In re J.H.: Waiver of Venue Objections and Implicit “Welfare of the Child” Findings in West Virginia Termination of Parental Rights

In re J.H.: Waiver of Venue Objections and Implicit “Welfare of the Child” Findings in West Virginia Termination of Parental Rights

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re J.H., No. 24-410 (Nov. 12, 2025), affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her newborn child who was born drug-affected while she was incarcerated. Although issued as a Rule 21 memorandum decision, the opinion is doctrinally important in three interrelated ways:

  • It reinforces that venue in abuse and neglect proceedings is waivable, and that a complete failure to object below bars raising venue for the first time on appeal.
  • It clarifies that a circuit court’s dispositional order in a termination case need not recite the statutory phrase “necessary for the welfare of the child” verbatim if the factual findings in the record clearly support that conclusion.
  • It applies existing law to hold that where a parent has already had parental rights involuntarily terminated to another child for essentially the same conduct, then no new “reasonable efforts” to reunify are required, and a second termination may proceed swiftly when a new child is born drug-affected.

The petitioner mother, A.H., argued that Wood County was not the proper venue and that termination was not the least restrictive alternative, particularly given the classes she had taken while incarcerated and the unresolved status of the alleged father’s paternity. The Court rejected all arguments and affirmed the termination of parental rights to J.H., emphasizing both procedural waiver rules and the overarching primacy of the child’s welfare.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

The background of In re J.H. is critical to understanding the Court’s analysis. The mother had already been involved in an earlier abuse and neglect case concerning J.H.’s older sibling.

A. The Prior Abuse and Neglect Case

  • In January 2023, the mother stipulated to abusing and neglecting J.H.’s older sibling, largely due to her chronic substance abuse.
  • She was offered extensive remedial services, including:
    • Participation in family treatment court, and
    • A traditional post-adjudicatory improvement period.
  • Despite these opportunities, the mother “did nothing” to address her addiction or comply with the offered services.
  • As a result, in June 2023, the circuit court involuntarily terminated her parental rights to the older sibling.

Significantly, the mother discovered she was pregnant with J.H. in July 2023—about a month after the termination of her rights to the older child—but continued her illegal drug use throughout the pregnancy.

B. Arrest, Incarceration, and Birth of J.H.

  • On February 17, 2024, eight months after the prior termination, the mother was arrested in Wood County, West Virginia, and charged with:
    • Third offense shoplifting; and
    • Delivery of a controlled substance resulting in death.
  • She was transported to the North Central Regional Jail (NCRJ) in Doddridge County.
  • Upon intake at NCRJ, a drug test was positive for amphetamines, buprenorphine, fentanyl, and THC.
  • On February 20, 2024, while still in state custody, she gave birth to J.H. at the jail and was transported with the infant to United Hospital Center (UHC) in Harrison County.
  • At UHC, the mother again tested positive for controlled substances.
  • J.H. suffered respiratory issues described as being caused by withdrawal due to prenatal drug exposure and was transferred to Ruby Memorial Hospital in Monongalia County.
  • While the child remained hospitalized and “clinging to life” in another county, the mother chose to sign herself out of UHC and returned to NCRJ.

By the time of appeal, the mother had pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance resulting in death and was serving a sentence at the Lakin Correctional Center, with the next parole hearing scheduled in December 2027 and a projected discharge date of September 2031. This time horizon loomed prominently over the question whether the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected “in the near future.”

C. The Abuse and Neglect Petition and Circuit Court Proceedings

  • On February 27, 2024, the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed the instant abuse and neglect petition in Wood County, alleging:
    • J.H. was born drug-affected;
    • The mother had continued illegal drug use throughout pregnancy; and
    • She had previously had parental rights terminated to J.H.’s sibling.
  • Adjudicatory hearing (April 2024):
    • The mother admitted that she resided in Wood County before her arrest.
    • She acknowledged the prior involuntary termination and that she had continued drug use after that termination until incarceration.
    • She had done “nothing” to address her addiction during this period.
    • The circuit court adjudicated her as an abusive and neglectful parent and J.H. as an abused and neglected child.
  • Dispositional hearing (June 2024):
    • The mother was the sole witness and was still incarcerated awaiting trial on the delivery resulting in death charge.
    • Under direct examination by her own counsel, she confirmed she was a resident of Wood County.
    • She testified that, in jail, the only controlled substance she took was prescribed Subutex and that she had completed various life skills courses.
    • She admitted that she learned she was pregnant with J.H. in July 2023 and continued to use illegal drugs throughout her pregnancy.
    • The circuit court noted her complete noncompliance in family treatment court and during the traditional improvement period in the prior case.

In its dispositional order, the circuit court made several key findings:

  • The mother discovered her pregnancy with J.H. a month after her prior termination but “did absolutely nothing to address her addiction.”
  • She continued using illegal drugs throughout the pregnancy, causing J.H. to be born drug-affected and to endure withdrawal.
  • J.H. was being scheduled to see a neurologist for seizures that were “quite likely” the result of prenatal drug exposure.
  • There was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future.

The court concluded that the mother’s parental rights to J.H. must be terminated. The permanency plan for the child was adoption in his current placement. The mother appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal, the mother raised two primary issues:

  1. Venue – She asserted that Wood County was not the appropriate venue because the child’s birth and much of the medical care occurred in other counties.
  2. Termination – She argued that:
    • Termination was not the least restrictive disposition;
    • The circuit court failed to adequately consider her efforts while incarcerated;
    • The court did not specifically find that termination was “necessary for the welfare” of J.H.; and
    • Termination should not have occurred before resolving the father’s paternity and potential placement.

The Supreme Court of Appeals:

  • Held that the venue objection was waived because the mother never raised it below and, in any event, the evidence established that Wood County was a proper venue.
  • Affirmed that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the near future, given the prior termination, failed services, continued drug use during pregnancy, and incarceration.
  • Emphasized that the DHS was statutorily excused from making reasonable efforts to reunify because the mother’s parental rights to another child had been involuntarily terminated.
  • Concluded that although the circuit court did not literally recite the words “necessary for the welfare of the child,” its factual findings and the overall record implicitly satisfied that statutory requirement.
  • Rejected the argument about the timing of termination relative to the father’s status as procedurally waived because it was presented in a skeletal fashion without citations to the appendix or supporting authority.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the June 26, 2024 order terminating the mother’s parental rights to J.H.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review: In re Cecil T.

The Court began by reiterating the familiar standard of review from syllabus point 1 of In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011):

  • Findings of fact in abuse and neglect appeals are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
  • Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This binary standard framed the Court’s approach: it did not reweigh evidence but examined the record to ensure that the circuit court’s factual findings were supported and that the legal conclusions flowed correctly from those facts.

B. Venue in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

1. Statutory Framework: West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(a)

Venue in abuse and neglect proceedings is governed by West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(a), which allows the petition to be filed:

  • In the county where the child resides; or
  • When the petition is brought by DHS, in the county where the custodial respondent or other named abuser resides; or
  • In the county where the abuse or neglect occurred.

The statute also prohibits filing the same set of facts in more than one county. Thus, venue is flexible but confined to a set of counties that have a logical connection to the child or the alleged misconduct.

2. Venue vs. Jurisdiction and Waiver: In re J.E. and Earlier Precedent

The mother’s venue argument collided directly with earlier case law, especially In re J.E., No. 14-0666, 2015 WL 1232024 (W. Va. Mar. 16, 2015) (memorandum decision), which the Court relied upon.

In J.E., the Court drew on a line of decisions distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from venue:

  • Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963) – explained that jurisdiction concerns the power of a court to hear a case, whereas venue concerns the place where that case is to be heard.
  • Vanover v. Stonewall Casualty Co., 169 W. Va. 759, 289 S.E.2d 505 (1982) – reiterated this distinction.
  • Hansbarger v. Cook, 177 W. Va. 152, 351 S.E.2d 65 (1986) – emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, but venue can be waived.

Building on these decisions, the Court in J.E. held that failing to object to venue before reaching the merits waives the issue on appeal. The Court also cited State v. Asbury, 187 W. Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d 891 (1992), for the general rule that failure to object at trial relinquishes the right to complain about the issue later.

In re J.H. invokes this same reasoning: venue is a procedural right that can be forfeited if a party does not raise it when the circuit court can still address and correct any error.

3. Role of Rule 17(b): Timing of Venue Challenges

The Court also referred to Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. That rule permits a respondent to raise issues—historically raised by “special appearance”—by motion without being barred merely because an answer has already been filed. Crucially, Rule 17(b) still requires a timely motion.

In In re J.H., the mother:

  • Never filed a motion contesting venue;
  • Never raised the issue at adjudication or disposition; and
  • Only asserted improper venue for the first time on appeal.

The Supreme Court therefore held that the venue objection was waived under both the general waiver doctrine and the specific framework of Rule 17(b).

4. Proper Venue in Wood County: Residence and Locus of Abuse

Even if venue were not waived, the Court concluded that the record independently showed that Wood County was a proper venue under § 49-4-601(a).

  • The mother was the custodial respondent.
  • She testified—under questioning by her own lawyer—that she was a resident of Wood County.
  • She also admitted that she did not use illegal drugs after her arrest and transport to NCRJ; thus, the drug use that caused J.H. to be born drug-affected necessarily took place while she resided in Wood County, before incarceration.

On those facts, Wood County qualified as both:

  • “the county in which the custodial respondent resides,” and
  • “the county in which the abuse or neglect occurred.”

The Court therefore held that venue was proper in Wood County on the merits, independent of the waiver analysis.

5. Practical Significance

The venue holding has two important practical implications:

  • Parents’ counsel must raise venue issues promptly. Silence at the trial level will almost certainly result in waiver, even in the sensitive context of child protection litigation.
  • Multi-county factual scenarios do not automatically relocate venue. The birth of a child or subsequent medical care in other counties does not defeat venue where the parent resided and where the underlying abuse or neglect (e.g., prenatal drug use) actually occurred.

C. Termination of Parental Rights: Statutory Standards and Precedents

1. The Core Statutory Standard: § 49-4-604(c)(6) and (d)

Termination of parental rights in West Virginia is principally governed by West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which authorizes a court to:

Terminate parental rights when (1) there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and (2) termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

Section 49-4-604(d) further defines when there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correction. In general terms, that standard is met when the parent has demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.

2. Reasonable Efforts Exception: § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C)

Ordinarily, DHS must make “reasonable efforts” to preserve or reunify families. But the Legislature has provided explicit exceptions. Under § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), DHS is not required to make reasonable efforts when:

The parent’s parental rights to another child have been terminated involuntarily.

This statutory exception is critical in In re J.H.. Because the mother’s rights to J.H.’s older sibling were previously terminated involuntarily, DHS was relieved of its duty to provide a new round of reunification services before seeking termination as to J.H.

3. Earlier Precedents: R.J.M., Kristin Y., and J.H.-1

The Court’s analysis is rooted in several well-known abuse and neglect precedents.

  • In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980) – In part, the Court held that circuit courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where doing so would seriously threaten the child’s welfare. This case is a foundational statement that the child’s need for safety and stability cannot be indefinitely delayed by the hope of future parental change.
  • In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) – In its syllabus, the Court held that termination of parental rights may be ordered without first resorting to less restrictive alternatives when the “no reasonable likelihood” standard is met and termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. The decision expressly builds on R.J.M..
  • In re J.H.-1, No. 17-0781, 2018 WL 317377 (W. Va. Jan. 8, 2018) (memorandum decision) – There, the Court affirmed termination in a case where a parent had received extensive services yet later gave birth to a second drug-affected child, evidencing that the parent had failed to internalize or implement those services. In re J.H. explicitly invokes this precedent as an analogous scenario.

Collectively, these cases underscore that when there is a pattern of unremedied abuse or neglect—especially following substantial services—courts may move directly to termination without cycling through additional improvement periods and less restrictive dispositions.

4. Application to the Mother’s Case

The Court in In re J.H. emphasized several key facts supporting the conclusion that there was no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future:

  • The mother had already undergone an entire prior abuse and neglect case involving similar issues (substance abuse), culminating in a prior involuntary termination.
  • In that prior case, she was offered family treatment court—a resource-intensive and highly structured therapeutic court program—and then a traditional improvement period. She failed to participate meaningfully in either.
  • Despite learning of her new pregnancy one month after the prior termination, she continued using illegal drugs throughout the pregnancy.
  • J.H. was born drug-affected, experienced withdrawal, and later required neurological evaluation for seizures likely linked to prenatal drug exposure.
  • The mother was facing a lengthy incarceration, with realistic reunification not even conceivable until at least 2027, by which time J.H. would be a school-aged child in need of permanent stability.

Although the mother pointed to life skills courses she had taken in jail as evidence of improvement, the Court treated this as far too little, too late, in light of:

  • Her entrenched addiction;
  • The failure of previous intensive services; and
  • The severe harm already inflicted on two children.

Consistent with R.J.M. and Kristin Y., the Court held that the circuit court was not required to pursue further speculative possibilities of parental improvement that would delay permanency for J.H. and that termination could be ordered without resort to less restrictive alternatives.

5. No Duty of Reasonable Efforts

Because of the prior involuntary termination, the Court held that DHS was excused from the duty to provide new reasonable efforts under § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C). In effect:

  • The earlier case provided the mother with her chance at rehabilitation;
  • Her failure to avail herself of those services triggered the statutory exception as to J.H.; and
  • DHS was entitled to move directly toward termination once the new child’s circumstances demonstrated ongoing serious harm.

This aspect of In re J.H. signals to practitioners and parents alike that a prior involuntary termination dramatically limits the procedural and substantive options in subsequent cases involving new children.

D. “Necessary for the Welfare of the Child”: Magic Words vs. Substantive Findings

1. The Statutory Requirement

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) plainly requires two findings before termination:

  1. No reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
  2. Termination is necessary for the welfare of the child.

In many decisions, the Court has reversed or remanded where critical statutory or rule-based steps were overlooked or where findings were too bare to permit appellate review. In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001), is emblematic of such cases: where circuit courts fail to observe procedural requirements or adequately explain their decisions, corrective action is required.

2. The Mother’s Argument and the Court’s Response

The mother argued that the circuit court erred by failing to expressly find that termination was “necessary for the welfare of J.H.,” and therefore the order violated § 49-4-604(c)(6).

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the circuit court did not use the statute’s phrasing verbatim, either in its oral ruling or in the written order. Nevertheless, the Court declined to reverse or remand, holding that:

  • The circuit court’s factual findings, both at the dispositional hearing and in the written order, implicitly established that termination was necessary for J.H.’s welfare; and
  • The process required by the abuse and neglect rules and statutes had not been “substantially disregarded or frustrated.”

The Court stressed that the combination of:

  • The prior termination;
  • The mother’s unremedied addiction;
  • Her continued drug use during pregnancy;
  • The child’s serious medical conditions directly attributable to that drug use; and
  • The mother’s lengthy incarceration

collectively provided “ample support” for the conclusion that termination was in J.H.’s best interests.

3. Doctrinal Effect

The decision does not abrogate the requirement that courts must find termination “necessary for the welfare of the child.” Instead, it clarifies:

  • Substance controls over form: So long as the record makes clear why termination is in the child’s best interests, an order will not be reversed solely for failing to recite the statutory phrase verbatim.
  • But explicit findings remain best practice: To avoid appeals and potential remands, circuit courts should continue to expressly state both prongs of § 49-4-604(c)(6) in their orders.

In practice, In re J.H. signals that appellate review is holistic: the Court will look at the entire record, not just the presence or absence of “magic words,” when deciding whether the statutory standards have been satisfied.

E. Improvement Periods and the Requirement of a Written Motion

The record revealed some discussion at the dispositional hearing about a post-dispositional improvement period. However:

  • No written motion for a post-dispositional improvement period could be found in the appendix; and
  • The docket sheet did not reflect such a motion.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(3) requires that a motion for a post-dispositional improvement period be in writing. The Court noted this omission but observed that, even assuming a request was made, the circuit court denied the improvement period for the same reasons supporting termination—namely, no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future.

The discussion has two implications:

  • Procedural rigor: Practitioners must file a written motion if they seek a post-dispositional improvement period. An oral request, standing alone, is procedurally deficient and may not preserve the issue for appeal.
  • Substantive overlap: Even where the issue is reached, a court may deny an improvement period when the same facts that justify termination also show there is no realistic prospect of meaningful remedial progress.

F. Skeletal Appellate Arguments and Rule 10(c)(7)

1. The Argument Regarding the Father

The mother briefly claimed that termination was improper because:

  • It was not yet known whether J.H. might eventually be placed with his father; and
  • It was not clear whether termination of her rights was necessary for adoption or other permanent placement.

The Supreme Court characterized this as a “skeletal argument”—a bare assertion without supporting citations to the appendix record or relevant authority.

2. Rule 10(c)(7) and In re M.F.

The Court invoked Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires that an appellant’s argument:

  • Contain specific citations to the record on appeal; and
  • Be supported by legal authority demonstrating why the alleged error merits relief.

The Court explained that it may disregard arguments that do not comply with this rule. It cited In re M.F., No. 22-0213, 2022 WL 4355492 (W. Va. Sept. 20, 2022) (memorandum decision), which in turn quoted State v. Kaufman, 227 W. Va. 537, 711 S.E.2d 607 (2011):

“A skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim …. Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”

Applying that principle, the Court in In re J.H. held that the mother’s brief comment about the unknown future role of the father was not preserved and declined to address it further.

3. Practical Lesson

The decision underscores a critical practice point for appellate advocates:

  • Assignments of error must be fully developed, with record citations and legal support, or risk being deemed waived.
  • Even in emotionally charged abuse and neglect appeals, the Court will apply standard waiver and preservation rules.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

This section explains several legal concepts used in the decision in more accessible terms.

1. Venue vs. Jurisdiction

  • Jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a type of case. If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any order it enters is void.
  • Venue is about which particular county’s court should hear the case. Multiple counties may be permissible venues. Venue errors generally do not make a judgment void and can be waived if not timely raised.
  • In In re J.H., the Wood County Circuit Court clearly had jurisdiction over abuse and neglect cases. The mother’s argument went only to venue, which she waived by failing to object below.

2. Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

Abuse and neglect proceedings are civil cases in which the State seeks to protect a child from harm or risk of harm from a parent or caregiver. They can lead to:

  • Removal of the child from the home;
  • Orders directing services and treatment for the parents; and, in serious or persistent cases,
  • Termination of parental rights, permanently severing the legal relationship between parent and child.

3. Drug-Affected Newborns

A “drug-affected” child is one who is born showing signs of having been exposed to illegal drugs in utero—such as withdrawal symptoms, respiratory problems, seizures, or other complications. In many jurisdictions, including West Virginia, such circumstances support a finding of abuse or neglect because they reflect serious prenatal harm or risk created by the parent’s conduct.

4. Improvement Periods

An improvement period is a defined period during which a parent is given the opportunity, with court oversight and agency assistance, to remedy the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect petition. Types include:

  • Post-adjudicatory improvement period – after the court adjudicates abuse/neglect.
  • Post-dispositional improvement period – after the dispositional phase, used sparingly.

Parents must generally show they are likely to fully participate and that an improvement period offers a realistic chance of correction. In In re J.H., the mother had previously been granted substantial opportunities—including family treatment court and traditional improvement periods—but failed to engage, which weighed heavily against any new improvement period.

5. Reasonable Efforts

“Reasonable efforts” refer to the steps that DHS ordinarily must take to help families stay together or be reunified, such as:

  • Providing substance abuse treatment referrals;
  • Arranging parenting classes;
  • Supervising visitation; and
  • Facilitating transportation and support services.

However, when parental rights to another child have already been involuntarily terminated, West Virginia law allows DHS to bypass further reasonable efforts in new cases. That exception applied in In re J.H..

6. “No Reasonable Likelihood” of Correction

A court finds “no reasonable likelihood” of correction when, looking at the parent’s history and current circumstances, it concludes that the parent:

  • Has not demonstrated the capacity to remedy the problems; and
  • Is unlikely to do so even with assistance, at least in the timeframe that matters for the child.

For an infant like J.H., “the near future” is measured in months, not years. A parent facing multiple years of incarceration, following years of unremedied drug abuse and a prior failed case, will almost always satisfy this standard.

7. “Necessary for the Welfare of the Child”

This phrase asks whether terminating parental rights:

  • Is needed to protect the child’s safety and well-being; and
  • Is necessary to allow the child to achieve a permanent, stable home (e.g., through adoption).

In practice, a court looks at the child’s health, developmental needs, emotional bonds, and the feasibility of a safe reunification. In In re J.H., the severity of the child’s medical issues and the mother’s history and incarceration made termination clearly aligned with J.H.’s welfare.

8. Family Treatment Court

Family treatment courts are specialized dockets that combine intensive judicial monitoring with treatment services, particularly for substance abuse. Participation offers parents a structured, supported path to reunification. Failure to engage or succeed in such a program is a powerful indicator that less intensive interventions are unlikely to succeed.

VI. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Circuit Courts

For trial judges, In re J.H. offers several key takeaways:

  • Venue: Judges may treat venue issues as waived if not raised by a timely motion. This reinforces the adversarial nature of venue disputes, even in child protection cases.
  • Findings: While explicit repetition of statutory language (“no reasonable likelihood,” “necessary for the welfare of the child”) remains best practice, the Supreme Court will examine the overall record to determine whether those standards are substantively met.
  • Prior cases matter: A prior involuntary termination and failed participation in family treatment court heavily support findings of no reasonable likelihood of correction and justify moving directly to termination without further improvement periods.
  • Infant permanency: For infants born drug-affected, courts are justified in acting swiftly when evidence shows a pattern of severe, ongoing parental substance abuse.

B. For Parents’ Counsel

The decision sends a clear message to lawyers representing parents in abuse and neglect proceedings:

  • Raise venue early and in writing. If you believe the petition was filed in the wrong county, a timely motion is essential; waiting until appeal is too late.
  • File written motions for improvement periods. Oral requests may not be enough to preserve the issue, especially with statutory language requiring a written motion.
  • Develop appellate arguments thoroughly. Under Rule 10(c)(7), skeletal arguments without record citations or legal authority are at risk of being summarily disregarded.
  • Be candid about prior terminations. If a client has previously lost parental rights, counsel must recognize the severe limitations this imposes on the availability of new services and improvement periods in subsequent cases.

C. For DHS and Guardians ad Litem

For DHS and guardians ad litem (GALs), In re J.H. validates several strategic approaches:

  • Rely on statutory exceptions. When prior involuntary terminations exist, DHS can move toward termination in new cases without offering extensive new reunification services, provided the evidence supports ongoing risk.
  • Document prior services and failures. A detailed record of past services, noncompliance, and continuing harmful conduct (such as drug use during pregnancy) is crucial to support “no reasonable likelihood” findings.
  • Highlight child’s specific medical and developmental needs. Evidence such as seizures, withdrawal, and specialist referrals reinforces the necessity of termination for the child’s welfare.
  • Support thorough but focused orders. GALs can help ensure that dispositional orders provide enough factual detail to survive appellate review, even if statutory phrases are not recited verbatim.

D. For Future Litigation

Doctrinally, In re J.H. refines several aspects of West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

  • Venue in multi-county cases: The case signals that where the nexus of parental conduct and residence is clear, later medical treatment in other counties will not undermine the petition’s venue.
  • Magic words vs. substantive compliance: The decision suggests that appellate courts will increasingly focus on whether the record, as a whole, demonstrates compliance with statutory standards, rather than insisting on ritualistic recitation of statutory language—so long as procedural fairness is maintained.
  • Prior terminations as a powerful factor: The case continues a trend in which prior involuntary terminations significantly constrain the options for parents in subsequent proceedings and support prompt termination when new children are similarly endangered.
  • Appellate discipline: The reaffirmation of Rule 10(c)(7) and the rejection of skeletal arguments may influence how abuse and neglect appeals are briefed, pushing counsel toward more disciplined, well-supported appellate advocacy.

VII. Conclusion

In re J.H. is a fact-driven but legally meaningful memorandum decision that reinforces several key principles of West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

  • Venue is waivable: Parents cannot sit silently in the circuit court and later challenge venue for the first time on appeal. Where the custodial respondent resides and where the abuse occurred are central to venue analysis.
  • Past behavior matters greatly: A prior involuntary termination, combined with failure to benefit from intensive services and continuation of the same harmful conduct (here, chronic drug use culminating in a second drug-affected newborn), strongly supports a finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction.
  • Reasonable efforts may not be required: Under § 49-4-604(c)(7)(C), DHS can, in appropriate cases, move directly toward termination without new reunification efforts.
  • Substance over form in findings: While courts should strive to recite statutory standards clearly, a termination order will not be overturned solely for failing to use the exact words “necessary for the welfare of the child” if the record robustly supports that conclusion.
  • Appellate arguments must be fully developed: Bare assertions without record citations or supporting authority will be ignored under Rule 10(c)(7).

Taken together, these teachings underscore the West Virginia Supreme Court’s continuing commitment to:

  • Protecting the safety and welfare of children;
  • Ensuring procedural regularity while avoiding hypertechnical reversals; and
  • Encouraging efficient, well-grounded decision-making in the most sensitive and consequential of family law cases.

For practitioners, In re J.H. is a pointed reminder that in termination of parental rights litigation, both procedural precision and substantive evidence of parental change—or the lack of it—are decisive, and that the child’s need for stability ultimately governs the outcome.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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