Jurisdictional Boundaries and Discretion in 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Discovery — Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Limited v. Devine

Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from a complex, multi-forum dispute between several Cayman Islands–based hedge funds (the “Funds”) and defendant‐appellant Susan Elaine Devine. The litigation spans:

• A federal RICO suit in the Middle District of Florida (the “RICO action”),
• A Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) voluntary dismissal and collateral battles over a stipulated protective order, and
• A 28 U.S.C. § 1782 petition in the Southern District of New York remedied by transfer back to Florida.

The core dispute centers on Mrs. Devine’s attempt to obtain confidential discovery materials—produced by the Funds under a court-approved protective order—for use in proceedings before the Liechtenstein Princely Court. The Eleventh Circuit was asked to resolve four discrete appeals:

1. The district court’s “transfer order” compelling the clerk to surrender Devine’s copies of confidential materials to opposing counsel;
2. An order denying Devine’s motion to enforce the protective order against the Funds;
3. An order declining to stay enforcement of the “transfer order” pending appeal; and
4. The denial of Devine’s § 1782 petition and refusal to send her case back to New York.

On March 11, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed portions of the appeal as moot or untimely, and ruled on the § 1782 issue under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, establishing important boundaries for personal jurisdiction and the discretionary denial of § 1782 discovery.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court’s principal holdings were:

• Transfer Order Mootness: Because the hard drive containing the documents was lost and cannot be returned, the appeal challenging the district court’s order directing their return to the Funds was dismissed as moot.
• Lack of Jurisdiction Over Protective‐Order Enforcement: After the Funds voluntarily dismissed the RICO action under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the district court lost jurisdiction to resolve Devine’s motion to enforce the protective order; that order is not an appealable collateral matter.
• Stay Denial Unreviewable: The denial of a stay pending appeal was neither a final order nor a permissible interlocutory appeal, and was furthermore mooted by the disposition of the underlying challenges.
• Section 1782 Petition: The district court properly exercised § 1782 jurisdiction over the Funds’ New York counsel—Spears and Imes LLP—because they were “found” in Florida through purposeful litigation contacts. The court then permissibly denied the petition, treating the protective order’s confidentiality constraints, concerns about end-running pending appeals, and foreign‐proof-gathering considerations as discretionary grounds under Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

Analysis

1. Treatment of Mootness and Collateral Jurisdiction

The Court reaffirmed that a federal court may not entertain an appeal if it cannot grant “meaningful relief.” Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 913 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, vacating the transfer order would not restore the lost hard drive, so the appeal was moot.

Similarly, once a plaintiff unilaterally dismisses its own suit under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), the district court loses jurisdiction over the merits and may only address a narrow set of collateral issues—costs, fees, and contempt sanctions—not motions to enforce protective orders. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine (“Devine I”), 998 F.3d 1258, 1265–69 (11th Cir. 2021).

2. Personal Jurisdiction in Section 1782 Cases

• The statutory text of § 1782 requires the respondent to “reside[ ] or [be] found” in the issuing district. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
• The Eleventh Circuit held that “found” extends to the full scope of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process (Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 255–60 (11th Cir. 1996)), and that sizeable, substantive law-practice contacts—advising, taking depositions, and producing documents in Florida-based litigation—suffice to render a non-resident law firm “found” in the Middle District of Florida for § 1782 purposes.

3. Discretionary Denial Under Intel Factors

Even where the statutory prerequisites are met, a district court has broad discretion to grant or deny § 1782 discovery. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264–65 (2004). Courts weigh four guideposts:

1. Whether the target is a participant in the foreign proceeding;
2. The nature and receptivity of the foreign tribunal;
3. Whether the request circumvents foreign restrictions or U.S. policy; and
4. Whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome.

Here, the district court permissibly concluded:

• The Liechtenstein court had not formally petitioned for the materials in that forum;
• Granting the petition would contravene the protective order’s terms;
• Devine was attempting an “end‐run” around prior, adverse rulings; and
• The Funds faced potential exposure under Cayman Islands confidentiality rules.

Those factors represent a sound exercise of discretion under Eleventh Circuit precedent. In re Department of Caldas, 925 F.3d 1218, 1221–23 (11th Cir. 2019).

Precedents Cited

• Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 542 U.S. 241 (2004) – Establishes statutory and discretionary framework for § 1782 petitions.
• In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) – First Eleventh Circuit § 1782 decision discussing Intel’s discretionary factors.
• Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine (“Devine I”), 998 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2021) – Clarifies limits on district court jurisdiction after voluntary dismissal.
• Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 2003) – Mootness standard: must be able to grant “meaningful relief.”
• Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996) – Due‐process standard for personal jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeded in three major steps:

1. Mootness & Collateral Jurisdiction: Documents were irretrievably lost, so no practical relief was possible. The protective-order enforcement motion was outside the narrow post-dismissal jurisdictional carve-outs.
2. Personal Jurisdiction for § 1782: Extending “found” to the due-process guarantee of International Shoe–type contacts, the Court applied Robinson to hold out-of-state counsel subject to discovery in Florida.
3. Discretionary § 1782 Denial: The district court’s reliance on protective-order constraints, a lack of formal foreign‐court petition, concerns about playing “fast and loose” with parallel appeals, and foreign confidentiality mandates fell within Intel’s discretionary guideposts.

Impact

This decision clarifies several important points for future litigants:

• After a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal, protective‐order enforcement motions cannot be resolved in federal court absent a contempt or fee application.
• Section 1782’s “found” language reaches any nonresident defendant over whom a district court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction.
• The Intel discretionary factors permit district courts to consider existing confidentiality orders, foreign privacy rules, and strategic litigation tactics when granting or denying foreign‐assistance petitions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Mootness: A case is moot if the court cannot fix the problem the appellant complains of. Here, the documents were gone, so nothing the appellate court could do would help.

2. Rule 41(a)(1)(A) Dismissal: When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its own case “without prejudice,” the court loses power to decide anything but a few limited questions (fees, sanctions).

3. Section 1782 Discovery: A U.S. district court can order U.S. residents or those “found” in the district to hand over evidence for a foreign court. It’s not automatic—judges use four discretionary Intel factors to decide.

4. Personal Jurisdiction vs. “Found”: If you can sue a nonresident in federal court under due‐process rules, that nonresident is also “found” in the district for § 1782.

Conclusion

Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Limited v. Devine underscores the interplay between jurisdictional limits, mootness, and a district court’s broad discretion under section 1782. It confirms that a protective order cannot be enforced through a post-dismissal motion, that personal jurisdiction defines where a § 1782 petition may issue, and that Intel’s factors allow courts to police potential forum‐shopping and confidentiality conflicts. Together, these principles will guide counsel in structuring discovery strategies for cross-border litigation and in anticipating the hurdles to foreign-court assistance in U.S. courts.