Implicit “No Reasonable Likelihood” Findings and Refusal to Acknowledge Substance Abuse in Termination of Parental Rights: Commentary on In re J.P. (W. Va. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re J.P., No. 24‑617 (Nov. 4, 2025), affirms the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her infant child following a series of substance-abuse-related events and a failed improvement period. Although procedurally concise, the decision provides an important reaffirmation and clarification of several principles in West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

The decisive role of a parent’s refusal to acknowledge ongoing substance abuse in determining whether less restrictive dispositional alternatives are appropriate.
The Court’s willingness to uphold termination of parental rights even when the circuit court’s order does not explicitly recite the statutory finding that there is “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions can be corrected—so long as that conclusion is clearly implicit in the factual findings.
The continued validity of terminating one parent’s rights even when the child is safely placed with a nonabusing parent.

The case centers on S.P. (“Petitioner Mother”), whose newborn J.P. was born drug-affected following her admitted use of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl during pregnancy. After an adjudication for abuse and neglect, the circuit court granted a post‑adjudicatory improvement period. Despite completing a short‑term treatment program, the mother relapsed, was reincarcerated following a positive cocaine screen, and continued to deny responsibility for her substance use. The circuit court ultimately terminated her parental rights. On appeal, she argued (1) that the circuit court misapplied a “fifteen‑month” statutory concept, and (2) that the court should have imposed a less restrictive dispositional alternative under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(5) instead of terminating her rights under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6).

The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, affirming the termination order and clarifying how the statutory framework operates in the context of substance-abusing parents who deny their ongoing problems.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals, in a memorandum decision, affirmed the Berkeley County Circuit Court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights to J.P. The key holdings are:

“Fifteen‑month” improvement period limit not actually at issue. The Court declined to address the mother’s complaint that the circuit court referenced a “fifteen‑month” concept (apparently West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑610(9)), because the mother did not seek additional improvement period time on appeal. Her arguments went only to disposition, not to the length of improvement periods.
Less restrictive disposition under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5) properly rejected. The Court held that a temporary custody disposition under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5) was inappropriate because the mother’s refusal to acknowledge ongoing substance abuse rendered the underlying problem effectively “untreatable.” In this circumstance, the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was no viable less restrictive dispositional alternative to termination.
Termination valid despite omission of explicit “no reasonable likelihood” language. While the dispositional order did not expressly state that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future” as required by § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), the Supreme Court held termination proper because the circuit court’s factual findings clearly supported that conclusion. This follows In re Jamie Nicole H., 205 W. Va. 176, 517 S.E.2d 41 (1999).
Termination of one parent’s rights permitted despite child’s placement with nonabusing parent. The Court reaffirmed that § 49‑4‑604 permits termination of one parent’s parental rights while the rights of a nonabusing parent remain intact, citing In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000).

Accordingly, the Court found no clear error in the circuit court’s factual findings and no legal error in its conclusions, and it affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Facts

In July 2023, the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition after J.P. was born drug‑affected. The mother admitted to using multiple controlled substances during pregnancy—cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl—and was incarcerated on felony drug charges at the time of the petition.

In her answer to the petition, the mother admitted several allegations, including her drug use during pregnancy. At an adjudicatory hearing in August 2023, based on these admissions, the circuit court adjudicated her as an abusing and neglecting parent as to J.P.

B. Improvement Period and Relapse

The mother requested a post‑adjudicatory improvement period in writing; the circuit court granted it in January 2024. After her release from incarceration, the court held a review hearing in May 2024, at which:

The mother was participating in a substance abuse treatment program.
She expressed an intention to move to a sober living facility after treatment.

She then moved for an extension of her improvement period in June 2024. However, in August 2024, she tested positive for cocaine and was arrested for violating probation, resulting in reincarceration. This relapse and probation violation occurred during her improvement period.

C. Dispositional Hearing

At the September 2024 dispositional hearing:

A DHS worker confirmed the positive cocaine screen and noted that, although the mother had completed a short‑term treatment program, DHS recommended termination because she had violated both her improvement period and probation. The worker emphasized that a positive test after prison and treatment showed her drug use “has not changed.”
The mother testified and:
- Denied using cocaine.
- Claimed her positive result was due to sexual intimacy with a cocaine user.
- Admitted she had completed substance abuse treatment in the past and relapsed.
- Admitted she had voluntarily relinquished parental rights to older children due to substance abuse.
- Admitted a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but attempted to minimize or deflect responsibility.
The mother blamed:
- A car accident and subsequent pain medication prescription for her addiction.
- DHS for her decision to attend short‑term instead of long‑term treatment.
- Her “poor judgment” in romantic partners as her only real mistake in the case.

The circuit court found that the mother “accept[ed] no responsibility for anything” and was concerned that “when a person puts the needs of herself above others, they typically fail in drug abuse rehabilitation.” It concluded that she failed to substantially comply with her improvement period and that no less restrictive alternative to termination was appropriate.

The court also observed that the child had been out of the mother’s care for fifteen months (some of that time in the father’s custody), and stated that “while the statutory strict rule regarding that period may not apply, the basic concept does apply.” It then terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding this in the child’s best interests. The child’s permanency plan was to remain with the nonabusing father.

D. Appeal

On appeal, the mother raised one assignment of error: that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights. She argued:

The circuit court’s reference to J.P. being out of her care for fifteen months was “legally not applicable” because the statutory 15‑of‑22‑month rule applies only when a child is in foster care.
The court should have imposed a less restrictive disposition—temporary commitment of J.P. under West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(5)—rather than terminating her rights under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6).
The circuit court failed to make the required statutory finding that there was “no reasonable likelihood” she could substantially correct the conditions in the near future.

The Supreme Court rejected each aspect of her argument and affirmed.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court cites In re Cecil T. for the standard of review in abuse and neglect appeals:

Findings of fact by the circuit court are reviewed for clear error.
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

This underscores that the Supreme Court will defer to the circuit court’s credibility determinations and factual assessments (for example, whether the mother was credible in denying drug use), while independently reviewing the interpretation and application of statutes like § 49‑4‑604 and § 49‑4‑610.

2. In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 743 S.E.2d 352 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 599 S.E.2d 631 (2004)

The Court reiterates a critical principle from Timber M. and Charity H.:

“Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect … results in making the problem untreatable.”

This doctrine is central to the outcome in In re J.P.. It means that in abuse and neglect cases, meaningful rehabilitation is impossible if the parent will not admit the existence and nature of the problem (here, ongoing substance abuse and relapse).

The Supreme Court applies this principle to conclude that the mother’s:

Denial that she used cocaine.
Blaming her positive test on sexual intimacy with a drug user.
Deflection of responsibility to DHS and others.

collectively rendered her substance abuse issue functionally “untreatable” within the legal framework. This justifies rejecting less restrictive dispositions and supports termination.

3. In re Jamie Nicole H., 205 W. Va. 176, 517 S.E.2d 41 (1999)

The mother argued that termination was invalid because the circuit court did not explicitly state the statutory finding required by West Virginia Code § 49‑4‑604(c)(6): that there was “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future.”

The Supreme Court relied on Jamie Nicole H. to reject this argument. That case holds that termination may still be upheld even if the dispositional order does not “track the language” of the statute verbatim, provided:

The record convinces the Court that the circuit court did, in substance, reach the conclusions required by the statute before terminating parental rights.

In In re J.P., the Supreme Court found that various factual findings—mother’s denial of her addiction, relapse after prison and treatment, blame‑shifting, and pessimistic prognosis for successful rehabilitation—demonstrated that the circuit court had effectively concluded there was no reasonable likelihood of correction, even though it did not use that precise statutory phrase.

4. In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000)

The mother argued that because J.P. was placed with the nonabusing father, a less restrictive disposition should have been used instead of termination of her parental rights. The Supreme Court answered this by citing In re Emily, which interprets § 49‑4‑604 to:

permit “the termination of one parent's parental rights while leaving the rights of the nonabusing parent completely intact, if the circumstances so warrant.”

Thus, the fact that a child is safe with a nonabusing parent does not immunize the abusing parent from termination if statutory criteria for termination are otherwise met. This preserves the child’s long‑term stability and autonomy from a persistently unfit parent while maintaining the child’s relationship with the nonabusing parent.

5. Statutory Framework: West Virginia Code §§ 49‑4‑610 and 49‑4‑604

§ 49‑4‑610(9) – 15‑of‑22 month limit.
This provision essentially caps the time a child may remain in foster care under combinations of improvement periods: “no combination of any improvement periods or extensions thereto may cause a child to be in foster care more than fifteen months of the most recent twenty‑two months,” subject to exceptions. The circuit court referenced the child being out of the mother’s care for fifteen months and stated that while the “statutory strict rule” may not apply, “the basic concept does.”

The Supreme Court deliberately sidestepped a detailed analysis of § 49‑4‑610(9), stating that:
- The petitioner did not argue she was entitled to additional improvement period time.
- Her appellate arguments focused solely on disposition.
Therefore, § 49‑4‑610(9) was “not at issue.”
§ 49‑4‑604(c)(5) – Temporary commitment disposition.
Under this provision, a court may “commit the child temporarily” to DHS, a licensed agency, or a suitable guardian when the abusing parent is “presently unwilling or unable to provide adequately for the child's needs.” The mother argued for this disposition as a less restrictive alternative to termination.
§ 49‑4‑604(c)(6) – Termination disposition.
This authorizes termination of parental rights where:
- There is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
- Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.
§ 49‑4‑604(d)(3) – Defining “no reasonable likelihood” in addiction cases.
This subsection provides that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions can be corrected when the abusing parent is:
“addicted to alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, to the extent that proper parenting skills have been seriously impaired and … [has] not responded to or followed through the recommended and appropriate treatment which could have improved the capacity for adequate parental functioning.”
The Supreme Court explicitly relied on this provision. It linked the mother’s addiction, prior treatment and relapse, and failure to accept responsibility to § 49‑4‑604(d)(3), concluding that the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” threshold had been met.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review and Deference to Circuit Court

Applying In re Cecil T., the Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court’s factual determinations—such as the mother’s credibility and the significance of her relapse—for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The opinion does not suggest any factual findings were clearly erroneous; instead, it emphasizes that the circuit court reasonably inferred ongoing addiction and lack of accountability from the mother’s conduct and testimony.

2. The “15‑Month” Issue Under § 49‑4‑610(9)

The mother objected that the circuit court referenced a “fifteen‑month” concept that she argued applied only when a child has been in foster care. The Supreme Court:

Inferred that she was referring to § 49‑4‑610(9).
Noted that neither party nor the circuit court cited any authority on this point.
Held that the statute was “not at issue” because the mother did not claim entitlement to more time under an improvement period on appeal.

The Supreme Court thus treated the circuit court’s mention of the 15‑month concept as essentially dicta—an observation about permanency and timeliness rather than a controlling legal premise for its decision. By declining to engage with the mother’s statutory argument, the Court kept the focus firmly on the dispositive question: whether, by the time of disposition, termination was warranted under § 49‑4‑604.

3. Rejection of Less Restrictive Disposition Under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5)

The mother’s principal argument on the merits was that the circuit court should have used the less restrictive dispositional option in § 49‑4‑604(c)(5)—temporary custody/guardianship—rather than terminating her rights.

The Supreme Court rejected this for a straightforward reason grounded in Timber M. and Charity H.: the mother’s refusal to acknowledge her ongoing substance abuse meant that the root problem could not be effectively treated or corrected. Specifically:

She denied intentional drug use despite a positive cocaine screen.
She blamed the positive test on intimate contact with a drug user, a theory the circuit court was entitled to view as implausible.
She blamed DHS for offering short‑term rather than long‑term treatment, instead of taking ownership of her relapse.
She minimized her faults by characterizing her only mistake as “poor judgment” in relationships.

From these facts, the circuit court concluded—and the Supreme Court agreed—that:

The mother had not substantively complied with her improvement period.
She had not internalized the need for sustained recovery work.
She was unlikely to achieve meaningful change in the near future.

Because § 49‑4‑604(c)(5) requires that a temporary disposition be realistic in light of a parent’s ability and willingness to improve, the Court held that it was improper in this case. When a parent’s problem is effectively “untreatable” due to denial, a temporary disposition would merely prolong instability and uncertainty for the child without reasonable prospect of reunification.

4. Implicit “No Reasonable Likelihood” Finding and § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)

The mother argued that the termination order was defective because the circuit court did not explicitly state that there was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions could be corrected in the near future, which § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) requires as a predicate to termination.

The Supreme Court agreed with her factual observation—the phrase does not appear verbatim—but rejected the legal conclusion. Relying on Jamie Nicole H., the Court emphasized:

A circuit court’s order does not need to recite statutory language mechanically.
What matters is whether the findings, taken together, demonstrate that the court actually reached the statutorily required conclusions.

Here, the circuit court found:

The mother had relapsed after treatment and incarceration.
She denied responsibility and refused to acknowledge ongoing substance abuse.
She blamed others—DHS, doctors, romantic partners—for her situation.
She would not be successful with substance abuse treatment, given her mindset.
Termination was in the child’s best interests and no lesser disposition was appropriate.

These findings align precisely with § 49‑4‑604(d)(3)’s definition of when “no reasonable likelihood” exists—specifically, addiction so severe and unaddressed that adequate parenting is unlikely to be restored. The Supreme Court therefore found it was “convinced” the circuit court had, in substance, made the requisite finding, even if not in statutory shorthand.

This reinforces a practical rule: in West Virginia, termination orders are not necessarily defective simply because they lack precise statutory language, provided the underlying factual findings satisfy the statute’s substantive requirements.

5. Termination Despite Placement with the Nonabusing Father

The mother also argued that because J.P. was already placed with the nonabusing father, a less drastic disposition should have been used. The Supreme Court rejected this, citing In re Emily:

The statutory scheme expressly contemplates termination of one parent’s rights while leaving the other parent’s rights unaffected.
The existence of a safe, nonabusing parent does not preclude terminating the other parent’s rights when that parent is unfit and unable to correct conditions in the foreseeable future.

This principle serves several functions:

It prevents an abusing parent from retaining legal rights that could undermine stability for the child (e.g., future litigation, interference, or emotional conflict).
It aligns with the overarching goal of achieving permanency and certainty for the child, not merely temporary safety.

Accordingly, the child’s placement with the father did not compel a less restrictive disposition for the mother. Termination remained an available and appropriate option.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Reinforcing the Centrality of Acknowledgment in Substance Abuse Cases

By heavily emphasizing the mother’s denial of responsibility and her refusal to acknowledge her ongoing drug use, In re J.P. reinforces a recurring theme in West Virginia jurisprudence: acknowledgment is a threshold requirement for successful rehabilitation in abuse and neglect cases.

Practically, this decision signals:

Parents who minimize, deny, or externalize blame for substance abuse—even after treatment and relapse—face a heightened risk that courts will deem their problems “untreatable” in the legal sense.
Attorneys representing parents must carefully counsel clients on the importance of candidly acknowledging addiction and demonstrating insight, not just superficial program compliance.

2. Guidance on Drafting and Reviewing Dispositional Orders

Although the Supreme Court upheld the termination despite imperfect statutory wording, In re J.P. implicitly warns trial courts to:

Make clear, specific findings on each statutory element—especially “no reasonable likelihood” and “best interests.”
Connect factual findings explicitly to statutory criteria (e.g., § 49‑4‑604(d)(3) regarding addiction).

For appellate practitioners, the case illustrates that:

Arguments based solely on missing statutory phrases may fail if the record robustly supports the statutory conclusions.
A successful appeal will often require showing not merely formal defects, but substantive insufficiency of the circuit court’s reasoning or evidence.

3. Limits of the 15‑of‑22 Month Argument

While the Supreme Court declined to squarely decide whether § 49‑4‑610(9) applied to this situation, In re J.P. provides a procedural caution:

If a party wishes to challenge a circuit court’s reliance on the “fifteen months” concept in § 49‑4‑610(9), they must properly raise issues related to improvement periods—such as entitlement to additional time—rather than treating it as an abstract error when the real dispute is dispositional.
The Court is disinclined to reach tangential statutory questions not necessary to resolve the actual assignment of error.

4. Continuing Acceptance of One-Parent Termination

By reaffirming In re Emily, the decision reinforces that:

Courts need not preserve an abusing parent’s rights simply because the child is already protected by placement with a nonabusing parent.
Long‑term emotional and legal stability for the child can justify terminating one parent’s rights even where immediate physical safety is not in question.

This matters for future cases where one parent is consistently unfit and the other is stable and protective. Courts may feel more comfortable terminating the unfit parent’s rights, knowing the law explicitly supports one‑parent termination.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Abuse and Neglect” Case

An abuse and neglect proceeding is a civil case where the State (through DHS) alleges that a child’s parent or guardian has abused or neglected the child. If the court finds the allegations true, it can order various protective and remedial measures, including removal of the child, improvement periods, and ultimately termination of parental rights.

2. Adjudication vs. Disposition

Adjudication: The stage where the court decides whether the allegations of abuse or neglect are true. Here, the mother admitted to drug use during pregnancy, and the court adjudicated her as an abusing/neglecting parent.
Disposition: The stage where the court decides what to do about the child’s placement and the parent’s rights (e.g., improvement periods, temporary custody, termination).

3. Improvement Period

An “improvement period” is a court‑supervised timeframe during which a parent is given an opportunity to correct the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect finding. The parent typically must:

Participate in services (e.g., treatment, counseling).
Comply with case plans.
Demonstrate progress in addressing the underlying issues.

The improvement period is not automatic; it must be requested, and the parent must show a willingness and ability to participate meaningfully. In this case, the mother was granted a post‑adjudicatory improvement period, but ultimately failed it due to relapse, probation violation, and lack of acceptance of responsibility.

4. Less Restrictive Dispositional Alternative – § 49‑4‑604(c)(5)

A “less restrictive” alternative to termination is any disposition that allows a parent’s rights to remain intact while still protecting the child. Under § 49‑4‑604(c)(5), the court can:

Place the child temporarily with DHS, a private agency, or a guardian.
Leave the door open for the parent to improve and potentially regain custody in the future.

The key idea is that the parent is “presently” unable or unwilling to care for the child, but might realistically become able in a reasonable time. If the court concludes that meaningful improvement is unlikely, then a temporary disposition is inappropriate.

5. Termination of Parental Rights – § 49‑4‑604(c)(6)

Termination is the most drastic dispositional option. It permanently severs the legal parent‑child relationship (as to the terminating parent). To terminate rights under § 49‑4‑604(c)(6), the court must find:

No reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future – meaning that, based on the parent’s history and current circumstances, it is unlikely they can fix the conditions that led to abuse/neglect in a timeframe that makes sense for the child.
Termination is necessary for the child’s welfare – not merely convenient, but necessary to protect the child’s well‑being and stability.

6. “No Reasonable Likelihood” and § 49‑4‑604(d)(3)

In cases involving substance addiction, § 49‑4‑604(d)(3) explains when “no reasonable likelihood” exists:

The parent is addicted to drugs or alcohol to the extent their parenting is seriously impaired; and
The parent has not responded to, or followed through with, appropriate treatment that could have improved their ability to parent.

In In re J.P., this concept was satisfied where the mother:

Had a long history of substance abuse, including during pregnancy.
Had prior treatment and relapse.
Relapsed again during an improvement period even after incarceration and treatment.
Denied ongoing drug use and blamed others.

7. One-Parent Termination

“One‑parent termination” refers to situations where a court terminates the rights of one parent (usually the abusing/neglecting parent) while leaving the other parent’s rights intact, often because that parent is nonabusing and able to care for the child. The law in West Virginia explicitly allows this when the circumstances justify it.

VI. Conclusion

In re J.P. may be a memorandum decision, but it reinforces several important themes in West Virginia abuse and neglect law:

Acknowledgment of the problem is critical. The mother’s refusal to accept responsibility for her ongoing substance abuse—despite prior treatment, relapse, and a positive drug screen—was central to the conclusion that her issues were legally “untreatable” and that no lesser dispositional alternative than termination was viable.
Substance over form in statutory findings. Even though the circuit court did not explicitly use the phrase “no reasonable likelihood,” its detailed factual findings met the substantive requirements of § 49‑4‑604(c)(6) and (d)(3). The Supreme Court thus reaffirmed that careful factual analysis can compensate for imperfect drafting, though best practice remains to track statutory language explicitly.
Placement with a nonabusing parent does not bar termination. Relying on In re Emily, the Court confirmed that a child’s safe placement with the other parent does not insulate an unfit parent from termination when statutory criteria are met and the child’s long‑term stability so requires.
Procedural focus matters on appeal. By declining to delve into the 15‑of‑22 month improvement‑period limit, the Court signaled that it will not reach out to decide statutory issues that are tangential to the actual relief requested on appeal.

Overall, In re J.P. stands as a cautionary example for parents in abuse and neglect proceedings: participation in treatment programs and completion of formal steps during an improvement period, without genuine acknowledgment of underlying problems and durable behavioral change, are unlikely to prevent termination where addiction remains active and unaddressed. For courts and practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of linking detailed factual findings to the statutory framework governing both less restrictive dispositions and termination of parental rights.