Introduction

This commentary examines the North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Kraft v. State, 2025 ND 155, which clarifies critical procedural distinctions in postconviction proceedings after the Legislature’s 2023 amendments splitting “summary dismissal” and “summary disposition” into separate statutory tracks. The Court held that when the State substantively invokes summary disposition (summary‑judgment) standards—by arguing lack of evidentiary support and absence of any genuine dispute of material fact—its motion is treated as one for summary disposition under N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑09.1, triggering a 30‑day response period for the applicant, regardless of how the motion is labeled.

The case arises from Taylor John Kraft’s application for postconviction relief following his guilty pleas to numerous theft‑related offenses. The district court granted the State’s motion—captioned as one for “summary dismissal”—before 30 days elapsed. On appeal, the central issue was whether the State’s motion should be treated as a motion for “summary disposition,” thereby entitling Kraft to 30 days to respond. The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that substance governs over form in determining the applicable procedure and response time.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Dakota
• Date: September 25, 2025
• Citation: 2025 ND 155
• Author: Justice Douglas A. Bahr
• Disposition: Reversed and remanded

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that the State’s motion, although labeled “summary dismissal,” in substance argued the standards that apply to “summary disposition” (akin to summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56) by asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Kraft had failed to produce evidentiary support for his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims. The district court also applied those summary‑disposition standards, putting Kraft to his proof and faulting him for not producing admissible evidence. Because a motion for summary disposition triggers a 30‑day response time, the district court erred by granting the motion only 21 days after it was filed. The Court reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the proper 30‑day response period and governing standards.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Hoff v. State, 2024 ND 235, 14 N.W.3d 892: Confirms postconviction proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent not inconsistent with the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act.
• N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑03(1), ‑04(1)–(2): An application commences proceedings. Argument and citations are unnecessary; affidavits may be attached but are not required.
• N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑06(1)–(2): The State must respond by answer or motion and may move to dismiss if it is evident from the application that the applicant is not entitled to relief.
• N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑09 (Summary Dismissal): After Aug. 1, 2023, codifies a dismissal mechanism analogous to Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim—focused on the face of the application.
• N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑09.1 (Summary Disposition): After Aug. 1, 2023, codifies a summary‑judgment‑like mechanism under which the State may “put the applicant to his proof.”
• Aune v. State, 2024 ND 99, 6 N.W.3d 833 (n.1): Explains the 2023 legislative amendments split “summary disposition” and “summary dismissal” into distinct procedures.
• Burden v. State, 2019 ND 178, 930 N.W.2d 619: Establishes response timelines by analogy—14 days for summary dismissal (Rule 12/Rule 3.2), 30 days for summary disposition (Rule 56). Also clarifies how to treat a State motion depending on its substance.
• Greywind v. State, 2015 ND 231, 869 N.W.2d 746; Kisi v. State, 2023 ND 226, 998 N.W.2d 797: Reinforce the analogy between summary disposition and Rule 56.
• Mwinyi v. State, 2024 ND 126, 9 N.W.3d 665; Atkins v. State, 2017 ND 290, 904 N.W.2d 738: Ordinarily, IAC claims should not be summarily disposed of without a hearing; however, once the State moves for summary disposition and points to absence of evidence, a minimal burden shifts to the applicant to provide competent evidence, failing which summary disposition may be appropriate.
• Almklov v. State, 2025 ND 27, 17 N.W.3d 583; Vandeberg v. State, 2003 ND 71, 660 N.W.2d 568; Lindeman v. State, 2024 ND 228, 14 N.W.3d 883: Articulate the summary‑judgment standard in postconviction settings and the “put to proof” framework—no genuine issues of material fact and the movant’s ability to point out the absence of evidence.
• Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, 608 N.W.2d 292: Recognizes that IAC claims are typically unsuited for summary disposition but may be resolved if no genuine issue of material fact exists—reinforces that the “no genuine issue” inquiry is a summary‑judgment concept.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three steps:

1. Clarification of Distinct Procedures Post‑2023: The Court reiterates that after the 2023 amendments, North Dakota now maintains two distinct procedural devices:
   • Summary dismissal under § 29‑32.1‑09—akin to a Rule 12(b)(6) facial sufficiency review, with a 14‑day response period under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a).
   • Summary disposition under § 29‑32.1‑09.1—akin to Rule 56 summary judgment, with a 30‑day response period.
   The two mechanisms are not interchangeable, and courts must apply the correct standards and timelines appropriate to the motion actually before them.
2. Substance Over Label: The State titled its filing a “motion for summary dismissal” but argued entirely in terms of summary disposition. It invoked “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” asserted Kraft’s “lack of evidentiary support,” and placed Kraft “on his proof,” all hallmarks of Rule 56 practice. The district court adopted the same summary‑disposition framework, emphasizing that Kraft needed to provide admissible evidence in response. The Court held that because the motion’s substance and the district court’s analysis employed summary‑disposition standards, the motion must be treated as one under § 29‑32.1‑09.1.
3. Procedural Consequence—Response Time: Treating the motion as one for summary disposition triggers a 30‑day response period. Here, the State filed its motion on April 11, 2025, and the district court granted it on May 2, 2025—only 21 days later. That truncated period violated the applicant’s right to the full Rule 56‑analogous response window. Accordingly, the district court misapplied the law, requiring reversal and remand.

In rejecting the State’s argument that the absence of affidavits or exhibits meant the motion could not be treated as summary disposition, the Court emphasized that what matters is not what papers accompany the motion, but the governing standard the movant invokes and the court applies. A motion premised on “no genuine issue of material fact,” “absence of evidentiary support,” and “putting the applicant to his proof” is a summary‑disposition motion in substance, regardless of its caption.

Impact and Implications

Kraft carries several important implications for North Dakota postconviction practice:

• Bright‑Line Procedural Rule: If the State’s motion invokes summary‑judgment concepts (e.g., “no genuine issue,” “absence of evidence,” “put to proof”) or the district court relies on those concepts, the motion is treated as one for summary disposition. The applicant must be afforded 30 days to respond.
• Labeling Pitfalls for the State: Mislabeling a summary‑disposition motion as “summary dismissal” will not compress the applicant’s response time to 14 days. Prosecutors should choose the procedural track deliberately:
  • Summary dismissal (§ 29‑32.1‑09): Use when the application fails on its face (akin to Rule 12(b)(6)); do not argue evidentiary insufficiency or lack of genuine disputes. Response time: 14 days.
  • Summary disposition (§ 29‑32.1‑09.1): Use when asserting the applicant has no supporting evidence and there is no genuine issue of material fact; expect the 30‑day response window and the potential need to meet Rule 56‑like burdens.
• Applicant Protections and Strategy: Applicants now have firm assurance that if the State “puts them to their proof,” they receive the full 30 days to marshal affidavits or other competent evidence. Counsel should vigilantly object if a court proceeds on a summary‑judgment standard without affording the proper response time.
• IAC Claims in Focus: The decision aligns with Mwinyi and Atkins: although IAC claims are ordinarily ill‑suited for summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing, once the State properly moves for summary disposition and points to the absence of evidence, the applicant bears a minimal burden to produce competent evidence to survive. Kraft ensures the applicant receives the full statutory‑analogous time to do so.
• Doctrinal Coherence Post‑Amendments: Kraft advances the Legislature’s 2023 goal of separating summary dismissal from summary disposition, reducing pre‑amendment confusion where the terms were used interchangeably. It supplies a practical, enforceable criterion—look to the motion’s substance and the standard applied—to police the distinction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Summary Dismissal (N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑09): Think “Rule 12(b)(6).” The question is whether, taking the application’s factual allegations as true, it states a claim for relief under the law. No evidence is required from the applicant at this stage. Response time is 14 days under N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a).
• Summary Disposition (N.D.C.C. § 29‑32.1‑09.1): Think “Rule 56 summary judgment.” The State can argue there is no genuine dispute of material fact and point out the absence of evidence supporting the applicant’s claims, thereby “putting the applicant to his proof.” The applicant must then produce some competent evidence (e.g., affidavits) to create a genuine issue, often leading to an evidentiary hearing if met. Response time is 30 days.
• “Put to Proof” or “Minimal Burden Shifts”: Once the State’s motion points to a lack of record evidence, the applicant must submit some competent evidence to support the claim. If the applicant does, the case typically proceeds to an evidentiary hearing; if not, summary disposition may be granted.
• Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) Claims: These claims frequently require factual development outside the existing record (e.g., what advice counsel gave, whether strategic choices were reasonable). For that reason, courts generally avoid summarily disposing of IAC claims unless the applicant, after being put to proof, fails to provide supporting evidence.
• Substance Over Label: Courts look past how a motion is titled and focus on the standards and arguments it advances. If it uses summary‑judgment language and reasoning, it will be treated as a summary‑disposition motion with the corresponding timelines and burdens.

Conclusion

Kraft v. State cements a vital procedural guardrail in North Dakota postconviction practice: when the State substantively invokes summary‑disposition standards, the applicant is entitled to the full 30‑day response period, irrespective of the motion’s label. The decision gives practical effect to the Legislature’s 2023 bifurcation of summary dismissal and summary disposition and aligns with longstanding case law that treats postconviction summary disposition like Rule 56. It also protects applicants—especially those advancing IAC claims—by ensuring they are not deprived of the time needed to assemble competent evidence in response to a motion that places them “on their proof.”

On remand, the district court must afford Kraft the proper 30‑day window and then assess, under the correct standard, whether he has produced evidence sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing or whether the State is entitled to summary disposition. More broadly, the ruling offers clear guidance to litigants and courts: in postconviction proceedings, substance controls, standards matter, and response times flow from the true nature of the motion.

• Key takeaway: Mislabeling cannot shorten an applicant’s response time where the State’s motion and the court’s analysis are, in substance, summary disposition under § 29‑32.1‑09.1.
• Practice pointer: Choose the correct procedural vehicle—use § 29‑32.1‑09 for facial challenges and § 29‑32.1‑09.1 when arguing evidentiary insufficiency—and honor the corresponding timelines.