Limiting the “Illegal Sentence” Exception to Appeal Waivers in Indiana: Commentary on Kimberly R. Anderson v. State

I. Introduction

In Kimberly R. Anderson v. State of Indiana, Case No. 25S-CR-294 (Ind. Nov. 13, 2025), the Indiana Supreme Court squarely addressed a question that had generated a split in the Court of Appeals: what does “illegal sentence” mean in the context of a plea-agreement appeal waiver?

Defendants in Indiana frequently sign plea agreements that include waivers of the right to appeal their sentence. Under prior Indiana Supreme Court precedent, even the broadest appeal waiver was understood not to bar a challenge to an “illegal” sentence. But the Court had never given a precise, operational definition of that term. Some appellate panels took a narrow view, limiting “illegal” to sentences outside statutory authorization; others treated substantial sentencing-procedure errors as producing an “illegal” sentence too.

In Anderson, the Court (Justice Slaughter writing for the majority; Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Molter concurring) adopts a narrow definition with major consequences for Indiana criminal practice. It holds that, for purposes of the non-waivable “illegal sentence” exception:

• A sentence is “illegal” only if it is either:
  • outside the prescribed statutory range, or
  • unconstitutional.

All other sentencing errors—including most claims that the trial court misweighed or mishandled aggravating and mitigating factors—are characterized as discretionary or procedural defects that can be (and often are) waived by an appeal waiver.

Justice Goff concurs in the judgment only. He would:

• interpret Anderson’s particular appeal waiver more narrowly (as not clearly covering procedural challenges), and
• define the concept of an “illegal sentence” more broadly to encompass certain serious procedural abuses in sentencing.

Nevertheless, he agrees that Anderson’s specific sentencing-discretion claims fail on the merits, so he would affirm rather than dismiss, while taking a very different doctrinal path.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

A. Underlying conduct and charges

In 2023, Kimberly Anderson stabbed her boyfriend with a box cutter and threatened to kill him. The State charged her with:

• Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon,
• Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, and
• Level 6 felony intimidation.

B. The plea agreement

On the eve of trial, Anderson and the State entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Key terms included:

• Anderson would plead guilty to:
  • Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, and
  • Level 6 felony intimidation.
• The State would:
  • dismiss the Level 5 felony battery charge,
  • refrain from adding an aggravated battery charge, and
  • not seek a habitual-offender enhancement.
• Sentencing structure:
  • “Open” plea as to the total length within the statutory ranges; but
  • a specific cap: maximum of four years executed (time to be served in the Department of Correction).
• An appeal-waiver clause providing:

  Defendant hereby waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, including the right to seek appellate review of the sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), so long as the Court sentences the defendant within the terms of this plea agreement.

Anderson initialed each provision—including the appeal waiver—and signed the agreement.

C. The sentencing hearing

At a combined plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court:

• personally reviewed the agreement with Anderson,
• confirmed she understood the rights she was waiving, including appeal, and
• verified that she initialed and signed after consulting counsel.

During sentencing argument:

• Anderson presented mitigating factors:
  • she was a caregiver for her elderly mother, and
  • she suffered from bipolar disorder.
• The State emphasized aggravating factors:
  • her criminal history, and
  • the premeditated nature of the attack.

The court also observed that Anderson made “mocking faces and faces of disbelief” during the prosecutor’s remarks—behavior the court said was “not at all helpful” to her case.

The trial court found that:

• aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones, and
• Anderson needed rehabilitation “best provided by a penal facility.”

The court imposed:

• a total sentence of six years:
  • three years executed in the Department of Correction, and
  • three years suspended to probation.

Importantly, the “executed” portion was three years—within the plea’s four-year executed cap—so, on its face, the sentence complied with the agreement’s explicit “terms” cap.

After imposing sentence, the judge—unprompted—told Anderson she had “a right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case, not the conviction, but you do have a right to appeal the sentence.”

D. The appeal and motion to dismiss

Anderson chose to appeal, arguing that the court had abused its sentencing discretion by:

• relying on improper reasons (her facial expressions and an asserted need for penal rehabilitation), and
• failing to consider her guilty plea as a significant mitigating factor.

She did not challenge the voluntariness of the plea or the waiver based on the trial judge’s post-sentencing statement. Instead, she argued:

• her appeal fell outside the waiver’s “limited scope” because she was challenging an illegal sentence, not simply a discretionary one.

The State moved to dismiss based on the waiver. A divided Court of Appeals motions panel dismissed the appeal; Judge Weissmann dissented and would have referred the motion to the merits panel. Anderson sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted. The Supreme Court vacated the dismissal order and took up the case.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. The majority’s holding (Justice Slaughter)

The Court’s core holdings are:

1. Definition of “illegal sentence” for waiver purposes:
   • A sentence is “illegal” (and thus not waivable) only if:
     • it is outside the prescribed statutory range for the offense(s), or
     • it is unconstitutional.
   • Errors in the trial court’s weighing or identification of aggravating/mitigating circumstances (i.e., abuse-of-discretion claims) do not render a sentence “illegal.”
2. Application to appeal waivers:
   • Appeal waivers are enforceable contracts.
   • They preclude any appeal that falls within their unambiguous scope, except for illegal sentences as defined above.
3. Scope of Anderson’s waiver:
   • The waiver’s language—“waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed... including review under Rule 7(B)”—is broad and unambiguous.
   • Her sentence (3 years executed, 3 suspended) fell within the plea’s cap of four years executed.
   • Thus, her abuse-of-discretion arguments fall within the waiver and are barred.
4. Effect of the judge’s misstatement:
   • The trial court’s incorrect oral statement that Anderson had a right to appeal cannot alter the written agreement’s clear terms.
   • Under Indiana’s “four corners” rule, unambiguous contract terms cannot be varied by extrinsic evidence.

The remedy: the Court dismisses Anderson’s appeal as barred by her valid appeal waiver.

B. Justice Goff’s separate opinion (concurring in the judgment)

Justice Goff agrees that Anderson’s sentence should ultimately stand, but he disagrees with the majority on two central points:

• Scope of the waiver: He finds the waiver ambiguous as to whether it covers challenges to sentencing procedure, as opposed to the “sentence imposed.” He would construe that ambiguity against the State and allow the appeal to proceed.
• Definition of “illegal sentence”: He views the majority’s definition as “much-too-narrow.” In his view:
  • Illegal sentences can stem from certain procedural abuses and reliance on improper aggravators, not just sentences that exceed statutory ranges or broadly violate the Constitution.

Nonetheless, after reaching the merits of Anderson’s abuse-of-discretion arguments, he concludes they fail and therefore concurs in the judgment to affirm (rather than dismiss) the sentence.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Appeal waivers as contracts and prior Indiana precedent

1. Creech v. State – Baseline enforceability of appeal waivers

In Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73 (Ind. 2008), the Court recognized that criminal defendants may validly waive their right to appeal a sentence as part of a plea bargain. The key proposition:

When a defendant pleads guilty and agrees to a specific sentence, he waives his right to challenge the propriety of his sentence.

Creech thus established that:

• Appeal waivers are generally enforceable.
• They are treated under contract principles, reflecting the mutual exchange of benefits in a plea bargain.

Anderson builds directly on this foundation, but clarifies the scope of what cannot be waived (the “illegal sentence” carve-out).

2. Crider v. State – The “contrary to law” / “illegal sentence” exception

In Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. 2013), the Court confronted a plea agreement with an appeal waiver where the trial court imposed consecutive sentences that allegedly exceeded statutory authorization. The Court held:

• An appeal waiver “is unenforceable where the sentence imposed is contrary to law and the Defendant did not bargain for the sentence.”
• The phrase “contrary to law” was equated with “illegal.”

Crucially, though, Crider did not define “illegal sentence” comprehensively. Instead, it:

• emphasized the defendant’s entitlement to presume the court would impose a sentence “in accordance with the law,” and
• addressed a specific context: the imposition of consecutive sentences where the statutory framework appeared to forbid it.

This left open whether “illegality” included only sentences beyond statutory authorization, or also encompassed serious procedural or abuse-of-discretion errors in how a lawful range sentence was imposed.

3. Davis v. State – Route for challenging waiver validity

In Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229 (Ind. 2023), the Court clarified the appropriate procedure for challenging the validity of an appeal waiver itself. It held:

• Claims that a waiver was not entered knowingly and voluntarily must be raised in post-conviction proceedings, not in a direct appeal.
• It reaffirmed that “contract law principles generally apply” to plea agreements.
• It reiterated that some sentencing claims are non-waivable—specifically referencing Crider’s “contrary to law” (illegal) sentence exception.

Anderson does not challenge the voluntariness of her waiver; she accepts that it was knowing and voluntary. Her argument instead turns on:

• the scope of the waiver (what it covers), and
• whether her sentence is “illegal” in the Crider sense, making it non-waivable.

4. Federal guidance: Garza, Adkins, Bownes, and related cases

The majority draws on U.S. Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit cases to support its contract-based view of appeal waivers:

• Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019).
  • Recognizes the validity of appeal waivers but stresses that a waiver bars only challenges “that fall within its scope.”
  • Emphasizes that plea bargains are “essentially contracts.”
• Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009).
  • Reinforces the contractual analogy for plea bargains.
• United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014).
  • Rejects any general, broad “constitutional-argument exception” to plea waivers.
  • Nonetheless acknowledges that some constitutional claims, such as sentencing based on race or many forms of fundamental breakdown in procedure, may remain non-waivable.
• United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005).
  • Provides colorful examples of truly non-waivable defects, like a “trial by twelve orangutans,” illustrating “deprivation of some minimum of civilized procedure.”

The Indiana Supreme Court borrows this framework: waivers are generally enforceable, with only narrow, exceptional limits rooted in statutory authorization and fundamental constitutional norms.

B. Competing definitions of “illegal sentence” and the Court’s resolution

1. The narrow approach: Wihebrink v. State

In Wihebrink v. State, 181 N.E.3d 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, an appellate panel interpreted Crider narrowly. It held:

• A sentence is “illegal” in this context only if outside the statutory range or otherwise unauthorized by law.
• Errors in aggravators/mitigators, even if serious, are not “illegal sentence” issues; they are abuse-of-discretion issues.
• To treat every invalid aggravator or missed mitigator as creating an “illegal sentence” would effectively gut appeal waivers recognized in Creech for open pleas: any defendant could recast a sentencing challenge as “illegality.”

Wihebrink therefore limited the “Crider exception” to per se illegal sentences, not to all procedural or discretionary errors.

2. The broader approach: Haddock, Fields, Crouse

Other Court of Appeals cases took a more expansive tack:

• Haddock v. State, 112 N.E.3d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied;
• Fields v. State, 162 N.E.3d 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied;
• Crouse v. State, 158 N.E.3d 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

These cases, all arising under Post-Conviction Rule 2 (belated appeals), reasoned that:

• Defendants remained “eligible” for belated appeals under PCR 2 where they sought to challenge allegedly illegal sentences.
• An “illegal sentence” could include sentences imposed based on improper aggravating factors or a misapplication of sentencing procedures.

Anderson relied heavily on this line of cases, arguing that:

• Crider’s reference to sentences “determined and imposed legally” must encompass the sentencing process itself, not just the final number.
• Hence, serious procedural errors could render a sentence “illegal” and thus outside the scope of any waiver.

3. The majority’s adoption of the Wihebrink standard

The Indiana Supreme Court deliberately sides with the narrow view:

• It “approves of Wihebrink’s reasoning” and explicitly holds that:

  a sentence is “illegal” only if it is outside the prescribed statutory range or is unconstitutional.

To support this interpretation, the Court points to:

• Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d), which authorizes sentencing courts to impose any sentence that:
  • is authorized by statute, and
  • is permissible under the Indiana Constitution,
  regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

This statute suggests that, so long as the length and structure of a sentence fall within statutory limits and do not violate constitutional constraints, the sentence is “legal” for purposes of appellate review—even if the trial court’s explanation or weighing of factors is imperfect. Procedural or abuse-of-discretion errors are reviewable only so far as the defendant has preserved the right to raise them, i.e., absent an appeal waiver.

The majority therefore:

• rejects Anderson’s attempt to equate “due process concerns in the sentencing procedure” with an unconstitutional “illegal sentence” in the Crider sense, and
• emphasizes that there is no broad, generic “constitutional-argument exception” to appeal waivers.

4. Justice Goff’s broader view in concurrence

Justice Goff agrees with the majority that some constitutional claims—such as race-based sentencing or fundamental deprivations of fair process—would obviously survive a waiver. But he would also recognize that:

• Certain abuses of sentencing discretion (e.g., reliance on wholly improper aggravators) may render the sentence “illegal” because they:
  • violate statutes that restrict what may be considered as evidence or aggravating factors, or
  • lead to sentences that effectively exceed what the statutory scheme permits.

As examples, he notes:

• Cases where courts imposed consecutive sentences based solely on improper aggravators, which would produce a sentence that “exceeds statutory guidelines.”
• Bell v. State, 59 N.E.3d 959 (Ind. 2016), where an abuse of discretion in ordering restitution resulted in what the Court labeled an “illegal sentence.”

He warns that the majority’s rigid distinction between “legality” and “abuse of discretion” overlooks the ways in which improper procedure can make the sentence effectively unauthorized by law.

To address concerns about opening floodgates of appeals, he suggests two solutions for the State:

1. Draft broader waivers that explicitly cover:
   • challenges for abuse of discretion,
   • challenges to sentencing statements, and
   • Rule 7(B) inappropriateness challenges—much like the waiver language used in Wihebrink.
2. Offer specific sentences in plea agreements rather than open pleas with caps; if the exact sentence is agreed to, there is no room for an abuse-of-discretion challenge.

Thus, Justice Goff would maintain a more flexible “illegal sentence” concept while preserving the practical functionality of plea waivers through better drafting and plea design.

C. Application to Anderson’s waiver and claims

1. Scope of the waiver under the “four corners” rule

The majority applies standard Indiana contract principles:

• Start with the text of the agreement.
• If unambiguous, enforce it as written without resort to extrinsic evidence.
• Ambiguities are construed against the drafter (the State).

Here, the appeal-waiver language (“waives the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, including the right to seek appellate review of the sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)”) is:

• described as “clear and comprehensive,” and
• reasonably subject only to one interpretation: it bars all appeals attacking the sentence, whether via abuse-of-discretion arguments or Rule 7(B) inappropriateness review, so long as the sentence stays within the plea’s terms (here, within the four-year executed cap).

Because Anderson’s sentence is:

• within statutory ranges, and
• within the plea’s executed-time cap,

her sentencing-abuse arguments fall squarely within the waiver’s bar.

2. Why her “illegal sentence” theory failed

Anderson attempted to label her sentence “illegal” by arguing that:

• the court relied on “improper reasons” (her facial expressions, asserted need for penal rehabilitation), and
• the court failed to give mitigating weight to her guilty plea.

Under earlier, broader interpretations of “illegality” (like those suggested in Haddock or Crouse), these might have preserved her appeal despite the waiver. But under the new Anderson standard:

• these are classic abuse-of-discretion claims, not illegality claims.
• they do not claim that the sentence:
  • exceeds any statutory maximum, or
  • violates a constitutional rule in the sense recognized by cases like Adkins and Bownes (e.g., race discrimination or fundamental breakdown of procedure).

Therefore, the Court treats her “illegal sentence” characterization as an attempt to avoid the waiver with a relabeling of arguments that remain discretionary in nature.

3. The trial court’s misstatement about appeal rights

The trial judge told Anderson, after sentencing, that she had a right to appeal the sentence. Anderson then tried to use that statement not to attack the waiver’s validity (which would be a post-conviction issue under Davis), but to argue:

• the waiver’s “limited scope” must not have included procedural or abuse-of-discretion challenges.

The Supreme Court rejects that argument on two grounds:

• Four corners rule: Under University of Southern Indiana Foundation v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2006), Indiana courts do not use extrinsic evidence to alter or expand the meaning of an unambiguous written contract.
• Clarity of the waiver text: Because the waiver is unambiguous, the judge’s oral statement cannot change its meaning.

Thus, the oral reference to a right to appeal is legally irrelevant to the interpretation of the written plea’s waiver provision.

4. Justice Goff’s contrasting interpretation of the waiver

Justice Goff focuses on the exact phrasing—waiver of the right to appeal “any sentence imposed” and Rule 7(B) review—and finds:

• This can be reasonably read as:
  • barring only challenges to the outcome (the length/structure) of the sentence, including “inappropriateness” claims under Rule 7(B), but
  • not unambiguously barring challenges to the procedure the court used to reach that outcome (e.g., reliance on improper aggravators).

Because two reasonable readings exist, he deems the waiver ambiguous and construes it against the State. Under his approach:

• Anderson’s procedural, abuse-of-discretion claims fall outside the waiver’s scope,
• her appeal should have been heard on the merits, and
• he then independently analyzes and rejects her arguments as meritless.

He underscores that if the State wanted to bar those specific kinds of challenges, it could (and should) have said so expressly—as it has in other plea agreements (for example, the waiver in Wihebrink that explicitly barred “challenges for abuse of discretion” and to the trial court’s “sentencing statement”).

D. Treatment of constitutional arguments in the context of waivers

Anderson attempted to frame her arguments in constitutional terms—invoking “due process concerns in the sentencing procedure.” The majority responds that:

• There is no broad, generic exception for all constitutional arguments to survive waivers.
• Many constitutional claims (e.g., Fourth Amendment suppression claims) are routinely waived by guilty pleas and appeal waivers.
• Only limited categories—such as:
  • sentencing based on constitutionally impermissible criteria like race, or
  • a fundamental deprivation of “a minimum of civilized procedure”—would defeat an appeal waiver as a matter of public policy and constitutional necessity.

Anderson’s claims about improper aggravators and unrecognized mitigators simply do not rise to that level; they remain ordinary discretionary claims rather than structural or categorical constitutional violations.

E. Interaction with Indiana’s statutory sentencing framework

Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d) is central to the majority’s reasoning. It provides that courts may impose any sentence that:

• is authorized by statute, and
• is permissible under the Indiana Constitution,

“regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.”

This framework serves two functions in the majority’s analysis:

• It supports the conclusion that:
  • the “legality” of a sentence ultimately turns on statutory and constitutional authorization, not on the procedural reasoning the judge uses.
• It aligns with the new Anderson rule:
  • a sentence is “illegal” only if it falls outside that statutory-constitutional envelope.

By contrast, Justice Goff points out that some procedural abuses may themselves violate statutes governing what evidence may be considered at sentencing (for example, statutory bars on using withdrawn plea negotiations), and thus could render the sentence “unauthorized by law” in a broader sense. The majority, however, does not engage that nuance, preferring a bright-line test tied to the final sentence length/structure and constitutional minima.

F. Post-Conviction Rule 2 and belated appeals

Although Anderson is a direct-appeal case (not a PCR 2 case), the opinion necessarily touches on how it interacts with the Haddock line of PCR 2 decisions.

Justice Slaughter notes:

• Haddock, Fields, and Crouse arose in the context of determining whether the defendant was an “eligible defendant” under Post-Conviction Rule 2, not in the posture of a routine direct appeal with a waiver in place.
• Under PCR 2, courts focus on:
  • whether the defendant was without fault in failing to pursue a timely appeal, and
  • whether they acted diligently once they learned of their rights.
• The merits of the belated appeal are not supposed to be evaluated at the eligibility stage (see Gallagher v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind. 1980)).

Justice Goff, in particular, cautions that nothing in the Anderson majority opinion should be read to overrule Haddock’s narrow procedural holding:

• In PCR 2, a defendant may still qualify as “eligible” to file a belated appeal even if, on the merits, their sentence might not ultimately be deemed “illegal” under the narrow Anderson definition.

He suggests that to the extent Crouse and Wihebrink went further and started deciding the merits of the sentencing challenges within the PCR 2 eligibility analysis, those cases were wrongly extending the inquiry beyond PCR 2’s proper scope.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What is an “appeal waiver” in a plea agreement?

An appeal waiver is a provision in a plea agreement in which the defendant agrees not to challenge the sentence (and sometimes the conviction) on appeal, usually in exchange for concessions from the State (such as reduced charges, sentencing caps, or dismissal of enhancements).

In Indiana:

• These waivers are generally enforceable if:
  • they are clear, and
  • the plea is knowing and voluntary.
• They are interpreted as contracts; courts look to the plain language, construing ambiguities against the State as drafter.

B. “Illegal sentence” vs. “abuse of discretion”

After Anderson, Indiana draws a sharp line:

• Illegal sentence (non-waivable):
  • Sentence exceeds statutory maximum or falls outside otherwise authorized statutory range, or
  • Sentence is unconstitutional in a substantial way (e.g., based on race, or imposed through a fundamental denial of fair procedure).
• Abuse of discretion (waivable via appeal waiver):
  • Errors in the trial court’s reasoning or explanation, such as:
    • relying on improper aggravators,
    • failing to find obvious mitigating factors,
    • giving too much or too little weight to particular factors.
  • So long as the final sentence is still within statutory bounds and not fundamentally unconstitutional, such errors do not make the sentence “illegal.”

C. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

Rule 7(B) allows appellate courts to revise an otherwise lawful sentence if they find it “inappropriate” in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. This is:

• not about whether the sentencing court followed correct procedure; rather,
• it is a discretionary “leavening” power to correct outlier sentences even where the trial court committed no error.

A waiver that bars Rule 7(B) review takes away that independent corrective mechanism.

D. Post-Conviction Rule 2 (PCR 2) – Belated appeals

PCR 2 provides a mechanism for defendants who missed deadlines to seek permission to file a belated appeal if:

• they were not at fault for missing the deadline, and
• they have acted diligently in seeking relief once aware.

Eligibility under PCR 2 does not require the defendant to demonstrate that the belated appeal will succeed on the merits; it only restores the chance to litigate the appeal.

E. The “four corners” rule for contracts

Under Indiana contract law:

• When the text of a written agreement is clear and unambiguous, courts determine the parties’ intent from within the “four corners” of the document itself.
• Extrinsic evidence (e.g., oral statements by judges or lawyers) is not allowed to contradict or alter that clear written meaning.

This principle is crucial in Anderson: the trial judge’s mistaken comment about a right to appeal could not override the plea agreement’s explicit appeal waiver.

VI. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For prosecutors

• Drafting waivers:
  • Prosecutors who want to maximize finality should draft waivers that explicitly encompass:
    • abuse-of-discretion claims,
    • challenges to the trial court’s sentencing statement, and
    • Rule 7(B) challenges.
  • Language similar to that used in Wihebrink is now a model: it removes ambiguity acknowledged by Justice Goff.
• Structuring plea offers:
  • Offering a specific sentence (rather than an open plea with a cap) may further reduce potential for post-sentencing litigation, as there is no discretionary space for judicial abuse.

B. For defense counsel

• Client counseling:
  • After Anderson, a broad appeal waiver will generally foreclose:
    • most procedural and abuse-of-discretion challenges, and
    • Rule 7(B) review,
    so long as the sentence is within statutory limits and not fundamentally unconstitutional.
  • Counsel must ensure clients understand that they are giving up almost all sentencing-appeal options if they sign such a waiver.
• Negotiating narrower waivers:
  • Defense attorneys may seek more limited waivers that:
    • preserve certain procedural objections, or
    • reserve Rule 7(B) challenges while waiving others.
  • They may also negotiate for plea language that clearly excludes particular claims from the waiver (e.g., constitutional claims, errors in restitution, etc.).
• Preservation strategies:
  • Where appeal waivers are broad, counsel should consider whether challenges to the voluntariness of the waiver or plea itself may be appropriate in a later post-conviction proceeding, consistent with Davis.

C. For trial courts

• Colloquy consistency:
  • Judges must ensure that their oral advisements about appellate rights are consistent with the actual plea terms.
  • Misstatements, while not modifying the written contract under the four-corners rule, can create confusion and potential claims of involuntariness in later collateral attacks.
• Sentencing statements still matter:
  • Even if many abuse-of-discretion claims are now waivable, careful, individualized sentencing statements:
    • reduce the risk of post-conviction challenges, and
    • maintain transparency and accountability in the sentencing process.

D. For appellate courts

• Threshold inquiry:
  • Anderson provides a clear, two-step threshold test when a waiver is present:
    1. Does the waiver’s text unambiguously cover the specific appellate claim?
    2. If so, is the sentence nonetheless “illegal” under the narrow Anderson definition (outside statutory range or unconstitutional)?
  • If both answers favor the State, the appeal must be dismissed without reaching the merits.
• Consistency with PCR 2 jurisprudence:
  • In PCR 2 cases, courts must keep distinct:
    • the eligibility question (fault/diligence), and
    • the merits of any would-be appeal (including whether an appeal waiver bars the claim).
  • Anderson does not appear to overrule Haddock’s approach to PCR 2 eligibility; that remains an important nuance.

E. Policy considerations

The majority’s rule strongly favors finality and the enforceability of bargains. The practical effect is:

• Defendants who agree to waivers will rarely be able to litigate sentencing procedure on direct appeal.
• Appeal waivers become a robust tool for the State to limit post-sentencing litigation.
• The residual non-waivable space is narrow: sentences that exceed statutory ranges or involve fundamental constitutional defects.

Justice Goff’s concurrence highlights the countervailing policy concern:

• Overly strict enforcement of waivers, coupled with a narrow “illegal sentence” definition, risks insulating some serious procedural abuses from appellate scrutiny.
• The system’s legitimacy depends not only on finality but also on the perception (and reality) that sentences are both lawful and fairly imposed.

VII. Conclusion

Anderson v. State is now a leading case on sentencing appeal waivers in Indiana. Its principal doctrinal contribution is a clear, restrictive definition of “illegal sentence” in this context:

• Only sentences outside the statutory range or unconstitutional in a meaningful, structural sense are unwaivable.

Everything else—most notably, errors in identifying or weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances—is treated as a waivable exercise of judicial discretion. This significantly curtails the reach of Crider’s “contrary to law” exception and resolves the appellate split between Wihebrink and the Haddock line in favor of a narrow conception of illegality.

At the same time, the concurring opinion by Justice Goff underscores that:

• waivers must still be drafted carefully if they are to cover procedural challenges,
• some serious procedural missteps may, in appropriate contexts, still amount to illegality, and
• Post-Conviction Rule 2’s procedural protections for belated appeals remain distinct from the merits-based waiver analysis.

Going forward, Anderson will shape plea bargaining, sentencing practice, and appellate litigation in Indiana by:

• encouraging precise waiver drafting,
• clarifying when appeal waivers must be enforced, and
• narrowing the category of “illegal sentences” that can be challenged despite such waivers.

In the broader legal context, the decision reflects a continuing trend to treat plea agreements as binding contracts, subject only to limited public-policy and constitutional constraints. It significantly elevates the importance of plea-stage negotiations and advisements, as for many defendants the sentencing hearing will now be, in effect, their last opportunity to influence the outcome.