In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc.: The Strict Evidentiary Threshold for Death‑Penalty Discovery Sanctions in Texas

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s per curiam opinion in In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc. (No. 24‑0255, opinion delivered May 16, 2025) is the latest in a long line of decisions policing the outer limits of trial‑court discretion in imposing “death‑penalty” discovery sanctions. These sanctions—striking pleadings or rendering default judgment—are the harshest tools available under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2(b).

The case arises out of a serious motor‑vehicle collision involving a tractor‑trailer operated by a Newkirk employee, Mario Cottman. The plaintiffs, Rayah Lemons and Nicholas Begaye, pursued negligence and gross‑negligence claims against Cottman and multiple theories of direct liability against his employer, Newkirk Logistics, Inc., as well as claims against DHL eCommerce and Hogan Truck Leasing, Inc. The discovery dispute centered largely on contracts and records allegedly governing or reflecting Newkirk’s relationship with DHL eCommerce and documents relating to the tractor‑trailer and Cottman’s employment.

The trial court ultimately struck Newkirk’s pleadings—effectively granting a default judgment against it—as a sanction for asserted discovery abuses. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief without opinion. The Texas Supreme Court intervened, issuing a conditional writ of mandamus vacating the sanctions order.

The opinion does not announce a brand‑new rule; instead, it powerfully reaffirms and tightens existing doctrines on:

• the evidentiary burden for proving discovery abuse (actual or constructive possession and intentional withholding or destruction);
• the requirement of “flagrant” or “extreme” bad faith before death‑penalty sanctions may be imposed;
• the necessity of a direct relationship between the misconduct and the sanction, and proportionality of sanctions under TransAmerican and Chrysler;
• the obligation to consider and, in most cases, test lesser sanctions before resorting to striking pleadings; and
• the limits of relying on post‑hoc, party‑drafted findings of fact to justify extreme sanctions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Newkirk sought mandamus relief after the trial court:

• struck its pleadings based on alleged discovery violations; and
• entered a 17‑page written sanctions order (with findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by plaintiffs’ counsel) several months after orally announcing sanctions, adding new justifications not discussed at the original sanctions hearing.

The court of appeals denied mandamus without a written opinion; Newkirk then petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas.

B. Holding

The Supreme Court:

• held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing death‑penalty sanctions (striking Newkirk’s pleadings);
• concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that Newkirk had actual or constructive possession of the disputed documents and intentionally concealed or withheld them;
• found no evidence of the “flagrant” or “extreme” bad faith required to support death‑penalty discovery sanctions;
• held that there was no direct relationship between the alleged misconduct and the sanction, and that the sanction was excessive under TransAmerican and its progeny; and
• emphasized that the trial court failed to consider or attempt lesser sanctions before striking pleadings.

Because striking pleadings effectively adjudicated the merits of the case and vitiated Newkirk’s ability to present its defenses, the Court held that appeal would be an inadequate remedy and granted mandamus, conditionally directing the trial court to vacate its sanctions order.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Litigation

Lemons and Begaye were seriously injured when their vehicle collided with a tractor‑trailer driven by Cottman, a Newkirk employee, transporting cargo from Oklahoma to Texas under an arrangement with DHL eCommerce. They sued:

• Cottman for ordinary and gross negligence;
• Newkirk for:
  • negligent entrustment;
  • negligent hiring, retention, and training; and
  • gross negligence; and
• DHL eCommerce and Hogan Truck Leasing, Inc. (the owner of the tractor) on related theories.

B. The Discovery Dispute

The main contested items involved:

1. Contracts between Newkirk and DHL eCommerce:
   • Newkirk asserted throughout discovery that its business relationship with DHL was conducted through an online bidding platform and not governed by written contracts.
   • In response to requests for production, Newkirk said that after diligent searches it had located no contracts.
2. Other records:
   • bills of lading and other shipping documents;
   • tractor‑trailer maintenance records and leases;
   • Cottman’s pay history and employment information;
   • post‑accident drug test results; and
   • GPS data.

The trial court issued a discovery order compelling Newkirk to produce contracts, bills of lading, shipping documents, maintenance records, leases, emails, and dispatch reports. That order anticipated monetary sanctions for an inadequate corporate‑representative deposition, directing plaintiffs to submit a proposed monetary sanctions order, which they never did; no monetary sanctions order was signed.

After further search, Newkirk remained unable to locate contracts with DHL. Plaintiffs moved for sanctions. At the first sanctions hearing, Newkirk’s counsel reiterated that best efforts had been made and no contracts were found. The trial court, at that stage, declined to impose sanctions.

C. DHL’s Production Changes the Landscape

In June 2023, in response to plaintiffs’ discovery requests, DHL eCommerce produced two documents:

• a 2015 document titled “DHL eCommerce Transportation Requirements”; and
• a 2014 “Cartage Agreement.”

Both were signed by DHL and Newkirk and “appeared to govern aspects of the companies’ business relationship.”

Plaintiffs viewed DHL’s production as conclusive proof that:

• Newkirk necessarily had the same documents in its possession or control; and
• Newkirk must have intentionally concealed or failed to produce them.

They filed a second motion for sanctions seeking the most severe remedies. Newkirk responded with affidavits from its president and an employee, both testifying that at the time of their depositions:

• they did not know of any such agreements; and
• they believed no written contracts existed between Newkirk and DHL.

The trial court conducted a brief sanctions hearing in July 2023. After only a few minutes of argument, the court orally announced that it was striking Newkirk’s pleadings because it had failed to produce the DHL documents.

D. The Written Sanctions Order and Expanded Justifications

Five months later, the trial court signed a 17‑page written sanctions order, adopting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by plaintiffs’ counsel. The written order:

• reiterated the failure to produce the DHL contracts; and
• added numerous additional justifications for death‑penalty sanctions that had not been discussed at the July hearing, including:
  • alleged failures to produce or retain bills of lading, other shipping records, maintenance records, leases, pay history, drug test results, and GPS data; and
  • a prior misidentification of DHL eCommerce as an entity in discovery responses.

The sanction—striking Newkirk’s pleadings—operated as a de facto default judgment against Newkirk on both negligence and gross‑negligence theories.

The court of appeals denied Newkirk’s mandamus petitions without issuing a substantive opinion. The Supreme Court then granted review.

IV. Doctrinal Background and Precedents Cited

The Court’s analysis is anchored in a well‑developed line of Texas cases governing discovery sanctions, especially the most severe:

• TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991):
  • First major articulation of the “just sanctions” standard under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.
  • Established two core requirements:
    1. Direct relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction; and
    2. Non‑excessiveness—the sanction must be no more severe than necessary to satisfy legitimate purposes.
  • Famously distilled into the maxim: “The punishment should fit the crime.”
  • Held that sanctions effectively adjudicating the merits require evidence justifying a presumption that the sanctioned party’s claims or defenses lack merit.
• Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992):
  • Reinforced TransAmerican and applied the “just sanctions” analysis to discovery abuse.
• Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004):
  • Approved death‑penalty sanctions where a party deliberately destroyed evidence after a court order.
  • Emphasized that death‑penalty sanctions are a “last resort”, appropriate only in exceptional cases and only after considering lesser sanctions, absent extraordinary circumstances.
• GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. 1993):
  • Clarified that the movant bears the burden of proof on sanctions.
  • Held that when a party is accused of failing to produce documents, the movant must prove the documents were within the party’s possession, custody, or control.
  • Stressed that it must be “fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance” before imposing death‑penalty sanctions.
  • Warned against using sanctions to adjudicate the merits in the absence of strong justification.
• In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009):
  • Held that “mere skepticism or bare allegations” of non‑compliance cannot justify intrusive discovery remedies.
  • The Court in Newkirk extends this reasoning to the use of severe sanctions.
• Altesse Healthcare Sols., Inc. v. Wilson, 540 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2018):
  • Reiterated that “flagrant” or “extreme” bad faith is required to support the most severe sanctions.
• Petroleum Sols., Inc. v. Head, 454 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. 2014):
  • Reversed severe sanctions where there was no proof of intentional concealment of evidence.
• Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. 2012):
  • Confirmed that sanctions that effectively adjudicate the merits require conduct justifying a presumption that the sanctioned party’s position lacks merit.
• Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003):
  • Held that the trial court must explain specifically why lesser sanctions would be ineffective.
  • Rejected conclusory recitations that are not tied to the record.
• American Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. 2006):
  • Confirmed that appellate courts independently review the entire record to assess whether sanctions are justified, rather than deferring blindly to trial‑court findings.
• Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992):
  • Established the standard for mandamus relief in Texas: a clear abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal.
  • Held that appeal is inadequate when a party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is “vitiated or severely compromised” by trial‑court error.

These precedents form the backbone of the Court’s reasoning in Newkirk, which is best understood as a forceful application and reaffirmation of the TransAmerican framework and its progeny.

V. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. The Burden of Proof: Possession, Custody, or Control

The Court starts with a foundational principle from GTE:

As the party seeking sanctions, Plaintiffs had the burden of establishing their right to relief. … Where, as here, “a motion for sanctions asserts that a respondent to a discovery request has failed to produce a document within its possession, custody or control, the movant has the burden to prove the assertion.”

This has two key consequences:

1. Plaintiffs had to show that the documents at issue (contracts, maintenance records, pay records, etc.) were in Newkirk’s actual possession or under its constructive control (i.e., that Newkirk had a legal right to obtain them); and
2. They had to prove not merely that the documents existed, but that:
   • Newkirk had access or control; and
   • Newkirk intentionally concealed or failed to produce them.

The Court emphasized that “mere speculation” that a party must have certain documents, especially because another party later produces them, does not meet this burden.

B. Actual and Constructive Possession: The DHL Documents and Other Records

1. The DHL Contracts

Regarding the DHL documents—the core impetus for the sanctions—the Court recognized that:

• The contracts were signed by Newkirk and DHL; this is “some evidence” that Newkirk once had possession of them.
• But there was insufficient evidence that:
  • Newkirk still had them when the discovery requests were made; or
  • Newkirk intentionally concealed or failed to produce them.

Newkirk’s president and employee testified they were unaware of the eight‑year‑old contracts and believed no such written agreements existed. Absent contrary evidence, the Court refused to infer bad faith from DHL’s production alone.

This is a critical doctrinal reaffirmation: third‑party production of documents is not, by itself, proof of intentional concealment or even current possession by another party.

2. Bills of Lading and Other Shipping Documents

The Court found:

• No evidence that Newkirk intentionally withheld any bills of lading or shipping records in its actual possession.
• Newkirk produced a copy of the electronic record of Cottman’s pickups and drop‑offs on the accident date.
• No evidence that Newkirk had a legal right to compel additional documents from any third party (i.e., constructive possession).

Plaintiffs’ position relied on inference and suspicion, which the Court explicitly rejected as a substitute for proof of bad faith.

3. Tractor‑Trailer Maintenance Records and Leases (Hogan’s Documents)

As to the maintenance records and lease documents, the Court noted:

• Hogan Truck Leasing owned the tractor and leased the trailer.
• Hogan—not Newkirk—ultimately produced the maintenance records.
• No evidence showed:
  • that Newkirk had those records in its own files; or
  • that Newkirk had legal control over Hogan’s internal maintenance records (e.g., via parent‑subsidiary relationship or contractual right of access).

The Court expressly rejected the idea that “mere business dealings between separate corporate entities” establish constructive possession:

Mere business dealings between separate corporate entities do not establish constructive possession over each other’s documents. See GTE, 856 S.W.2d at 729.

This has broad implications for multi‑defendant litigation: one party is not automatically responsible for the internal documents of another, even if they are closely cooperating commercial partners.

4. Pay History, Drug Test, and GPS Data

Regarding Cottman’s pay history, post‑accident drug test, and GPS data, the Court again stressed:

• There was no evidence that Newkirk actually or constructively possessed additional responsive information at the relevant times.
• Plaintiffs’ theory of intentional concealment was “speculation rather than evidence.”
• Crucially, the trial court’s June 16, 2023 discovery order did not compel production of these categories of information, meaning:
  • even if there were gaps in production, there was no violation of a court order as to these particular items.

That last point is particularly important; violation of a specific court order often underlies severe sanctions. Here, no such violation existed for these data categories.

C. Bad Faith: From Negligence to “Flagrant” or “Extreme” Misconduct

Even if a party fails in its discovery obligations, Newkirk reiterates the sharply elevated mental‑state requirement for death‑penalty sanctions:

Such a severe outcome requires evidence not just of “bad faith,” but of “flagrant” or “extreme” bad faith. Altesse, 540 S.W.3d at 575–76.

The Court concluded:

• The record showed, at most, possible negligence in failing to retain or locate older documents.
• There was no proof of intentional destruction or concealment.
• Speculation and skepticism about Newkirk’s searches were inadequate; as in Weekley Homes, bare allegations of non‑compliance cannot justify severe remedial measures.

The Court explicitly distinguished this case from Cire, where death‑penalty sanctions were sustained because the party destroyed evidence after being ordered to produce it—an archetype of “flagrant” bad faith.

D. Misidentification of DHL eCommerce: Prejudice and Arbitrary Reliance

Another pillar of the trial court’s written order was Newkirk’s initial misidentification of DHL eCommerce in discovery responses. The Supreme Court treated this as a minor, cured error:

• The mistake was corrected in time for plaintiffs to join the correct DHL entity “well before any statute‑of‑limitations issue arose.”
• Thus, plaintiffs suffered no meaningful prejudice.
• The trial court itself had previously acknowledged on the record that plaintiffs had not shown intentional misleading or prejudice and had stated that sanctions were not appropriate on that basis.

The Supreme Court characterized the trial court’s later reliance on the misidentification as a justification for death‑penalty sanctions as an “about‑face” that “can only be described as arbitrary.”

E. TransAmerican’s Two‑Part Test: Direct Relationship and Non‑Excessiveness

1. Direct Relationship Between Misconduct and Sanction

Under TransAmerican, sanctions must be “directed against the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the innocent party.” The Court held neither condition was satisfied.

On this record:

• There was no persuasive showing that plaintiffs were unable to prepare for trial because of Newkirk’s alleged discovery failures.
• Nor was there evidence that any legitimate efforts to prosecute their claims were irreparably hindered.
• The sanction—striking pleadings—did not “fit the crime”; it effectively decided the entire case against Newkirk on both negligence and gross‑negligence claims.

Without a demonstration that discovery misconduct justified presuming Newkirk’s defenses lacked merit, default‑type sanctions are improper.

2. Excessiveness: When Sanctions Adjudicate the Merits

The Court reiterated a crucial limitation from TransAmerican and Paradigm Oil:

Sanctions cannot be used to effectively adjudicate the merits of a case unless the offending party’s conduct justifies a presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit.

That standard was not met:

• Newkirk’s conduct did not rise to the level of deliberate destruction or obstruction that would justify presuming its defenses meritless.
• At most, the record suggested possible gaps in record retention or misunderstandings about older agreements.

The Court concluded the sanctions were therefore excessive as a matter of law.

F. The Requirement to Consider Lesser Sanctions

Another pillar of Texas sanctions jurisprudence, emphasized in Cire, GTE, and Spohn Hospital, is the requirement that a trial court:

1. consider lesser sanctions; and
2. usually, test lesser sanctions before resorting to death‑penalty measures.

The Court found:

• The trial court did not consider or try lesser sanctions; it went directly to striking pleadings after a short hearing.
• Although the written order recited that lesser sanctions would be ineffective, its statements were conclusory and did not “adequately explain the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed.”
• The record did not make it “fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the rules.”

The Court underscored that a broad spectrum of lesser sanctions—from monetary penalties to issue‑limiting orders, fee‑shifting, or contempt—could have been employed if actual abuse existed. Instead, the trial court immediately imposed the “most devastating” sanction available.

G. Role of Party‑Drafted Findings and Independent Appellate Review

Plaintiffs argued that the appellate courts were bound by the trial court’s extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, which expanded and reframed the justifications for sanctions. The Supreme Court rejected that argument:

• Following American Flood Research, the Court reiterated that it independently reviews the entire record to determine whether sanctions constitute an abuse of discretion.
• Adoption of party‑drafted findings, especially when they go beyond what was actually argued or found at the hearing, does not shield a sanctions order from meaningful appellate scrutiny.
• The disconnect between the brief hearing (focused on the DHL contracts) and the later, more expansive written order weighed heavily against the legitimacy of the sanctions.

H. Mandamus as the Proper Remedy

Finally, the Court addressed the remedy. Under Walker v. Packer, mandamus is appropriate where:

1. the trial court clearly abuses its discretion; and
2. there is no adequate remedy by appeal.

Both criteria were met:

• The trial court clearly abused its discretion under TransAmerican, GTE, and Cire by imposing extreme sanctions without sufficient evidence and without considering lesser options.
• By striking Newkirk’s pleadings, the court “had the effect of adjudicating a dispute,” vitiating Newkirk’s ability to present its defenses at trial.

The Supreme Court thus conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order striking Newkirk’s pleadings, expressly noting that the writ would issue only if the trial court failed to comply.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Reinforcing a Restrictive Approach to Death‑Penalty Sanctions

In re Newkirk Logistics reinforces a long‑standing message from the Texas Supreme Court:

• Death‑penalty sanctions are reserved for the rarest and most egregious instances of discovery abuse;
• They are not mere “enforcement tools” for punishing imperfect or incomplete discovery; and
• The threshold for imposing them is intentionally high—both evidentially and procedurally.

Trial courts that are inclined to use striking pleadings or default judgments to manage complex discovery disputes are now on even clearer notice that they must:

• build a detailed, evidence‑based record of deliberate misconduct;
• demonstrate actual or constructive possession and intentional non‑production;
• tie the sanction closely to the specific prejudice suffered; and
• channel their discretion through a careful consideration of lesser sanctions.

B. Clarifying Constructive Possession in Multi‑Defendant and Corporate Contexts

The Court’s discussion of maintenance records and the DHL contracts is particularly significant for cases involving:

• multiple corporate defendants (e.g., motor carrier, shipper, equipment lessor);
• business relationships without control relationships (e.g., independent contractors, vendors, logistics chains); and
• complex, distributed record‑keeping across entities.

Newkirk makes clear:

• Constructive possession requires a legal right to obtain records—not merely a commercial relationship.
• One entity is not responsible for another entity’s internal documents absent some independent basis for control.
• Later production of records by another defendant is not, in itself, proof that the original party intentionally suppressed or destroyed records.

This clarification will likely be especially important in:

• trucking and logistics litigation;
• healthcare systems and affiliated clinics or contractors;
• franchise systems; and
• situations where plaintiffs attempt to bootstrap evidence of one entity’s records to sanction a different entity.

C. Evidentiary Demands on Sanctions Movants

The opinion strengthens the burden on parties seeking severe sanctions, requiring:

• admissible evidence that the targeted party had possession, custody, or control;
• evidence of deliberate concealment, destruction, or obstruction—not mere failure to locate or retain old records;
• avoidance of reliance on “argumentative filings” or large, unfocused record dumps; and
• specific articulation of how the alleged non‑production has prejudiced trial preparation.

For practitioners, this means sanctions motions seeking death‑penalty relief must be constructed almost like mini‑trials on bad faith and prejudice, not simply as strongly worded advocacy pieces.

D. Trial‑Court Management and Appellate Oversight

The Court’s insistence on independent review of the record reaffirms that:

• Appellate courts will not rubber‑stamp expansive sanctions orders, especially when grounded in party‑drafted findings cobbled together long after the hearing;
• Trial courts must be careful about later “expansions” of oral rulings through post‑hoc findings that were never actually litigated; and
• The per curiam, no‑oral‑argument disposition signals the Court’s view that this was a clear and correctable abuse of discretion under settled law, not a close or novel question.

E. Strategic Considerations for Litigants

For defendants:

• Search and documentation: Thorough documentation of search efforts and sworn testimony describing those efforts (as Newkirk did through affidavits) can be critical in combating accusations of bad faith.
• Immediate response to third‑party disclosures: When another party produces documents previously believed non‑existent, counsel should:
  • promptly investigate how and where those documents were maintained;
  • supplement disclosures if anything new is found; and
  • put the discovery context and search process on the record.

For plaintiffs:

• Developing proof of possession and bad faith:
  • Focus on developing concrete evidence (emails, internal policies, testimony) tying the documents to the sanctioned party’s systems or control.
  • Use targeted depositions (e.g., 199.2(b)(1) corporate representative depositions) to pin down where records are kept, for how long, and under what policies.
• Tailoring sanctions requests:
  • Consider asking first for lesser sanctions—monetary penalties, adverse‑inference instructions, issue preclusion—before seeking death‑penalty sanctions, to align with the Court’s incremental approach.

VII. Complex Legal Concepts Explained

A. “Death‑Penalty Sanctions”

“Death‑penalty sanctions” is shorthand for discovery sanctions so severe that they effectively decide the case against the sanctioned party. Common examples:

• striking a party’s pleadings;
• dismissing a plaintiff’s claims with prejudice; or
• rendering default judgment against a defendant.

They are called “death‑penalty” sanctions because they terminate a party’s right to have its claims or defenses adjudicated on the merits.

B. “Possession, Custody, or Control”

When a party is required to produce documents in discovery, that duty extends to documents within its:

• Possession: The party physically or electronically has the documents.
• Custody: The party has them in its care, even if they belong to someone else (e.g., a custodian maintaining another’s files).
• Control (constructive possession): The party does not physically hold the documents but has a legal right to obtain them on demand (for example, under a contract or corporate relationship).

In Newkirk, the Supreme Court stressed that “mere business dealings” do not automatically create constructive possession; there must be some independent legal basis for control.

C. “Bad Faith” vs. “Flagrant or Extreme Bad Faith”

In the sanctions context:

• Bad faith can include intentional non‑compliance, deceit, or conscious disregard of court orders.
• Flagrant or extreme bad faith is a high bar, referring to egregious, willful misconduct—such as:
  • deliberately destroying evidence after being ordered to produce it (Cire);
  • engaging in a sustained pattern of obstruction that leaves the opposing party unable to obtain crucial evidence by any means.

Newkirk reaffirms that this heightened level of misconduct is required before death‑penalty sanctions can be imposed.

D. “Just” Sanctions under Rule 215 and TransAmerican

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2(b), trial courts may impose “just” sanctions for discovery abuse. TransAmerican interprets “just” to require:

1. A direct relationship between the misconduct and the sanction—sanctions must be aimed at curing the prejudice and deterring the misconduct, not punishing beyond that; and
2. Non‑excessiveness—the sanctions must be no more severe than necessary, and should not adjudicate the merits unless the misconduct itself justifies presuming the sanctioned party’s position is without merit.

Put more plainly, the sanction must be proportionate and closely tied to the actual harm caused by the discovery violation.

E. Mandamus Relief

Mandamus is an extraordinary appellate remedy used to correct clear abuses of discretion when no adequate remedy by appeal exists.

In the sanctions context, mandamus is often appropriate when:

• a sanction effectively ends a party’s ability to present its case (e.g., striking pleadings); and
• waiting for a final judgment and then appealing would not adequately repair that harm.

In Newkirk, because the sanction vitiated the company’s defenses, the Supreme Court held that appeal would not be an adequate remedy.

VIII. Conclusion

In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc. fits squarely within the Texas Supreme Court’s long‑term project of keeping the most severe discovery sanctions within strict, clearly defined limits. The Court reaffirmed that:

• Death‑penalty sanctions are a last resort, reserved for cases of flagrant or extreme bad faith and demonstrable, irreparable prejudice.
• Movants bear a heavy evidentiary burden to prove:
  • possession, custody, or control of the disputed documents; and
  • intentional concealment, destruction, or obstruction.
• Speculation, skepticism, and even substantial suspicion are not substitutes for actual evidence.
• Mere business relationships do not create constructive possession of another entity’s documents; some independent basis for legal control must be shown.
• Trial courts must carefully consider and often test lesser sanctions before reaching for the most drastic remedies.

By granting mandamus and vacating the sanctions order, the Supreme Court of Texas has again emphasized that the justice system’s commitment to fair, merits‑based adjudication cannot be overridden by aggressive use of discovery sanctions unsupported by a rigorous, evidence‑based analysis. Newkirk thus stands as a cautionary and instructive precedent for Texas trial courts and litigants navigating the fraught terrain of discovery disputes and sanctions practice.