Inferred Conspiracy Through Intermediary Conduct: The Eleventh Circuit’s Clarification on Sufficiency of Evidence in United States v. Damion Clarke

1. Introduction

On 22 August 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit delivered a non-published but precedentially persuasive opinion in United States v. Damion Clarke (No. 25-11287). The Court affirmed the conviction of Damion Clarke for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (C) and 846.

The central dispute was evidentiary: did the Government adduce sufficient evidence to prove that Clarke formed an illicit agreement with someone other than a confidential informant (CI) or government agent? Clarke maintained that the only people he dealt with were an FBI informant, undercover officers, and therefore, under the “two-to-conspire” rule, the conspiracy element failed. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that Clarke’s repeated facilitation of drug sales between the CI and an independent supplier (Rafick Gilpin) provided ample circumstantial evidence of an unlawful agreement between Clarke and Gilpin.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and viewed all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
Applying United States v. Colston, the Court reiterated the three elements for a drug-distribution conspiracy: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement; and (3) voluntary participation by the defendant.
Because Gilpin was a private actor—not a government agent—the jury could reasonably infer a conspiratorial agreement between Clarke and Gilpin from their repeated, coordinated conduct.
The panel distinguished United States v. Wright, where only a single purchase occurred, emphasising that multiple transactions, negotiations, and Clarke’s own admissions elevated the relationship well above a one-off buyer-seller transaction.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Clarke’s motions for acquittal and new trial was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225 (11th Cir. 2022) – Established the de novo standard for sufficiency review.
United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021) – Restated the elements of a drug-distribution conspiracy.
United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 1995) – Recognised the “one-off sale” exception; here distinguished because Clarke facilitated multiple sales.
United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014) – Allowed conspiratorial agreement to be inferred from “development and collocation of circumstances.” Applied here to treat Clarke’s intermediary role and admissions as sufficient circumstantial proof.
United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 2006) & United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) – Affirmed that knowledge of every stage or every member is unnecessary; significant for rejecting Clarke’s argument that he lacked direct partnership with Gilpin.
United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir. 1995) – Endorsed the “disbelieved-testimony-as-substantive-evidence” doctrine: the jury may treat a defendant’s implausible testimony as evidence of guilt.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three distinct steps:

Identification of a Non-Government Co-Conspirator: By highlighting Gilpin’s independent status, the panel bypassed Clarke’s major defence predicated on the presence of only government actors.
Inference from Repeated Transactions: Under Reeves, a series of narcotics sales often suffices to infer conspiratorial agreement. Clarke’s ongoing logistical and financial coordination (arranging prices, locations, quality complaints, transporting money, promising discounts) presented a “development and collocation” pattern far deeper than a casual buyer–seller relationship.
Jury Credibility Determinations: The Court emphasised that sufficiency review defers to the jury’s credibility findings. Clarke’s own admissions—coupled with the jury’s prerogative to disbelieve his exculpatory claims—supported the verdict.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

Lower Evidentiary Threshold for Intermediaries: The case clarifies that individuals who act as “go-betweens” linking a CI to a supplier can readily meet the conspiratorial agreement element—even without direct evidence of profit-sharing contracts or explicit drug-distribution plans.
Narrowing of the Wright Safe Harbour: After Clarke, defendants can no longer rely on the “single isolated sale” doctrine if there is evidence of negotiations, multiple calls, or a continuing relationship—even over a short period.
Practical Police Considerations: Law-enforcement operations often utilise CIs. The decision alleviates concerns that involvement of a CI disrupts conspiracy charges so long as a non-government participant appears anywhere in the chain.
Sentencing and Plea-Bargaining: Prosecutors may leverage the clarified standard to secure pleas from intermediaries who otherwise would argue insufficiency. Defence counsel must now marshal compelling evidence negating any knowing link to non-government actors.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Two-to-Conspire Rule: A conspiracy needs at least two culpable, non-government participants. A solitary agreement between a defendant and a CI or undercover agent alone is not enough.
Buyer–Seller Exception: If a person merely purchases drugs for personal use in a single, arm’s-length transaction, courts may refuse to infer a larger conspiratorial agreement. The Eleventh Circuit narrowed this exception in Clarke.
Circumstantial Evidence: Evidence that suggests a fact by implication or inference—such as patterns of phone calls, repeated meetings, or money transfers—rather than direct “smoking-gun” proof.
Disbelieved-Testimony Doctrine: The jury may treat a defendant’s implausible or contradicted testimony not merely as neutral, but as affirmative proof of guilt.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Damion Clarke is a robust reaffirmation of the Eleventh Circuit’s willingness to infer a conspiratorial agreement from circumstantial evidence where an intermediary repeatedly facilitates deals between a confidential informant and an independent supplier. By distinguishing the Wright line of cases, the Court substantially narrows the safe harbour for defendants who claim they are mere purchasers or facilitators without conspiratorial intent. Going forward, the decision lowers practical hurdles for prosecutors in “sting” operations and signals to defence attorneys that combating conspiracy charges will require more than highlighting the presence of a CI. In sum, Clarke fortifies the government’s hand in drug-conspiracy prosecutions while clarifying the evidentiary benchmarks defendants must overcome to secure an acquittal.