In re M.B.: The Foster Child Bill of Rights as Best‑Interest Factors and the Permissibility of Amish Foster Placements

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in In re M.B. (No. 24‑176, Nov. 13, 2025) addresses a highly sensitive and novel intersection of child welfare law, religious liberty, and the statutory “Foster Child Bill of Rights” (FCBR) in West Virginia Code § 49‑2‑126.

The case arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding concerning M.B., a two‑year‑old biracial child who, from birth, has lived with Old Order Amish foster parents (A.Y. and B.Y.) alongside his three older biological sisters, whom the foster parents have already adopted. The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), acting as petitioner, sought to remove M.B. from this placement on the theory that it could not lawfully or practically lead to permanency (adoption) because:

The Amish foster parents intend to limit M.B.’s formal schooling to grades 1–8, allegedly denying him his state constitutional and statutory rights to a “thorough and efficient” education and the FCBR’s education-related guarantees.
The family and their community do not routinely use preventive medical care or vaccinations, allegedly violating the child’s statutory “right to medical care.”
The Amish, white, German‑ancestry community might not accept a biracial child, and the foster parents had initially expressed a preference for white children, allegedly compromising M.B.’s right to a “safe and healthy environment.”

The Department of Human Services (DHS) and the foster parents opposed removal, arguing that the placement is loving, stable, and in M.B.’s best interests, especially because it keeps him with his three siblings. The State of West Virginia, as amicus curiae, supported affirmance of the circuit court’s refusal to move the child.

The Supreme Court affirms the circuit court’s order denying the GAL’s motion to change placement. In doing so, it articulates an important rule: with limited exceptions, the rights enumerated in the Foster Child Bill of Rights are not self‑executing, rigid mandates that automatically disqualify certain foster homes; rather, they are factors that must be weighed within a best‑interest-of-the-child analysis.

The opinion also squarely holds that the FCBR’s education‑related provisions cannot be interpreted to categorically bar Amish families from fostering or adopting children, and rejects the assertion that the statute requires routine preventive care or vaccinations as a condition of lawful placement, absent other statutory directives.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Procedural and Factual Background

M.B.’s three older biological sisters were placed with the Amish foster parents in 2020 during an abuse and neglect proceeding in Greenbrier County. The foster parents became their legal guardians and ultimately adopted them, with no objection from any party.
M.B. was born in May 2023 and immediately placed with the same foster parents in Kanawha County. His biological parents’ rights were terminated in December 2023.
In September 2023, the GAL moved to change placement, initially centering on the foster mother’s attempt to induce lactation to breastfeed M.B., and secondarily on concerns about Amish education, transportation, medicine, vaccinations, lack of technology, and racial acceptance.
The circuit court:
- Ordered the foster mother to cease inducing lactation (which she did),
- Appointed a special commissioner to investigate permanency, and
- Solicited briefs from DHS and the GAL.
The special commissioner found the home “loving and spiritual,” spotless, with clean, well‑behaved children, and recognized substantial benefits of permanency with the foster family and siblings. Nonetheless, citing limits on education, medical care, vaccines, technology, rigid gender roles, and concerns about racial acceptance, the commissioner recommended that M.B. be placed elsewhere—explicitly accepting that his sisters would remain with the foster parents.
After a hearing at which the foster father testified, the circuit court:
- Denied the foster parents’ motion to intervene (though it allowed them to participate through counsel),
- Denied the GAL’s motion to remove M.B., and
- Found it could not discriminate against the family because of its “religion and lifestyle,” emphasizing the controlling importance of the child’s best interests under W. Va. Code § 48‑9‑102.
The circuit court ordered M.B. to be “staffed for adoption” with the foster family; that aspect was stayed pending appeal.

2.2 Issues on Appeal

The GAL raised three principal assignments of error:

Education: That the placement violates M.B.’s state constitutional right to a “thorough and efficient” education and his statutory rights under the FCBR, especially:
- § 49‑2‑126(a)(13): the right “to attend school,” and
- § 49‑2‑126(a)(18): the right “to have access to information regarding available educational options.”
Medical care and vaccinations: That the placement violates M.B.’s statutory right to “medical, dental, and vision care” under § 49‑2‑126(a)(4) because the Amish community lacks a resident physician, uses home remedies, and does not routinely vaccinate children.
Race and safety: That placing a biracial child with white Amish foster parents who initially preferred white children, and allegedly “hiding” his race from the community, violates M.B.’s right to live in a “safe and healthy environment” under § 49‑2‑126(a)(1).

2.3 Holding

The Supreme Court of Appeals:

Affirms the circuit court’s order denying the motion to remove M.B. from the foster parents’ home.
Declines to reach the state constitutional education claim because it was inadequately briefed under Rule 10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Holds that:
- With the exception of § 49‑2‑126(a)(1)–(3), which deal with basic safety and subsistence, the FCBR’s provisions in § 49‑2‑126(a)(4)–(21) are not automatic grounds for removal; they are factors to be weighed within a best‑interest-of-the-child analysis.
- Sections 49‑2‑126(a)(13) and (18) cannot be read to bar Amish parents from fostering or adopting children.
- The record does not support a finding that M.B.’s right to “medical care” is being or will be violated; nor does the statute require routine preventive exams or vaccination of children who are not in public school.
- The record contains no evidence that the foster parents are concealing M.B.’s race or that his race compromises his safety or well‑being in the community.

3. Key Legal Framework and Precedents

3.1 The “Polar Star”: Best Interests of the Child

The Court anchors its analysis in a long line of cases declaring that the child’s welfare is the governing standard in custody disputes. The syllabus reiterates:

“In a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.”
– Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Cash v. Lively, 155 W. Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 (1972); adopted in State ex rel. David Allen B. v. Sommerville, 194 W. Va. 86, 459 S.E.2d 363 (1995); In the Interest of Kaitlyn P., 225 W. Va. 123, 690 S.E.2d 131 (2010); and In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013).

This “polar star” principle is both doctrinal (it guides the legal test) and rhetorical (it signals that all other considerations, including statutory preferences or policy goals, are subordinate).

3.2 Foster Child Bill of Rights – Previous Interpretations

The Court builds heavily on its two prior major decisions interpreting the FCBR:

In re R.S., 244 W. Va. 564, 855 S.E.2d 355 (2021):
- Addressed § 49‑2‑126(a)(6), which provides a foster child the right, “when placed with a foster or kinship family, to be matched as closely as possible with a family meeting the child's needs, including, when possible, the ability to remain with siblings.”
- The circuit court had treated this provision as mandating sibling placement. The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing:
  - The absence of mandatory language (“shall,” “must”) in § 49‑2‑126(a)(6); and
  - The provision’s character as a factor among others in deciding placement, not a conclusive rule.
In re G.G., 249 W. Va. 496, 896 S.E.2d 662 (2023):
- Involved § 49‑2‑126(a)(5), stating a foster child’s right “to be placed in a kinship placement, when such placement meets the objectives set forth in this article.”
- Relatives argued this created a mandatory kinship placement preference. The Court rejected that view and reaffirmed:
  “[I]n a contest involving the custody of an infant where there is no biological parent involved, the best interests of the child are the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.”
  – In re G.G., 249 W. Va. at 507, 896 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting State ex rel. Treadway v. McCoy)
- The FCBR provision again was treated as a factor, not a dispositive entitlement.
In re M.M., 251 W. Va. 74, 909 S.E.2d 109 (2024):
- M.M. reaffirmed R.S. and G.G. and held that § 49‑2‑126(a)(5) requires a best‑interests analysis before removing a child from a long‑term foster home to place them with kin, not an automatic transfer.

In re M.B. extends this interpretive approach to all of the FCBR provisions in § 49‑2‑126(a)(4)–(21), expressly positioning them as components of a holistic best‑interests inquiry.

3.3 Religious Liberty and Amish Education: Wisconsin v. Yoder and State v. Riddle

Two key precedents frame the religious and educational context:

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972):
- The U.S. Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could not criminally prosecute Amish parents for refusing to send their children to high school, where the parents’ refusal was grounded in sincere religious beliefs.
- The Court described Amish communities as maintaining a simple, agrarian way of life, emphasizing:
  - Community over competition,
  - Informal learning‑through‑doing over formal education, and
  - Separation from “worldly” society.
- Central to Yoder is the parent‑state conflict over compulsory attendance—not a child asserting an educational right against parents.
- The Yoder plurality expressly noted that the children were not parties and the case was not litigated as a child’s right to attend high school against parental wishes.
State v. Riddle, 168 W. Va. 429, 285 S.E.2d 359 (1981):
- West Virginia’s version of the Amish‑compulsory‑education conflict.
- Riddle discussed West Virginia’s constitutional mandate in art. XII, § 1 to provide a “thorough and efficient system of free schools,” and observed, in dicta, that an Amish education may satisfy that standard “because of the unique, and longstanding, nature of the Amish community, which [is] defined not only through common membership in a religious sect, but also geographically and culturally.”

In re M.B. invokes Yoder to describe Amish educational practices and to highlight the novel posture of this case: unlike Yoder, the party pressing the education claim here is the child’s GAL, not the state, and the issue arises in a foster/adoption context.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Standards of Review

The Court applies familiar abuse and neglect standards:

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard: they will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Conclusions of law and statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo (fresh, without deference).

Statutory issues, such as interpretation of the FCBR, fall under the de novo standard. But how those statutory principles apply to the concrete facts (e.g., whether a child is receiving “medical care”) is assessed under the clearly erroneous standard.

4.2 Constitutional Claim: Child’s Right to a “Thorough and Efficient” Education

The GAL briefly argued that West Virginia’s Constitution guarantees children a fundamental right to education and that limiting schooling to eighth grade violates that right. The Court declines to reach the merits because the argument is inadequately developed under Rule 10(c)(7), which requires:

Appropriate and specific citations to the record, and
Legal authority and analysis—not merely conclusory statements.

The GAL’s constitutional argument comprised only two brief sentences. The Court emphasizes that such skeletal assertions do not preserve complex claims such as:

Whether high school attendance is a necessary element of a “thorough and efficient” education under art. XII, § 1, and
Whether, and under what conditions, a child’s asserted educational right might override Amish foster/adoptive parents’ free exercise rights.

By declining to reach the constitutional merits, the Court both:

Enforces procedural rigor in raising constitutional claims, and
Avoids reaching difficult religion‑education questions that could collide with Yoder and Riddle.

Nonetheless, by citing Riddle’s dicta that Amish education may meet the “thorough and efficient” standard, the Court signals that, at minimum, there is no clear doctrinal consensus that high school is constitutionally required in this particular religious context.

4.3 Statutory Claims: Education Under the Foster Child Bill of Rights

4.3.1 The Text of the FCBR

The Court reproduces § 49‑2‑126(a) in full. Two provisions are central to the GAL’s argument:

§ 49‑2‑126(a)(13): The right “to attend school, and, consistent with the finances and schedule of the foster or kinship family, to participate in extracurricular, cultural, and personal enrichment activities, as appropriate to the child's age and developmental level.”
§ 49‑2‑126(a)(18): The right “to have access to information regarding available educational options.”

The GAL interprets these clauses as guaranteeing M.B. a right to attend high school and to know about such schooling options. The GAL contends that Amish parents, by religious conviction, will not permit high school attendance before M.B. is 18, making permanency with them inconsistent with his statutory rights.

4.3.2 FCBR as Factors, Not Automatic Bars

Relying on R.S., G.G., and M.M., the Court extends its prior interpretive methodology:

With the exception of subsections (a)(1)–(3), the FCBR rights do not operate as rigid, self‑executing conditions for foster eligibility.
Rather, §§ 49‑2‑126(a)(4)–(21) are to be considered and weighed in a best‑interest-of-the-child analysis whenever removal or placement is at issue.

The Court explicitly holds:

“[O]ur precedents lead ineluctably to the conclusion that West Virginia Code section 49‑2‑126(a) (2020), the Foster Child Bill of Rights, requires a circuit court to conduct a best‑interest‑of‑the‑child analysis before removing a foster child from his or her current placement based upon an allegation that the child is being denied one or more of the rights enumerated in subsections (4) through (21) of the statute.”

In other words, even if a placement does not provide every aspect of an idealized version of these rights, removal is not automatic. The court must weigh:

The alleged deficiencies (e.g., no high school, limited technology), and
The positive aspects (e.g., continuity, sibling placement, emotional security, moral upbringing, vocational training).

By contrast, the Court implies that violations of:

§ 49‑2‑126(a)(1) – safe and healthy environment,
§ 49‑2‑126(a)(2) – freedom from abuse, and
§ 49‑2‑126(a)(3) – adequate food and clothing,

would be so serious that removal would effectively be mandated. Such fundamental failures strike at the core of child protection.

4.3.3 Amish Families Are Not Statutorily Disqualified

The Court takes a further critical step:

“We believe that the rationale of these cases is sound and that such rationale supports our conclusion today that the provisions of West Virginia Code sections 49‑2‑126(a)(13) & (18), either singly or together, cannot be read to bar Amish parents from fostering or adopting children.”

This is a clear statement of new precedent: the education‑related FCBR rights do not create a categorical statutory bar to Amish foster or adoptive parents. Instead, the nature of Amish schooling (eight years of formal education followed by vocational learning) becomes one factor among many in best‑interest determinations.

The Court approves the circuit court’s findings that:

The foster family offers a “stable loving home,”
M.B. lives with his biological siblings, and
He will “receive a basic education and will further learn a trade.”

These findings, in the Court’s view, adequately support the conclusion that, despite limited formal schooling, the placement is consistent with M.B.’s statutory rights when assessed in the broader best‑interest framework.

4.4 Statutory Claims: Medical Care and Vaccinations

4.4.1 The Right to Medical Care under § 49‑2‑126(a)(4)

Section 49‑2‑126(a)(4) guarantees foster children:

“The right to receive medical, dental, and vision care, mental health services, and substance use treatment services, as needed.”

The GAL argued that Amish reluctance to use preventive medicine, the absence of a resident physician in the community, and the community’s general stance against routine childhood vaccination would deprive M.B. of this right.

4.4.2 Application of the Best‑Interest Approach

The Court applies the same interpretive logic:

§ 49‑2‑126(a)(4) is part of subsections (4)–(21), which do not automatically trigger removal.
The adequacy of medical care must be evaluated contextually, based on evidence.

The factual record undercuts the GAL’s claim:

The foster parents fully complied with DHS requirements:
- They brought M.B. to regular medical checkups.
- He received vaccinations.
- He saw a specialist and underwent surgery for bilateral hydronephrosis.
- They administered prescribed medications.
The foster father testified that:
- They take children to doctors when necessary (e.g., serious injuries, persistent or worsening illness).
- They would consider additional vaccines if circumstances warranted it.

On this record, there is simply no evidence that M.B. has been or will be deprived of needed medical care.

4.4.3 No Statutory Duty of Preventive Exams or Vaccination

The Court adds a more general doctrinal observation: the GAL “points to no statutes or case law” establishing that “medical care” in § 49‑2‑126(a)(4):

Requires regularly scheduled preventive exams, or
Mandates vaccination for children who are not attending public school.

Thus, the Court rejects the attempt to read into § 49‑2‑126(a)(4) a robust preventive-care or vaccination regime not found in the statutory text or precedent. Absent clearer legislative direction, the term “medical care” is interpreted to require reasonable access to needed treatment—not to codify particular public-health policies as placement conditions.

4.5 Race, Safety, and “Safe and Healthy Environment”

4.5.1 Allegations and Evidence

The GAL’s final argument is that the placement violates M.B.’s right to live in a “safe and healthy environment,” § 49‑2‑126(a)(1), because:

The foster parents originally expressed a preference for white children on their foster application.
The Amish community is homogeneously white and of German ancestry.
The foster parents were allegedly trying to hide the children’s biracial status from the community.

The evidence, however, paints a very different picture:

The foster father openly acknowledged the initial race preference, explaining it reflected concern that the community might not accept a non‑white child—a concern that “proved to be wholly unfounded.”
The community, according to uncontradicted testimony, has been “completely accepting of, and welcoming to” M.B. and his sisters.
The foster father testified that, if the community’s attitude changed, the family would relocate to a more welcoming Amish community.
Most importantly, the foster parents in fact welcomed and raised four biracial children, adopted three, and seek to adopt M.B. as well.

4.5.2 Application of § 49‑2‑126(a)(1)

The Court finds “not one scintilla of evidence” that the foster parents are hiding the children’s race or that race has endangered M.B.’s safety or health. The special commissioner described the home as “loving and spiritual,” and the children as well‑dressed, clean, attached to their parents, and thriving.

Therefore, the Court concludes that placing a biracial child with white Amish foster parents in a white community, on these facts, does not violate § 49‑2‑126(a)(1). Instead, this placement appears affirmatively beneficial, largely due to stability, sibling unity, and emotional security.

4.6 Non‑Discrimination Based on Religion and Lifestyle

The circuit court expressly stated that it “does not believe that it can discriminate against this family due to its religion and lifestyle” and emphasized best interests under W. Va. Code § 48‑9‑102. The Supreme Court’s affirmance implicitly endorses this approach.

While the opinion does not deeply analyze free exercise doctrine or equal protection, its practical message is clear: courts cannot disqualify or remove foster parents solely because their religious community has unconventional educational, technological, or cultural norms, so long as:

The home is safe and loving,
Basic needs are met, and
The statutory rights are reasonably respected when viewed in totality under a best‑interest analysis.

5. Impact and Implications

5.1 Clarifying the Legal Effect of the Foster Child Bill of Rights

In re M.B. cements and extends a doctrinal trajectory begun in R.S., G.G., and M.M.:

The FCBR is not a collection of absolute, independently enforceable entitlements that always override other considerations.
Instead, with limited exceptions, the FCBR delineates guiding interests and policy goals to be weighed as part of the best‑interest analysis.

This interpretation:

Prevents piecemeal removal arguments based on isolated deviations from ideal conditions (e.g., lack of technology, absence of high school, unconventional medical practices).
Requires circuit courts to conduct a holistic evaluation of each child’s situation, balancing tradeoffs inherent in any placement (for example, high academic opportunities vs. sibling continuity and emotional stability).

5.2 Religious and Cultural Diversity in Foster and Adoptive Placements

By expressly holding that §§ 49‑2‑126(a)(13) and (18) cannot be interpreted to bar Amish parents from fostering or adopting, the Court sends a clear message:

Religious minorities with non‑mainstream educational practices remain eligible foster and adoptive parents in West Virginia.
Cultural or religious distinctiveness, by itself, is not a disqualifying factor.

This has broad implications:

Public agencies and courts must avoid equating “different” with “unsafe” or “non‑compliant” where statutes are silent or ambiguous.
Challenges to religiously motivated schooling or medical traditions must identify concrete harm or statutory violations, not rely on general discomfort with non‑majority lifestyles.

5.3 Education Rights of Foster Children – Open Questions

The Court leaves unresolved important questions about children’s education rights:

Is high school attendance—or something equivalent—constitutionally required for a “thorough and efficient” education under art. XII, § 1?
Can a child, through a GAL, assert an education right against foster/adoptive parents whose religion restricts schooling, particularly once the child is older and personally expresses a desire to attend high school?
How should courts balance:
- The child’s educational aspirations,
- The parents’ religious liberty interests, and
- The state’s interest in education?

Because the Court sidestepped the constitutional issues on briefing grounds, these questions remain ripe for future litigation. In re M.B. thus provides a statutory, not constitutional, resolution tailored to the FCBR and the particular facts.

5.4 Medical Care, Vaccination, and Public Health Policy

The opinion also frames important boundaries regarding state intervention in medical decisions for foster children:

Absent specific statutory requirements, courts cannot infer an obligation for routine preventive exams or vaccinations simply from the FCBR’s reference to “medical care.”
Courts must distinguish between:
- Neglect or denial of necessary medical treatment (which would implicate §§ 49‑2‑126(a)(1) and (4)), and
- Reasonable, though perhaps unconventional, decisions about the timing and extent of preventive care, where the child’s health needs are being met in substance.

If the Legislature wishes to impose more specific health obligations on foster parents (e.g., mandatory vaccination unless medically contraindicated), it would need to do so explicitly.

5.5 Practical Guidance for GALs, DHS, and Courts

Guardians ad litem:
- Must present well‑developed legal and factual arguments, especially on constitutional claims, with citations and analysis that satisfy Rule 10(c)(7).
- Should frame concerns about education, medical care, or culture within a best‑interest analysis, recognizing they are not per se disqualifiers.
DHS and caseworkers:
- Should recognize that compliance with core safety obligations and DHS policies will weigh heavily in favor of upholding placements, even when families have unconventional religious or cultural practices.
- Must document children’s actual care—medical visits, vaccinations administered or declined, schooling arrangements—to provide a clear record for judicial review.
Circuit courts:
- Should resist interpreting FCBR clauses as rigid mandates (except in obvious cases of abuse, neglect, or deprivation of essentials).
- Must explicitly engage in a best‑interests analysis when removal is sought based on alleged FCBR violations.
- Should be cautious about allowing personal or cultural biases (e.g., valuing technology, public schooling, certain gender roles) to dominate the analysis absent statutory support.

5.6 Sibling Relationships and Permanency

Although the opinion’s main focus is on education and religious practice, it is significant that:

M.B.’s three sisters already live permanently with the foster parents.
The special commissioner candidly acknowledged that “there is no appetite” to remove the sisters, even if that were legally possible.
The commissioner recommended, effectively, that M.B. be permanently separated from his siblings for the sake of more conventional education and medical practices.

By affirming the decision to keep M.B. with his siblings and rejecting removal, the Court implicitly underscores:

The strong weight of sibling continuity and long‑term attachment in best‑interest determinations, consistent with § 49‑2‑126(a)(6) and (9), and
The serious costs—emotional, psychological, and developmental—of disrupting such bonds.

6. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

6.1 “Best Interests of the Child”

This is the central standard in child custody, foster care, and adoption cases. It requires judges to ask: What outcome will best promote this specific child’s overall well‑being? Factors often include:
- Safety and physical health,
- Emotional and psychological attachments,
- Stability and continuity of care,
- Educational and developmental opportunities,
- Siblings and other significant relationships, and
- The child’s own preferences (when age‑appropriate).
In In re M.B., the Court treats this standard as the “polar star” that overrides any rigid reading of individual FCBR provisions.

6.2 Guardian ad Litem (GAL)

A GAL is a lawyer or qualified advocate appointed to represent the best interests of a child in court. The GAL:
- Investigates the child’s circumstances,
- Advocates for what they believe is best for the child’s welfare (which may differ from what the child verbally expresses, especially if young), and
- Participates fully in litigation, including appeals.
In this case, the GAL is the petitioner, arguing that M.B. should be moved to a non‑Amish adoptive home.

6.3 Foster Child Bill of Rights (FCBR)

West Virginia’s FCBR, in § 49‑2‑126(a), lists 21 rights of foster and kinship‑placed children, including:
- Safe and healthy environment,
- Freedom from abuse,
- Adequate food and clothing,
- Medical care and mental health services,
- Schooling and extracurricular activities,
- Contact with siblings and important adults,
- Religious practice, and
- Access to information and participation in legal proceedings.
In re M.B. emphasizes that, except for the basic safety and subsistence rights (subsections (a)(1)–(3)), these provisions operate within the best‑interest framework rather than as automatic vetoes of particular placements.

6.4 Old Order Amish Educational and Medical Practices

Old Order Amish communities:
- Typically operate their own schools for grades 1–8.
- After that, children learn trades and household skills to prepare for adult life in the community.
- Often avoid high school and higher education because they see these as exposing their youth to “worldly” influences contrary to their religious values.
- Use a mix of home remedies and professional medical care, often reserving doctors for serious or persistent illness.
- Commonly limit technology (such as cars, television, and the internet) to maintain separation from mainstream culture.
In this case, those practices are central to the GAL’s objections, but the Court concludes that, as applied here, they do not violate the statutory rights of M.B. when understood in context.

6.5 Standards of Review: “De Novo” and “Clearly Erroneous”
- De novo review: The appellate court decides the legal question anew, without deferring to the lower court’s legal conclusion. This applies to statutory interpretation and constitutional issues.
- Clearly erroneous review: The appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless it is firmly convinced a mistake was made. Differences in how the appellate judges might have decided the case do not suffice to overturn plausible factual findings.
In In re M.B., factual findings about the quality of the home, the child’s medical care, and community acceptance are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and the Court finds ample support for them.

7. Conclusion

In re M.B. is a significant decision in West Virginia child welfare law, for at least three reasons:
1. It definitively frames the Foster Child Bill of Rights as a best‑interest framework, not a checklist of automatic grounds for removal or disqualification. Except for core safety and subsistence provisions, alleged non‑compliance with individual FCBR clauses must be weighed against all other circumstances.
2. It explicitly confirms that Amish foster and adoptive placements are legally permissible under the FCBR’s education provisions. Sections 49‑2‑126(a)(13) and (18) cannot be construed to exclude Amish families merely because they limit formal schooling to eighth grade and rely heavily on vocational training and community‑based learning.
3. It sets boundaries on using general concerns about medical practices, vaccination, or race to justify removal. The opinion requires concrete evidentiary support for claims that a child’s statutory rights are being violated, and it rejects speculative or culturally biased fears where facts show a loving, safe, and medically responsible home.
At a broader level, the case reinforces that:
- The child’s welfare—stability, love, sibling ties, and safety—remains the “polar star” guiding judicial discretion.
- Courts must approach religious and cultural diversity in foster care with humility and care, avoiding the temptation to equate non‑mainstream lifestyles with legal non‑compliance absent clear statutory directives.
The decision leaves open complex constitutional questions about children’s individual education rights vis‑à‑vis religious parents and communities, but it provides clear statutory guidance for how West Virginia courts should evaluate foster placements going forward. In doing so, In re M.B. offers a robust, carefully reasoned reaffirmation that the ultimate measure remains what is best for the particular child in the real world, rather than an abstract checklist of idealized rights divorced from lived circumstances.