Landlord Non-Liability for Tenant’s Concealed Dog under a “No-Pet” Lease: Actual or Constructive Knowledge Requirement Clarified

Introduction

TLM Investments, LLC v. Shanda Yates, decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi on 8 May 2025, addresses a recurring question in premises-liability and landlord-tenant law: When, if ever, is a residential landlord liable for a dog-bite suffered by a guest of the tenant when the tenant has violated a “no-pet” clause and concealed the animal’s presence?

The factual matrix is straightforward yet legally rich. Tenant Neah Friar, in open violation of a lease provision forbidding pets, secretly kept a pit bull named Yurk in the rented house. When Friar’s friend, Shanda Yates, visited, Yurk bit her. Yates sued both Friar (the dog’s owner) and TLM (the landlord). Although Friar’s liability was not at issue on interlocutory appeal, Yates argued that TLM was negligent for “allowing” a dangerous animal on the premises and that she enjoyed lease-based protections as a third-party beneficiary. The trial court denied TLM’s motion for summary judgment, prompting the landlord’s interlocutory appeal.

The Supreme Court reversed, rendered summary judgment for the landlord, and remanded for any residual proceedings. In doing so it explicitly clarifies Mississippi law in three ways:

Affirming that actual or constructive knowledge of a dog and its dangerous propensities is a prerequisite to landlord liability, and such knowledge cannot be inferred merely from the existence of a no-pet clause.
Holding that deliberate concealment by a tenant defeats constructive-knowledge arguments and that earlier knowledge of a different dog on the premises does not automatically create a duty of continuing inquiry.
Confirming that a tenant’s guest is generally an incidental—not intended—third-party beneficiary of a residential lease, even when the contract contains broad “any other person” language.

Summary of the Judgment

Applying a de novo standard of review to the denial of summary judgment, the Court found:

No genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding TLM’s lack of actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or any dangerous propensity.
The no-pet clause was included to protect the landlord from property damage; it does not establish that all dogs are presumed dangerous nor does it impose an affirmative duty to inspect for hidden pets.
Yates failed to establish standing or meet the test for intended third-party beneficiary status under the lease.
Consequently, TLM was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under M.R.C.P. 56(c). The trial court’s order was reversed, summary judgment rendered for TLM, and the matter remanded solely for further proceedings against any remaining defendants.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Karpinsky v. American National Insurance Co., 109 So.3d 84 (Miss. 2013)
– Reaffirmed the de novo standard for reviewing summary-judgment rulings and the twin burdens (absence of factual dispute + entitlement as a matter of law).
Mongeon v. A & V Enterprises, Inc., 733 So.2d 170 (Miss. 1997)
– Provided the two-part test for dog-bite liability: (a) proof of prior dangerous propensity, and (b) knowledge (actual or constructive) by the defendant. The Court imports this test to landlord liability.
Olier v. Bailey, 164 So.3d 982 (Miss. 2015)
– The plaintiff leaned on Olier for the proposition that pit bulls are presumptively dangerous. The Court distinguished it, noting that Olier dealt with an owner’s liability and still required knowledge;
Mitchell v. Ridgewood East Apartments, LLC, 205 So.3d 1069 (Miss. 2016)
– Defined “constructive knowledge” and emphasised the duty of reasonable inquiry. The Court found no such duty arose here because the tenant actively concealed the dog.
Simmons Housing, Inc. v. Shelton, 36 So.3d 1283 (Miss. 2010) & Burns v. Washington Savings, 171 So.2d 322 (Miss. 1965)
– Both articulate Mississippi’s three-part test for intended third-party beneficiaries and the distinction between intended and incidental beneficiaries. Applied to reject Yates’s contractual theory.
Delta Construction Co. v. City of Jackson, 198 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1967)
– Cited for the privity requirement in contract actions, underscoring Yates’s lack of standing.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Summary-Judgment Framework

The Court reiterates that a defendant moving for summary judgment must first show the absence of any genuine factual dispute regarding an element on which the plaintiff bears the trial burden. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts; the non-movant must “come forward” with specific evidence proving a triable issue. Yates offered none on knowledge.

b. Actual v. Constructive Knowledge

Evidence from depositions established that:

Friar admitted concealing Yurk and instructing her brother to lie about ownership;
TLM representatives testified they were unaware of the dog’s presence;
TLM’s prior discovery of a different dog, promptly removed, did not create an ongoing duty to assume another dog’s presence.

Thus, neither actual nor constructive knowledge could be imputed to the landlord, defeating the negligence claim as a matter of law.

c. The “No-Pet” Clause Is Not an Admission of Dangerous Propensity

The Court treats the clause as a property-protection device rather than a safety device. Therefore, its existence does not satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proving the landlord knew (or should have known) of risk to personal safety. Relying on a contract term aimed at safeguarding physical property cannot bootstrap a tort-duty to monitor for hidden pets.

d. Waiver and Third-Party Beneficiary Analysis

Even if the landlord could have waived the no-pet clause, waiver would have affected only its own rights against the tenant (e.g., to collect a pet deposit). It would not have created a duty to the tenant’s guests. Applying the three-factor Simmons Housing test, the Court concluded:

The contract’s wording (“any other person”) was not sufficiently specific to include Yates by name or by a clearly defined class.
No evidence showed the contracting parties’ intent to benefit Yates.
TLM’s only articulated interest was preventing property damage, not ensuring third-party bodily safety.

Yates therefore lacked standing; she was, at most, an incidental beneficiary with no enforceable rights.

3. Impact of the Decision

The ruling does more than resolve a single dog-bite case; it delineates Mississippi doctrine on several intersecting issues:

Landlord-Tenant Law – Establishes that mere inclusion of restrictive lease covenants does not create tort duties toward invitees absent knowledge of the prohibited condition.
Premises Liability – Re-affirms that landlords are not strict insurers; liability hinges on knowledge (actual or constructive) coupled with the ability to control the danger.
Animal-Injury Jurisprudence – Resists any trend toward breed-specific presumptions; plaintiffs must still prove dangerous propensity and knowledge.
Contract Law – Confirms a stringent approach to third-party-beneficiary claims in residential leases, protecting landlords from open-ended liability to tenants’ visitors.
Litigation Strategy – Signals to plaintiffs that, absent evidence of landlord knowledge, dog-bite suits should focus on the animal’s owner, not the property owner.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual Knowledge – The defendant actually knows a fact (e.g., the dog is present and dangerous).
Constructive Knowledge – The law treats a person as knowing a fact if, by reasonable diligence, the person should have discovered it.
Dangerous Propensity – A tendency of an animal to harm humans, established by prior aggressive acts or other objective indicators.
Summary Judgment – A procedural device allowing courts to dispose of cases without trial when no material facts are contested.
No-Pet Clause – Lease term forbidding pets; generally designed to prevent property damage, not guarantee visitor safety.
Third-Party Beneficiary – A non-party who may sue on a contract if it is evident that the contract was made for that person’s benefit. An incidental beneficiary, by contrast, has no such right.
Waiver – Voluntary relinquishment of a known right. A party may waive lease provisions protecting itself, but doing so does not create new duties to outsiders.

Conclusion

TLM Investments, LLC v. Shanda Yates cements an important principle in Mississippi law: a residential landlord cannot be held liable for injuries inflicted by a tenant’s secretly harboured dog unless the plaintiff can prove the landlord’s actual or constructive knowledge of both the animal’s presence and its dangerous tendencies. The mere existence of a no-pet clause does not bridge that evidentiary gap, nor does it confer third-party rights upon a guest of the tenant. By strictly enforcing the knowledge requirement and carefully cabining third-party-beneficiary status, the Court provides clear guidance that aligns contractual expectations with tort duties and curbs the scope of landlord liability in animal-injury cases.