ICRA Claims Are Not “Brought Under” the IMTCA: Section 670.4A’s Qualified Immunity, Heightened Pleading, and Immediate Appeal Do Not Apply

Introduction

In Benjamin Fogle and Amanda Fogle, on behalf of minor child P.F. v. Clay Elementary School–Southeast Polk Community School District, et al., the Iowa Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal brought by a school district and three of its employees who had sought immediate review of the district court’s refusal to dismiss discrimination and tort claims. The key question was whether Iowa Code section 670.4A—added to the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) in 2021 to provide qualified immunity and a heightened pleading standard—applies to claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and to common-law tort claims. The Court held it does not. Because section 670.4A did not apply to any of the plaintiffs’ claims, the defendants had no statutory right to an immediate appeal from the denial of qualified immunity under section 670.4A(4), and the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The decision clarifies the relationship between two foundational Iowa statutes: the ICRA (chapter 216), which provides a comprehensive administrative and judicial scheme for discriminatory practices—including in education—and the IMTCA (chapter 670), which waives municipal sovereign immunity for torts and, since 2021, contains a qualified-immunity defense with a heightened-pleading gateway. The Court confirms that ICRA claims proceed solely under chapter 216’s exclusive framework and are not governed by section 670.4A. It also reaffirms, consistent with Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, that section 670.4A’s qualified immunity does not extend to purely common-law torts.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fogles allege that their son, P.F., was subjected to severe student-on-student harassment and assaults based on his sexual orientation at Clay Elementary School during the 2022–2023 school year, and that the school district and specified administrators/educators knew of but failed to address the conduct adequately. After exhausting ICRA administrative prerequisites and obtaining a right-to-sue letter, the Fogles filed suit asserting:

ICRA claims against the district under Iowa Code § 216.9 for discrimination and harassment in education (Counts II and III), and
an ICRA aiding-and-abetting claim against individual employees under Iowa Code § 216.11 (Count IV), plus
common-law claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and negligent training/supervision (Counts V–VII).

The defendants moved to dismiss all counts for failure to satisfy section 670.4A(3)’s heightened pleading standard (particularity, plausibility, and clearly-established-law). The district court declined to dismiss, reasoning that ICRA claims are not “torts” under the IMTCA and that the common-law claims met the heightened standard in any event.

On the defendants’ interlocutory appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held:

Section 670.4A’s qualified immunity and heightened pleading apply only to “a claim brought under [chapter 670].” ICRA claims are not brought under chapter 670; they are brought under chapter 216’s exclusive scheme. Therefore, section 670.4A does not apply to the ICRA counts.
Under Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, section 670.4A also does not apply to common-law tort claims.
Because section 670.4A does not apply to any claim, there is no qualified immunity to “deny,” and section 670.4A(4)’s right to an immediate appeal is unavailable. The appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and the case is remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, 20 N.W.3d 798 (Iowa 2025): The Court described section 670.4A as a legislative response to exposure arising from state constitutional tort jurisprudence (e.g., Godfrey). Doe emphasized that section 670.4A introduced a substantive qualified-immunity defense for municipal officers/employees and a companion heightened pleading rule, and that these provisions apply to constitutional and certain statutory claims but not to common-law torts. Doe further characterized subsections (1) (substantive qualified immunity) and (3) (heightened pleading) as a “couplet”—when one is inapplicable, the other is too. Fogle builds on Doe by applying that couplet logic to subsection (4)’s immediate-appeal right: if qualified immunity is inapplicable, the interlocutory appeal right falls away as well.
1000 Friends of Iowa v. Polk County Board of Supervisors, 19 N.W.3d 290 (Iowa 2025): The Court cited 1000 Friends to reinforce the textual limits of section 670.4A—it applies to “a claim brought under [chapter 670]” and, as discussed in 1000 Friends, to claims for monetary damages. 1000 Friends also illustrates that section 670.4A does not bar non-monetary relief like certiorari challenging illegal action.
Carver-Kimm v. Reynolds, 992 N.W.2d 591 (Iowa 2023): Explained the newly enacted heightened pleading standard under section 670.4A(3) (particularity, plausibility, and clearly-established-law), underscoring the severity of dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance. Fogle confirms that this demanding standard does not govern ICRA claims or common-law torts.
Shumate v. Drake University, 846 N.W.2d 503 (Iowa 2014): Emphasized the ICRA’s comprehensive, exclusive administrative and judicial scheme. The Court relies on Shumate’s principle against creating alternative enforcement mechanisms that would duplicate or undermine chapter 216 procedures. That framework supports the conclusion that the IMTCA’s procedural overlay (including section 670.4A) cannot be grafted onto ICRA claims.
Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2019): Clarified the IMTCA’s function as a waiver of municipal immunity for torts; it does not create causes of action. Fogle leverages Venckus’s understanding of the IMTCA to show that ICRA liabilities, already imposed by chapter 216 (including against municipalities), do not depend on IMTCA’s waiver and are not “brought under” it.
Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 2013): Reaffirmed that punitive damages are generally unavailable under the ICRA (except for housing discrimination under section 216.17A(6)(a)). Fogle uses the remedies mismatch between IMTCA and ICRA (e.g., punitive damages against an employee under the IMTCA but not under ICRA) to underscore why the statutes cannot be overlaid in the way defendants urged.
Rheeder v. Gray, 23 N.W.3d 1 (Iowa 2025); Valdez v. West Des Moines Community Schools, 992 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 2023); Deeds v. City of Marion, 914 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 2018); City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 554 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 1996); Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 335 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1983): These decisions treat ICRA claims against municipalities without invoking the IMTCA. Fogle leverages this long line to show the two regimes have coexisted for decades without courts importing IMTCA standards into ICRA adjudication.
Benskin, Inc. v. West Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 2020); White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2023); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1987): These cases frame the motion-to-dismiss standards (accepting well-pleaded facts, ruling only when no legal recovery is possible). They set the review posture but do not drive the central statutory holding.
In re N.F., 17 N.W.3d 667 (Iowa 2025); State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 2021): The Court cites these to reinforce that appellate jurisdiction requires statutory authorization; absent it, appeals must be dismissed.
Federal district court guidance: Dickey v. Mahaska Health Partnership, 705 F. Supp. 3d 883 (S.D. Iowa 2023): Though not binding, the Court notes Dickey’s “recent, thorough” analysis concluding section 670.4A does not apply to ICRA claims, lending persuasive support to Iowa’s high court’s reading.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning rests on statutory text, structural coherence, and the need to preserve the integrity of the ICRA’s exclusive enforcement scheme:

Textual limit: “A claim brought under this chapter.” Section 670.4A applies when “an employee or officer subject to a claim brought under this chapter [chapter 670] shall not be liable for monetary damages” if the law was not clearly established. The Court construes “brought under this chapter” to mean claims that owe their existence and procedural posture to the IMTCA, not simply any civil claim against a municipality. ICRA claims are brought under chapter 216, not chapter 670; therefore section 670.4A does not apply to them.
IMTCA’s broad tort definition does not swallow ICRA. Although “tort” in section 670.1(4) is broadly defined to include injuries and even statutory or constitutional deprivations, that definitional breadth does not transform independent statutory causes of action like ICRA claims into claims “brought under” the IMTCA. The IMTCA’s definition remained unchanged when the legislature added section 670.4A in 2021; the amendment did not expand the reach of chapter 670 to subsume ICRA claims.
Exclusive ICRA framework cannot be duplicated or displaced. The ICRA imposes a mandatory administrative exhaustion process, short and specific filing windows (300 days to file with the ICRC; a 60-day waiting period; 90 days post–right-to-sue to file in court), and its own remedial limits (no general punitive damages). By contrast, IMTCA claims go directly to district court and are governed by a two-year statute of limitations and allow punitive damages against employees in certain circumstances. Overlaying IMTCA procedures (like section 670.4A’s heightened pleading) onto ICRA claims would create a competing enforcement track that Shumate’s exclusivity principle forbids.
Cohesion with Doe: the “couplet” and the “package deal.” Doe described subsections 670.4A(1) (the substantive qualified-immunity defense) and 670.4A(3) (the heightened pleading standard) as a “couplet”—both rise or fall together. Fogle extends that logic to subsection (4)’s immediate-appeal right. In short, section 670.4A is a “package deal”: if the substantive qualified-immunity defense does not apply to a claim, neither do the heightened pleading standard nor the immediate appeal.
Application to common-law claims. Doe conclusively resolved that section 670.4A does not apply to common-law torts. Consequently, defendants cannot use section 670.4A’s heightened pleading gateway to dismiss such claims, nor can they invoke subsection (4) to immediately appeal a denial of such dismissal.
Jurisdictional consequence. Because none of the Fogles’ claims—ICRA or common-law—were subject to section 670.4A, the district court’s denial of dismissal did not deny “qualified immunity” within the meaning of subsection (4). Lacking a statutory basis for an interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded.

Impact

This decision carries substantial procedural and substantive effects for civil-rights and tort litigation against Iowa municipalities and their employees:

ICRA remains insulated from IMTCA’s heightened pleading: Plaintiffs bringing ICRA claims against municipal bodies or employees are not subject to section 670.4A(3)’s particularity/clearly-established-law pleading gauntlet or the threat of dismissal with prejudice for failing to meet it.
No automatic interlocutory appeal in ICRA and common-law cases: Defendants may not invoke section 670.4A(4) to immediately appeal denials of motions to dismiss ICRA or common-law claims. Interlocutory review, if any, must rest on other statutory or rule-based avenues and is not guaranteed.
Strategic pleading and motion practice will adjust: Defense strategies premised on early dismissal via section 670.4A will give way to merits-based motions (e.g., summary judgment) or motions invoking other statutory defenses or exceptions under chapter 670 where applicable. Plaintiffs should continue to meticulously follow ICRA’s administrative prerequisite path to avoid timeliness and exhaustion pitfalls.
Clear boundary lines between ICRA and IMTCA: Courts and litigants must analyze at the outset which statutory regime governs. If a claim is not “brought under” chapter 670, section 670.4A is wholly out of play—the “package deal” principle means no qualified immunity, no heightened pleading, and no interlocutory appeal under that statute.
Practical effect on discrimination-in-education cases: Victims of harassment or discrimination in public schools can pursue ICRA remedies without confronting IMTCA’s qualified-immunity filter. Municipal employees still face potential ICRA aiding-and-abetting liability, subject to the ICRA’s own elements and defenses.
Common-law torts proceed under ordinary notice pleading: Consistent with Doe, common-law claims against municipalities and their employees are evaluated under Iowa’s traditional notice-pleading standards, not the 670.4A heightened regime.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ICRA (Iowa Civil Rights Act, chapter 216): A comprehensive statute prohibiting discrimination and harassment in employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, and education. It requires filing a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) within 300 days, waiting at least 60 days, and filing in court within 90 days after a right-to-sue letter.
IMTCA (Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, chapter 670): Waives municipal immunity for tort claims and governs when and how municipalities and their employees may be sued for torts. In 2021, the legislature added section 670.4A to provide a qualified-immunity defense and heightened pleading for certain claims.
Qualified immunity (section 670.4A): A statutory defense for municipal officers and employees that shields them from money damages unless they violated clearly established law. It comes paired with a heightened pleading requirement and, when applicable, creates a right to immediate appeal if immunity is denied.
Heightened pleading (section 670.4A(3)): Requires plaintiffs bringing a claim under chapter 670 that alleges a legal violation to plead with particularity and plausibility that a clearly established legal right was violated. Failure must result in dismissal with prejudice. This standard does not govern ICRA or common-law tort claims.
“Brought under this chapter”: A textual limit in section 670.4A meaning the claim arises within and proceeds under the IMTCA’s framework. ICRA claims are brought under chapter 216, not under chapter 670, and thus are outside section 670.4A.
Interlocutory (immediate) appeal under section 670.4A(4): Allows immediate appeal when a district court denies qualified immunity under 670.4A. If section 670.4A is inapplicable to the claims, there is no such appeal right.
Notice pleading: Iowa’s ordinary, more forgiving pleading standard requiring a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. Applies to ICRA and common-law claims in the wake of this decision, not the 670.4A heightened standard.
Exclusive enforcement scheme (ICRA): The notion that the ICRA’s administrative process and judicial remedies are self-contained, precluding alternative or duplicative enforcement mechanisms. Courts avoid readings that would import other statutes’ procedures or remedies in ways that conflict with chapter 216.

Conclusion

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision draws a clear boundary: the ICRA is not governed by the IMTCA’s qualified-immunity regime. Section 670.4A’s substantive defense, heightened pleading requirement, and immediate-appeal right apply only to claims “brought under” chapter 670. ICRA claims are brought under chapter 216’s exclusive framework, and common-law torts are not subject to 670.4A under Doe. Because none of the Fogles’ claims fell within section 670.4A, the defendants lacked a statutory basis for an interlocutory appeal, requiring dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and a remand to proceed in district court.

Practically, plaintiffs alleging discrimination against municipal actors in education may proceed under ICRA without encountering section 670.4A’s heightened pleading barrier or the risk of dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance. Municipal defendants must recalibrate: motions to dismiss premised on section 670.4A are unavailable for ICRA and common-law claims, and interlocutory appeals under subsection (4) cannot be used to short-circuit such litigation. The opinion preserves the integrity of ICRA’s administrative and remedial structure while reinforcing Doe’s clarification of section 670.4A’s narrow scope. Going forward, the decision will streamline threshold motion practice by orienting courts and litigants to first ask the gateway question: Is the claim actually “brought under” the IMTCA? If not, section 670.4A, in all of its parts, does not apply.