Inferring the MDLEA’s “On Request” Statelessness Requirement from Standard Boarding Procedures

Introduction

In United States v. Santo Rosario‑Rivera (consolidated with United States v. Francisco Rijo‑Rijo and United States v. Placido Rivera‑Rodriguez), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed three convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) arising from a Coast Guard interdiction 130 nautical miles off Aruba, within Aruba’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The defendants pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and possessing with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction. They raised two sets of challenges on appeal:

• Constitutional challenges to the MDLEA’s application on the high seas and in the EEZ, including claims that (a) the EEZ is not the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause, and (b) due process requires a nexus to the United States.
• A statutory jurisdiction challenge contending the government failed to prove the vessel was “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) because the record did not expressly show the Coast Guard asked the “master or individual in charge” to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel.

The panel—Chief Judge William Pryor and Judges Jill Pryor and Brasher—resolved both issues against the defendants in a per curiam, unpublished decision issued on October 21, 2025. The opinion clarifies, in practical terms, how the government can satisfy the MDLEA’s “on request” requirement through circumstantial proof of standard boarding procedures and the defendants’ stipulations. It also reiterates that, in the Eleventh Circuit, the EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for the Felonies Clause and that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding:

• Constitutional challenges were foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. The MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power even absent a nexus to the United States, and a coastal state’s EEZ is “part of the ‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause.”
• The district court had statutory jurisdiction under the MDLEA because the record supported an implicit finding that the Coast Guard requested a claim of nationality or registry and no such claim was made, rendering the vessel “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B).

Applying de novo review to legal questions and clear-error review to the jurisdictional factual findings, the court concluded the district court did not clearly err in crediting testimony about standard Coast Guard “right of visit” procedures and the defendants’ stipulation that they made no claim of nationality for the vessel.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Cabezas‑Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): The panel relied on Cabezas‑Montano for two core propositions. First, jurisdictional determinations under the MDLEA are reviewed with legal issues de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error. Second, the MDLEA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power without requiring a nexus to the United States, a conclusion grounded in prior circuit authority.
• United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited by Cabezas‑Montano and echoed here, Campbell is the Eleventh Circuit’s foundational statement that the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach does not depend on a nexus between the offense and the United States. This precedent foreclosed defendants’ Fifth Amendment due process and Felonies Clause nexus arguments.
• United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025): Alfonso squarely held that a nation’s EEZ qualifies as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. That holding defeats the defendants’ core contention that their interdiction in Aruba’s EEZ placed them beyond the reach of the MDLEA as a constitutional matter.

Together, these precedents foreclosed the constitutional arguments and framed the remaining contest over whether the statutory predicate for jurisdiction—a “vessel without nationality” within the meaning of § 70502(d)(1)(B)—was met.

Legal Reasoning

1) Constitutional Issues

The panel addressed and quickly dispatched the constitutional challenges by reaffirming its own binding case law:

• EEZ as “high seas”: Under Alfonso, a coastal state’s EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes. Thus, an interdiction 130 nautical miles off Aruba was not beyond Congress’s power to legislate against felonies “on the high seas.”
• No nexus requirement: Under Campbell and Cabezas‑Montano, the MDLEA does not require that the offense have a nexus to the United States to be valid under the Felonies Clause or to satisfy due process.

Because the panel was bound by those decisions, and the defendants acknowledged as much, the constitutional arguments could not succeed.

2) Statutory “Jurisdiction” Under the MDLEA

The MDLEA criminalizes possession (or conspiracy to possess) with intent to distribute a controlled substance “while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), 70506(b). One category of covered vessels is a “vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). The statute provides that a vessel is “without nationality” if, among other circumstances, “the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.” Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B).

The defendants’ precise argument was evidentiary: although they stipulated that the vessel bore no indicia of nationality and that none of them made a claim of nationality for the vessel or identified himself as the master, the record did not affirmatively show the Coast Guard actually made the required “request” for a nationality or registry claim. Without proof of that “request,” the defense argued, the § 70502(d)(1)(B) statelessness criterion was not satisfied.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention. Reviewing the district court’s jurisdictional findings for clear error, the panel concluded the trial court “implicitly” found that a request was made. That implicit finding was sufficiently supported by:

• Lieutenant Box’s testimony about standard Coast Guard “right of visit” boarding procedures, which include asking everyone on board whether anyone is the master and whether anyone makes a claim of nationality for the vessel; and
• The defendants’ stipulation that they made no claim of nationality for the vessel and did not identify a master.

In other words, while the witness did not specifically testify “we asked and they declined,” the district court credited testimony establishing that asking is the Coast Guard’s routine procedure during such boardings and found that no claim was made. The appellate panel held that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to infer that the “on request” condition in § 70502(d)(1)(B) was met on this record. That inference was sufficient to conclude the vessel was “without nationality,” rendering it a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” under § 70502(c)(1)(A).

Impact and Practical Significance

A) Evidentiary Showing for § 70502(d)(1)(B)

The most practically significant aspect of the decision is its acceptance of circumstantial proof to satisfy the MDLEA’s “on request” requirement for statelessness. The panel’s reasoning signals that:

• Direct, verbatim testimony that a “request” was made is not strictly necessary if other record evidence credibly establishes (i) that asking is standard operating procedure in the specific type of boarding and (ii) that no claim was made in response.
• District courts may make implicit findings about the “request” based on credited testimony about standard procedures combined with undisputed facts (such as a stipulation that no claim of nationality was made and no master identified).
• Appellate review will be deferential (clear error) as to those implicit findings when the district court has credited agency procedure evidence and the defendants have conceded the absence of any claim of nationality.

This approach lowers the risk that a prosecution will fail on a technical record gap where routine practice and the defendants’ own admissions point to satisfaction of the statutory condition.

B) Continuing Reaffirmation of the MDLEA’s Breadth

On the constitutional front, the decision reinforces two already-settled propositions in the Eleventh Circuit:

• The EEZ is treated as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause purposes (Alfonso).
• No “nexus” to the United States is required to prosecute under the MDLEA (Campbell; Cabezas‑Montano).

The combination of those holdings preserves a broad scope for MDLEA enforcement in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the Eleventh Circuit’s geographic footprint.

C) Practice Notes

• For the government: Although this opinion accepts circumstantial proof, the cleaner practice remains to elicit explicit testimony or produce documentation (e.g., boarding logs) that a nationality/registry request was made to the master or person in charge and that no claim was asserted. Doing so minimizes litigation over “implicit” findings.
• For the defense: To contest § 70502(d)(1)(B) jurisdiction, defense counsel should aim to (i) elicit concessions that no explicit request was made, (ii) challenge the applicability or completeness of “standard procedure” testimony to the particular boarding, and (iii) avoid stipulations that effectively concede the core statelessness facts unless strategically necessary.
• For district courts: The opinion approves reliance on credited testimony about standard practice to fill evidentiary gaps, but district courts should make express findings where feasible—particularly on the “request” element—to fortify the record against appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felonies Clause: The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads “high seas” to include a coastal state’s EEZ for this purpose, enabling Congress to regulate certain conduct occurring up to 200 nautical miles offshore.
• Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline, where the coastal state has sovereign rights for resource-related purposes. The Eleventh Circuit treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for Felonies Clause analysis, even though it is distinct from territorial sea for many international law purposes.
• MDLEA “Vessel without nationality”: Under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d), a vessel can be “without nationality” in several ways, including when the master or person in charge—upon request from authorized U.S. officers—fails to make a claim of nationality or registry for the vessel. Stateless vessels are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under the MDLEA.
• “On request” requirement: The government must show that an authorized U.S. officer requested a nationality or registry claim from the master or person in charge and that no claim was made. In this case, the court held that testimony about standard Coast Guard boarding practice (which includes making such a request), combined with defendants’ stipulations that no claim was made, sufficed to support an implicit finding that the request occurred.
• Standards of review:
  • De novo: The appellate court independently reviews legal questions, including constitutional issues.
  • Clear error: The appellate court defers to the district court’s factual findings unless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Here, whether a “request” occurred was treated as a factual determination supported by the credited evidence.
• Right of visit boarding: A maritime concept in which authorized officers board a vessel to verify its nationality when there are grounds to suspect it is stateless or engaged in certain illicit activities. The Coast Guard witness described “right of visit” procedures that include asking about the vessel’s master and any claim of nationality—central to the court’s inference in this case.

Conclusion

United States v. Santo Rosario‑Rivera confirms two enduring features of Eleventh Circuit MDLEA jurisprudence: the Act’s constitutionality without a U.S. nexus and the classification of the EEZ as part of the “high seas” under the Felonies Clause. More notably for day-to-day prosecutions, the decision clarifies that courts may infer satisfaction of the MDLEA’s “on request” statelessness requirement based on credible testimony about standard Coast Guard boarding procedures and a defendant’s stipulation that no claim of nationality was made.

Although unpublished and therefore non-precedential, the opinion is a pragmatic blueprint for trial courts and litigants: when routine practice evidence is credited and uncontested facts show no claim of nationality or identified master, an implicit finding that the statutory “request” occurred will likely withstand clear-error review. In the broader legal landscape, the decision buttresses the MDLEA’s reach and streamlines evidentiary burdens in proving statelessness, ensuring continued robust enforcement against maritime drug trafficking in the Eleventh Circuit.