Judicial Factfinding Permitted for § 609.035 Arson–Concealment Exception; Clarified Standards for “Significant Relationship” and “Past Pattern” in Minnesota First-Degree Domestic‑Abuse Murder

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Melvin Bilbro, 24 N.W.3d 827 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a bench‑trial conviction and sentencing package arising from the brutal killing of Shanna Daniels and an attendant arson set to conceal the crime. The Court issued two holdings of broad significance:

• First, it reaffirmed and refined evidentiary standards for first‑degree domestic‑abuse murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6), emphasizing how a short but intense romantic/sexual relationship can be “significant” under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b), and how a “past pattern of domestic abuse” may be proven across victims and across time, with incarceration periods considered in the proximity analysis.
• Second, it held that the Sixth Amendment jury right recognized in Blakely v. Washington does not apply to the threshold factfinding under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 4 (the arson‑to‑conceal exception) that permits multiple sentences for offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident. Because such a finding does not increase the statutory or guidelines maximum of any individual sentence, no sentencing jury is required.

The parties were represented by the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender’s Office for the appellant and the Minnesota Attorney General and Ramsey County Attorney for the State. Justice Hennesy authored the unanimous opinion affirming the conviction and consecutive sentences (life without release for first‑degree domestic‑abuse murder and 57 months for first‑degree arson).

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for first‑degree domestic‑abuse murder. The State proved (1) that Bilbro and Daniels were in a “significant romantic or sexual relationship,” thereby making Daniels a “family or household member” and bringing the killing within “domestic abuse,” and (2) that Bilbro had engaged in a “past pattern of domestic abuse,” demonstrated through multiple prior acts against a former partner, A.B., including two assaults (one resulting in a gross‑misdemeanor domestic‑assault conviction and another established through credible testimony) and a knife attack causing permanent loss of vision that constituted first‑degree assault (an enumerated predicate under the domestic‑abuse statute).

On sentencing, the Court rejected the argument that Blakely required a jury to decide whether the arson was committed “for the purpose of concealing” the murder under § 609.035, subd. 4. That finding merely determines whether multiple sentences may be imposed notwithstanding the single‑behavioral‑incident rule; it does not enlarge the maximum authorized penalty for either offense. Because each individual sentence remained within the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, judicial factfinding at that threshold did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. The judgment and consecutive sentences were therefore affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Sanchez‑Diaz, 683 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 2004) and State v. Lopez, 908 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 2018): These cases articulate the standard for sufficiency‑of‑the‑evidence review—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the district court’s credibility determinations in bench trials as in jury trials. The Court applied this deferential lens to both the “significant relationship” and “past pattern” elements.
• State v. Latino, 15 N.W.3d 654 (Minn. 2025): Reiterates deference to a district court sitting as factfinder. It underscores why the Supreme Court credited the district court’s assessment of A.B.’s testimony regarding prior abuse.
• State v. Johnson, 773 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 2009) and State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1995): Stand for the principle that a “pattern” requires more than one prior act and looks to whether the abuse reflects a “regular way of acting.”
• State v. Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. 2013): Emphasizes proximity in time—acts not sufficiently proximate may fail to establish a pattern—but without imposing a rigid temporal cutoff.
• State v. Heller, 12 N.W.3d 452 (Minn. 2024): The Court relied on Heller to reinforce that a pattern may span decades if the abuse recurs with some regularity and that single acts against multiple partners may demonstrate a “regular way of acting.” This was central to concluding that a five‑and‑a‑half‑year gap post‑release did not break the pattern, especially in light of a nine‑year incarceration.
• State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 2007): Provides a narrow example where old acts were too remote given 13 nonviolent years living together with the same victim. The Court distinguished Clark by noting that (a) most of Bilbro’s intervening non‑abusive period was spent in prison, and (b) there is no comparable extended record of nonviolence in a similar relationship setting.
• State v. Cross, 577 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1998) and Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 2014): Confirm that convictions are not required to prove the predicate domestic‑abuse acts; credible testimony suffices to establish the acts themselves.
• State v. Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2004): A single credible witness can prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt—key to crediting A.B.’s testimony about the push causing a cut.
• State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 2023): Supports inference of intent from the natural and probable consequences of conduct (e.g., an intentional push into a wall infers intent to inflict bodily harm).
• State v. Gisege, 561 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1997): Clarifies lesser‑included doctrine. The district court mistakenly equated assault as a lesser‑included of attempted second‑degree murder. The Supreme Court corrected that doctrinal point but upheld the use of the underlying conduct as first‑degree assault to satisfy an enumerated domestic‑abuse predicate.
• Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005); State v. Rourke, 773 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 2009): These authorities frame Minnesota’s Blakely doctrine: the “statutory maximum” for Sixth Amendment purposes is the top of the presumptive guidelines range unless facts found by a jury (or admitted) justify more. The Court harmonized its holding with Blakely by noting that the § 609.035 finding did not change the maximum or minimum sentence for either offense.
• State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1995) and State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 161 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1968): Explain the purposes of § 609.035’s single‑behavioral‑incident rule and its legislative character, as well as its designated exceptions allowing multiple sentences—including for arson committed to conceal another crime.
• Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): Cited to show that the U.S. Supreme Court did not expand Blakely beyond facts that increase the maximum or minimum sentence; Erlinger reaffirms the Blakely rule rather than extending it to threshold multiple‑sentencing conditions that do not alter any individual offense’s range.

Legal Reasoning

1) “Significant romantic or sexual relationship” under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)

The statute instructs courts to consider four factors: length, type, frequency of interaction, and if terminated, how long since termination. Although the relationship here spanned only 47 days, the Court emphasized qualitative markers:

• Rapid development of intimacy (sleeping together, sexual relationship, exchanging nude photos).
• Frequent, affectionate communications (terms of endearment, mutual declarations of love, talk of marriage).
• Third‑party observations supporting a romantic relationship (neighbors and property manager perceived them as dating).

These qualitative indicators outweighed the short temporal duration. The Court’s approach confirms that “significance” is not measured strictly by calendar length but by the relational substance and intensity reflected in the statutory factors.

2) “Past pattern of domestic abuse” under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6)

The Court reiterated that a “pattern” requires more than one act and focuses on whether domestic abuse is the defendant’s “regular way of acting.” Applying that standard:

• The State proved three prior acts against A.B. beyond a reasonable doubt:
  • A push resulting in a gross‑misdemeanor domestic‑assault conviction.
  • A separate push into a wall causing a cut near A.B.’s eye (proved via credible testimony; no conviction required).
  • A knife attack creating permanent partial blindness—qualifying as first‑degree assault because it inflicted “great bodily harm,” an enumerated predicate for “domestic abuse.”
• The Court corrected a doctrinal misstep by the district court (assault is not a lesser‑included of second‑degree murder) but held the underlying conduct independently satisfied first‑degree assault.
• On proximity, the Court declined a rigid cutoff. It discounted the nine‑year prison term’s weight in the proximity analysis because incarceration limits opportunities for domestic abuse in the community and there was no evidence of relevant qualifying relationships while incarcerated. Post‑release, the five‑and‑a‑half‑year period without known abuse did not break the “regular way of acting” where the new relationship with Daniels lasted only 47 days before lethal violence, and where the prior abuse against A.B. was escalating and frequent during their short relationship. This factual constellation differs meaningfully from Clark’s 13 years of peaceful cohabitation with the same partner.
• The Court drew support from Heller, emphasizing that patterns may be demonstrated through single acts across different partners over time and that sustained, unremarkable gaps can coexist with a pattern when the overall history is of recurring violence.

Bottom line: the record showed domestic abuse as Bilbro’s “regular way of acting,” satisfying the pattern requirement beyond a reasonable doubt.

3) Sixth Amendment and the § 609.035, subd. 4 arson–concealment exception

Minnesota’s single‑behavioral‑incident rule ordinarily bars multiple punishments for one incident (§ 609.035, subd. 1), but subdivision 4 provides a targeted exception: when arson is committed to conceal another crime, a court may impose a separate sentence for arson and for the underlying offense. The district court found that Bilbro set two points of origin—the mattress and Daniels’s body—after killing her, which supported a concealment purpose and triggered the exception.

The Supreme Court concluded that Blakely does not apply to this concealment finding because it does not increase the maximum or minimum for any individual offense; it merely removes a statutory bar to imposing multiple sentences that each remain within their guidelines ranges. Under Minnesota’s Blakely jurisprudence (Shattuck; Rourke), the relevant “statutory maximum” is the presumptive guidelines maximum. Here, both the life‑without‑release murder sentence and the 57‑month arson sentence were individually authorized by the guidelines. Thus, the concealment finding is not a “Blakely fact.”

The Court also noted that Erlinger did not expand Blakely; it reconfirmed that only facts increasing exposure to punishment (higher maximums or minimums) require jury findings. The concealment determination did neither. This rationale aligns with broader federal doctrine permitting judicial factfinding for consecutive‑sentencing decisions that do not alter individual offense maxima (consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Oregon v. Ice).

Impact and Implications

Domestic‑Violence Homicide Prosecutions

• Prosecutors can satisfy the “significant relationship” prong with robust qualitative evidence—text messages, affectionate language, sexual intimacy, and third‑party observations—even where the relationship is brief.
• For the “past pattern” element, prosecutors may rely on credible testimony of uncharged acts and on prior convictions, and may link severe acts (e.g., attempted murder) to enumerated predicates by proving the conduct also constituted first‑degree assault.
• Proximity remains fact‑intensive. Incarceration periods are of “limited relevance” and do not necessarily reset the pattern analysis. A non‑violent window of several years does not automatically defeat a pattern when the new relationship quickly escalates to severe violence and the prior relationship featured repeated, escalating abuse.

Sentencing Practice under § 609.035

• District courts may continue to make concealment findings under § 609.035, subd. 4, without convening a sentencing jury, provided each individual sentence imposed conforms to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Defense objections grounded in Blakely will not prevail in this context.
• Charging and proof strategies for the State should foreground concrete evidence of concealment (multiple points of origin in fires, post‑homicide staging, efforts to destroy evidence). Defense counsel should meet those proofs with focused factual challenges rather than constitutional jury‑right arguments.
• Expect analogous reasoning to apply to other § 609.035 exceptions that turn on threshold facts permitting multiple sentences, so long as no individual sentence is aggravated beyond the guidelines maximum on judicial factfinding alone.

Doctrinal Clarifications for Trial Courts

• Assault is not a lesser‑included offense of second‑degree murder (Gisege). Trial courts should avoid conflating lesser‑included doctrine with the separate question of whether past conduct independently meets an enumerated domestic‑abuse predicate.
• Credibility findings matter. A single victim’s testimony can establish a prior act beyond a reasonable doubt if the district court finds it credible (Foreman).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Domestic‑abuse murder (Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(6)):
  • Requires a killing “while committing domestic abuse.”
  • Domestic abuse consists of certain crimes (e.g., assault, criminal sexual conduct, threats of violence) against a “family or household member.”
  • “Family or household member” includes persons in a “significant romantic or sexual relationship.”
  • There must be a “past pattern of domestic abuse” against the decedent or any other family/household member.
• Significant romantic or sexual relationship (Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)):
  • Courts weigh: length; type; frequency of interaction; and, if ended, time since termination.
  • Intensity and nature of interactions can outweigh short duration.
• Past pattern:
  • Means more than one prior act and asks whether domestic abuse is the defendant’s “regular way of acting.”
  • Convictions are not required; credible testimony can establish prior acts.
  • Proximity in time is fact‑specific; incarceration may reduce the weight of a “gap.”
• Great bodily harm vs. bodily harm:
  • “Bodily harm” includes physical pain or injury; “great bodily harm” includes permanent or protracted loss or impairment (e.g., permanent partial blindness).
  • First‑degree assault requires infliction of great bodily harm.
• Blakely and Minnesota’s guidelines maximum:
  • Blakely requires a jury for facts that increase the authorized maximum or minimum sentence.
  • In Minnesota, the “maximum” is the presumptive guidelines maximum unless a jury finds additional facts.
  • Findings that permit multiple sentences under § 609.035, subd. 4, do not increase an individual offense’s maximum; they merely allow separate sentences, each within its own range.
• Single‑behavioral‑incident rule (Minn. Stat. § 609.035):
  • General rule: only one sentence when multiple offenses arise from the same behavioral incident.
  • Exceptions: the Legislature has carved out specific circumstances—such as arson committed to conceal another crime—where multiple sentences are permitted.

Conclusion

State v. Bilbro cements two important propositions in Minnesota criminal law. On the substantive offense of first‑degree domestic‑abuse murder, it underscores that the “significance” of a romantic or sexual relationship is a qualitative, not purely temporal, inquiry, and that a “past pattern” may be shown through multiple acts across partners with a flexible, context‑sensitive proximity analysis that accounts for incarceration and the rapidity with which violence emerges in a new relationship. On sentencing, the decision draws a clear constitutional line: Blakely’s jury‑trial right does not extend to judicial findings that unlock the Legislature’s exceptions to the single‑behavioral‑incident rule, so long as each individual sentence remains within the guidelines’ authorized range.

Practically, prosecutors now have a reinforced pathway to prove first‑degree domestic‑abuse murder in cases with brief but intense relationships and prior abuse histories, and district courts can make concealment findings under § 609.035, subd. 4, without convening a sentencing jury. Defense counsel should respond with focused factual challenges to “significance,” “pattern,” and “concealment,” rather than constitutional objections under Blakely. The opinion provides a comprehensive, fact‑driven framework that will shape domestic‑violence homicide prosecutions and multiple‑sentencing analyses in Minnesota for years to come.