Iowa Narrows the Safe Harbor from No‑Contest Clauses: Subjective Good Faith, Restatement (Third) Probable Cause, and Burden on the Challenger in In re Estate of Felten

Case: In the Matter of the Estate of Rex L. Felten, deceased (No. 24‑1053)
Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date: Filed November 25, 2025
Opinions: Waterman, J. (plurality, joined by Oxley, J.); May, J. (concurring in the judgment, joined by McDonald, J.); McDermott, J. (dissenting, joined by Christensen, C.J.); Mansfield, J. took no part.

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I. Introduction

This decision is a major modern restatement of Iowa law on “no‑contest” (in terrorem) clauses in wills. Such clauses threaten a beneficiary with forfeiture of their gift if they contest the will. Iowa has long recognized a “safe harbor” for challengers who act in good faith and with probable cause. But the governing standards had not been revisited at the supreme court level since 1950. In In re Estate of Felten, the court:

• Clarifies who bears the burden of proof in disputes over no‑contest clauses.
• Defines “good faith” as a subjective standard.
• Replaces the old Restatement (First) of Torts probable‑cause test with a more targeted Restatement (Third) of Property standard.
• Applies those clarified rules to uphold the disinheritance of a daughter who unsuccessfully challenged her father’s will.

The case also exposes a deep philosophical divide on the court about the proper role and strength of no‑contest clauses: the plurality tightens, but preserves, the safe harbor; a concurrence suggests Iowa should, in a future case, return to automatic enforcement of such clauses; and a dissent argues that under the clarified rules, the daughter did satisfy good faith and probable cause and should not lose her inheritance.

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II. Background: The Family, the Will, and the Contest

A. The Felten family and Rex’s decline

Rex L. Felten, a farmer from near Maquoketa, Iowa, had three children: daughters Karen and Kathy, and a son Kenneth. After his wife Mildred died in 2002, Rex lived alone and struggled with health and mobility issues. Kathy moved in during the mid‑2000s to help, and by 2013 she was providing full‑time care: feeding, bathing, managing medications, errands, and dealing with incontinence. Rex granted Kathy power of attorney (POA) over his finances.

Rex’s health worsened. He became forgetful and paranoid and was diagnosed with mild dementia. His mother and sister had also had dementia, and Kathy saw similar patterns in him. His vision failed, requiring cataract surgeries in late 2019 and early 2020.

B. The arrival of Karen and the shift in control

In December 2019, Karen moved into Rex’s home. The sisters clashed intensely. Kathy moved out, leaving Karen as primary caregiver. Rex revoked Kathy’s POA in April 2020 and gave POA to Karen in January 2020. Karen installed cameras in Rex’s home and limited Kathy’s access.

In April 2021, Karen wrote Rex a letter severely disparaging Kathy, including:

• Accusing Kathy of wishing Rex had died instead of their mother.
• Labeling Kathy both a “liar” and a “thief.”
• Asserting that Kathy had committed “Financial Elder Abuse” with his finances and warning Karen herself could face jail if she failed to report it (though at trial Karen admitted she had no evidence of theft).

Kathy did not see this letter until after filing her will contest.

C. Rex’s history of changing wills

Rex had a long history of altering his estate plan, sometimes providing for and sometimes disinheriting his children, and he had used no‑contest clauses in prior wills. When considering changes, he typically visited his lawyer, Billy Coakley, often with Kathy present. They would discuss the effect of changes and tax consequences.

After Kathy moved out and Karen assumed the caregiving role, Rex and Karen discussed new estate plans. Karen took notes on his wishes. By summer 2021, working with Coakley, Rex decided to overhaul his will:

• Karen would receive most of the real property (i.e., the bulk of the estate).
• Kathy would receive a burial plot and the income from a trust, with Karen as trustee.
• Kenneth would receive only a yellow toolbox.
• The will contained a robust no‑contest clause disinheriting any beneficiary who, directly or indirectly, challenged the will’s validity or sought to resist probate—treating that beneficiary as having predeceased Rex without issue.

The clause contained a narrow carve‑out allowing a beneficiary to enforce rights under the will in equity without triggering forfeiture.

D. The attorney and doctor’s steps to document capacity

Coakley anticipated a will contest and sought to shore up the will’s defensibility. He directed Rex to undergo a cognitive evaluation.

On June 23, 2021, Rex’s family physician, Dr. Kimberly Thompson, administered a cognitive test. Rex scored perfectly. Dr. Thompson wrote that Rex “has been evaluated and is mentally competent to make his own decisions at this time.” Coakley placed the letter in his file. Kathy was unaware of this letter when she filed her will contest.

Coakley then made a house call; on July 2, 2021, he witnessed Rex execute the new will. Rex died nineteen days later, on July 21, 2021, at age eighty‑nine.

E. The will contest and jury verdict

Karen, as executor, admitted the will to probate. Kenneth and Kathy contested it, alleging:

1. Lack of testamentary capacity.
2. Undue influence by Karen.
3. Intentional interference with their inheritance.

Karen counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging the contest was brought in bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim, noting factual issues around execution of the will and quoting Iowa precedent that supports “protecting the right of ready access to the courts.”

The will‑contest claims were tried to a jury. The court denied Karen’s motion for directed verdict, holding there was sufficient evidence on each claim to go to the jury. The jury ultimately rejected all three of Kathy and Kenneth’s claims.

F. Enforcement of the no‑contest clause and appeal

Following the verdict, Karen filed a final report for Rex’s estate. Invoking the no‑contest clause, the report treated Kathy and Kenneth as having forfeited their gifts by contesting the will. Kathy (but not Kenneth) filed objections, arguing that she should still take under the will because her challenge had been made in good faith and with probable cause.

After a nonevidentiary hearing at which neither side introduced new evidence, the district court overruled Kathy’s objections, stating:

Having heard the testimony of the parties at trial and reviewed the pleadings, this Court FINDS that Kathy's claim lacked good faith and probable cause to contest the Will.

Kathy appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court retained the case to clarify “good faith” and “probable cause” standards in this context, citing that it had not revisited them since 1950.

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III. Summary of the Court’s Opinions

A. The plurality (Waterman, J., joined by Oxley, J.)

The plurality affirms the enforcement of the no‑contest clause and disinheritance of Kathy, while substantially restating Iowa law on no‑contest clauses.

Key holdings and clarifications:

1. Burden of proof: The challenger to the will (the beneficiary seeking to avoid the no‑contest penalty) bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the contest was brought in good faith and with probable cause.
2. Standard of review: On appeal from an order on objections to a final report in probate, the review is de novo (equitable), with deference to the trial court’s factual findings.
3. Good faith:
   • Good faith is a purely subjective standard—focused on the challenger’s actual honest belief and purpose.
   • This is distinct from probable cause, which is objective.
4. Probable cause:
   • The court adopts the definition in comment c to §8.5 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers:

   Probable cause exists when, at the time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.

   • Advice of independent legal counsel is a factor but not controlling.
   • The focus is on facts known when the suit was filed, not on how the case ultimately turned out.
5. Totality of the circumstances: Courts must infer the existence or absence of good faith and probable cause from the totality of the circumstances, rather than any rigid factor checklist.
6. Length of jury deliberations: The plurality expressly cautions against giving significant weight to the length of jury deliberations as an indicator of probable cause.
7. Application to Kathy:
   • Giving deference to the trial judge’s finding that Kathy lacked good faith and probable cause, and reviewing the record, the plurality holds Kathy did not carry her burden.
   • Key to this conclusion is the absence of evidence about what facts Kathy provided her lawyer, what pre‑suit investigation occurred, and what legal advice she received about the strength of her claims.

The plurality describes no‑contest clauses as a “roaring lion” (borrowing Chief Justice Evans’s famous metaphor from the 1909 Moran dissent), but says Iowa keeps “the lion on a leash” by preserving a safe harbor for challengers who can prove both subjective good faith and robust probable cause.

B. The concurrence (May, J., joined by McDonald, J.)

The concurrence agrees with the judgment (Kathy is disinherited) but signals openness to abolishing the safe‑harbor exception altogether in a future case and returning to automatic enforcement of no‑contest clauses.

Justice May emphasizes:

• The narrowness of the issues presented: no party asked the court to overrule Cocklin (which created the good‑faith/probable‑cause exception), so the exception remains law.
• He nonetheless questions whether the exception is wise, arguing:
  • The core function of probate courts is to carry out the testator’s intent, including conditions attached to gifts.
  • No‑contest clauses are simply another lawful condition: “do not challenge the will if you want the gift.”
  • A no‑contest clause does not bar access to the courts; it merely changes the risk‑reward calculus, akin to contractual fee‑shifting provisions that Iowa enforces.
  • There is no clear legislative policy in Iowa against such clauses (unlike, for example, Florida’s statute invalidating them).
  • Strong public‑policy reasons favor automatic enforcement: preserving estate assets, reducing intra‑family strife, and protecting privacy (avoiding public airing of family conflict and a testator’s medical issues).

Justice May uses a counter‑metaphor, likening no‑contest clauses less to a dangerous lion and more to Aslan, the benevolent lion of Narnia: a powerful protector of testamentary intent. He suggests that perhaps no‑contest clauses ought to be enforced “as written,” with only narrow, exceptional limits.

C. The dissent (McDermott, J., joined by Christensen, C.J.)

The dissent agrees with the legal framework—that no‑contest clauses are unenforceable when a challenger proves subjective good faith and objective probable cause—but concludes that Kathy did meet that standard under the clarified rules.

Justice McDermott emphasizes:

• The need to preserve the safe harbor so that beneficiaries are not deterred from exposing wills tainted by incapacity or undue influence.
• Probable cause must be evaluated at the time of filing, based on what Kathy actually knew: longstanding dementia, proximity of new will to Rex’s death, Karen’s influence and hostility, and a sharp change in testamentary disposition favoring Karen.
• These facts, the dissent argues, comfortably satisfy the Restatement (Third) definition: a reasonable, properly informed person could see a substantial likelihood of success.
• The district court already had a full trial record; a separate evidentiary hearing on the final report was not a “put up or shut up moment” akin to resisting summary judgment.
• Advice‑of‑counsel evidence is of limited value because parties can almost always find a lawyer to file a case; and here, Kathy’s lawyer made a professional representation that, based on the facts, he would file the same case again.
• It is unrealistic to fault Kathy for not discovering Coakley’s request for cognitive testing or Dr. Thompson’s favorable capacity letter before filing; and even if she had, the mere fact that the lawyer sought testing could strengthen—rather than weaken—suspicions about capacity.

The dissent warns that today’s decision will skew the balance too far in favor of rigid enforcement of no‑contest clauses, “allow[ing] schemers to profit from their misconduct” by deterring meritorious challenges.

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IV. Precedents and Authorities: How the Court Reworked the Doctrinal Landscape

A. Iowa’s historical trajectory on no‑contest clauses

1. Moran v. Moran (1909)
   

   Early Iowa law enforced no‑contest clauses strictly. In Moran, the court treated such clauses as valid and enforceable regardless of the challenger’s motives or the reasonableness of their claims.

   Chief Justice Evans dissented in a passage that became highly influential decades later. He described no‑contest clauses as a “roaring lion” that “terrorize[s] every beneficiary of the will,” suppressing the truth and impeding the probate court’s duty to investigate validity before admitting a will to probate.

2. Cocklin v. Watkins (In re Cocklin’s Estate) (1945)
   

   In 1945, the Iowa Supreme Court overruled Moran and adopted a middle‑ground approach. In Cocklin, the court:

   • Extensively quoted Chief Justice Evans’s “roaring lion” dissent.
   • Surveyed other states’ approaches.
   • Held that a no‑contest clause would not be enforced where a will challenge was brought in good faith and for probable cause.

   Cocklin did not comprehensively define “good faith” or “probable cause,” but found those elements present where:

   • The challengers acted on advice of counsel.
   • The trial court sent issues of capacity and undue influence to the jury.
   • The jury deliberated for roughly 35 hours before reaching a verdict.
3. Geisinger v. Geisinger (1950)
   

   Geisinger refined the doctrine by borrowing a definition of probable cause from civil malicious prosecution:

   One has probable cause for initiating civil proceedings against another if he reasonably believes in the existence of facts upon which his claim is based and reasonably believes that under such facts the claim may be valid at common law or under an existing statute, or so believes in reliance upon the advice of counsel….

   This definition, rooted in the Restatement (First) of Torts §675, emphasized:

   • The challenger’s reasonable belief in facts and legal validity.
   • The importance of advice of counsel as a way to demonstrate reasonableness.

   However, the court did not further systematize how to apply this test over time.

4. Estate of Workman v. Workman (Iowa Ct. App. 2017, unpublished)
   

   Although nonprecedential, Workman became a practical reference point. The court of appeals:

   • Surveyed national authority and secondary sources.
   • Outlined various factors for good faith/probable cause, including:
     • Reliance on informed legal advice.
     • Understanding of testator’s intentions.
     • Consistency of testator’s conduct with those intentions.
     • Susceptibility of the testator (e.g., mental weakness).
     • Whether the case went to the jury and how long the jury deliberated.
   • Emphasized advice of counsel as a “key factor.”

   The panel affirmed enforcement of the no‑contest clause, finding the challenger had failed to establish probable cause and good faith. A dissenting judge would have found the safe harbor satisfied.

B. National approaches and the Restatement (Third)

The plurality situates Iowa’s doctrine against three broad national models:

1. Strict enforcement: No‑contest clauses enforced according to their terms, regardless of good faith or probable cause (e.g., Missouri, Wyoming).
2. Void as against policy: No‑contest clauses are unenforceable as a matter of statute or strong public policy (e.g., Florida Stat. §732.517).
3. Middle ground: enforceable absent probable cause:
   • Following the Uniform Probate Code and Restatement (Third) of Property, many states enforce no‑contest clauses unless the challenger had probable cause.
   • Some of these regimes consider good faith implicitly; others, like Iowa, explicitly require both good faith and probable cause.

The Restatement (Third) of Property §8.5:

• States that a clause penalizing challenges is enforceable unless probable cause exists.
• Defines probable cause (comment c) in terms of evidence that would lead a reasonable, properly advised person to see a substantial likelihood of success at the time the proceeding is instituted.
• Lists advice of independent legal counsel as a factor bearing on probable cause.

Felten embraces this Restatement (Third) definition and explicitly moves away from the older malicious‑prosecution standard of the Restatement (First) of Torts.

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V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Allocating the burden of proof

Prior Iowa precedent had not clearly stated which party bears the burden of proving or disproving good faith and probable cause. The court of appeals in Workman implicitly placed the burden on the challenger

The plurality adopts the Restatement (Third) approach, holding:

• The beneficiary seeking to avoid forfeiture under a no‑contest clause (here, Kathy) bears the burden to show good faith and probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence.
• This aligns with:
  • General Iowa principles that the party who would suffer if an issue is not established typically bears the burden.
  • The challenger’s superior access to information about what they knew and did before filing suit.
  • A presumption of validity in favor of the testator’s donative intent expressed in the will, including the no‑contest clause.

B. Good faith as a subjective standard

Iowa law uses the term “good faith” in many contexts, sometimes objectively, sometimes subjectively (e.g., subjective good faith for immunity in child‑abuse reporting).

The plurality reasons:

• Because probable cause is explicitly objective, if “good faith” were also objective, it would become redundant.
• When a doctrine requires both good faith and objective reasonableness, the good‑faith component should be purely subjective.

Accordingly, in the no‑contest context:

• Good faith asks whether the challenger honestly believed in the legitimacy of the challenge and was not motivated by malice, harassment, or an improper purpose (e.g., to “bleed out” estate resources).
• Probable cause is separately assessed under an objective “reasonable person, properly informed and advised” standard.

This bifurcation is significant: a challenger must satisfy both prongs to avoid forfeiture.

C. Probable cause under the Restatement (Third): a more demanding standard

The court expressly abandons the 1950 Geisinger adoption of the malicious‑prosecution probable cause definition in favor of the Restatement (Third) of Property approach.

Under the new standard, probable cause requires evidence that would lead a reasonable, properly informed person to conclude there was a substantial likelihood of success at the time the contest was filed.

Key features of this standard:

• Time‑of‑filing focus: New facts discovered later (e.g., at trial) are not relevant to whether probable cause existed when the petition was filed.
• “Substantial likelihood” is a relatively high threshold—more than mere plausibility or a non‑frivolous argument; the challenger must show that success appeared significantly likely given the known evidence.
• Totality‑of‑the‑circumstances: Courts should evaluate all relevant facts, not follow a rigid checklist. Factors may include:
  • Known medical or cognitive history.
  • Patterns of prior estate planning.
  • Relationships of dependence and influence.
  • Information reasonably obtainable through pre‑suit inquiry.
  • Advice of independent counsel, if based on full disclosure of facts.
• Advice of counsel as non‑dispositive:
  • Whether a challenger relied on independent legal advice is a factor supporting probable cause.
  • But because representation is common and attorneys can sometimes be found to take weak cases, it is not controlling.
  • As the plurality notes, this approach avoids unduly penalizing pro se challengers but still values robust legal vetting.

The plurality also expressly downplays some of the Cocklin/Workman era factors, especially:

• The length of jury deliberations—too variable and potentially driven by case complexity or jury dynamics unrelated to the merits.
• The mere fact that the trial court denied directed verdict or summary judgment—since trial judges are encouraged under Iowa’s “Uhlenhopp rule” to send cases to juries to avoid retrials in case of appellate error.

D. Application to Kathy’s case

Under the clarified framework, the plurality conducts a de novo review, with deference to the trial judge’s factual findings, particularly regarding credibility.

The plurality acknowledges that there was evidence at trial that could raise suspicions:

• Rex’s dementia diagnosis and health decline.
• Kathy’s prior caregiving role and displacement by Karen.
• Karen’s hostile letter and control over Rex’s environment and access.
• The significant shift in estate disposition favoring Karen and sharply diminishing Kathy’s and Kenneth’s shares.
• The short time (19 days) between execution of the new will and Rex’s death.

Yet, for the no‑contest analysis, the court considers:

• The evidence that Rex’s attorney took precautionary steps to confirm capacity:
  • Recommending cognitive testing, conducted by Rex’s longtime doctor.
  • Receiving an unequivocal letter that Rex was “mentally competent to make his own decisions” at the relevant time.
• Rex’s history of frequent will changes, including prior use of no‑contest clauses—undermining the theory that Karen newly imposed the clause on a susceptible testator.
• The district court’s explicit factual finding, after observing all witnesses, that Kathy lacked good faith and probable cause.

Most crucially, the plurality focuses on the absence of evidence from Kathy on key issues for which she bore the burden:

• No testimony or documents about:
  • What specific facts Kathy conveyed to her lawyer before filing.
  • What factual investigation she or her lawyer conducted pre‑filing.
  • What advice counsel gave about the strength and likelihood of success of her claims.
• No introduction of Rex’s prior wills, which might have illustrated a dramatic and unexplained departure from prior estate plans (Kathy testified she did not have them but, the court suggests, could have obtained them from Coakley).
• No effort at the final‑report hearing to supplement the record with evidence bearing directly on her subjective good faith and the objective strength of her claims at filing.

Kathy’s reliance on the general certification under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1)—that the petition was “well grounded in fact” and not filed for improper purpose—was deemed insufficient. The plurality distinguishes such routine certifications from the more focused kind of legal advice that can support probable cause in the no‑contest setting: an informed, specific assessment that, given the disclosed facts, there is a substantial likelihood of success.

Given the district court’s finding, the lack of challenger‑side evidence, and the balancing of facts, the plurality concludes that Kathy failed to prove either:

• Subjective good faith (given Rex’s evident desire to include a no‑contest clause to deter exactly this kind of intra‑family litigation); or
• Objective probable cause under the substantial‑likelihood standard.

Therefore, the no‑contest clause is enforced and Kathy’s gifts under the will are forfeited.

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VI. Impact and Implications for Iowa Law and Practice

A. The clarified doctrinal framework

Felten significantly tightens and structures Iowa’s safe harbor from no‑contest clauses. The operative rules going forward can be summarized as:

1. No‑contest clauses remain valid in Iowa but are unenforceable against a challenger who proves they acted:
   • In subjective good faith, and
   • With probable cause, as defined by the Restatement (Third) of Property §8.5 cmt. c.
2. The challenger bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. Good faith is a subjective inquiry into the challenger’s honest belief and motives.
4. Probable cause is an objective assessment at the time of filing, requiring:
   • Evidence that would lead a reasonable, properly informed and advised person to see a substantial likelihood of success.
5. Court must conduct a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances analysis, giving weight to, but not being controlled by, factors such as:
   • Pre‑suit factual investigation.
   • Nature and quality of legal advice received (if any).
   • Known medical and relational context.
   • Testator’s estate‑planning history.

B. Practical consequences for litigants and estate planners

1. For beneficiaries considering a will contest

The decision raises the stakes for beneficiaries who are subject to a no‑contest clause:

• They must assume they will later need to prove both their honest belief and an objectively robust evidentiary basis existing at the time they file.
• They should:
  • Conduct and document a careful pre‑suit factual investigation.
  • Fully disclose known facts to qualified counsel.
  • Consider obtaining written legal opinions or at least preserving evidence of counsel’s assessment of the likelihood of success.
  • Anticipate that reliance on counsel may waive privilege and make counsel a witness if they later invoke “advice of counsel” as a basis for probable cause.

2. For estate planners and testators

Felten arguably makes no‑contest clauses more powerful and predictable:

• The safe harbor is now more clearly defined and calibrated, reducing uncertainty.
• By adopting a relatively demanding “substantial likelihood of success” standard and placing the burden on the challenger, the court strengthens the deterrent effect.
• Estate planners may:
  • Continue or increase the use of no‑contest clauses, especially in families with known conflict.
  • Advise testators to document capacity and voluntariness (e.g., contemporaneous physician letters, as in Rex’s case) precisely because courts will later look at what objective evidence was available.
  • Preserve clear records showing that the no‑contest clause reflects the testator’s longstanding preferences, not a last‑minute manipulation.

3. For probate procedure

In probate practice:

• Objections to final reports that turn on no‑contest clauses will now be understood as substantive evidentiary contests where the challenger must marshal the record or supplement it.
• District courts may:
  • Expect challengers to treat the final‑report hearing as their “opportunity” to present targeted evidence on good faith and probable cause—even if the judge already heard the will‑contest trial.
  • Write more detailed factual findings on challengers’ state of mind and pre‑suit information, given the supreme court’s request for more explicit reasoning.

C. The unresolved policy fault line

The opinions also preview a potential future shift in Iowa law:

• The concurrence questions whether the good‑faith/probable‑cause exception is sound at all and suggests, in a proper case, Iowa might revert to automatic enforcement of no‑contest clauses (subject to the will itself being valid).
• The dissent defends the exception and argues Felten has already made the safe harbor too hard to reach, risking impunity for undue influencers.
• The plurality takes a middle position: keep the exception but raise its evidentiary bar and clarify standards.

For now, the exception stands, but it is narrower and more demanding. Future litigants might ask the court to reconsider Cocklin outright, especially where the facts starkly showcase the costs of will contests (financial, emotional, privacy‑related) in the face of a clear testator intent.

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VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What is a no‑contest (in terrorem) clause?

A no‑contest clause is a provision in a will that says, in substance:

If any beneficiary challenges (contests) this will or any part of it, that beneficiary loses their inheritance under this will.

“In terrorem” is Latin for “by way of threat.” The clause is designed as a deterrent: “Accept what I give you under this will, or risk losing it entirely if you attack it.”

B. What is “good faith” in this context?

Here, “good faith” is about the challenger’s actual state of mind—their honesty and motive:

• Did they genuinely believe they were right to question the will (e.g., they thought dad was not competent or was unduly influenced)?
• Or were they mainly trying to cause trouble, harass others, or leverage a better settlement without caring about the truth?

Evidence can be direct (testimony about belief) or circumstantial (behaviors, communications, lack of extortionary tactics).

C. What is “probable cause” under the Restatement (Third) standard?

Under the adopted definition, probable cause exists at the time of filing if:

There was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.

Key elements:

• It’s about evidence, not just suspicion.
• The hypothetical person is “properly informed and advised,” meaning:
  • They know the relevant facts the challenger could reasonably know.
  • They have been given sound legal guidance about what those facts mean under the law.
• “Substantial likelihood” is more than “barely possible” or “not frivolous.” It suggests a significant chance of winning.

D. Burden of proof and standard of proof

• Burburden of proof: Who must prove the issue?
  • Here, the challenger must prove both good faith and probable cause.
• Standard of proof: “Preponderance of the evidence”:
  • This is the typical civil standard: the evidence makes it more likely than not (over 50%) that the fact is true.

E. De novo review with deference

Because objections to final reports in probate are equitable, appellate review is de novo: the supreme court reviews the law and the facts afresh. But it still gives deference to the trial judge’s factual findings, particularly about credibility, because the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses live.

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VIII. Conclusion: The Significance of Felten in Iowa’s Law of Wills

In re Estate of Felten is a pivotal case in Iowa probate law. It preserves Iowa’s long‑standing compromise between:

• Respecting a testator’s desire to prevent litigation through no‑contest clauses, and
• Ensuring beneficiaries with legitimate concerns about incapacity, undue influence, or other defects are not terrorized into silence.

But the decision significantly recalibrates that compromise:

• By placing the burden squarely on challengers.
• By requiring challengers to prove subjective good faith and a rigorous, Restatement (Third)–style probable cause threshold.
• By reinforcing that contemporaneous evidence of capacity and a history of consistent testamentary intent can weigh heavily in favor of enforcing no‑contest clauses.

The plurality and concurrence signal strong respect for testamentary freedom and a willingness, in a proper case, to consider even stricter enforcement of no‑contest clauses. The dissent, meanwhile, warns that an overly narrow safe harbor may let wrongdoing go unchallenged and deter meritorious claims.

For now, the message to Iowa beneficiaries is clear: contesting a will with a no‑contest clause is possible without forfeiture, but only if the challenger can later demonstrate—not merely assert—that they entered the litigation honestly and with a substantial, evidence‑based likelihood of success known at the time they filed. The lion remains on a leash, but the leash has been shortened and its contours more precisely drawn.