Limits on Compassionate-Release Authority: Nonretroactive Law Changes Not “Extraordinary and Compelling”

Introduction

This consolidated Sixth Circuit decision—United States v. Bricker, McHenry, and Orta (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025)—addresses three long-serving federal prisoners who sought sentence reductions under the compassionate-release statute (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Each invoked a newly enacted Sentencing Commission policy statement (USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6)) treating nonretroactive changes in sentencing law as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release. The key issue is whether the Commission had the authority to bind district courts to consider such nonretroactive legal developments when deciding compassionate-release motions. The United States challenged the Bricker district court’s grant of release and supported the denials in McHenry and Orta. Judge Batchelder delivered the majority opinion (Reversing Bricker, Affirming McHenry and Orta), with Judge Stranch dissenting.

Summary of the Judgment

After de novo review, the court held:

USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid because it conflicts with the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and with the nonretroactivity principle codified at 1 U.S.C. § 109.
The Sentencing Commission lacked authority to treat nonretroactive revisions in federal sentencing law as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for early release.
Bricker’s compassionate-release order was reversed; his motion failed absent a valid § 1B1.13(b)(6) basis.
The district courts’ denials in McHenry and Orta were affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): Compassionate-release statute.
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C) & § 994(t): Commission’s authority to issue policy statements defining “extraordinary and compelling.”
1 U.S.C. § 109: Nonretroactivity of repealed statutes.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989): Separation-of-powers concerns over Commission’s authority.
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) & Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991): Role of policy statements in § 3582 proceedings.
United States v. McCall (en banc), 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022): Nonretroactive changes are not “extraordinary and compelling.”
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996): An agency cannot overrule a judicial construction of an unambiguous statute.
Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 545 U.S. 967 (2005): An agency’s new interpretation governs only if the statute is ambiguous on its face.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024): Post-Chevron framework for deference in express vs. implied delegations.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

Statutory Framework and Nonretroactivity. By statute, prison sentences are generally final and new penalties apply only to future offenders. Compassionate release is a narrow exception permitting a reduction for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” consistent with Commission policy statements. Nonretroactive amendments in sentencing law remain nonretroactive under 1 U.S.C. § 109 and the finality principle.
Commission’s Delegated Authority. Congress expressly charged the Sentencing Commission to define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)) and required courts to follow those policy statements in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) proceedings. However, the Commission’s interpretive power cannot override unambiguous statutory terms or contravene other statutes.
Invalidity of USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6). The policy statement re-characterized ordinary nonretroactivity into an “extraordinary and compelling” factor, effectively granting retroactive effect to laws Congress made nonretroactive—and even potentially lowering statutory mandatory minima. Neal v. United States prohibits an agency from overruling a court’s unambiguous statutory construction; Brand X and Loper Bright emphasize that in cases of express delegation courts must defer to reasonable agency definitions unless manifestly contrary to the text. Here, however, the Commission’s rule conflicted with clear nonretroactivity commands in § 109 and with Congress’s decision not to apply certain sentencing reforms retroactively. Because USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) is inconsistent with those provisions, it exceeds the Commission’s authority and is invalid.

3. Potential Impact

District courts retain sole discretion to determine what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release, without relying on § 1B1.13(b)(6).
Prisoners can no longer obtain relief simply by pointing to disparities between old and new sentencing laws; they must demonstrate individual circumstances (age, terminal illness, dire family situations, etc.).
The decision reinforces the finality and nonretroactivity principles in federal sentencing.
It clarifies the limits of the Sentencing Commission’s power vis-à-vis Congress and the judiciary, preserving the separation of powers in sentencing policy.
Congress—not the Commission—must explicitly make any nonretroactive changes retroactive or authorize courts to consider them for release.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate Release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)): A limited statutory pathway allowing a district court to reduce a final prison sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” after considering the Section 3553(a) factors and following Commission policy statements.
Policy Statement vs. Guideline: A “guideline” is a binding sentencing range; a “policy statement” guides courts on how to apply statutes like § 3582(c). Both come from the Sentencing Commission but undergo different procedures.
Nonretroactivity (1 U.S.C. § 109): When Congress changes a law, the new penalty structure applies only to future actions unless Congress expressly says otherwise. Sentences already imposed remain governed by the old law.
Separation of Powers Concerns: The Commission—an agency within the judicial branch—cannot override statutory commands from Congress or judicial interpretations of those statutes. Each branch must respect the powers and limits of the others.
Agency Deference (Brand X & Loper Bright): Courts must defer to reasonable agency interpretations when Congress has expressly delegated interpretive authority, so long as the agency’s rule does not conflict with clear statutory text or overarching statutory schemes.

Conclusion

This decision establishes that the Sentencing Commission may not treat the ordinary nonretroactive effect of federal sentencing amendments as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release. District courts remain free to define those terms based on individual circumstances, but they cannot rely on USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) to grant release where Congress has expressly withheld retroactivity. By striking down the policy statement, the Sixth Circuit reaffirms statutory nonretroactivity, the finality of sentences, and the separation of powers between Congress, the Commission, and the judiciary in the federal sentencing framework.