Lefors v. Lefors: Stacking Per‑Violation Civil Penalties and No Show‑Cause Requirement for Visitation-Order Sanctions Under SDCL 25‑4A‑5

Introduction

In Lefors v. Lefors, 2025 S.D. 46, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed sanctions imposed against a custodial parent, Krista Mae LeFors, for willfully failing to comply with a visitation order requiring her to “encourage” her minor child to attend scheduled dinners with the child’s father, Joseph Daniel LeFors. The case arrives after years of highly contested post-separation litigation involving custody, visitation, counseling, and competing narratives of parental conduct and child reluctance.

The appeal raised four principal issues:

Whether sanctions under SDCL 25‑4A‑5 require initiation through a show-cause order and personal service typical of civil contempt proceedings;
Whether the evidence supported a finding that Krista willfully violated the visitation order’s “encouragement” requirement;
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in imposing a $500 civil penalty for each failed visitation (four violations; $2,000 total); and
Whether the court abused its discretion by awarding $2,000 in attorney’s fees as a sanction without detailed findings on reasonableness/necessity.

At bottom, the Court clarifies procedural and substantive enforcement tools for visitation orders: it reaffirms that sanctions authorized by SDCL 25‑4A‑5 are independent of contempt and may be pursued by motion under SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1 without a show-cause order; it endorses a robust parental duty to actively encourage visitation even with resistant adolescents; and it holds that civil penalties under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(3) may be imposed on a per-violation basis without an aggregate cap, so long as each individual penalty does not exceed $1,000.

Summary of the Opinion

Procedural vehicle: A motion to enforce visitation under SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1, supported by an affidavit, properly invoked the court’s sanctioning authority under SDCL 25‑4A‑5. No order to show cause or personal service—requirements associated with contempt—was necessary (and, in any event, objections to service/jurisdiction were waived by not being timely raised).
Willful noncompliance: The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Krista willfully failed to comply with the February 26 order requiring her to “encourage” the child to attend dinners. Evidence showed persistent undermining and only superficial efforts, despite Krista’s ability to influence the child.
Civil penalties: The court acted within SDCL 25‑4A‑5(3) by imposing $500 for each of four separate violations ($2,000 total). The statute’s $1,000 limit is per violation; there is no aggregate cap.
Attorney’s fees: The $2,000 award under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(2) was affirmed. While fees must be reasonable, the statute does not require traditional “necessity” or ability-to-pay findings once willful noncompliance is established; the record supported the amount.
Appellate fees: The Court denied Joseph’s request for appellate attorney’s fees.

Factual and Procedural Background

Joseph and Krista married in 2002 and have two children. After separation, the circuit court entered a decree of separate maintenance awarding joint legal custody (both parents) and primary physical custody (Krista), and implemented a graduated parenting plan supported by counseling. Over several years, Joseph alleged Krista’s interference with visitation and parental alienation; Krista denied alienation and cited the children’s fear stemming from Joseph’s past abuse and alcohol misuse. Multiple therapists were involved. Despite interventions, the children repeatedly refused to engage in visitation, sometimes running away or walking long distances home after exchanges.

In August 2023, the court ordered weekly reunification counseling with a new provider, Michael Wheaton, and directed Krista to ensure attendance and for both parents to follow recommendations. Progress stalled. On February 26, 2024, the court replaced counseling with twice-weekly one-hour dinners at a restaurant. Krista was to transport the child and “encourage” attendance but not be present during the visit.

The child continued to refuse to enter the restaurant or speak with Joseph, sitting on a bench outside. Joseph renewed his request for sanctions under SDCL 25‑4A‑5. The court ultimately found Krista’s efforts were surface-level and undermining, pointing to her broader pattern of behavior and specific conduct (e.g., allowing the child to compete under Krista’s maiden name) inconsistent with fostering a relationship. It imposed $500 per failed visit (four visits in April = $2,000) and $2,000 in attorney’s fees.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Hiller v. Hiller, 2018 S.D. 74, 919 N.W.2d 548.
- Important for two propositions: (a) SDCL 25‑4A‑5 provides “discrete statutory authority” to sanction visitation/custody noncompliance independent of contempt, and (b) courts may find willful failure to facilitate visitation even when a teenager refuses, where the parent’s conduct suggests passive resistance or undermining. Hiller also guides attorney-fee awards under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(2): reasonableness is required, but not the conventional necessity or ability-to-pay analysis.
Metzger v. Metzger, 2021 S.D. 23, 958 N.W.2d 715.
- Supplies the familiar civil contempt factors—existence of an order, knowledge, ability to comply, and willful disobedience—which “overlap” the willfulness analysis under SDCL 25‑4A‑5.
Pieper v. Pieper, 2013 S.D. 98, 841 N.W.2d 781.
- Reiterates that children’s best interests ordinarily include receiving love and companionship from the noncustodial parent; adolescents’ preferences are relevant but not dispositive.
Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 1999 S.D. 35, 591 N.W.2d 798; Kreps v. Kreps, 2010 S.D. 12, 778 N.W.2d 835.
- Cement the best-interest factor assessing a parent’s willingness to “maturely encourage and provide frequent and meaningful contact” with the other parent, and uphold custody determinations giving significant weight to gatekeeping or undermining behavior.
Jameson v. Jameson, 306 N.W.2d 240 (S.D. 1981).
- Affirms the primacy of the trial court’s credibility determinations in contempt-type matters—a point the Court invokes to defer to the trial court’s assessment of Krista’s “surface-level” encouragement.
Statutory and procedural authorities.
- SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1 (motion to enforce visitation) and SDCL 25‑4A‑5 (sanctions) provide the non-contempt enforcement pathway.
- SDCL 25‑5‑7.6 codifies the duty of joint legal custodians to foster the other parent’s relationship.
- SDCL ch. 25‑4A Appendix A parenting guidelines reinforce parents’ duties to encourage respect for and visitation with the other parent.
- SDCL 15‑6‑12(b), (h)(1) govern waiver of personal jurisdiction/service objections not timely raised.
- On sanctions: Roth v. Farner‑Bocken Co., 2003 S.D. 80, 667 N.W.2d 651 (due process limits on punitive awards); State v. One 1995 Silver Jeep Grand Cherokee, 2006 S.D. 29, 712 N.W.2d 646 (Eighth Amendment civil penalties); Reck v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 2019 S.D. 42, 932 N.W.2d 135 (plain-meaning statutory interpretation); Toft v. Toft, 2006 S.D. 91, 723 N.W.2d 546 (appellate disposition without remand for additional findings); Goeden v. Goeden, 2024 S.D. 51, 11 N.W.3d 768 (issue preservation).

2) Legal Reasoning

A. Procedural Requirements: Sanctions Without Show‑Cause Formalities

Krista argued that, absent a show-cause order and personal service (typical prerequisites for civil contempt), the court lacked “jurisdiction” to sanction her. The Court first found waiver under SDCL 15‑6‑12(b), (h)(1) because Krista participated in the hearing and only later raised process/service defects. It then rejected the contention on the merits: sanctions under SDCL 25‑4A‑5 may be sought “independent from the law of contempt” through a motion to enforce visitation rights under SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1, supported by affidavit. The court “shall immediately set a hearing,” and upon finding willful noncompliance, it may impose “appropriate sanctions.” Reiterating Hiller, the Court emphasized that this statutory sanctioning authority is “discrete” and “unconnected” to contempt, even though the factual inquiry overlaps.

B. Willful Noncompliance: The Duty to Actively Encourage

The trial court’s willfulness determination tracked the overlapping civil-contempt factors: there was a valid order, Krista knew of it, she had the ability to comply, and she engaged in willful disobedience. The evidence supported the conclusion that Krista’s “encouragement” was superficial and that she undermined the prescribed dinners:

Despite transporting the child to each visit, Krista allowed the child to remain outside the restaurant and made no meaningful effort to ensure the child joined the father for the one-hour meal—the designed first step in resuming parenting time.
The court found broader patterns of undermining—e.g., Krista not acknowledging Joseph at school events and allowing the child to compete under Krista’s maiden name—signaling to the child that the father was not part of her identity or quotidian life.
Professional testimony confirmed the children had been wielding “all the power” in the visitation dynamic, with no consequences for refusal; the reunification therapist was “at a loss” absent parental enforcement.

The Court leaned on Hiller to reject the notion that a parent may simply stand back when a “strong‑willed” teenager declines visitation. A parent’s obligation, especially under joint legal custody, is to actively foster and facilitate the relationship—including by communicating clear expectations and consequences where appropriate. The Court accepted the trial court’s credibility determinations and its in‑camera evaluation of the child’s maturity and capacity to follow a “straightforward directive” when supported by consistent parental messaging and conduct.

Importantly, the Court harmonized any facial tension between the order’s direction that Krista not be “present during the visit” and her duty to “encourage.” The trial court reasoned that nothing in the order prohibited Krista from remaining in the vicinity as needed to facilitate the child’s entry and initiation of the visit; the violation, in the court’s view, was not mere absence but the failure to achieve any engagement at all. In context, “encouragement” required reasonable, affirmative steps calibrated to the order’s objective, not just transport-and-exit.

The Court also addressed an earlier 2022 finding (by a different judge) declining to find deliberate alienation. It explained that (i) judicial assessments may change over time as dynamics evolve and new evidence accrues, and (ii) a failure to comply with a specific, later-issued court order to encourage visitation is analytically distinct from a global finding (or not) of parental alienation for purposes of custody modification.

C. Civil Penalties: Per‑Violation Stacking Permitted

SDCL 25‑4A‑5(3) authorizes “a civil penalty of not more than the sum of one thousand dollars” when a party willfully violates custody or visitation orders. Krista argued, post‑hearing, that the aggregate award of $2,000 exceeded a supposed $1,000 statutory ceiling. Although the argument was unpreserved, the Court reached the merits and held that the statute’s plain language imposes a per‑violation cap, not an aggregate cap. Nothing in SDCL 25‑4A‑5(3) limits total penalties across multiple proven violations; accordingly, the court could impose $500 for each of four April violations.

As to the need for specific findings justifying the amount of each penalty, the Court noted that once willful noncompliance is found, the statute empowers the court to select “appropriate sanctions.” The record supported four discrete violations corresponding to four failed visits; $500 per violation was within the statutory limit and not shown to be constitutionally excessive. The Court declined to graft a requirement for granular “reasonableness” findings onto civil penalties under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(3), while noting constitutional constraints (Due Process and Excessive Fines) can limit penalties in appropriate cases—arguments Krista did not raise.

D. Attorney’s Fees as a Sanction: Reasonableness Without Traditional Necessity Findings

Under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(2), courts may award “reasonable attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the noncompliance.” Citing Hiller, the Court reaffirmed that such fee awards are punitive/remedial sanctions distinct from fee-shifting statutes; thus, the court need not engage in the conventional family-law “necessity” analysis or weigh relative financial resources once willful noncompliance is established. Reasonableness is required, however.

Here, the trial court reviewed Joseph’s itemized billing, reduced the request by more than half, and awarded $2,000. Although the court did not make detailed findings on reasonableness, the appellate record (motions, hearings, and the billing entries) sufficed to affirm the award without remand under Toft. The Court also noted, but did not resolve, the trial court’s oral suggestion that Krista might offset sanctions against Joseph’s arrearages; that offset did not appear in the written order and was not briefed on appeal.

3) Impact and Practical Significance

A. Clearer, Faster Enforcement Mechanism

No show‑cause prerequisite: Parties may seek sanctions for visitation‑order violations via a motion under SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1, supported by affidavit, without invoking contempt procedures. This lowers procedural hurdles and may accelerate enforcement.
Issue preservation matters: Objections to personal jurisdiction, process, or service must be raised in a responsive pleading or by timely motion, or they are waived.

B. Substantive Standard: Active Encouragement Is Enforceable

Adolescents’ preferences are not a veto: While a teenager’s views matter, a custodial parent must still actively foster visitation. Passive transport coupled with “it’s up to the child” will not satisfy an “encourage” requirement where the parent retains influence and can set expectations and consequences.
Evidence of undermining counts: Courts may look beyond lip-service encouragement to surrounding conduct (e.g., social nonacknowledgment, symbolic distancing such as surnames) that communicates to the child that the other parent is dispensable.
Therapeutic impasse is not dispositive: Professionals may recommend against “forcing” visitation, but the court is not bound by that opinion when it finds willful noncompliance and an enforceable path forward.

C. Sanctions Have Teeth

Per‑violation penalties can add up: Each violation can draw up to $1,000. Repeated noncompliance can quickly escalate financial exposure.
Attorney’s fees are available: Reasonable fees “incurred as a result of the noncompliance” may be awarded as sanctions without traditional need-based findings.
Constitutional limits remain: Although not litigated here, due process and excessive‑fines constraints can cap penalties in extreme cases.

D. Guidance for Trial Courts and Practitioners

Draft orders with specificity: When directing “encouragement,” spell out concrete steps—e.g., parent remains nearby until the child enters, parent sets consequences for refusal, parent must not provide substitute meals, etc.
Build a record of efforts: Courts advised Krista to document encouragement; parents should memorialize pre‑visit discussions, consequences communicated, and steps taken to ensure compliance.
Align messaging and actions: Courts will scrutinize whether day‑to‑day conduct (school events, public interactions, naming conventions) aligns with the duty to foster the other parent’s relationship.
Consider graduated enforcement: The one‑hour dinner here was designed as an incremental step. Courts may tailor sanctions to incentivize compliance before seeking more drastic remedies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1 vs. contempt: SDCL 25‑4A‑4.1 lets a parent move to enforce visitation; SDCL 25‑4A‑5 lets the court sanction willful noncompliance. This is independent of contempt, so no show‑cause order is necessary even though the factual analysis overlaps.
Willfulness: Not just intentionality—it includes the ability to comply and a conscious choice not to. A parent’s “hands-off” stance when they could set expectations or consequences supports a willfulness finding.
“Encourage” in visitation orders: This means more than transport. It entails affirmative, reasonable steps to achieve engagement consistent with the order’s aims, including pre‑visit coaching, presence as needed to initiate the visit, and appropriate consequences for refusal.
Per‑violation civil penalties: The statute caps each penalty at $1,000, but multiple violations can yield multiple penalties exceeding $1,000 in total.
Attorney’s fees as sanctions: Fees awarded under SDCL 25‑4A‑5(2) punish/remedy noncompliance. They must be reasonable, but courts need not apply the usual “necessity” or ability-to-pay tests used in fee‑shifting or domestic‑relations contexts.
In‑camera interviews: Judges may speak privately with children to assess maturity, preferences, and dynamics—one of several inputs to fact‑finding.

Conclusion

Lefors v. Lefors materially clarifies South Dakota’s enforcement architecture for visitation orders. It confirms that SDCL 25‑4A‑5 provides a swift, stand‑alone pathway to sanctions—without the formalities of contempt—whenever a party willfully fails to comply with a visitation decree. The decision underscores a substantive, enforceable duty on custodial parents to take active, reasonable steps to encourage visitation, even when adolescents resist, and it authorizes stacking civil penalties on a per‑violation basis up to $1,000 each. Finally, it reaffirms that attorney’s fees may be awarded as sanctions upon a willfulness finding, subject only to overall reasonableness.

For families and practitioners, the message is direct: South Dakota courts will hold parents accountable not merely for logistical compliance but for genuine facilitation of the other parent’s relationship with the child. Passive acquiescence to a teenager’s refusal is insufficient. And for repeat violations, the financial consequences can be substantial. The decision will likely shape how trial courts draft orders (with concrete “encouragement” steps), evaluate conduct that signals undermining, and calibrate meaningful, incremental sanctions to restore and protect parent‑child relationships consistent with the best interests of children.