies—decide statutory meaning.

This decision preserves the balance between legislative directives, judicial interpretation, and the Commission’s role, while spotlighting potential legislative reform if a broader compassionate-release regime is desired.