Kentucky Supreme Court Clarifies “Resident Relative” for Unemancipated Minors: Undefined “Resides Primarily” Is Ambiguous; Physical Presence Is Not Controlling

Introduction

In Jessica Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and Tyler Delonjay, the Supreme Court of Kentucky confronted a recurring problem at the intersection of family law and insurance coverage: whether an unemancipated minor, in the sole legal custody of a parent, qualifies as a “resident relative” under that parent’s automobile liability policy when the child is temporarily staying elsewhere due to family conflict. The case arose from a serious August 5, 2020 collision in Jefferson County in which 17-year-old Tyler Delonjay, driving his aunt’s car with permission, struck Jessica Hill’s vehicle, causing significant injuries and a pregnancy loss.

The State Farm policy covered “resident relatives,” defined as persons who “reside primarily” with the named insured, but it did not define “resident,” “reside,” or “primarily.” Tyler had been in his father Jason’s sole legal custody for nine years (2011–2020), lived with him for 105 months (97% of the time) during that period, and used his father’s address for official documents, yet had been staying with an aunt or friends for approximately three months before the accident. The trial court and the Court of Appeals granted summary judgment to State Farm, reasoning that Tyler’s physical absence at the time of the crash defeated coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the undefined “resides primarily” language is ambiguous in the context of an unemancipated minor, and that actual physical presence on the date of loss is relevant but not controlling.

This commentary situates the decision within Kentucky’s insurance-interpretation jurisprudence, explains the Court’s reliance on precedent regarding domicile, residency, and minor status, and explores the practical implications for insurers, policyholders, and litigants.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous Court (Justice Bisig; Justice Goodwine not sitting), the Kentucky Supreme Court:

Held that the State Farm policy’s use of “resident relative” and “resides primarily” is ambiguous as applied to an unemancipated minor who is in the sole legal custody of the named insured yet temporarily staying elsewhere.
Clarified that for minors, legal custody/domicile and the broader factual context—not just physical presence at the moment of loss—inform whether the child “resides primarily” with the insured.
Reaffirmed Kentucky’s interpretive rules: ambiguous insurance terms are construed against the drafter (contra proferentem) and in favor of coverage and the insured’s reasonable expectations.
Determined that State Farm could have eliminated ambiguity by expressly defining “resident” as physical presence; having failed to do so, the ambiguity must be resolved for coverage.
Reversed the Court of Appeals and Jefferson Circuit Court, and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Jessica Hill, holding that coverage and indemnity are available for Tyler as an insured under Jason’s State Farm policy.

Factual and Procedural Background

Tyler (born September 2002) lived with his father Jason in Louisville from 2011 through May 2020 under family court orders granting Jason sole legal custody (2011, reaffirmed 2013). In the three months before the accident, Tyler stayed intermittently with his aunt and friends after disputes with his father. Despite being physically away, he maintained his father’s address on his driver’s license, a speeding ticket, and employment records, and was claimed as a dependent on Jason’s 2020 taxes. He was indisputably an unmarried, unemancipated minor at the time of the crash.

State Farm denied liability coverage, arguing Tyler was not a “resident relative” because he was not living at home on the accident date. The trial court, in a brief order, granted summary judgment to State Farm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing physical residence as the controlling factor and deeming the policy language unambiguous. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Perry v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 860 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1993): The Court relied heavily on Perry’s recognition that “residence” is a flexible concept, that a person may have more than one residence, and that ambiguity in undefined policy terms must be resolved in favor of coverage. Although Perry involved an 18-year-old adult recently married and temporarily staying elsewhere, its core guidance—residency is a fact-intensive inquiry, physical presence is relevant but not dispositive, and undefined “resident” is ambiguous—was applied with amplified force to a minor.
STATE AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. REYNOLDS, 32 S.W.3d 508 (Ky. 2000): Addressed a 17-year-old who left home. The Court endorsed Reynolds’s key insight: even if a youth appears “emancipated” for some purposes (e.g., self-support), that does not render the child sui juris or erase minor status for statutory liability contexts. Here, the Court analogized that Tyler’s temporary absence did not negate his legal status as a minor under his father’s custody for insurance purposes.
OLD RELIABLE INS. CO. v. BROWN, 558 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. App. 1977): Distinguished by the Court. Brown denied “same household” status where an adult child had moved out of state, secured her own apartment, and lived independently for over a year. None of those stabilizing, permanent factors existed for Tyler. Brown nonetheless contributed the observation that “floating intentions” are typical of the recently emancipated—here, the Court applied that sensibility to an unemancipated minor’s fluid circumstances.
Burr’s Adm’r v. Hatter, 240 Ky. 721, 43 S.W.2d 26 (1931): Recognized that “residence” can mean legal residence (domicile) or actual residence; courts must consider both facts and intention, including intent to abandon a former domicile and to establish a new one. The Court chastised the lower courts for acknowledging this dual meaning but failing to apply it to Tyler’s status as a minor in sole custody.
Majestic Oaks Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Majestic Oaks Farms, Inc., 530 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2017); Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinney, 831 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1992): Reaffirmed Kentucky’s contra proferentem principle: ambiguous contractual terms are construed against the drafter, especially in insurance contracts; exclusions are strictly construed to make insurance effective.
Foreman v. Auto Club Prop.-Cas. Ins. Co., 617 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2021): Applied the “reasonable expectations” doctrine—policies are interpreted as an average insured would reasonably understand them. The Court used this to emphasize that a parent reasonably expects an unemancipated minor child in his legal custody to remain covered despite a temporary stay elsewhere.
Moses v. Baker, 798 F. Supp. 2d 863 (E.D. Ky. 2011): Cited to show that insurers know how to define “resident” as “physical presence” when they intend to. The absence of such language in State Farm’s policy exposed the ambiguity here.
Standards: Summary judgment is reviewed de novo (Caniff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 368 (Ky. 2014)); CR 56.03 governs; KRS 418.040 authorizes declaratory relief.
Statutes underscoring minor status and custody: KRS 2.015 (age of majority), KRS 600.020(1)(a) (abandonment as abuse/neglect definition), and references to state intervention mechanisms emphasize that an unemancipated minor cannot be legally “in the wind” and remains under a custodial domicile absent formal proceedings.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

Undefined, context-sensitive terms create ambiguity—especially for minors. “Resident relative” turns on whether the person “resides primarily” with the named insured, but the policy fails to define “resident,” “reside,” and “primarily.” Kentucky law acknowledges that “residence” can denote either legal domicile or actual presence. When applied to an unemancipated minor in sole custody—and especially where the minor has no legal guardian other than the custodial parent—the terms’ application is uncertain. The policy also includes a specific carveout for a child “away at school,” signaling that “resides primarily” tolerates significant temporary absences. The word “primarily” itself contemplates less than 100% physical presence.
Physical presence is relevant but not controlling. The lower courts erred by treating Tyler’s physical absence in the three months preceding the accident as dispositive. Following Perry and Burr’s Adm’r, the Court looked to the totality of circumstances: nine uninterrupted years of sole legal custody; 105 months of co-residence versus three months away (97% of the time with father over nine years); the continued use of father’s address for license, traffic citation, and employment; tax dependency; and evidence of ongoing support. The Court also weighed that Tyler, as a minor, could not lawfully vest guardianship in his aunt by mere agreement or conduct, and—under Reynolds—his temporary self-direction did not erase his legal status as a minor.
Contra proferentem and reasonable expectations compel coverage. Because the policy’s language is ambiguous in this context, Kentucky’s established rules require construing the policy against the drafter and in favor of coverage. The Court stressed that family conflict prompting a teen to stay with relatives or friends is foreseeable to both insurer and insured; if an insurer intends to condition “resident relative” status on continuous physical occupancy, it must say so in plain terms. State Farm did not. Consequently, the Court reversed and directed entry of summary judgment for Jessica Hill, confirming that coverage and indemnity are available for Tyler under Jason’s State Farm policy for the non-owned car he was permissibly driving.

Why This Decision Matters

The ruling is a significant clarification of Kentucky law at the junction of household-residency clauses and minor status:

It establishes that, absent clear policy definitions, “resides primarily” is ambiguous when applied to unemancipated minors in sole custody who are temporarily staying elsewhere.
It elevates legal custody/domicile and long-term living patterns over snapshot physical location in determining “resident relative” status for minors.
It underscores the insurer’s burden to draft with precision if it seeks to make physical presence dispositive.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Resident vs. domicile: “Residence” can mean where a person is actually living at a given time. “Domicile” is a legal home—usually more stable and linked to legal ties like custody and intent. For minors, domicile is often determined by the custodial parent’s home.
Unemancipated minor / sui juris: An unemancipated minor is still under parental/legal control and cannot make all legal decisions independently (not sui juris). Moving out temporarily does not, by itself, make a minor legally independent.
“Resident relative” in insurance: A typical policy category extending coverage to family members who “reside” with the insured. When the policy does not define “resident,” courts look at multiple factors, not just physical presence.
Contra proferentem: When contract terms are ambiguous, courts interpret them against the party who drafted the contract—here, the insurer.
Reasonable expectations doctrine: Courts interpret insurance policies as an average insured would reasonably understand them; coverage should not be defeated by technical or unclear wording.
Summary judgment (CR 56.03): Granted only when no genuine disputes of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; appellate review is de novo.
“Primarily”: Commonly means “for the most part” or “chiefly,” not “exclusively” or “always”—suggesting that some degree of absence is consistent with primary residence.
Non-owned car coverage: Liability coverage typically extends to insureds while using a car they don’t own, if policy conditions (including insured status) are satisfied.

Detailed Impact Assessment

For Insurers

Policy drafting: If the carrier intends “resident relative” to require physical occupancy, it must expressly define “resident” as physical presence and perhaps specify a minimum duration or continuous occupancy requirement. The Court pointed to another policy that expressly defined “resident” as physically residing with intent to continue—showing insurers know how to draft for that outcome.
Underwriting and claims handling: Carriers should expect that unemancipated minors in sole custody will ordinarily be treated as resident relatives even during temporary absences for family conflict, unless the policy defines otherwise.
Litigation posture: Motions for summary judgment premised solely on the minor’s physical absence at the loss date will face headwinds. A fact-rich record (custody orders, addresses on official documents, support, duration of absence, intent) will matter—but ambiguity will typically cut toward coverage.
Portfolio-level exposure: Liability coverage may be triggered for minors driving non-owned cars with permission, even when staying with relatives or friends. Carriers should reassess risk assumptions where policy language mirrors State Farm’s here.

For Policyholders and Families

Reasonable expectation affirmed: Parents can reasonably expect an unemancipated minor child, in their legal custody, to remain covered as a “resident relative” despite a temporary stay elsewhere due to conflict or transition.
Documentation helps: Maintaining the custodial address on licenses, school/employment records, and tax status supports resident-relative status if disputes arise.
Family law intersections: Sole custody is powerful evidence of a minor’s domicile. Absent a court-ordered transfer or emancipation, a minor’s temporary relocation does not dissolve the parent-child household for coverage purposes.

For Plaintiffs in Tort Cases

Additional coverage pathways: Where an at-fault teen is in a custodial parent’s household but temporarily staying elsewhere, liability coverage may still be available under the parent’s policy if residency terms are undefined or ambiguous.
Discovery focus: Custody orders, duration and reasons for absence, addresses on official records, financial support, and the insurer’s drafting choices are critical discovery targets.

For Courts and Practitioners

Fact-sensitive but principle-driven: While residency remains fact-specific, this decision sets a strong presumption for minors—legal custody and domicile carry substantial weight, and undefined “resides primarily” is ambiguous as applied to them.
Trans-subline implications: The reasoning may carry into homeowners, UM/UIM, and med-pay contexts using similar “resident relative” language, particularly regarding minors.

Key Holdings and Doctrinal Clarifications

Undefined “resides primarily” is ambiguous for unemancipated minors in sole custody who temporarily stay elsewhere; ambiguity is resolved in favor of coverage.
Physical presence at the time of loss is relevant but not controlling for minors’ residency; courts must weigh legal custody/domicile, duration and context of absence, documentation, support, and intent to establish a new domicile.
Insurers bear the burden to define “resident” expressly if they intend to tie coverage to physical occupancy; failure to do so invites coverage via contra proferentem and reasonable expectations.

Open Questions and Limits

Adults vs. minors: The Court’s reasoning is anchored in minor status and sole custody. Adult children’s cases remain governed by Perry’s fact-specific analysis without the strong custodial-domicile presumption.
Bright-line rules: The Court did not announce a fixed temporal threshold for how long a minor’s absence defeats residency; instead, it underscored context, foreseeability, and drafting clarity.
Effect of explicit definitions: If a policy clearly defines “resident” as in-person occupancy with specified criteria, future cases may reach different outcomes.

Practical Guidance

Insurers: Review and, if necessary, amend form language to define “resident,” “reside,” and “primarily,” including specific treatment for minors temporarily away (e.g., with relatives, during counseling, after family disputes) parallel to “away at school” provisions.
Defense counsel: Avoid staking summary judgment solely on the insured minor’s temporary physical absence; build a record on custody, intent, and documentation.
Plaintiff’s counsel: Secure family court orders, address records, tax dependency, and evidence of support to establish resident-relative status for minors.
Family law practitioners: Advise clients that without court-ordered changes, a minor’s temporary relocation usually will not sever insurance residency ties.

Conclusion

Hill v. State Farm sets a clear and consequential precedent in Kentucky insurance law: when an automobile policy leaves “resident” and “resides primarily” undefined, those terms are ambiguous as applied to unemancipated minors in sole custody who are temporarily staying elsewhere. In this posture, legal custody/domicile and the overall factual profile—not the child’s physical location on the accident date—govern the resident-relative inquiry. Consistent with long-standing Kentucky principles, the ambiguity is resolved against the insurer and in favor of coverage and the policyholder’s reasonable expectations.

Beyond correcting the lower courts’ overreliance on physical presence, the decision instructs insurers to draft with precision if they intend to narrow resident-relative coverage. For families and injured plaintiffs, it ensures that a teen’s temporary absence during turbulent periods does not, without clear contractual language, erase coverage under the custodial parent’s policy. The Court’s remand for entry of summary judgment for Jessica Hill underscores the strength of these principles when applied to minors: in Kentucky, a child in sole legal custody cannot be rendered “residence-less” through a brief change in sleeping arrangements.

Case Snapshot

Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Date: February 20, 2025
Holding: Undefined “resides primarily” in a resident-relative clause is ambiguous as applied to an unemancipated minor in the sole custody of the named insured; physical absence at the time of loss is not controlling; coverage must be construed in favor of the insured.
Disposition: Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for appellant Jessica Hill; coverage and indemnity available for Tyler under the State Farm policy.