In re Lawson: Tenth Circuit Reaffirms That § 1915(e)(2)(B) Pre‑Service Screening and Short Delays Do Not Justify Mandamus to Compel Service, Reassignment, or Vacatur

Introduction

In In re Lawson, No. 25-3158 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), a Tenth Circuit panel (Judges Hartz, Phillips, and Rossman) denied a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus brought under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Petitioner Angeliina Lynn Lawson sought three forms of extraordinary relief: (1) an order compelling the district court (Judge John W. Broomes, D. Kan.) to issue summons and arrange prompt service of her complaint; (2) reassignment of her case to a three-judge panel from outside the District of Kansas; and (3) vacatur of prior adverse rulings.

The underlying district court action arises from state-court child-custody proceedings. Ms. Lawson alleged violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and civil rights statutes. The district court granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status but withheld service pending the mandatory screening contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), explaining that the complaint appeared to target parties entitled to immunity and otherwise failed to state a claim. Ms. Lawson argued that the hold on service functioned as an indefinite stay, depriving her of court access; that reassignment was necessary due to alleged bias and conflicts; and that prior orders should be vacated.

The central issues before the Tenth Circuit were whether (a) pre-service screening and a relatively brief passage of time constituted “extraordinary circumstances” warranting mandamus to compel service; (b) the record showed a clear and indisputable entitlement to reassignment/recusal via mandamus; and (c) mandamus could substitute for appellate review of interim adverse rulings. The court answered each in the negative.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for writ of mandamus. Reaffirming the stringent standard for mandamus relief, the court held:

Delaying service while screening an IFP complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) does not, without more, deny access to the courts or amount to “extraordinary circumstances” justifying mandamus. Only roughly two months had passed, the district court’s docket reflected active case management, and petitioner retained the ordinary avenue of appeal from any final dismissal.
Petitioner’s own filing behavior—multiple amended complaints and a flurry of reassignment motions—undercut any claim that mandamus was necessary to remedy delay.
The reassignment request, construed liberally as akin to a recusal motion, failed because it relied chiefly on adverse rulings and speculation about local bias. Judicial rulings are almost never a valid basis for recusal, and conjecture about district-wide conflicts is insufficient.
Assignment of related cases to the same district judge is a legitimate case-management choice that promotes efficiency and is not, without more, evidence of bias.

The court granted Ms. Lawson’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs on the mandamus petition but denied all requested substantive mandamus relief. A late-filed supplement referencing separate district court events did not change the outcome, and any request for expedited review was denied as moot.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2009): The court relied on Cooper Tire’s classic formulation of the mandamus standard. Mandamus is “drastic,” reserved for “extraordinary circumstances,” requires the petitioner to show no other adequate means of relief and a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ, and is not a substitute for appeal. The panel repeatedly referenced these guideposts to frame its analysis of service, reassignment, and vacatur.
Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1990): Johnson granted mandamus in a habeas case where a 14-month delay was attributable solely to docket congestion. The panel used Johnson as a comparator to show that the two-month period here—especially amidst active case management—fell far short of the “exceptional” delay necessary to warrant mandamus. Johnson also notes that a petitioner’s own responsibility for delay matters; the panel invoked that observation when recounting Ms. Lawson’s serial amendments and repeated motions.
Lawson v. Bolton, No. 25-3167 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025) (order): In a recent order involving Ms. Lawson, the Tenth Circuit held that § 1915(e)(2) screening does not deny access to courts; it authorizes dismissal of meritless complaints, subject to appellate review. The panel applied this rationale here to reject the argument that pre-service screening itself warranted extraordinary relief.
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991): Cited for the principle that pro se pleadings are construed liberally. The panel used this to treat Ms. Lawson’s “reassignment” request as akin to a recusal motion for purposes of analysis.
Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam): Recognizes that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to seek review of a denial of recusal. The panel acknowledged this pathway but nevertheless found the substantive showing for recusal lacking.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): Establishes that adverse judicial rulings, standing alone, “almost never” support a recusal motion. The panel applied Liteky to dismiss the contention that prior unfavorable orders evidenced bias.
United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993): Clarifies that recusal cannot rest on speculation or conjecture. The panel quoted Cooley to reject assertions that no Kansas-based federal judge could be impartial in a case involving allegations against state judicial actors.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning hewed closely to well-settled mandamus principles:

No other adequate means; clear and indisputable right; appropriateness. Under Cooper Tire, a mandamus petitioner must satisfy all these elements. Ms. Lawson failed at every turn. She had an adequate remedy—appeal after judgment—if the district court ultimately dismissed her complaint. Her asserted “right” to immediate service was not “clear and indisputable” in light of § 1915(e)(2)(B), which authorizes pre-service screening for IFP litigants. And the short timeline and active case management undermined any claim that the writ was “appropriate” in context.
Pre-service screening does not deny court access. Echoing its recent Lawson v. Bolton order, the panel emphasized that § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening filters meritless IFP complaints and preserves judicial resources; it does not bar meritorious claims, which, if dismissed in error, can be reviewed on appeal. Ms. Lawson’s generalized assertions of evidence spoliation and systemic bias did not transform routine screening into a constitutional deprivation.
Delay was neither prolonged nor solely attributable to the court. Johnson v. Rogers sets a high bar for delay-based mandamus, particularly where delay stems from docket congestion alone. Here, only about two months had elapsed, the docket showed ongoing management (including prompt rulings on Ms. Lawson’s reassignment requests), and petitioner’s own multiple amendments and repeated motions materially contributed to the pace of proceedings.
Reassignment/recusal requires more than adverse rulings and conjecture. Construed as a recusal request, the reassignment bid faltered on Liteky and Cooley. Adverse rulings do not evidence bias, and speculation that Kansas federal judges necessarily lack impartiality toward Kansas state judicial actors is insufficient. The court also rejected the insinuation of bias from the judge’s “prior involvement” with petitioner’s related cases; centralized assignment of overlapping matters is a legitimate, efficiency-driven practice.
Mandamus is not a vehicle to vacate adverse interlocutory orders. The request to vacate prior rulings effectively sought to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal, which Cooper Tire forbids. Alleged legal errors in interim orders are properly reviewed, if at all, through ordinary appellate mechanisms after final judgment.

Procedurally, the panel granted Ms. Lawson’s motion to proceed IFP on the mandamus petition, considered her last-minute supplemental filing (relating to a different district court case) to the extent it bore on reassignment, and denied additional relief. The request for expedited review was denied as moot.

Note: The order cites district court entries in Lawson v. Godderz, No. 25‑cv‑1179 (D. Kan.) with dates of August 21, 2015 and August 21, 2025 in different places. This appears to be a typographical inconsistency; nothing in the analysis turns on the precise citation date.

Impact

The decision consolidates several practical lessons for federal civil practice—especially for pro se litigants proceeding IFP—and for judges managing clusters of related cases:

Mandamus to force service during § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening will rarely succeed. The panel’s reliance on its own recent Lawson decision and on Cooper Tire makes clear that routine pre-service screening, even if it causes some delay, is not grounds for extraordinary relief. Litigants should expect service to await screening in IFP cases.
Short delays, coupled with active case management, are not “exceptional.” Johnson v. Rogers remains the touchstone: it took a 14-month, court-caused delay to justify mandamus there. Two months here—amidst active rulings—was far short of that bar.
Serial filings can backfire. The court expressly noted that Ms. Lawson’s multiple amendments and repeated reassignment motions contributed to delay. Prolific motion practice, especially on issues already ruled upon, can undermine later claims of undue delay.
Recusal requires evidence, not conjecture. Adverse rulings, generalized claims of local bias, and the mere fact that a judge presides over related matters do not suffice. This reinforces the principle that recusal is grounded in objective indications of bias, not in dissatisfaction with case outcomes or in broad-brush allegations about a court’s locale.
Efficiency-based assignment is permissible. The explicit endorsement of assigning overlapping cases to the same judge signals institutional support for consolidated case management where issues and parties recur—especially common with frequent filers.
Spoliation and “ongoing harm” allegations must be supported. Unsubstantiated assertions about evidence spoliation (e.g., by state court clerks) do not convert ordinary pre-service screening into a constitutional violation warranting mandamus. Concrete, record-supported showings are required.
Mandamus remains a poor substitute for appeal. Attempts to vacate unfavorable interlocutory orders via mandamus will continue to face steep odds absent a showing of “judicial usurpation of power” or analogous extraordinary circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of mandamus (28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)): An extraordinary order from a higher court directing a lower court or official to perform a specific duty. To obtain it, a petitioner must show no other adequate remedy, a clear and indisputable right to relief, and that issuance is appropriate under the circumstances. It is reserved for truly exceptional situations, not ordinary disagreements with rulings.
In forma pauperis (IFP) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening: When a litigant cannot afford filing fees, a court may allow the case to proceed IFP. In such cases, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from immune defendants. Courts commonly delay issuance of summons and service until screening is complete.
“Clear and indisputable right”: A stringent requirement that the legal entitlement to the requested relief be beyond reasonable dispute. If reasonable judges could disagree or if ordinary appellate review is available, the standard is not met.
Mandamus vs. appeal: Mandamus is not a shortcut around normal appellate processes. Errors in interlocutory rulings are generally reviewed after a final judgment, not via mandamus, unless exceptional harm or a usurpation of power is shown.
Recusal and reassignment: Recusal is removal of a judge from a case due to actual bias or circumstances creating an appearance of partiality. Adverse rulings alone do not show bias. Speculation or generalized allegations about an entire court’s impartiality are insufficient.
“Judicial usurpation of power”: A severe form of judicial overreach—acting beyond lawful authority—that can justify mandamus. Routine case-management decisions, like sequencing screening before service, do not qualify.
Three-judge panels: While federal three-judge district courts exist in limited statutory contexts (e.g., certain redistricting cases), parties cannot typically demand one in ordinary civil litigation. The opinion did not reach any statutory entitlement to a three-judge court; it denied mandamus on threshold grounds.

Conclusion

In re Lawson is a careful application of established mandamus principles to a familiar contemporary posture: a pro se IFP litigant seeks to accelerate service, relitigate reassignment, and overturn adverse interlocutory orders while § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening is still underway. The Tenth Circuit’s message is clear:

Pre-service screening is legitimate and does not deny court access.
Short, actively managed delays do not warrant extraordinary relief.
Reassignment/recusal demands evidence of bias, not dissatisfaction with rulings or generalized assertions of local conflicts.
Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal.

For district courts, the decision validates efficient case-management tools—screening IFP cases before service and assigning related matters to the same judge. For litigants, it underscores the importance of channeling disagreements through ordinary appellate paths and of avoiding repetitive motion practice that can hinder rather than hasten judicial attention. Although not groundbreaking, the order meaningfully consolidates and applies key standards governing mandamus, recusal, and IFP screening in the Tenth Circuit’s ongoing engagement with serial and complex pro se filings.