Iowa Clarifies: No Overt Act or Interruption Required to Prove Specific Intent Under § 709.11; Single‑Episode Cross‑Victim Conduct Can Establish Intent

Introduction

In State of Iowa v. Frederick Lee Hawkins III, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed what proof is necessary to sustain convictions for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse under Iowa Code § 709.11. The case arose from a brief but intense sequence of assaults inside a church dining program in Ames, during which the defendant touched three women—M.B., C.C., and E.M.—in quick succession and in enclosed spaces. Hawkins conceded sufficient evidence showed a specific intent to sexually abuse M.B. but argued the State failed to prove he harbored that same intent when he touched C.C. and E.M.

The central issues were: (1) whether § 709.11 requires proof of an “overt act” or an “interruption” beyond the assault showing steps toward a sex act; and (2) whether a defendant’s conduct against one victim can shed light on his specific intent toward other victims assaulted within the same short episode. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, clarifying that § 709.11 is not an inchoate offense requiring a substantial step or interruption and that intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including the pattern of conduct across closely connected victims.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice McDonald (joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justices Waterman, Oxley, and May) held there was substantial evidence to support all three convictions for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The Court emphasized:

Section 709.11 requires two elements: an assault and the specific intent to commit sexual abuse at the time of the assault. It is not an attempt crime and does not require proof of an overt act beyond the assault or proof that the assault was interrupted before a sex act occurred.
Specific intent is commonly proved by circumstantial evidence. Here, the court looked to the entire criminal episode—three assaults in minutes, in enclosed areas of the same church, directed at similar victims—to infer intent.
Hawkins’s clearly sexualized assault of M.B. (isolating her, humping with an erection, forcing his hand under her underwear to her pubic hairline) provided powerful evidence of sexual intent. Combined with his near-contemporaneous assaults on C.C. and E.M., the Court found sufficient evidence that he acted with the same sexual intent toward them.
The Court rejected the view that the State must show a thwarted attempt or “substantial step” toward a sex act to prove intent under § 709.11.

On sentencing, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded for a plenary resentencing because the district court failed to provide reasons for imposing consecutive terms. The court of appeals’ resolution of other issues (including suppression and capacity to form intent) remained final.

Justice Mansfield concurred in part and dissented in part: he would uphold counts I (M.B.) and III (E.M.) but found the evidence insufficient as to count II (C.C.). Justice McDermott dissented: he would uphold only count I and would reduce counts II and III to simple assault, reasoning the State failed to prove overt acts or a thwarted progression toward a sex act for those counts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s opinion synthesizes Iowa sufficiency doctrine and specific-intent jurisprudence with both in-state and out-of-state authority:

Standards for sufficiency and circumstantial proof:
- State v. Dible, 538 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1995): Defines “substantial evidence” and instructs reviewing courts to view the record in the light most favorable to the verdict; direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative.
- State v. Fordyce, 940 N.W.2d 419 (Iowa 2020): All fair inferences and presumptions favor the verdict.
- State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1998) and State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 2021): Specific intent is rarely proved directly and is commonly established by circumstantial evidence.
- State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2021): Evidence isn’t insubstantial because alternate inferences are possible; the question is whether it supports the finding made.
Elements of sexual abuse and the need for more than a “sex-oriented purpose”:
- State v. Baldwin, 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980): The State must prove intent to commit a “sex act” specifically defined in § 702.17, not merely a sex-oriented purpose.
- State v. Martens, 569 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 1997): “Pubic hair” is included within “genitalia,” a point the Court used to characterize Hawkins’s contact with M.B. as contact with genitalia.
“Overt act” discussion in earlier Iowa cases:
- State v. Radeke, 444 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1989); State v. Roby, 188 N.W. 709 (Iowa 1922); State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1992) (en banc): These cases discuss overt acts as strong circumstantial evidence of intent. The dissent leans heavily on them to argue for a “thwarted progression” requirement. The majority distinguishes them, clarifying that overt acts are not elements of § 709.11.
Use of related acts to show intent:
- State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 2010) and State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 1985): Prior or related sexual misconduct can be relevant to motive or intent under principles akin to Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b). The majority extrapolates this logic within a single episode and across multiple victims.
- State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 1993): Implausible denials and false statements support an inference of guilt; applied to Hawkins’s denials to officers.
Out-of-state support for cross-incident inference:
- State v. Vickers, 326 A.3d 287 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024): Assaults against different victims minutes apart in the same store were mutually probative of specific intent; the court affirmed both convictions.
- State v. Diaz, 349 P.3d 1220 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015): Conduct in one event (clear sexualized steps) was potent evidence of intent in a closely similar event days later near the same bar.
- People v. Demetrulias, 137 P.3d 229 (Cal. 2006): Intent toward one victim can inform intent toward another where assaults occur on the same night.
Sentencing procedure:
- State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298 (Iowa 2025): When a carceral sentencing error occurs, remand for a plenary sentencing hearing is appropriate; applied here because the district court failed to state reasons for consecutive sentences.

In sum, the Court reaffirmed deference to factfinding on intent, recognized the admissibility and probative value of related acts to show intent, and clarified that “overt act” language in prior cases describes one type of circumstantial proof, not an additional element the State must satisfy under § 709.11.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning turns on two clarifications:

Assault with intent to commit sexual abuse is not an inchoate offense requiring a substantial step or interruption.
The statute (Iowa Code § 709.11) demands proof of (a) an assault, and (b) the specific intent at that time to commit a “sex act” as defined in § 702.17 by force or against the will of another (§ 709.1). It does not require that the defendant take a further step beyond the assault, nor that the assault be interrupted by an external force which prevented the completion of a sex act. The Court’s express rejection of an “overt act” or “thwarted attempt” requirement is a central holding of the case.
Specific intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, including a single criminal episode spanning multiple victims.
Recognizing that intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, the Court evaluated the entire sequence: Hawkins sexually assaulted M.B. in a stairwell with actions unmistakably directed toward sexual gratification (humping with an erection; intrusion beneath underwear to the pubic hairline). Almost immediately, he slapped or grabbed C.C.’s buttocks on the stairway and then followed E.M. into an elevator, sliding his hand up her buttocks while holding his crotch and saying, “Help me. Help me.” The temporal and spatial closeness, the similarity of targets, the enclosed locations, and Hawkins’s sexualized gestures and words formed a pattern that allowed a rational factfinder to infer the same sexual intent across the episode.

The Court distinguished authority cited by the dissent. Earlier cases discussing “overt acts” (e.g., Roby, Radeke, Casady) do not insert a new element into § 709.11; they describe the kind of evidence that can be powerful in proving intent. The majority underscored that other circumstantial evidence can also suffice. It further emphasized the deferential standard of review: if any rational trier of fact could find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the record in the prosecution’s favor, the verdicts stand.

Points Raised in the Separate Opinions

Justice Mansfield (concur in part/dissent in part): Accepts the majority’s legal framing but would reverse count II (C.C.) because a transient buttocks slap, standing alone in that moment, did not show a separate, contemporaneous specific intent to commit a sex act against C.C. He would uphold counts I (M.B.) and III (E.M.).
Justice McDermott (dissent): Would reverse counts II and III, limiting them to simple assault. He argues that Iowa precedent requires overt acts showing a progression toward a sex act, usually coupled with an interruption (e.g., arrival of a bystander, victim’s escape) to explain noncompletion. He views the majority as convicting based on speculation about what might have happened under different facts rather than proof of intent under the actual circumstances of the assaults on C.C. and E.M.

Impact and Practical Implications

This decision makes two important contributions to Iowa criminal law:

Proof burden clarified under § 709.11: Prosecutors need not show a “substantial step” beyond assault or an “interruption” that thwarted a sex act. This lowers the evidentiary threshold relative to the dissent’s view and aligns the statute with general principles of specific intent proven by circumstantial evidence.
Cross‑victim inference within a single episode: Courts may consider the defendant’s near-simultaneous conduct with one victim to infer intent toward another, especially where the incidents are close in time and place and share common features (enclosed spaces, similar victims, sexualized words/gestures). This approach borrows logic from Rule 5.404(b) cases (motive/intent), applied intra-episode rather than as “prior bad acts.”

For prosecutors:

Develop the “totality” narrative: proximity in time/place, similarity of victims/locations, sexualized gestures (e.g., grabbing crotch), words, and false denials to police.
Use one clearly sexualized incident to illuminate intent in adjacent incidents within the same episode.

For defense counsel:

Press the Baldwin line: a sex-oriented purpose is not enough; tie arguments to the absence of direct movement toward a sex act at the moment of the contact with each victim.
Seek to compartmentalize each count, arguing that intent must be victim-specific and contemporaneous.
Request lesser-included instructions on simple assault where the sexualized conduct is minimal relative to § 702.17’s “sex act” definitions.

For trial courts:

When sitting as factfinder, articulate specific findings that connect the circumstantial evidence to intent as to each victim.
On sentencing, provide individualized, on-the-record reasons for consecutive terms; failure to do so will result in remand for plenary resentencing.

Potential policy concerns include the risk—highlighted by the dissents—of intent being inferred from generalized sexualized conduct or propensity rather than concrete indications of intent to proceed to a sex act against each victim. Future cases may test the outer boundary: how far can courts extrapolate intent from a highly sexualized assault on one victim to a far more transient or ambiguous contact with another?

Complex Concepts Simplified

Specific intent: The mental determination to commit a particular act—in this context, to go on to commit a statutorily defined sex act—at the time of the assault. It can be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Assault with intent to commit sexual abuse (§ 709.11): Requires proof of an assault plus specific intent to commit “sexual abuse” (a sex act by force or against the will). It is not an “attempt” statute and requires no further step beyond the assault.
Sex act (§ 702.17): Enumerated forms of sexual contact, including penetration, genital-genital contact, hand-to-genital or hand-to-anus contact, ejaculation onto another, use of artificial organs on genitalia/anus, or directing another to touch their own genitalia/anus. Contact with pubic hair can be within “genitalia.”
Overt act: A step toward completing a crime. In this context, it is a form of circumstantial evidence of intent, not a required element of § 709.11.
Single criminal episode logic: Similar acts against multiple victims within a short time and confined space may be used to infer intent across counts because they reveal a coherent course of conduct.
Substantial evidence standard: On appeal, the question is whether any rational factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Sentencing reasons for consecutives: Iowa law requires district courts to state reasons for imposing consecutive sentences; omission necessitates remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Conclusion

State v. Hawkins clarifies Iowa law in two consequential ways. First, the Court disavows any requirement that the State prove an “overt act” beyond the assault or a “thwarted attempt” to establish specific intent under Iowa Code § 709.11. Second, it confirms that a defendant’s conduct toward one victim during a single, tightly connected criminal episode can be probative of his specific intent toward other victims assaulted moments apart. Applying these principles, the Court held that Hawkins’s obviously sexualized assault on M.B., combined with his near-contemporaneous assaults on C.C. and E.M. in the same setting, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational factfinder to conclude he acted with the requisite specific intent as to all three counts.

The separate opinions spotlight a line-drawing challenge that will recur: when does a brief or ambiguous touch rise, in context, to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent to commit a sex act against that particular victim? Going forward, trial courts should carefully articulate the contextual facts supporting their inferences, and counsel should tailor their proof and arguments to the statute’s focus on contemporaneous, victim-specific intent. Finally, the opinion reinforces Iowa’s requirement that sentencing judges explain consecutive terms on the record—failure to do so will trigger plenary resentencing.