Jus Soli Reaffirmed and Universal Relief Clarified: First Circuit Strikes Down EO 14160 and Holds “Subject to the Jurisdiction” Encompasses Nearly All U.S.-Born Children

Introduction

This appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit arises out of consolidated challenges to Executive Order 14160, “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship.” The Executive Order’s stated purpose was to deny birthright citizenship to children born after its effective date if, at the time of birth, (i) the father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) and (ii) the mother was present in the United States either unlawfully or temporarily. Plaintiffs included an expectant mother and two immigrant-serving organizations (the Doe-Plaintiffs), and a coalition of States and one municipality (the State-Plaintiffs).

A Massachusetts district court granted preliminary injunctions barring implementation and enforcement of the EO. The First Circuit, per Chief Judge Barron, affirmed in substantial part. It held that plaintiffs are exceedingly likely to succeed on their claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, rejected the government’s standing objections (both Article III and prudential), sustained a nationwide (complete-relief) injunction for the State-Plaintiffs after the Supreme Court’s guidance in Trump v. CASA, Inc., and refined the scope of relief by vacating the injunction insofar as it ran against federal agencies rather than officers.

Key issues addressed:

Who is “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a)?
Whether Congress’s 1952 codification (§ 1401(a)) is interpreted by its time-of-enactment understanding.
Article III standing for States premised on loss of federal funds in cooperative programs.
Whether prudential/third-party standing bars States’ claims; and the “enforcement against the litigant” route to third-party standing.
Equitable factors for preliminary relief.
Scope of injunctions after the Supreme Court’s CASA decision and Armstrong’s limit to officer-focused injunctions.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirms preliminary injunctions enjoining EO 14160’s enforcement because plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits:

Merits: The EO conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1401(a). “Subject to the jurisdiction” in the Citizenship Clause adopts the common-law jus soli rule—citizenship by birth on U.S. soil—subject only to narrow, historically recognized exceptions (children of foreign diplomats; children born on foreign public ships; children born to hostile occupying forces; and, historically, members of Native American tribes). Domicile of parents, their immigration status, or lawful presence is not part of the Clause’s limitation. Section 1401(a), enacted in 1952, is construed by its 1952 understanding, which matches the same broad rule.
Standing:
- O. Doe has Article III standing as an expectant mother directly targeted by the EO; the organizations have associational standing under Hunt.
- States have Article III standing based on direct loss of federal funds under the EAB program, Medicaid, CHIP, IDEA, and Title IV-E, paralleling Biden v. Nebraska (MOHELA). The losses are fairly traceable to the EO (a point the government conceded below) and redressable by injunction.
- Prudential third-party standing limits (and parens patriae) do not bar the States’ claims; the EO operates against States by preventing them from verifying eligibility and thus from conferring benefits on persons legally entitled to them, satisfying the “enforcement against the litigant” route to third-party standing (see Department of Labor v. Triplett).
Equitable factors: Plaintiffs face irreparable harms, including denial of passport and SSN issuance at birth and cascading harms in access to services; the public interest and equities favor injunctions.
Scope: The court sustains a universal injunction for the State-Plaintiffs to the extent necessary to provide them complete relief after CASA, noting the government failed to timely propose workable narrower alternatives; but it vacates the injunction insofar as it ran against federal agencies rather than officers (per Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center and sovereign immunity principles).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898): The keystone. The First Circuit reads Wong Kim Ark to adopt the common-law jus soli rule for the Citizenship Clause, using The Schooner Exchange to explain that “subject to the jurisdiction” reflects territorial sovereignty with narrow sovereign-waiver exceptions (diplomats, hostile occupiers, public warships) and, historically, tribal members. The court rejects the government’s attempt to extract a domicile requirement from Wong Kim Ark.
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884): Recognized the distinctive, quasi-sovereign status of Native American tribes as an additional exception; later superseded legislatively via the Indian Citizenship Act (now codified at § 1401(b)).
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812): Grounded the jurisdictional analysis in territorial sovereignty and the specific, limited sovereign waivers of jurisdiction that justify exceptions to jus soli.
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023): Supports state standing where a federal action deprives a state or a closely related state entity of federal revenues directly caused by the challenged action (here, lost reimbursements and fees in cooperative programs).
United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023): The government’s reliance on a footnote about indirect fiscal effects fails; the First Circuit distinguishes the States’ direct loss of federal funds from indirect budgetary impacts in nonenforcement contexts.
Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025): Universal injunctions generally exceed equitable authority as to non-parties, but courts may grant relief necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs. The First Circuit holds that a nationwide injunction remains proper here to give the State-Plaintiffs complete relief, given mobility of newborns and the interlocking federal-state systems.
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, 575 U.S. 320 (2015), and FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994): Confirm equity’s traditional officer-suit model and sovereign immunity constraints. The First Circuit vacates the injunction only insofar as it bound agencies as entities, limiting relief to agency officials.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), and FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367 (2024): Associational standing standards; organizations met them by identifying pregnant members directly harmed by EO-driven denials of passports and SSNs via the Enumeration at Birth (EAB) program.
Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990): Provides the “enforcement against the litigant” pathway for third-party standing; invoked to permit States to assert constitutional and statutory interests that the EO directly prevents them from vindicating for eligible newborns.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982): Characterized “jurisdiction” in the Fourteenth Amendment as “predominantly geographic,” undermining any domicile-based limitation and reinforcing that noncitizens present unlawfully are “within the jurisdiction” in the Clause’s sense.
Other reinforcing authorities: INS v. Rios-Pineda (1985); U.S. ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy (1957); INS v. Errico (1966) (U.S.-born children of unlawfully present parents are citizens); interpretive methodology cases (United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988); George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740 (2022); Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)) support the time-of-enactment and “old soil” approaches for § 1401(a).

Legal Reasoning

1) Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The court offers two independent and mutually reinforcing grounds for concluding plaintiffs are likely to prevail:

Section 1401(a) (1952 time-of-enactment meaning): Although § 1401(a) borrows the Citizenship Clause’s language, the court applies the standard statutory canon that words are read by their common meaning at enactment. The Nationality Act of 1940, drafted after an interagency study, codified jus soli while recognizing narrow, long-standing exceptions identified in Wong Kim Ark. In 1952, Congress recodified the same language in the INA intending to “carry forward” the 1940 understanding; committee reports described Wong Kim Ark as holding that all persons born here are citizens “regardless of the nationality of their parents,” except diplomats. Executive-branch practice (State and DOJ) and contemporaneous congressional practice confirmed this reading. The government’s contrary authorities were either conclusory, out-of-date, or inconsistent with the prevailing understanding.
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause (binding constitutional floor): The court reads Wong Kim Ark as adopting the common law jus soli rule in the Clause, tethering “subject to the jurisdiction” to The Schooner Exchange’s territorial-sovereignty framework. The holding is incompatible with a domicile-based limitation. The only historically recognized exceptions are those where the sovereign has waived (in whole or part) its otherwise “exclusive and absolute” territorial jurisdiction—foreign diplomats, hostile occupiers, foreign public warships—and the additional, then-peculiar case of tribal members. The government’s domicile theory cannot be reconciled with Wong Kim Ark’s text, structure, or rationale, the Clause’s child-focused language, or post-Wong Kim Ark Supreme Court pronouncements.

Because any denial of citizenship on the EO’s criteria would contravene § 1401(a) and the Citizenship Clause on their face, plaintiffs’ facial challenge is likely to succeed (see United States v. Salerno).

2) Standing

O. Doe and organizational plaintiffs: O. Doe faces direct, imminent denial of her child’s passport and SSN under the EAB program. The organizations satisfy Hunt—identified pregnant members whose children would be denied documents; the interests are germane and do not require individual participation.
States: The States showed imminent, direct loss of federal funds tied to cooperative programs (EAB fees, Medicaid, CHIP, IDEA, Title IV-E) because citizenship is a gatekeeping eligibility criterion; the government conceded in district court that “federal funding will be lost” if the EO operates. The court distinguished Texas’s footnote about indirect fiscal harms and analogized to Nebraska’s MOHELA revenues. Traceability was established by the EO’s directives and agency implementation guidance (SSA’s EAB guidance would trigger parental-status inquiries). The court also noted that under IDEA, certain services must be provided regardless of immigration status, increasing the likelihood of concrete loss of federal reimbursements.
Third-party and parens patriae objections: The States sue for their own injuries and thus are not invoking parens patriae. Any prudential third-party standing limits are waivable and, in any event, satisfied: the EO directly constrains the States’ ability to verify eligibility and to provide services to persons with a legal entitlement, fitting Triplett’s “enforcement against the litigant” pathway. This is not an “ill-defined” dispute; the Citizenship Clause also determines state citizenship “of the State wherein they reside,” making the States direct stakeholders.

3) Equitable Factors

Irreparable harm: Birthright denial—even temporarily—creates cascading and sometimes permanent harms: lack of documentation at birth (passports, SSNs), barriers to health care and other services, and risks of family separation. For States, unrecoverable administrative upheaval and retooling of verification systems (including training and systems redesign) would be required absent an injunction.
Balance of equities and public interest: The public has a compelling interest in ensuring persons entitled to citizenship are recognized as such. The government’s reliance on the President’s immigration authority (and Legalization Assistance Project) fails where plaintiffs have standing and are likely to prevail on the legality of the EO.

4) Scope of Relief

Doe-Plaintiffs: The injunction properly covers O. Doe and the organizations’ members. To the extent the government fears uncertainty about which members are covered, the district court can address notice mechanisms on remand.
States; “Universal” relief after CASA: CASA disapproved universal injunctions to benefit non-parties but preserved courts’ authority to grant relief necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs. The district court found that a national bar on EO enforcement was necessary to afford complete relief to the States (e.g., inter-state mobility of newborns and systems integration). The government did not timely present workable narrower alternatives pre-appeal and later declined to develop the CASA-suggested narrower options on remand. On this record, the First Circuit affirms the breadth as a permissible complete-relief injunction.
Armstrong/Meyer officer-only rule: The court vacates the injunction to the limited extent it bound federal agencies as entities; relief must run against officials in their official capacities.

Impact

This opinion carries significant consequences for constitutional law, immigration administration, and remedial practice:

Birthright citizenship settled doctrine strengthened: The decision forecloses executive efforts to condition citizenship at birth on parental citizenship, immigration status, or domicile. Any policy shift to that effect would require constitutional amendment, not executive action or ordinary legislation, and would still be constrained by § 1401(a) unless repealed.
Section 1401(a) interpretive anchor: The “time-of-enactment” methodology fixes § 1401(a)’s meaning to 1952, reinforcing that the statute at least equals (and in parts exceeds) the constitutional floor and cannot be contracted by executive policy.
State standing in cooperative federalism: The court’s application of Nebraska to cooperative programs confirms that States can establish Article III standing based on direct losses of federal reimbursements traceable to federal action—independent of indirect fiscal effects.
Prudential standing clarity for States: Where a federal measure directly prevents States from delivering benefits to persons with a legal entitlement, the “enforcement against the litigant” rule supports States’ ability to assert those rights. This is particularly salient in citizenship-linked eligibility programs.
Injunction practice post-CASA: Nationwide injunctions remain available where necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs themselves; the First Circuit’s emphasis on the government’s obligation to timely propose workable narrower alternatives will shape litigation strategy.
Officer-only injunctions: Litigants should ensure they name appropriate officials for equitable relief; agencies as entities are shielded by sovereign immunity absent waiver.
Administrative programs: Passport adjudications (DOS) and SSN issuance via EAB (SSA) must proceed without EO-driven parental-status filters. The opinion will guide future agency guidance and prevent adoption of citizenship-screening criteria grounded in parental immigration status.
Pending and parallel litigation: The court heard a coordinated appeal from New Hampshire with similar issues; the reasoning will likely control. The opinion also notes a separate class action (Barbara) and the government’s certiorari petition, signaling potential Supreme Court review, though the First Circuit’s analysis is tightly bound to Wong Kim Ark and the INA’s text and history.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jus soli vs. jus sanguinis: Jus soli confers nationality based on place of birth (the U.S. rule); jus sanguinis confers nationality based on parentage (common in some other countries). The Citizenship Clause constitutionalizes jus soli with narrow exceptions.
“Subject to the jurisdiction thereof”: In the Fourteenth Amendment, this phrase refers to being within the United States’ territorial jurisdiction and not within a class where the sovereign has waived jurisdiction (e.g., children of diplomats). Unlawful presence or temporary status does not remove a person from U.S. jurisdiction; everyone physically here (apart from the narrow exceptions) owes obedience to U.S. law.
Domicile: A legal concept combining residence with intent to remain indefinitely. The court rejects any reading that makes parental domicile a condition of a child’s U.S. citizenship at birth.
Associational standing: An organization can sue for injuries to its members if at least one member would have standing, the interests are germane to the organization’s purpose, and the claim does not require individualized member participation.
Prudential/third-party standing: Courts sometimes limit a litigant’s ability to assert rights of others. One recognized route allows such assertion when a challenged rule is enforced against the litigant in ways that prevent a third party from entering a legally protected relationship with the litigant (e.g., a state’s inability to deliver benefits to eligible citizens).
Universal injunction vs. complete relief: A “universal” or “nationwide” injunction often improperly benefits non-parties. After CASA, courts may still grant injunctions as broad as necessary to give complete relief to the plaintiffs themselves. Here, given inter-state movement and national program administration, a nationwide bar was necessary to protect the plaintiff States’ interests.
Officer-only injunctions: Equity traditionally restrains officers from unlawful acts; agencies are generally shielded by sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs should target appropriate officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief.
Enumeration at Birth (EAB): A joint process by which hospitals transmit birth data to SSA to issue SSNs to newborns based on birth certificates—built on the premise that U.S.-born children are citizens regardless of parents’ status.

Conclusion

The First Circuit’s decision is a robust reaffirmation of America’s constitutional commitment to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment and its statutory counterpart, § 1401(a). Anchored in Wong Kim Ark’s common-law jus soli framework and the time-of-enactment understanding of § 1401(a), the opinion rejects efforts to redefine citizenship by executive fiat through parental status or domicile. It also advances doctrine on state standing in cooperative federalism, clarifies prudential standing’s “enforcement against the litigant” exception, and charts a careful path for equitable relief after CASA—permitting broad injunctions when necessary for complete relief while limiting them to officers as equity traditionally requires.

Taken together, the ruling significantly constrains executive attempts to narrow birthright citizenship, stabilizes federal-state program administration that turns on citizenship, and provides a clear remedial blueprint for future constitutional and statutory challenges implicating nationwide policies. The core takeaway is simple but profound: save for historically narrow exceptions, a child born on U.S. soil is a United States citizen at birth—regardless of parental immigration status—and neither executive policy nor administrative guidance may say otherwise.