Implied Intent & Logical Limits on Time-Distance in Disorderly Conduct Restraining Orders
Comprehensive Commentary on Fagnon v. Ngaima, 2025 ND 122 (N.D. Sup. Ct.)

1. Introduction

The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Fagnon v. Ngaima, 2025 ND 122, confronts two recurring practical hurdles in disorderly-conduct restraining order (DCRO) litigation:

1. How “old” may an act of violence be before it is too remote in time to justify current injunctive relief?
2. When parties reside in different cities, does geographical distance alone undercut the need for protection?

Petitioner–appellee Prisca Houenoukpo Fagnon sought a DCRO against respondent–appellant Ndorleh S. Ngaima, her former partner and father of their children. She alleged a history of harassment, threats, and a particularly brutal assault in July 2023 that broke her nose. Despite the parties living ~100 miles apart (Jamestown vs. Fargo) and the incident being 18 months old, the district court granted a two-year DCRO. On appeal, Ngaima argued the order exceeded “logical limits” on time and distance and was unsupported by adequate findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, producing a clarifying precedent on implied intent and the elasticity of the time-distance test in DCRO cases.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court (Justice McEvers writing) held the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DCRO.
• Even though the violence occurred 18 months earlier and the parties live in separate cities, neither factor crossed the “logical limits” referenced in Meier v. Said and Mead v. Hatzenbeller.
• Physical violence inherently qualifies as “intrusive or unwanted acts … intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another,” satisfying N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(1) without an express finding on intent.
• The trial court’s oral findings—though brief—were sufficient under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) because the factual basis (photographs, credible testimony of assault) was evident from the record.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Meier v. Said, 2007 ND 18 – Introduced the “logical limits on time and distance” concept. Acts in California eight months prior were still actionable in North Dakota due to history of violence, pregnancy, and ongoing litigation.
2. Mead v. Hatzenbeller, 2023 ND 248 – Approved a DCRO one year after the act, emphasizing the parties’ proximity in a small town and a judicially-noticed criminal conviction for disorderly conduct.
3. Gerszewski v. Rostvet, 2024 ND 141 – Restated the abuse-of-discretion standard and the necessity of Rule 52 findings.
4. Jones v. Rath, 2023 ND 69 – Allowed appellate courts to infer sufficiency of findings when the record illuminates the trial court’s rationale, even if specific statutory phrasing is absent.

Collectively, these cases frame the analytical scaffold for DCRO appeals: (1) abuse-of-discretion review; (2) reasonable-grounds ≅ probable-cause standard; (3) Rule 52(a) sufficiency; and (4) the flexible “logical limits” test.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Standard of Review. The Court reiterated that it will reverse only for an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable exercise of discretion or legal misapplication.
2. Time Factor. While no statutory temporal limit exists, the Court examined the 18-month gap and declared it not beyond logical limits, especially where:
   • The violence was severe (broken nose, bloodied photographs).
   • The parties share children requiring future interaction.
3. Distance Factor. Approximately 100 miles between Fargo and Jamestown does not negate risk. The foreseeable need for parental exchanges means physical separation is not dispositive.
4. Implied Intent. The Court concluded that physical violence is generally an intrusive and unwanted act intended to adversely affect safety. Therefore, an explicit finding of intent was unnecessary when the facts themselves compel that inference.
5. Rule 52(a) Findings. The trial judge’s on-record comments—crediting the photographs and testimony—enable appellate understanding, satisfying Rule 52 despite the absence of ornate findings.

C. Impact of the Judgment

1. Expanded Flexibility on Remoteness. Future litigants cannot rely solely on the age of violent incidents or interstate/long-distance living arrangements to defeat a DCRO. An 18-month gap is within acceptable bounds when severity and ongoing relational contexts exist.
2. Implied-Intent Doctrine. By holding that some acts (notably, physical violence) intrinsically satisfy the statutory intent element, the Court lowers evidentiary hurdles for petitioners in comparable circumstances.
3. Guidance for Trial Courts. Oral, concise findings that tether facts to the statutory definition can survive appeal; however, prudence still counsels more detailed, written findings to pre-empt challenges.
4. Domestic-Violence Intersection. The opinion signals that conduct sufficient for a domestic violence protection order certainly suffices for a DCRO. Practitioners may strategically consider which statutory remedy to pursue based on burdens of proof and desired relief.
5. Co-Parenting Contexts. The Court implicitly acknowledges that shared-child logistics sustain risks despite distance, making DCROs a viable tool even when parties reside in different jurisdictions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Disorderly Conduct Restraining Order (DCRO): A civil injunction under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-31.2 prohibiting a respondent from engaging in specified conduct; requires “reasonable grounds” & equals probable cause.
• “Logical Limits” Test: A judicially-created fairness boundary assessing whether acts are too old or parties too geographically separated to warrant injunctive relief. It is not a bright-line rule but a fact-specific inquiry.
• Rule 52(a) Findings: Trial judges must state the facts and legal conclusions separately when no jury is involved. Adequacy hinges on whether an appellate court can discern the pathway from evidence to decision.
• Abuse of Discretion: A deferential standard. An appellate court will overturn only if the lower court’s decision was irrational or legally erroneous.
• Implied Intent Doctrine (post-Fagnon): In cases of direct physical violence, courts may infer the statutory “intent to adversely affect safety” without explicit testimony or findings on intent.

5. Conclusion

Fagnon v. Ngaima fortifies two doctrinal pillars in North Dakota protective-order jurisprudence:

1. The Elastic Time-Distance Principle. Severe misconduct, even 18 months old and across city lines, may still justify a DCRO when contextual factors (shared children, credible threats) exist.
2. Implied Intent in Violent Acts. Courts may infer the requisite statutory intent from the inherent nature of physical violence, streamlining petitioner burdens and emphasizing victim safety.

By affirming the order on these grounds, the Supreme Court provides clearer guidance for trial courts, litigants, and counsel on when protective measures are appropriate and how findings can withstand appellate scrutiny. Expect future respondents to face an uphill battle when challenging DCROs predicated on unequivocal physical harm, regardless of temporal or geographic gaps.