Johnson v. Spalding County: The Eleventh Circuit Tightens the Double-Hearsay Gate at Summary Judgment and Re-affirms that a “Convincing Mosaic” Is Not a Separate Test

Introduction

Happy Johnson, the chief counselor at the Spalding County Correctional Institute (“SCCI”), brought a Title VII gender- discrimination claim and an associational-disability claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) after she was passed over for a deputy-warden position that ultimately went to a male colleague, Eric Sellers. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Spalding County. On appeal, Johnson challenged three principal rulings: (1) the exclusion of a declaration the district court deemed inadmissible double hearsay; (2) the finding that she failed to create a triable issue of pretext or a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination; and (3) the rejection of her mixed-motive theory. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in full.

Although the court did not break new doctrinal ground on Title VII or ADA standards, the opinion is noteworthy for two clarifications that will reverberate through future employment-discrimination litigation in the circuit:

It underscores that each tier of double hearsay must be covered by a hearsay exclusion or exception and the proponent must come forward with concrete evidence (not hopes) that the testimony will be obtainable in admissible form at trial.
It reiterates—citing the 2024 en banc decision in McCreight v. AuburnBank—that the “convincing mosaic” metaphor adds nothing to the traditional summary-judgment inquiry.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Brasher, and Wilson) reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and its grant of summary judgment de novo.

Hearsay Ruling. Johnson relied on a declaration from former administrative assistant Joni Adams, who recounted statements by another assistant (Angie Perdue) who in turn repeated remarks by Warden Carl Humphrey. The court characterized this as “hearsay within hearsay.” While Humphrey’s statements to Perdue qualified for the Rule 801(d)(2)(D) party-opponent exclusion, Perdue’s statements to Adams did not. Johnson provided no affidavit, deposition, or commitment indicating Perdue would testify, so the declaration could not be “reduced to admissible form.” Exclusion affirmed.
Pretext Under McDonnell Douglas. The County articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason: Sellers outscored Johnson in a structured interview and had broader operational experience. Johnson’s evidence (her past performance evaluations and Humphrey’s alleged remark that he needed to “lay off” her because of her husband’s illness) did not undermine that reason.
“Convincing Mosaic.” Without evidence that the hiring panel knew about Johnson’s husband’s disability or her gender, the same facts that failed at the pretext stage could not form a “convincing mosaic.” The panel reiterated that the phrase is “a metaphor, not a legal test.”
Mixed-Motive Theory. Because the only gender-related evidence (Humphrey’s alleged desire for a male deputy) was embedded in the excluded declaration, Johnson lacked admissible proof that sex was even “a motivating factor.”

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2012) – establishes that hearsay is inadmissible at summary judgment unless it can be reduced to admissible form.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) – party-opponent exclusion, applied to Humphrey’s statements.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – burden-shifting template for circumstantial evidence.
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) & Brooks v. Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2006) – require proof that the proffered reason was both false and discriminatory.
Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019); McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) – define and cabin the “convincing mosaic” concept.
Quigg v. Thomas County School District, 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016) – mixed-motive standard under § 2000e-2(m).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Double Hearsay at Summary Judgment.
The panel applied a two-step analysis mandated by Rule 805:

Identify each layer of hearsay.
Verify that each layer is covered by an exclusion or exception and can realistically be presented in admissible form at trial.

Johnson satisfied the first layer (Humphrey → Perdue) but not the second (Perdue → Adams). A “hope” that Perdue might testify is insufficient under McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1996). The ruling elevates the evidentiary bar by requiring litigants to concretely demonstrate future admissibility, not simply speculate.

b) Pretext Analysis.
Even viewed most favorably to Johnson, the record showed Sellers (i) scored highest in the blind, structured interview conducted by three wardens, and (ii) possessed broader operational knowledge. Johnson offered no comparative metrics undermining those twin rationales. Her favorable performance appraisals measured a different skill set and thus could not create “implausibilities or incoherencies” in the County’s justification.

c) Convincing Mosaic.
Post-McCreight, the Eleventh Circuit reads “convincing mosaic” as merely shorthand for the overarching summary-judgment test. Without specific facts establishing a triable issue, the metaphor cannot salvage a weak case. By declining to treat the phrase as a freestanding doctrinal pathway, the court harmonizes its precedent and prevents plaintiffs from bypassing McDonnell Douglas with generic accusations of “mosaic.”

d) Mixed-Motive.
Section 2000e-2(m) allows liability where a protected trait is “a motivating factor,” but some evidence of that motivation is essential. Because the only arguably gender-related statement was stricken as hearsay, Johnson’s mixed-motive claim failed at step one.

3. Impact of the Judgment

Evidentiary Strategy: Litigants must line up admissible testimony—affidavits, depositions, declarations of intent—before summary-judgment briefing. Mere conjecture that a witness “could” testify will not suffice.
HR & Hiring Panels: The opinion validates structured, score-based interview panels as strong evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory decision-making.
“Convincing Mosaic” Doctrine: By re-emphasizing that the phrase is a metaphor, the court reduces doctrinal confusion and likely curtails reliance on amorphous “bits and pieces” arguments in lieu of concrete comparators.
ADA Associational Claims: Plaintiffs must connect decision-makers’ knowledge of the association (here, husband’s illness) to the adverse action; generalized workplace sympathy will not carry the day.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it says. Unless an exception applies, it is inadmissible.
Double Hearsay: A statement that contains another statement—both levels must be admissible.
Summary Judgment: Early case dismissal because no reasonable jury could rule for the non-moving party on the available evidence.
McDonnell Douglas Framework: A three-step test—(1) prima facie case, (2) employer’s legitimate reason, (3) plaintiff’s proof of pretext.
Convincing Mosaic: A collection of circumstantial facts that, together, support an inference of discrimination; not a separate legal doctrine.
Mixed-Motive: A claim that discriminatory and legitimate reasons both played a part. The plaintiff needs only show the protected trait was a motivating factor, not the sole factor.

Conclusion

Johnson’s defeat underscores the centrality of evidentiary rigor at the summary-judgment stage. The Eleventh Circuit has now made plain that:

Plaintiffs must cure every layer of hearsay with concrete, trial-ready evidence.
High evaluation scores cannot overcome objective, panel-generated interview data unless the plaintiff can show those scores are themselves tainted or that the panel process is a sham.
The “convincing mosaic” metaphor will not rescue a claim absent specific, admissible facts creating a genuine dispute.

Going forward, employment litigants in the Eleventh Circuit must treat evidentiary preparation—not just legal draftsmanship—as the lynchpin of surviving summary judgment. Johnson v. Spalding County thus serves as a cautionary tale and a clarifying precedent on the admissibility of double hearsay and the limited utility of the “convincing mosaic” shorthand.