Introduction

This Third Circuit decision addresses a recurring pleading obstacle in § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution suits: how a plaintiff can overcome the presumption of probable cause arising from grand jury action. The court holds that a presentment issued by a Pennsylvania statewide investigating grand jury—like an indictment—constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause. To rebut that presumption at the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the presentment was procured through fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. Allegations that prosecutors failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, or charged offenses that appear ill-fitted to the plaintiff’s job description, do not suffice.

The case arises from criminal charges filed against Joseph John Slack, a daytime maintenance supervisor for the Scranton School District, after lead was discovered in school drinking water. Following a statewide investigating grand jury’s presentment recommending charges, Slack was arrested and prosecuted; the Commonwealth later withdrew all charges. Slack then sued two prosecutors and two law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed; the Third Circuit affirms solely on the ground that Slack failed to plausibly allege a lack of probable cause.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirms dismissal of Slack’s § 1983 claims because the investigating grand jury’s presentment is prima facie evidence of probable cause to arrest and prosecute, and Slack did not plead facts that would rebut that presumption. The panel emphasizes:

• Both indictments and investigating grand jury presentments carry a prima facie probable cause presumption under Third Circuit precedent (Rose v. Bartle; Camiolo v. State Farm).
• To rebut, a plaintiff must allege that the grand jury action was procured by fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means.
• Alleged failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury is not inherently wrongful (United States v. Williams), and does not, by itself, constitute fraud or corruption.
• Allegations that prosecutors charged statutes that “facially could not apply” to Slack do not allege fraud or corruption either, absent facts suggesting deception or corruption in obtaining the presentment.

Because lack of probable cause is an essential element of both false arrest and malicious prosecution, Slack’s claims necessarily fail. The panel therefore does not reach the district court’s alternative ruling on absolute prosecutorial immunity.

Factual and Procedural Background

• 2018: The Scranton School District discovers lead in its water. The COO directs Slack to take drinking sources offline immediately. Slack begins shutting off contaminated sources and posting warning signage. The Superintendent stops him from further action absent her express authorization.
• 2019–2020 Investigation: Pennsylvania State Police open a criminal investigation; a statewide investigating grand jury is empaneled under Pennsylvania’s Investigating Grand Jury Act. Slack testifies under subpoena and tells prosecutors of a witness and photographs corroborating his warning signage.
• September 2020 Presentment and Charges: The investigating grand jury issues a presentment recommending charges against the Superintendent, COO, and Slack for reckless endangerment and endangering the welfare of children. The Commonwealth files 11 felony and 8 misdemeanor charges against Slack. An arrest warrant issues; Slack surrenders.
• June 2021: After Slack submits a written statement and the prosecution seeks a continuance to review new evidence, the Commonwealth withdraws all charges.
• September 2022 Civil Suit: Slack sues two prosecutors (Erik Olsen and Brian Zarallo) and two law enforcement officials (Michael Mulvey and Robert McHugh) under § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The district court dismisses for absolute prosecutorial immunity and failure to allege lack of probable cause.
• Appeal: The Third Circuit affirms on the probable cause ground alone.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pleading Standards and Review

• Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2024); Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020): De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and application of plausibility pleading.
• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Complaints must plead sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim.
• Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009): At the motion-to-dismiss stage, factual allegations are accepted as true and viewed in the plaintiff’s favor.

Elements of the § 1983 Claims

• Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295 (3d Cir. 2024): Lack of probable cause is required to sustain a false arrest claim.
• Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022): Recognizes the contours of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim and confirms the centrality of probable cause; also known for clarifying the “favorable termination” element.

Probable Cause Presumption from Grand Jury Action

• Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989): An indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause; can be overcome by showing fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means.
• Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2003): Applies the same principle to Pennsylvania investigating grand jury presentments; a presentment supports a prima facie finding of probable cause subject to the same fraud/perjury/corruption rebuttal.

Exculpatory Evidence and the Grand Jury

• United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992): Prosecutors have no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury; failure to do so is not, without more, misconduct that undermines a grand jury’s action.

Pennsylvania Investigating Grand Jury Framework

• Investigating Grand Jury Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 4541–4553: Establishes statewide investigating grand juries with authority to subpoena, investigate, and issue presentments recommending criminal charges. A presentment authorizes prosecutors to file charges consistent with the recommendation (§ 4551).

These authorities collectively frame the panel’s analysis: a presentment equals a prima facie showing of probable cause; plaintiffs must plead specific corrupt procurement to rebut; and failure to present exculpatory evidence cannot, standing alone, constitute such corruption.

Legal Reasoning

1. Element common to both claims: lack of probable cause.

   False arrest and malicious prosecution both require the plaintiff to plausibly allege the absence of probable cause at the time of arrest or initiation of criminal proceedings. Given this shared element, a failure to plausibly plead lack of probable cause is dispositive of both claims.

2. Presentment creates a prima facie presumption of probable cause.

   The court applies Rose and Camiolo to hold that a statewide investigating grand jury presentment, like an indictment, is prima facie evidence of probable cause. Slack’s complaint itself alleges that a presentment issued recommending charges, triggering the presumption against him.

3. Rebuttal requires fraud, perjury, or corruption; Slack’s allegations do not suffice.
   • Failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Under Williams, prosecutors have no obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury; without more, such an omission is neither inherently unfair nor indicative of fraud or corrupt procurement. Slack’s allegations therefore do not rebut the presumption.
   • Charging statutes that allegedly do not fit Slack’s role. Slack asserts the charged felonies required supervision of children, which he says he did not perform. But he pleads no facts indicating that prosecutors deceived the grand jury about his role, suborned perjury, or otherwise used corrupt means to obtain the presentment. At most, he alleges negligence or disagreement about statutory fit, which is insufficient to overcome the presumption.
4. Consequent dismissal at the pleading stage.

   Applying Twombly/Iqbal, the court holds that, even accepting Slack’s facts as true, he has not plausibly alleged lack of probable cause. Given the presumption from the presentment and the absence of allegations of fraud, perjury, or corruption, his § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims cannot proceed. The panel therefore affirms without reaching prosecutorial immunity.

Impact and Practical Implications

Key clarifications and reinforcements

• Presentment = prima facie probable cause. In the Third Circuit, a Pennsylvania investigating grand jury presentment functions like an indictment for purposes of the probable cause presumption in later § 1983 litigation. Plaintiffs who acknowledge a presentment must plead specific facts showing fraudulent, perjurious, or corrupt procurement.
• Exculpatory omissions at grand jury are not enough. Merely asserting that prosecutors failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury does not rebut the presumption. Plaintiffs must allege more—e.g., that prosecutors knowingly presented false evidence, suborned perjury, or otherwise corrupted the grand jury process.
• Charging misfit is not corruption. Allegations that the charged statutes do not match a plaintiff’s role amount to a legal dispute or potential negligence; absent deceit or corrupt procurement, such allegations do not negate probable cause.

Effects on future § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution suits

• Heightened pleading burden where grand jury acted. When a presentment or indictment exists, plaintiffs must plead with specificity the type of misconduct that undermines the grand jury’s independent probable cause determination. Conclusory allegations or disputes over charging judgment are unlikely to survive Rule 12(b)(6).
• Strategic focus on corrupt procurement. Viable pleadings will target deliberate falsehoods, fabricated evidence, subornation of perjury, or knowingly misleading the grand jury—rather than omissions of exculpatory material alone.
• Complementary hurdles. In many cases, an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate will independently support probable cause for false arrest claims. Although not central to this decision, practitioners should expect courts to consider warrant-based probable cause along with any grand jury presumption.

Institutional and doctrinal implications

• Persuasive but not binding. The opinion is non-precedential under the Third Circuit’s I.O.P. 5.7. Nonetheless, it provides persuasive guidance on how the court will apply Rose and Camiolo to Pennsylvania presentments in § 1983 contexts.
• Separation of functions respected. By invoking Williams, the court underscores the grand jury’s investigative autonomy and the limited obligations prosecutors owe at that stage, narrowing the avenues for collateral § 1983 challenges based solely on exculpatory omissions.
• Immunity questions reserved. Because the panel affirms on probable cause grounds, it leaves for another day the scope and application of absolute prosecutorial immunity in comparable settings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A practical, common-sense standard—whether facts known at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe the suspect committed a crime. It is lower than “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Prima Facie Evidence: Evidence that is adequate to establish a fact unless it is rebutted. Here, a presentment presumptively establishes probable cause unless the plaintiff pleads corrupt procurement.
• Investigating Grand Jury (Pennsylvania): A statewide body empowered by statute to investigate suspected crimes, issue subpoenas, and recommend charges through a “presentment.” A presentment is a formal recommendation that prosecutors can act upon to file charges.
• Presentment vs. Indictment: An indictment is a formal grand jury charge. A Pennsylvania investigating grand jury’s presentment is a recommendation to prosecute. In the Third Circuit, both create a prima facie probable cause presumption for later § 1983 litigation.
• Fraud, Perjury, or Other Corrupt Means: Conduct that undermines the integrity of the grand jury’s decision, such as knowingly presenting false testimony, fabricating evidence, or otherwise deceiving the grand jury.
• Rule 12(b)(6): A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts factual allegations as true but requires a plausible claim based on those facts.
• False Arrest vs. Malicious Prosecution: False arrest addresses seizures before or at the initiation of legal process (e.g., warrantless arrests). Malicious prosecution addresses post-initiation harms (e.g., after a charging instrument). Both require lack of probable cause.
• Exculpatory Evidence and the Grand Jury: Under Williams, prosecutors generally have no duty to present exculpatory evidence during grand jury proceedings; withholding such evidence, without more, is not misconduct that invalidates grand jury action.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision reinforces a significant gatekeeping rule in § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution suits: when a Pennsylvania statewide investigating grand jury issues a presentment recommending charges, that presentment presumptively establishes probable cause. To overcome this hurdle, plaintiffs must plausibly allege that defendants procured the presentment through fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. Allegations that prosecutors failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, or pursued charges that seem ill-suited to the plaintiff’s role, do not suffice without concrete facts showing deceit or corruption.

For practitioners, the opinion highlights a demanding pleading burden where grand jury action occurred. Successful complaints will focus not on omissions of exculpatory material per se, but on specific, intentional misconduct that tainted the grand jury’s independent judgment. Although the panel did not reach prosecutorial immunity, its probable cause analysis will likely shape pleading strategies in Third Circuit § 1983 litigation involving Pennsylvania investigating grand jury presentments.

Key Takeaways:

• A Pennsylvania investigating grand jury presentment, like an indictment, creates a prima facie probable cause presumption.
• Rebuttal requires allegations of fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means in procuring the presentment.
• Failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury does not, standing alone, rebut the presumption.
• Disagreement with the charging decision or statutory fit is not enough to negate probable cause.
• Absent plausible allegations rebutting probable cause, § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims will not survive Rule 12(b)(6).