Implausibility Is Not Enough: Seventh Circuit Reaffirms Deference to District Courts’ Franks Credibility Findings and Cautions Against “Bound to Credit” Language

Introduction

In United States v. Payne T. Randle, No. 24-1969 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 2025), a Seventh Circuit panel (Judges Brennan, St. Eve, and Maldonado) affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress following a Franks hearing. Police had executed a warrant at Randle’s Fort Wayne, Indiana home, uncovering drugs and firearms. The pivotal pretrial dispute was whether the affiant, Detective Daniel Radecki, lied when he reported smelling a strong odor of raw marijuana from 25–30 feet away outside the house—a statement that supported the search-warrant affidavit.

The district court—despite voicing skepticism that the odor could be detected under the circumstances—ultimately credited six officers who testified consistently that they smelled raw marijuana, and it denied suppression. On appeal, Randle argued that the district court committed clear error by crediting an implausible narrative, supposedly because it was told by multiple officers. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that:

At a Franks hearing, the defendant bears the burden to prove by a preponderance that the affidavit contained deliberate or reckless falsehoods; mere implausibility, without more, does not carry that burden.
Appellate review of credibility determinations is highly deferential and will be overturned only if the testimony was “physically impossible” or contrary to the laws of nature.
While the district court’s phrasing that it was “bound” or had “little choice” to credit police testimony was inapt, the ruling as a whole reflected an independent credibility assessment and was not clearly erroneous.

Although designated a nonprecedential disposition under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, the decision offers a pointed clarification for trial courts and practitioners about how credibility is assessed in Franks proceedings, the role of corroborating officer testimony, and the kinds of evidence that can effectively challenge a warrant affidavit.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel affirmed Randle’s convictions and sentence, rejecting his sole appellate challenge to the denial of suppression. The court applied clear-error review to the district court’s factual findings at the Franks hearing and reviewed any legal questions de novo.

Key holdings:

The district court permissibly credited the testimony of six officers who consistently reported a strong odor of raw marijuana outside the home, especially given their training and experience and the absence of impeachment or countervailing expert evidence.
The claim that detecting raw marijuana from 25–30 feet away was “too implausible” to be believed did not meet the stringent standard for reversing a credibility finding; it was not “physically impossible” under the circumstances presented.
Although the district court’s language suggested reluctance to “call” officers liars and that it felt “bound” to credit them, the record confirmed that the court made an independent credibility determination and understood its authority to disbelieve the officers if the defendant carried his burden.

Because Randle failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit included deliberate or reckless falsehoods, the court did not reach Franks materiality (i.e., whether excising the challenged statements would defeat probable cause).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Establishes that a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of a warrant affidavit by showing, at an evidentiary hearing, that the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false statements or omitted material information, and that the falsehoods were necessary to probable cause. The Seventh Circuit applied Franks’ burden-shifting framework and focused on the falsity prong, given the district court’s credibility finding.
United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2024): Reiterates that at the Franks hearing the defendant must prove deliberate or reckless falsity by a preponderance of the evidence. The panel used Hueston to restate the burden Randle failed to carry.
United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2017): Confirms clear-error review of factual findings on motions to suppress. This standard anchored the deferential approach to the district court’s credibility determinations.
United States v. Spears, 673 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 2012): Clarifies that legal questions associated with suppression are reviewed de novo. The panel referenced this standard while emphasizing the factual nature of the credibility call.
United States v. Edwards, 34 F.4th 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2022): Frames the appellate inquiry in Franks disputes as whether it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that law enforcement did not doubt the truth of the affidavit. This focus on the affiant’s state of mind is central: the issue is not simply whether the contested fact was true, but whether the officer lied or acted with reckless disregard for truth.
United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2016): Two contributions were crucial here: (1) the “physically impossible” standard for overturning credibility findings—appellate courts will not disturb a trial judge’s credibility determination unless the account defies physical possibility or the laws of nature; and (2) the propriety of considering mutually corroborative officer testimony and its coherence with surrounding evidence.
United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1137–38 (7th Cir. 1982): Recognizes that a witness’s training and experience—especially in narcotics investigations—can be considered in assessing credibility. Here, the officers’ drug-investigation experience buttressed the trial court’s credibility assessment.
United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2001): Highlights how contradictions or omissions can impeach credibility. The panel noted Randle did not identify such defects in the officers’ testimony.
United States v. Alexander, 741 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2014): Warns against implying that police officers’ oaths or professional roles make them intrinsically more credible. The panel’s gentle criticism of the district court’s “bound”/“little choice” phrasing drew on this principle, even as the panel ultimately found no reversible error.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning turned on the Franks burden and the deferential clear-error standard:

Defendant’s burden at Franks: Randle had to prove by a preponderance that the affiant included deliberate or reckless falsehoods and that, corrected, the affidavit would lack probable cause. The district court found he did not meet the falsity prong.
Credibility call belongs to the district court: The district judge heard six officers who testified that they smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana that intensified as they approached the house. The judge found them “consistent and credible,” despite expressing skepticism about the story’s plausibility.
Corroboration and experience matter: Consistency among multiple trained officers can reinforce credibility. The court also considered contextual details—cold weather, closed doors and windows, the age of the home and potentially leaky windows, and the timing of when drugs were moved to the car.
“Implausible” is not “impossible”: Appellate courts will overturn a credibility determination only if the testimony was physically impossible or contrary to scientific law. There was no expert testimony or studies that rendered detection of raw marijuana odor at 25–30 feet impossible as a matter of law.
No effective impeachment: Randle did not produce expert testimony, contradictions, or omissions to undermine the officers’ accounts. The lack of extrinsic impeachment meant the district court could permissibly credit the officers.
Language caution but no reversible error: The district court’s statements that it was “bound” to credit officers and had “little choice” were imprecise and potentially suggestive of undue deference to police witnesses. But the Seventh Circuit read the ruling as a whole, concluding that the judge recognized her duty and authority to make an independent credibility assessment and simply found the officers believable on this record.

Importantly, because the panel agreed with the district court that Randle had not proved a deliberate or reckless falsehood, it had no occasion to address Franks materiality (whether the affidavit would still establish probable cause if the challenged odor statements were excised).

What the Court Did Not Decide

Probable cause without the odor statements: The panel did not analyze whether the affidavit would have supported probable cause if the odor statements were removed. The affidavit also referenced a package containing 500g of marijuana and 391g of methamphetamine addressed to the residence, as well as subsequent events, but the opinion resolved the appeal on the falsity prong and left materiality unaddressed.
Legality of the vehicle search: Randle did not pursue his vehicle-search challenge on appeal; the panel accordingly did not address it.
A categorical rule about odor distances: The court did not set a scientific or categorical benchmark for when marijuana odor detection is or is not plausible; it held only that the testimony here was not physically impossible and was credited by the district court without clear error.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers several practical guideposts for Franks litigation in the Seventh Circuit:

Defense burdens are substantial at Franks hearings: Defendants need more than an argument from implausibility. Persuasive challenges will often require expert testimony (e.g., on olfactory detection ranges), contradictions, omissions, or other extrinsic impeachment that undercuts the officers’ accounts.
Multiple consistent officer accounts carry weight: When several trained officers testify in a mutually corroborative manner and their story is facially coherent, trial courts may credit them, and appellate courts will be reluctant to disturb that finding absent impossibility or contradiction by extrinsic evidence.
Trial judges should avoid language suggesting a default in favor of police credibility: The panel’s cautionary note about “bound”/“little choice” language underscores that judicial findings must reflect an independent assessment of all witnesses, with no special presumption of truthfulness attached to law enforcement testimony.
Odor-based probable cause remains viable but fact-dependent: The opinion does not resolve broader debates over marijuana-odor reliability in jurisdictions with changing cannabis laws. It does, however, reaffirm that odor observations—especially when corroborated—can be credited and used in probable-cause analyses, subject to Franks constraints.
State-of-mind focus under Franks: The inquiry is not purely about whether the underlying fact (odor) existed; it is whether the affiant deliberately or recklessly misstated it. Edwards’ emphasis on whether law enforcement “doubted the truth” of the affidavit guides this focus.
Appellate deference is real: The clear-error and “physical impossibility” thresholds set a high bar for overturning a district court’s credibility determinations. The presence of misgivings or even skepticism at the trial level does not equate to reversible error when the judge ultimately makes and explains an independent credibility finding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Franks hearing: A specialized evidentiary hearing where a defendant seeks to show that a search-warrant affidavit contained knowingly false statements or omissions made with reckless disregard for the truth. If the defendant proves falsity and materiality, the court excises the falsehoods and reassesses probable cause; if probable cause then fails, suppression follows.
Preponderance of the evidence: The standard of proof at a Franks hearing—more likely than not (i.e., greater than 50% likelihood).
Clear-error review: A deferential appellate standard for factual findings. The appellate court will not reverse unless it is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made—especially rare for credibility calls based on live testimony.
“Physically impossible” standard: Appellate courts generally uphold a trial court’s decision to credit a witness unless the testimony could not possibly be true given physical realities or scientific law.
Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard that asks whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Affidavits may be based on officers’ observations (including odors), informant tips, and other corroborated facts.
Nonprecedential disposition (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1): A decision designated as not binding precedent, though it may be cited in accordance with the rules. Such opinions can still guide practice by signaling how a circuit is likely to assess recurring issues.

Conclusion

United States v. Randle reinforces bedrock features of Franks litigation in the Seventh Circuit. First, defendants bear a demanding burden to prove deliberate or reckless falsity; arguments from mere implausibility—without expert evidence or extrinsic impeachment—are unlikely to suffice, particularly where multiple trained officers testify consistently. Second, appellate deference to trial-level credibility determinations remains robust and will only yield when a witness’s account is physically impossible or contradicted by objective evidence. Finally, the panel’s caution about “bound to credit” phrasing reminds trial courts to avoid even the appearance of a presumption favoring police testimony and to articulate their credibility determinations as independent judgments grounded in the record.

While nonprecedential, the decision is an instructive roadmap: it shows how Franks challenges falter without concrete impeachment; it validates trial courts’ reliance on coherent, corroborated officer testimony; and it signals the limits of appellate intervention in credibility disputes. For practitioners, the message is clear—effective Franks challenges demand targeted, evidence-backed attacks on an affiant’s truthfulness, not generalized skepticism about plausibility.