Intentional Wrong Exception in Workers' Compensation: Comprehensive Analysis of Millison et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company

Intentional Wrong Exception in Workers' Compensation: Comprehensive Analysis of Millison et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Date: December 10, 1985

Introduction

The landmark case of Millison et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company addresses a critical intersection between workers' compensation and common-law tort actions. Plaintiffs, composed of current and former employees of E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company (du Pont) and their spouses, alleged that their employer and its company physicians intentionally exposed them to asbestos and subsequently concealed medical information regarding asbestos-related diseases. The core legal issue revolves around whether the New Jersey Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive-remedy provision precludes such employees from pursuing separate tort actions against their employer and company physicians for intentional wrongs.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that while the Workers' Compensation Act generally serves as the exclusive remedy for employees injured or debilitated due to employment-related hazards, an exception exists for cases involving "intentional wrongs." Specifically, the Court determined that plaintiffs could pursue separate tort claims for the aggravation of their pre-existing occupational diseases resulting from defendants' fraudulent concealment of known disabilities. However, claims related to the initial exposure to asbestos were deemed exclusive to the Workers' Compensation system and thus subject to its provisions.

The Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims concerning deliberate asbestos exposure under the exclusive-remedy provision but reversed the dismissal of claims alleging fraudulent concealment and aggravation of existing diseases. This nuanced decision underscores the Court's commitment to maintaining the integrity of the Workers' Compensation framework while recognizing the necessity for additional legal recourse in instances of egregious employer misconduct.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court extensively referenced prior cases to contextualize and support its decision:

  • Bryan v. Jeffers: Established that "intentional wrong" under the Workers' Compensation Act necessitates a deliberate intention to injure, not merely gross negligence.
  • Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co.: Reinforced the narrow interpretation of "intentional wrong," indicating that willful misconduct alone does not suffice.
  • Copeland v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Supported the view that knowing exposure to hazards does not equate to intentionality required for tort exceptions.
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A: Provided the definition of intent as desiring consequences or being substantially certain of their occurrence.

These precedents collectively emphasize a stringent standard for what constitutes an "intentional wrong" capable of circumventing the exclusive-remedy provision of the Compensation Act.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's legal reasoning hinged on interpreting the "intentional wrong" exception within the Workers' Compensation Act. It adopted the "substantial certainty" standard from Restatement (Second) of Torts and Dean Prosser's analysis, which requires that the defendant acted with a high degree of certainty that their actions would result in harm.

Applying this standard, the Court found that while defendants knowingly exposed employees to asbestos—a conduct falling short of "substantial certainty" of causing disease—the fraudulent concealment of pre-existing conditions did meet the threshold. This is because the concealment directly aggravated the existing occupational diseases, thereby aligning with the exception outlined in the Compensation Act.

Additionally, the Court addressed the relationship between employers and company physicians, concluding that physicians, when acting under corporate directives to conceal information, effectively represent the employer's conduct. This reinforced the ability of plaintiffs to seek tort remedies against both the employer and its medical staff for intentional wrongdoing.

Impact

This judgment has profound implications for both workers' compensation and employment law in New Jersey:

  • Legal Recourse for Aggravation: Employees can pursue tort claims for the worsening of pre-existing occupational diseases due to employers' intentional concealment, beyond the scope of workers' compensation.
  • Employer Accountability: Employers may face additional liability for deliberate misconduct that exacerbates employee injuries, promoting higher standards of corporate responsibility.
  • Clarification of "Intentional Wrong": The decision delineates a clear boundary for what constitutes an intentional wrong, using the "substantial certainty" standard to prevent the dilution of the exclusive-remedy provision.
  • Influence on Future Cases: This precedent guides future litigation involving occupational hazards and employer misconduct, providing a framework for distinguishing between covered workers' compensation claims and actionable torts.

Overall, the decision balances the need to preserve the Workers' Compensation system's efficiency with the necessity to hold employers accountable for intentional misconduct that directly harms employees.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusive-Remedy Provision
A legal principle stating that workers' compensation benefits are the sole remedy available to employees for workplace injuries, thereby preventing them from suing their employers for additional damages.
Intentional Wrong
Actions taken by an employer with a deliberate intention to cause harm or with knowledge that harm is substantially certain to occur as a result of those actions.
Substantial Certainty Standard
A legal threshold requiring that a defendant's actions are almost certain to result in the plaintiff's harm, distinguishing intentional wrongdoing from negligence or mere recklessness.
Workers' Compensation Act
A statute providing benefits to employees who suffer job-related injuries or illnesses, typically rendering it the exclusive remedy and limiting further legal actions against employers.
Aggravation of Illness
The worsening of a pre-existing condition due to additional exposure or harm, in this case, the deliberate concealment of an asbestos-related disease leading to further health deterioration.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision in Millison et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company marks a pivotal moment in the interpretation of workers' compensation laws. By affirming that the "intentional wrong" exception permits separate tort actions for the aggravation of occupational diseases through fraudulent concealment, the Court reinforces the protection of employees against exploitative corporate practices. This ruling ensures that while the Workers' Compensation Act remains the primary avenue for addressing workplace injuries, it does not shield employers from accountability when deliberate misconduct is evident.

Moving forward, employers must exercise greater transparency and integrity in handling occupational health risks, lest they face compounded legal liabilities beyond the confines of workers' compensation. Simultaneously, employees gain a strengthened legal foundation to seek comprehensive remedies in cases of intentional employer malfeasance, fostering a more equitable workplace environment.

Case Details

WILLIAM B. MILLISON AND MARIE MILLISON, HIS WIFE; VERNON G. KRONMAIER ANDDOROTHY KRONMAIER, HIS WIFE; HAROLD SCHWEBEL AND SUSAN SCHWEBEL, HIS WIFE;CLARENCE SCHWEBEL AND GERALDINE SCHWEBEL, HIS WIFE; FRANK BAPTISTE ANDCATHERINE BAPTISTE, HIS WIFE; AND EDWARD B. AGAR AND EILEEN AGAR, HIS WIFE,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS COMPANY; WILLIAM E.NEELD, JR., M.D.; G.F. REICHWEIN, M.D.; AND ALBINAS SMULKSTYS, M.D.,DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, AND JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION; OWENS-CORNINGFIBERGLASS CORPORATION; KEENE CORPORATION; CELOTEX CORPORATION;RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN CORPORATION; SEPCO CORPORATION; AMATEX CORPORATION;PHILLIP CAREY COMPANY; LIMPET CORPORATION; H.J. STEIN, M.D.; JOHN DOE, M.D.;RICHARD ROE, M.D.; JOHN DOE CORPORATION; AND RICHARD ROE CORPORATION,DEFENDANTS.EVAN TAYLOR AND ROSINA TAYLOR, HIS WIFE; JOSEPH J. KUCZMARSKI AND LOUISEKUCZMARSKI, HIS WIFE; JOHN STILL AND ANNA L. STILL, HIS WIFE; LOUIS WALATAND CATHERINE WALAT, HIS WIFE; NORRIS M. HILDERBRAND AND HILDA HILDEBRAND,HIS WIFE; PASQUALE S. CHILLIRI, SR., AND MARY CHILLIRI, HIS WIFE; ANTONIODIPIETRO; ROBERT MCKIBBIN AND ANNA MCKIBBIN, HIS WIFE; ROBERT TANNER ANDROSEMARY TANNER, HIS WIFE; LOUIS J. KIRSCH AND EDITH KIRSCH, HIS WIFE;HOWARD H. AMOS AND ANN AMOS, HIS WIFE; HAROLD KNORR AND ELEANOR KNORR, HISWIFE; GEORGE SULLIVAN AND PAULINE SULLIVAN, HIS WIFE; LOUIS P. FAVERIO ANDDOLORES FAVERIO, HIS WIFE; ARTHUR KIRNER AND MARGERY KIRNER, HIS WIFE; EARLSTANTON AND MADELINE STANTON, HIS WIFE; DANIEL MULLEN AND SHIRLEY MULLEN,HIS WIFE; GEORGE MILTON GROSS AND ALICE M. GROSS, HIS WIFE; CALVIN R. SHAWAND DOLORES SHAW, HIS WIFE; PAUL DONALD LONG AND GRACE LONG, HIS WIFE; DAVIDROBERT RAMSEY AND VIRGINIA RAMSEY, HIS WIFE; AND EUGENE BLECKLEY,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
Year: 1985
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Judge(s)

HANDLER, J., concurring in part and dissenting.

Attorney(S)

David Jacoby argued the cause for appellants ( Tomar, Parks, Seliger, Simonoff Adourian, attorneys; William Tomar, of counsel; James Katz, on the briefs). Thomas L. Morrissey argued the cause for respondents ( Carpenter, Bennett Morrissey, attorneys; Rosemary A. Hall, on the briefs). Verice M. Mason, Assistant Deputy Public Advocate, argued the cause for amicus curiae Public Advocate ( Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Advocate, attorney; Verice M. Mason and Michael L. Perlin, Special Counsel to the Commissioner, of counsel and on the brief). Sebastian P. Lombardi submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Edwin Davis Merrill, M.D., ( Budd, Larner, Kent, Gross, Picillo Rosenbaum, attorneys).

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