Life-With-Parole Modifications for Juvenile Offenders as “New Judgments” Under AEDPA: Commentary on Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board

I. Introduction

The First Circuit’s decision in Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board, No. 23‑1810 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2025), sits at the intersection of two powerful strands of modern criminal law:

the Eighth Amendment revolution in juvenile sentencing (e.g., Miller v. Alabama, Graham v. Florida, Montgomery v. Louisiana), and
the restrictive regime Congress enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) to limit second or successive federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

Joseph Donovan was 17 when he participated in a robbery during which another juvenile fatally stabbed an MIT student. Convicted of first-degree murder under Massachusetts’ felony-murder rule, Donovan received the then-mandatory sentence for that offense: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“juvenile LWOP”). After his direct appeal failed, Donovan filed his first federal habeas petition in 1997; it was denied in 2002, and he did not appeal.

Two decades later, the legal landscape shifted dramatically. The U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), declared mandatory juvenile LWOP unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC), in Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013), both:

held Miller retroactive under state law, and
held, under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution, that even discretionary juvenile LWOP is unconstitutional.

As a remedy, the SJC severed the “without possibility of parole” language from the state’s murder statute as applied to juveniles, leaving their life sentences in place but making them parole-eligible. Donovan’s sentence accordingly became “life with the possibility of parole.” He was later paroled and released.

In 2020, Donovan sought authorization from the First Circuit to file a new federal habeas petition—his second-in-time petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA’s gatekeeping provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), generally prohibits “second or successive” habeas applications unless stringent conditions are met and the court of appeals pre-authorizes filing. The key question became:

Did the change in Donovan’s sentence from life without parole to life with the possibility of parole constitute a “new judgment” under AEDPA, such that his new petition is not “second or successive” within the meaning of § 2244(b)?

The district court answered no, reasoning that Massachusetts had not resentenced Donovan and that his judgment of conviction and life term remained intact. On appeal, a divided First Circuit reversed. The majority held that the modification from juvenile LWOP to life with parole is a new sentence and therefore a new judgment for § 2244(b) purposes. As a result, Donovan’s new petition is not “second or successive” and need not satisfy AEDPA’s gatekeeping requirements.

Judge Lynch dissented, arguing that:

Massachusetts law, via Diatchenko, clearly preserved the original judgment and sentence;
federal courts are bound by state-law severability and characterization of the judgment; and
the majority’s ruling conflicts with AEDPA’s text, with Montgomery v. Louisiana, and with multiple circuits’ interpretations of the “new judgment” doctrine.

This commentary analyzes the opinion in depth, focusing on how the First Circuit:

applies the Supreme Court’s “new judgment” jurisprudence (Magwood, Burton, Rivers, Banister),
deploys the Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing cases (Miller and Graham) to characterize parole-eligibility changes as new sentences,
resolves (and arguably deepens) several circuit splits, and
reshapes habeas practice for juveniles and “emerging adults” whose LWOP sentences have been converted to parole-eligible life terms.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The Majority’s Holding

The majority (Judge Montecalvo, joined by Judge Kayatta) articulates two core holdings:

New Sentence = New Judgment: When a juvenile LWOP sentence is transformed into a life sentence with the possibility of parole as a constitutional remedy (as in Diatchenko following Miller), the defendant receives a new sentence. Because, under AEDPA, a criminal “judgment” consists of both conviction and sentence, that new sentence constitutes a new judgment for purposes of § 2244(b).
First Petition Attacking That New Judgment Is Not “Second or Successive”: Donovan’s new habeas petition, though second in time and directed at his conviction rather than the modified sentence, is the first petition challenging this new judgment. Under Magwood and the weight of circuit authority, such a petition is not “second or successive” under § 2244(b). Therefore, Donovan does not need pre-authorization from the court of appeals.

On that basis, the court reverses the district court’s judgment and remands for further proceedings on Donovan’s habeas claims, expressly leaving open any other procedural or substantive defenses the state might raise.

B. The Dissent’s Position

Judge Lynch dissents, contending that:

The SJC’s decision in Diatchenko—severing the parole-ineligibility language while leaving the life sentence and judgment “in full force and effect” and explicitly denying resentencing—means there is no new judgment under state law.
AEDPA focuses on the “judgment of a State court” under which the petitioner is in custody; that judgment is the 1993 life sentence judicially imposed, not any later remedial parole eligibility.
The majority improperly conflates “sentence” and “judgment,” misreads dicta in Miller and Graham, and conflicts with Montgomery, which expressly allows states to remedy Miller violations by parole alone, without resentencing or new judgments.
By allowing Donovan a fresh, unconstrained federal habeas challenge decades after his conviction and prior habeas denial, the majority undermines AEDPA’s finality, comity, and federalism goals and creates circuit splits on what constitutes a “new judgment.”

III. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. AEDPA’s “Second or Successive” Bar and the Concept of a “Judgment”

AEDPA’s core provision for state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), authorizes federal courts to entertain habeas petitions from a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Section 2244(b) then imposes strict limitations on “second or successive” applications:

Claims raised in a prior application must be dismissed. § 2244(b)(1).
New claims must satisfy narrow exceptions (new rules of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court, or newly discovered facts establishing innocence, etc.). § 2244(b)(2).
Before filing in district court, the petitioner must get authorization from the court of appeals. § 2244(b)(3).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the phrase “second or successive” is a term of art, not a simple chronological descriptor of filings:

Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 511 (2020), and
Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443, 452 (2025)

conclude that not every later-in-time filing is “second or successive.”

In Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), the Court held that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id. at 333. When a prisoner is resentenced and a new judgment is entered, the first federal habeas petition attacking that new judgment is not “second or successive” even if the prisoner had previously filed a habeas petition challenging the prior judgment. As Magwood puts it:

“[W]here . . . there is a ‘new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions,’ an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.”
— Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341–42 (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007))

Burton, in turn, makes clear that for AEDPA purposes, the “judgment” comprises both conviction and sentence:

The statute of limitations begins to run when “both [a] conviction and [a] sentence ‘bec[o]me final.’”
— Burton, 549 U.S. at 156–57 (quoting § 2244(d)) (emphasis added)

Thus, the majority reads AEDPA as tying “new judgment” to the imposition of a new sentence. The dissent agrees that judgments include both conviction and sentence but insists that not every alteration to a sentence qualifies as a new judgment, and that state law characterizations matter critically to that question.

B. Juvenile Sentencing and Parole: Graham, Miller, and Montgomery

Three major Supreme Court decisions structure the juvenile sentencing context:

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) – The Court held that juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses may not be sentenced to life without parole. While “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom,” it “must . . . give [juvenile non-homicide offenders] some meaningful opportunity to obtain release” through parole or a comparable mechanism. Id. at 75. The opinion treats:
- life without parole, and
- life with the possibility of parole
as materially distinct sentencing outcomes, the former unconstitutional and the latter permissible.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) – The Court held that mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment. In its opening paragraph, the Court notes that “a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole)” might be appropriate instead of mandatory juvenile LWOP. Id. at 465. Throughout, Miller contrasts:
- mandatory juvenile LWOP, and
- a life sentence with parole eligibility or a lengthy term of years
and treats the former as constitutionally problematic while recognizing the latter as the sort of individualized alternative required.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) – The Court made Miller retroactive on collateral review and expressly addressed remedial options. Crucially, it said:
“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”
— Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212
Thus, Montgomery recognizes that states may choose to add parole eligibility to unconstitutional juvenile LWOP sentences instead of conducting new sentencing hearings.

The majority uses Miller and Graham to characterize life-with-parole as a materially distinct, “lesser” sentence compared to LWOP—a difference so weighty that it determines constitutional validity. The dissent emphasizes Montgomery’s remedial discussion, arguing that if adding parole eligibility alone is a sufficient remedy without resentencing, that very fact shows such changes need not be understood as new judgments for AEDPA purposes.

C. Massachusetts Decisions: Diatchenko I, Diatchenko II, and Mattis

The SJC’s decisions form the state-law backdrop.

1. Diatchenko I (2013)

In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 1 N.E.3d 270 (Mass. 2013), the SJC held that:

Mandatory juvenile LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment in light of Miller and is retroactive.
Under art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, even discretionary juvenile LWOP is unconstitutional.
The parole-ineligibility clause in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 2 is “invalid as applied to juvenile homicide offenders” and is severable from the remainder of the statute.

As to remedy, the SJC held:

The remaining statutory provision—imprisonment for life—“remains in full force and effect.”
The “statutory exception to parole eligibility no longer applies” to juveniles.
Juvenile homicide offenders are “not entitled to be resentenced given that [they were] not improperly sentenced in the first instance, but only . . . denied the chance to be considered for parole.” Id. at 286.

This language is central to the dissent’s argument that no new judgment or sentence exists under state law.

2. Diatchenko II (2015)

In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District (Diatchenko II), 27 N.E.3d 349 (Mass. 2015), the SJC addressed the procedural safeguards required to ensure a meaningful parole opportunity. In a footnote, the SJC stated:

“The opportunity to seek parole is . . . a component of the sentence that the offender receives from a judge.”
— Diatchenko II, 27 N.E.3d at 357 n.12

The majority in Donovan relies on this footnote to underscore that parole eligibility is indeed a component of the sentence and that a change in that component constitutes a change in the sentence. The dissent, however, reads the footnote more narrowly and emphasizes that Diatchenko II did not alter Diatchenko I’s holding that no resentencing was required and that the life sentence remained intact.

3. Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024)

In Commonwealth v. Mattis, 224 N.E.3d 410 (Mass. 2024), the SJC extended Diatchenko’s reasoning to “emerging adults” aged 18–20 at the time of their offense. It held that mandatory LWOP for this group also violated art. 26, invalidated the parole-disabling portions of the applicable statutes for them, and placed them into a graduated parole-eligibility scheme.

Notably, the SJC in Mattis referred to emerging adults “receiving the benefit of resentencing” under its holding. Id. at 430. The Donovan majority seizes on that phrasing to argue that the SJC views such parole-eligibility changes as effectively new sentences; the dissent responds that Mattis did not vacate convictions or impose new sentences and that the “resentencing” language merely captures the need to fix parole-eligibility dates under the new scheme.

D. Circuit Authority on New Judgments and Component Changes

The First Circuit situates its analysis amidst a complex body of circuit law on what constitutes a “new judgment” for AEDPA purposes. Broadly:

Whole-Judgment View (New Judgment Resets AEDPA for Conviction and Sentence): Six circuits hold that a new sentence that results in an amended judgment resets AEDPA for challenges to both the conviction and the sentence:
- Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2010)
- Lesko v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 34 F.4th 211 (3d Cir. 2022)
- In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2017)
- King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 2015)
- Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012)
- Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014)
Component-Specific View (New Judgment Only for Amended Counts or Aspects): Other circuits, including the Seventh and Tenth, have adhered to pre‑Magwood precedent treating each count or sentence as a separate judgment, such that a resentencing on one count does not open up the undisturbed conviction to renewed habeas challenge:
- Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 283–85 (7th Cir. 2013)
- Burks v. Raemisch, 680 F. App’x 686, 690–91 (10th Cir. 2017)

Separately, circuits have considered whether lesser modifications or administrative changes create a new judgment:

Ninth Circuit: United States v. Buenrostro, 895 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2018), held that a presidential commutation that reduces a sentence does not create a new judgment because it does not “legally invalidate” the prior judgment. Legal invalidation is the “essential criterion.”
Third Circuit: In re Edwards, 98 F.4th 425 (3d Cir. 2024), similarly held that a sentence reduction under the First Step Act did not result in a new judgment because it did not invalidate the underlying judgment.
Eleventh Circuit: A line of cases focuses on whether there is an “underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current detention” (Cassidy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 119 F.4th 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Ferreira)). The court has also emphasized deference to state-law characterizations of judgments, including whether modifications are nunc pro tunc (Osbourne v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2020); Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc)).

The Donovan majority explicitly aligns with the whole-judgment view and draws on Buenrostro and Edwards to frame “legal invalidation” as a key marker of a new judgment, while distinguishing cases where the prior sentence remains valid.

IV. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning

A. Framing the Question

The majority carefully narrows the question presented in light of the parties’ arguments. Both Donovan and the Massachusetts Parole Board (MPB) focused on whether the change from LWOP to life with parole constituted a new sentence and thus a new judgment under § 2244(b). Pursuant to Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 273 (2025), the court confines itself to the issues argued by the parties and does not address other potential procedural or merits obstacles.

Accordingly, the core inquiry is:

Does the modification of Donovan’s sentence—from life without parole to life with the possibility of parole, pursuant to Diatchenko—create a new judgment such that his second-in-time federal habeas petition is not “second or successive” under § 2244(b)?

B. Step One: What Counts as a “New Judgment”?

Building on Magwood and Burton, the majority reiterates:

“Judgment” under AEDPA is defined by reference to § 2254, which governs applications on behalf of persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
A judgment includes both conviction and sentence; a new sentence can therefore constitute a new judgment.

The majority emphasizes Magwood’s statement that “the existence of a new judgment is dispositive” of whether a petition is second or successive. 561 U.S. at 338. Once a new judgment intervenes, a petition challenging that new judgment—whether aimed at the sentence, the conviction, or both—is treated as a first petition for § 2244(b) purposes.

C. Step Two: Is Life With Parole a “New” and Distinct Sentence from LWOP?

The majority then asks whether the change from LWOP to life with parole is sufficiently substantive to qualify as a “new sentence.” To answer, it draws heavily on Miller and Graham:

Miller’s opening characterization of “life with the possibility of parole” as a “lesser sentence” than LWOP, 567 U.S. at 465, is treated as a “carefully considered” statement entitled to significant weight, even if technically dicta.
Graham’s holding that juvenile non-homicide LWOP is unconstitutional while life with parole is constitutionally permissible underscores that parole eligibility is outcome-determinative for Eighth Amendment proportionality.

From this, the majority concludes:

Life with parole and life without parole are not variations of the same sentence but materially distinct sentences.
The difference is constitutionally decisive: one is cruel and unusual punishment in some contexts, the other is not.
Therefore, when Diatchenko converted juvenile LWOP to life with parole, Donovan “received the benefit of a materially different, new sentence.”

The majority further buttresses this conclusion by pointing to the practical effect: Donovan is no longer incarcerated; he could never have been released under his original LWOP sentence. It rejects MPB’s argument that because both before and after the change the statutory term was “life,” no resentencing occurred, calling that view a triumph of “form over substance.”

D. Step Three: Legal Invalidation and Severability

The majority then deploys the “legal invalidation” concept found persuasive in Buenrostro and Edwards. It notes:

Diatchenko held that juvenile LWOP, as mandated by the Massachusetts murder statute, is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.
The SJC severed the parole-ineligibility clause, leaving the rest of the statute intact under its severability clause.
Severability analysis only applies when part of a statute has been held invalid; here, the parole-disabling aspect was indeed invalidated.

From that, the majority reasons:

Donovan’s original LWOP sentence is legally invalid and cannot be the judgment authorizing his present confinement (at least during the time he remained imprisoned).
The only sentence that can be said to authorize his custody is the post‑Diatchenko life-with-parole sentence.
This new, constitutional sentence replaces the original unconstitutional one—and because the sentence is part of the judgment, the judgment itself has been replaced “by operation of law.”

While acknowledging that severability is a matter of state law and that the First Circuit is bound by the SJC’s severability determination, the majority draws a sharp distinction between:

the state-law question of how to preserve the statute’s remaining provisions, and
the federal question of what constitutes a “new judgment” under AEDPA.

It treats Diatchenko’s severability analysis as confirming the invalidity of the original sentence (a key factual premise) while reserving for itself the AEDPA characterization of the resulting sentencing structure.

E. Step Four: Addressing State Court Characterizations (Diatchenko and Mattis)

MPB (and the dissent) place heavy weight on two SJC statements in Diatchenko I:

“[Diatchenko’s] life sentence remains in full force and effect, but the statutory exception to parole eligibility no longer applies to him…. [He is] not entitled to be resentenced given that he was not improperly sentenced in the first instance, but only was denied the chance to be considered for parole.”
— 1 N.E.3d at 286

The majority responds as follows:

Whether a defendant is entitled to a resentencing hearing in state court is analytically distinct from whether he has a new judgment for federal habeas purposes.
The SJC’s statement that the defendant was not “improperly sentenced” can be read as meaning the term of imprisonment (life) was proper and did not itself require alteration, not as a categorical assertion that no change to the sentence occurred.
Any ambiguity in Diatchenko I is clarified by later decisions:
- Diatchenko II recognizes parole eligibility as “a component of the sentence.”
- Mattis explicitly says emerging adults affected by its holding are “receiving the benefit of resentencing,” even though the practical remedy is, again, conversion from LWOP to life with parole.

The majority concludes that, even if one reads Diatchenko I as trying to avoid duplicative resentencing proceedings, the effect of the SJC’s remedial choice is to impose new, constitutionally permissible sentences of life with parole on juvenile offenders like Donovan.

F. Step Five: Treating a Petition Attacking Only the Conviction as Non-Successive

A final doctrinal wrinkle is that Donovan’s new petition challenges his conviction, not the newly modified sentence. Magwood expressly left open whether a petitioner resentenced on only the penalty could later challenge the undisturbed conviction without running afoul of § 2244(b). 561 U.S. at 342.

The majority notes that six circuits (Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh) have answered that question in the prisoner’s favor: when a new judgment is entered, the first petition challenging that judgment is not second or successive “regardless of whether it challenges the sentence or the underlying conviction.” See, e.g., Johnson, 623 F.3d at 46; Lesko, 34 F.4th at 224–25; In re Gray, 850 F.3d at 143; King, 807 F.3d at 156; Wentzell, 674 F.3d at 1127–28; Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1281.

The court then underscores a procedural point: MPB “offers no argument at all” against applying this logic in Donovan’s case, and neither did the district court. Under First Circuit waiver principles, “the appellee waives, as a practical matter anyway, any objections not obvious to the court to specific points urged by the appellant.” United States v. Reyes-Correa, 971 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir. 2020).

Thus, both on the basis of:

the substantial circuit consensus that new judgments reset the bar for conviction and sentence alike, and
MPB’s waiver,

the court holds that Donovan’s challenge to his conviction does not become “second or successive” merely because his sentence, rather than his conviction, is what changed.

G. Step Six: Summary of the Majority’s Core Logic

The majority’s reasoning can be distilled as:

AEDPA’s “second or successive” bar is judgment-focused, not filing-focused.
A judgment comprises both conviction and sentence; a new sentence can entail a new judgment.
Life with parole is a materially distinct, constitutionally significant sentence from life without parole, as established in Miller and Graham.
Diatchenko rendered Donovan’s LWOP sentence unconstitutional and, through severance, imposed a new sentence of life with parole.
Because the old LWOP sentence cannot validly authorize custody, the new life-with-parole sentence is the operative judgment.
Donovan’s new habeas petition is the first to challenge this new judgment; therefore, it is not “second or successive,” regardless of whether it attacks the conviction rather than the sentence.

V. The Dissent’s Legal Reasoning and Critique

A. Primacy of State-Law Characterization of the Judgment

Judge Lynch’s dissent begins from a different premise: that state law governs the content and continuity of state criminal judgments. She emphasizes that:

Diatchenko I, applying Massachusetts severability principles, held that only the parole-ineligibility clause was invalid as applied to juveniles, while the life sentence provision remained fully operative.
The SJC expressly declared that juvenile homicide offenders “remain[ed] in full force and effect” under their life sentences, were “not entitled to be resentenced,” and were “not improperly sentenced in the first instance.” 1 N.E.3d at 286.
Under Massachusetts law, the parole board has no authority to modify sentences or judgments; it can only grant release within the maximum term imposed by the sentencing court. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081, 1087–89 (Mass. 2014).

Given these state-law holdings, the dissent concludes:

Donovan’s 1993 judgment of conviction and life sentence is the same judgment under which he has remained in custody.
His current habeas petition, like his 1997 petition, challenges that same judgment; it is therefore a “second or successive” application under § 2244(b).

The dissent emphasizes that federal courts must accept state courts’ interpretations of state statutes, including severability and remedial choices. Citing cases such as Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 624 (1985), and First Circuit precedent like Ballester-Ripoll v. Court of Tax Appeals of Puerto Rico, 142 F.2d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 1944), the dissent argues that the SJC’s severability determination and explicit statement that no resentencing occurred are conclusive on the question of whether there is a new state-court judgment.

B. Distinguishing “Judgment” from “Sentence” Under AEDPA

The dissent then turns to text and structure. It points out that AEDPA’s state-prisoner provision, § 2254(a), refers to persons “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” while the federal-prisoner analog, § 2255(a), speaks of prisoners “in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress.” Congress, the dissent says, chose these words deliberately; under the familiar canon that “different terms denote different ideas,” the two are not interchangeable.

Moreover, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure define “judgment of conviction” to include the plea, verdict or findings, adjudication, and sentence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(k)(1). That definition, the dissent notes, confirms that while the sentence is part of the judgment, it is not the same thing as the judgment itself.

The dissent accuses the majority of effectively collapsing judgment into sentence, thereby erasing Congress’s decision to focus AEDPA’s state-prisoner regime on “judgments” rather than “sentences.” Given Congress’s concern with finality and deference to state courts, this conflation, in the dissent’s view, is doctrinally unsound and policy-wise problematic.

C. Critique of the Majority’s Use of Miller and Graham

Judge Lynch also challenges the majority’s reliance on Miller and Graham. She notes:

The reference in Miller to “life with the possibility of parole” as a “lesser sentence” than juvenile LWOP is a “fleeting” descriptive phrase used in the context of Eighth Amendment proportionality, not AEDPA’s judgment-focused inquiry.
Per Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 141 (2022), lower courts should not stretch “stray comments” beyond their context.
Neither Miller nor Graham suggests that converting juvenile LWOP to life with parole—by itself, without resentencing—creates a new judgment for habeas purposes.

In particular, the dissent stresses that Montgomery squarely addressed the remedial question and explicitly endorsed a state’s choice to correct Miller violations simply by extending parole eligibility, “rather than by resentencing them.” 577 U.S. at 212. That language, the dissent argues, implies that parole-eligibility remedies need not be conceptualized as new judgments; the majority’s contrary view, in her eyes, “turns Montgomery on its head.”

D. Circuit Splits and Limiting the New-Judgment Doctrine

The dissent also canvasses circuit precedent to argue that:

Not every alteration to a sentence or conviction constitutes a new judgment. E.g., Cassidy, 119 F.4th at 1343; Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325–26 (order excusing chemical castration did not create a new judgment).
Some circuits (Seventh, Tenth, parts of Fifth) have held that resentencing on one count does not permit a wholesale reopening of undisturbed convictions for AEDPA purposes. See Suggs, 705 F.3d at 283–85; Burks, 680 F. App’x at 690–91; In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2012).
The Ninth and Third Circuits’ focus on “legal invalidation” (Buenrostro; In re Edwards) should be understood to require vacatur or formal replacement of the prior judgment, not mere administrative or remedial changes like parole.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach in Osbourne and Cassidy underscores that federal courts must defer to state characterizations (e.g., “nunc pro tunc”) in deciding whether a new judgment exists under § 2244(b).

In the dissent’s view, Donovan improperly extends the new-judgment doctrine beyond its established bounds, creating conflicts with these cases by treating a state remedial measure that leaves the original life term intact (but adds parole eligibility) as a wholesale new judgment.

E. AEDPA’s Finality, Comity, and Federalism Concerns

Finally, the dissent situates the case within AEDPA’s overarching objectives. Citing cases such as Banister, Rivers, Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), and Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), the dissent underscores:

AEDPA sharply limits second or successive petitions to promote finality and reduce piecemeal litigation.
Federal habeas review is meant to be narrow and deferential, recognizing states’ sovereign power to enforce criminal judgments and their good-faith efforts to comply with constitutional requirements.
Donovan has already had multiple layers of review: direct appeal, an initial federal habeas petition, and state post-conviction proceedings under Rule 30(b). Allowing him now to litigate anew all manner of claims (including ones rejected in state court and new ones) undermines these finality interests.

The dissent therefore would affirm the district court’s denial of Donovan’s second/successive petition.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Immediate Consequences Within the First Circuit

The most direct impact of Donovan is on prisoners in the First Circuit (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico) whose sentences have been altered from LWOP to life with parole due to constitutional developments:

Juveniles whose LWOP sentences were converted to life with parole under Diatchenko, and
“Emerging adults” (18–20) whose LWOP sentences are modified under Mattis.

Those individuals, many of whom likely filed earlier federal habeas petitions before Miller, Montgomery, and the SJC’s decisions, can now argue that:

They have received a new, constitutionally valid sentence of life with parole, and hence a new judgment.
Any federal habeas petition challenging their convictions or sentences post‑modification is a first petition as to that new judgment and therefore not “second or successive” under § 2244(b).

In practical terms, Donovan re-opens the federal habeas forum for these defendants, allowing them to raise substantive and procedural challenges that might otherwise be barred by AEDPA’s gatekeeping mechanisms. The district courts will still confront other hurdles (timeliness, exhaustion, procedural default, and AEDPA’s deferential standard of review), but the categorical bar on second-or-successive petitions will not apply at the threshold.

B. Broader Habeas Doctrine: Expansion of the New-Judgment Principle

Doctrinally, Donovan pushes the “new judgment” concept beyond traditional resentencing scenarios:

Classic Magwood-type cases involve a formal resentencing or amended judgment entered by the trial court.
Donovan extends the principle to a situation where:
- the trial court never held a resentencing hearing or entered a new judgment document;
- the appellate court’s constitutional ruling and severance effectively convert an unconstitutional LWOP sentence into a parole-eligible life term; and
- the state’s highest court expressly disclaimed “resentencing” for state-law purposes.

The First Circuit’s answer is that formal procedure is not determinative; the substantive reality—that an unconstitutional sentence was replaced with a constitutionally valid one—is what matters. This is a significant doctrinal move, particularly in light of Montgomery’s approval of parole-based remedies.

C. Federal–State Relations and Severability

The decision also has federalism implications. It implicitly asserts that:

While state courts are authoritative on matters of state statutory interpretation and severability,
federal courts retain independent authority to determine whether, from the perspective of federal habeas law, a “new judgment” has arisen.

Federal courts may thus accept that a state has not “resentenced” a defendant as a matter of state law, yet still conclude that a new sentence (and hence a new judgment) exists for AEDPA purposes when the original sentence has been declared unconstitutional and functionally replaced.

This dual-track approach respects state-law severability (which determines what substantive penalty the state imposes) but reserves for federal law the classification of judgments for habeas procedural purposes. Critics, like the dissent, will see this as insufficiently deferential to state remedial choices, especially where the state deliberately eschews resentencing to avoid disrupting final judgments.

D. Circuit Splits and Potential Supreme Court Review

Donovan deepens or creates several points of inter-circuit tension:

On whether changes like added parole eligibility—without resentencing—constitute new judgments.
On the extent to which state-court labels (e.g., “no resentencing,” “nunc pro tunc”) control the new-judgment inquiry.
On whether and when a petitioner may challenge an undisturbed conviction after a new sentence has been imposed.

Given the Supreme Court’s existing interest in AEDPA’s “second or successive” doctrine (Panetti, Magwood, Banister, Rivers) and in juvenile sentencing (Graham, Miller, Montgomery), Donovan presents a plausible candidate for eventual certiorari, especially if other circuits expressly reject its approach in future cases.

E. Policy Considerations: Fairness v. Finality

Substantively, Donovan illustrates the tension between:

Fairness and evolving constitutional norms – Juvenile LWOP sentences imposed decades ago have now been declared unconstitutional. Allowing those individuals a fresh opportunity to challenge their convictions and sentences in federal court aligns with a sense that major constitutional shifts should not be blocked by procedural bars.
Finality and judicial economy – AEDPA was enacted precisely to prevent endless rounds of relitigation. As the dissent notes, Donovan has already pursued direct appeal, one federal habeas petition, and state post-conviction review. Opening a new, unconstrained habeas round risks protracted litigation, especially in older cases with stale records and witnesses.

Donovan weighs heavily toward fairness in the specific context of invalidated juvenile LWOP sentences, but its logic could be invoked in other settings where sentencing remedies retroactively correct constitutional defects (e.g., certain mandatory-minimum schemes, categorical Eighth Amendment bans, or significant changes in collateral consequences that are deemed “components” of the sentence).

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a “Second or Successive” Habeas Petition?

Under AEDPA:

Your first federal habeas petition attacking a particular state-court judgment is generally allowed (subject to other rules).
A later petition is “second or successive” if it attacks the same judgment a second time.
Second or successive petitions are almost always barred unless the petitioner can satisfy narrow statutory exceptions and obtain permission from the court of appeals.

Crucially, not every later-in-time filing is “second or successive.” If the state later changes your sentence in a way that amounts to a new judgment (e.g., resentencing), then your first petition challenging that new judgment is treated as a fresh first petition.

B. What Is a “Judgment” in Criminal Cases?

In the criminal context, the “judgment of conviction” is a package that includes:

the determination of guilt (conviction), and
the sentence imposed (length and conditions of punishment).

Changing the sentence can, in some circumstances, create a new judgment, but not every modification counts. Federal law—not state labels alone—determines when a change rises to the level of a new judgment for AEDPA purposes.

C. What Is Severability?

Severability is a doctrine of statutory interpretation. When a court finds one part of a statute unconstitutional, it must decide whether:

the rest of the statute can still function as law without the invalid part, and
the legislature would have wanted the remainder to survive.

If so, the invalid provision is “severed,” and the rest stands. In Diatchenko, the SJC severed the parole-ineligibility clause from the murder statute as applied to juveniles, leaving in place the life-sentence provision and applying the general parole statute to those offenders.

D. What Does “Nunc Pro Tunc” Mean?

“Nunc pro tunc” is Latin for “now for then.” A court may enter an order “nunc pro tunc” to reflect what the law or judgment should have been at an earlier time. In some circuits, whether a sentence modification is labeled “nunc pro tunc” under state law affects whether it is treated as a new judgment for AEDPA purposes. Donovan did not involve any explicit “nunc pro tunc” labeling, but similar concerns about state labels appear in the dissent’s discussion.

E. Why Does Parole Eligibility Matter So Much?

For juveniles:

Life without parole means, as a practical matter, death in prison, regardless of rehabilitation.
Life with parole eligibility offers a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” if the person can demonstrate maturity and reform.

The Supreme Court has treated that difference as constitutionally decisive under the Eighth Amendment. That same difference underpins the First Circuit’s conclusion in Donovan that switching from LWOP to life with parole is not a mere administrative tweak but a fundamentally new sentence.

VIII. Conclusion

Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board establishes an important precedent in the First Circuit:

When a juvenile LWOP sentence is retroactively transformed into a life-with-parole sentence as a constitutional remedy, the defendant has received a new sentence, and thus a new judgment, for purposes of AEDPA’s “second or successive” bar.
The first federal habeas petition challenging that new judgment is not “second or successive,” even if it attacks only the long-standing conviction rather than the modified sentence.

By anchoring its reasoning in Miller and Graham’s recognition that parole eligibility is a constitutionally pivotal feature of juvenile sentencing, and by reading Diatchenko as having legally invalidated Donovan’s original LWOP sentence, the majority extends the Magwood new-judgment doctrine to the context of parole-eligibility remedies.

The dissent, grounded in state-law severability, AEDPA’s text, and Montgomery’s remedial framework, warns that this expansion:

erodes AEDPA’s finality and gatekeeping structure,
disrespects state courts’ characterization of their own judgments, and
creates or deepens circuit splits about what modifications count as new judgments.

Whichever view one finds more persuasive, Donovan will shape habeas litigation in the First Circuit for juveniles and emerging adults whose sentences have been constitutionally restructured. It may also serve as a focal point in the continuing national debate over how to balance evolving constitutional standards, the need for finality in criminal judgments, and the appropriate scope of federal collateral review.