Limits of State-Created Danger Doctrine in Schools: Defining “Conscience-Shocking” Conduct

Introduction

William Myre v. Oxford Community School District (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025) arises from the tragic November 2021 shooting at Oxford High School, in which a 15-year-old student (E.C.) opened fire on classmates and a teacher, killing four students. The families of victims filed federal suits against two school officials—counselor Shawn Hopkins and dean of students Nicholas Ejak—invoking the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause under the “state-created danger” doctrine. They alleged that the officials’ actions and omissions before the shooting created or increased the risk of harm. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendants, finding that, except for one specific interaction, the plaintiffs failed to show “conscience-shocking” conduct. Hopkins and Ejak appealed, as did the plaintiffs on the narrow exception. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals and on March 20, 2025, issued its decision.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, ultimately directing dismissal of all claims. Applying the state-created danger framework, the court held:

Returning E.C.’s backpack (unsearched) and sending him back to class did not “create” any new danger. E.C. had carried the gun before and after; no affirmative act increased risk.
Alleged “concealment” of risk from other school staff was a mere omission, not an affirmative act sufficient to ground due‐process liability.
Hopkins’ warning—in E.C.’s presence—to call Child Protective Services if parents did not obtain counseling within 48 hours qualified as an affirmative act, but it was aimed at risk mitigation. It lacked the “egregious,” “outrageous” quality required to shock the contemporary conscience.

Because none of the alleged actions met the high threshold of conscience-shocking behavior, the court held the defendants entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the complaints.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Doe v. Jackson Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (954 F.3d 925, 6th Cir. 2020): Established that due‐process claims against schools require “conscience-shocking” conduct and that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state power rather than guaranteeing a baseline of safety.
McQueen v. Beecher Community Schools (433 F.3d 460, 6th Cir. 2006): Recognized the “state-created danger” exception, allowing constitutional claims when state actors’ affirmative acts increase private‐actor risk.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis (523 U.S. 833, 1998): Defined the “shocks the conscience” standard under substantive due process.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (489 U.S. 189, 1989): Held that states are not liable for private violence solely via omission; affirmative acts are required to trigger due process protection.
Bukowski v. City of Akron (326 F.3d 702, 6th Cir. 2003): Clarified that returning a person to preexisting danger without more is not an affirmative act under the doctrine.
Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger County (819 F.3d 834, 6th Cir. 2016): Confirmed that mere failures to warn or inform colleagues ordinarily are omissions, not affirmative conduct.

Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit applied the three-pronged state-created danger test:

Affirmative Act: Did the official undertake an affirmative act that created or increased risk? Returning E.C.’s backpack and concealing information were deemed non-affirmative. Only Hopkins’ CPS warning qualified, but its purpose was protective.
Special Danger: Was the harm to plaintiffs a specific heightened risk beyond that faced by the public generally? The court assumed arguendo yes, focusing on the third element.
Conscience-Shocking Conduct: Would a reasonable observer view the act as so outrageous as to violate fundamental fairness? A demand that parents seek immediate counseling and warning of CPS intervention, held the court, was professionally motivated to reduce risk, not to increase it. Thus it failed to shock the contemporary conscience.

Qualified immunity governed because, even if a constitutional right existed, it was not “clearly established” that protective steps by a counselor could constitute conscience-shocking conduct.

Impact

This decision sharpens the boundary between state tort liability and constitutional due process in school contexts:

It reaffirms that school officials’ remedial efforts—however inadequate in hindsight—do not give rise to federal due process claims absent evidence of reckless, callous, or punitive intent.
It underscores the high bar for “conscience-shocking” conduct, limiting the state-created danger exception to truly egregious breaches of duty.
For future litigants, it signals that routine risk-management decisions—even when unsuccessful—will likely be immune from federal constitutional suit. Plaintiffs must point to affirmative, unjustified acts that exacerbate risk, not mitigate it.
For schools, the opinion offers guidance: document protective steps and refrain from punitive measures in crisis response to avoid creating an affirmative constitutional exposure.

Complex Concepts Simplified

State-Created Danger Doctrine: An exception to DeShaney’s general rule that the government is not liable for private violence. It imposes liability when state actors take affirmative steps that increase a specific person’s risk of harm by a private party.

Conscience-Shocking Standard: A Supreme Court-crafted test requiring that government conduct be so outrageous, arbitrary, or reckless that it violates fundamental fairness and the Due Process Clause.

Qualified Immunity: A doctrine protecting officials from suit unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known at the time.

Conclusion

Myre v. Oxford Community School District clarifies that even in tragic settings, due process liability under the state-created danger doctrine remains narrow. Protective actions taken by school officials—such as urgent counseling referrals and warnings of CPS involvement—are unlikely to be deemed “conscience-shocking,” and thus do not strip officials of qualified immunity. This ruling reaffirms that federal constitutional claims cannot serve as a substitute for state‐law tort remedies unless truly egregious, reckless misfeasance is alleged. For schools and litigants alike, the decision delineates a clear boundary: only actions that unreasonably magnify private risk, with punitive or callous intent, will trigger substantive due process scrutiny.