Household-Pet or Livestock?
Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm HOA and the Re-Entrenchment of the Jury as Arbiter of Fact in Restrictive-Covenant Disputes

1. Introduction

In Schroeder v. Oak Grove Farm Homeowners Association, the Supreme Court of North Carolina confronted a deceptively homespun question: Are sixty backyard chickens “household pets” or prohibited “poultry” under a suburban restrictive covenant? Behind the feathery facts lay weightier themes involving the distribution of power between judges and juries, the burden of proof in motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and the continued vitality of North Carolina’s presumption in favor of the free use of land.

Craig and Mary Schroeder, owners in the Oak Grove Farm subdivision, kept a fluctuating flock of up to sixty chickens. The community’s 1996 Declaration permits “dogs, cats, or other household pets” (if not kept for commercial purposes) but elsewhere bars “animals, livestock, or poultry of any kind.” After the HOA threatened daily fines, the Schroeders sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief; the association counterclaimed for enforcement. A Union County jury sided with the HOA, finding that the birds were not household pets. The Court of Appeals reversed, directing that judgment be entered for the homeowners.

In a 6–1 decision authored by Justice Earls, the Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict. The Court held that (i) the trial judge correctly submitted the “household-pet” question to the jury, (ii) more than a scintilla of evidence supported the HOA’s position, and (iii) no prejudicial error infected the charge, evidentiary rulings, or closing-argument restrictions. Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Dietz, dissented, warning that the majority under-protected the traditional rule that ambiguities in restrictive covenants be construed for the free use of land and failed to provide juries with sufficiently focused guidance.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment for the HOA.
• Applying a de-novo standard, the Court ruled that the trial court properly denied the Schroeders’ motions for directed verdict and JNOV because conflicting evidence existed on whether the chickens were “household pets” and whether any commercial purpose was involved.
• The majority affirmed the trial court’s refusal to deliver the homeowners’ ten requested non-pattern jury instructions, reasoning that the court had already resolved the covenant’s meaning as a matter of law and properly left only fact questions for the jury.
• The Court upheld the exclusion of caselaw readings during closing and the exclusion of a county ordinance defining “animal,” finding no abuse of discretion under Rules 403 and trial-management authority.
• Key precedent emphasized: a party survives JNOV with “more than a scintilla” of evidence (Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody). The decision underscores that a jury’s credibility determinations deserve respect even in the rarefied context of land-use covenants.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Vanguard Pai Lung, LLC v. Moody, 387 N.C. 376 (2025)
   – Reiterated the “more than a scintilla” threshold for defeating JNOV and directed-verdict motions. The Court transplanted the commercial-litigation standard to homeowner-covenant cases.
2. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass’n, 360 N.C. 547 (2006)
   – Sets out the strict-construction rule favoring free use of land, unless contrary to the instrument’s “plain and obvious purpose.” The majority reconciled Armstrong by noting the trial judge had already adopted the less-restrictive reading that allowed chickens if they were in fact household pets.
3. State v. Scott, 314 N.C. 309 (1985) & Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
   – Quoted for the “commonsense judgment of the community” rationale underpinning jury supremacy in fact finding.
4. Weeks; Gardner; and Chappell line of cases
   – Address trial-court discretion in jury instructions, closing-argument limitations, and harmless-error analysis.

3.2 Core Legal Reasoning

a) Parsing the Covenant

The Court accepted that the covenant’s language—“No other animals, livestock or poultry of any kind…except that dogs, cats, or other household pets…”—is facially contradictory. Applying Armstrong, the judge harmonized the clauses by recognizing that the drafters intended an exception: if an animal qualifies as a household pet and is not used commercially, it may be kept. That construction, reached as a matter of law, cleared the path for the jury to decide a pure fact issue: Do these chickens fit the exception?

b) Sufficiency of Evidence

Evidence favoring the HOA included: flock size (≈60), the homeowner’s inability to name the birds, daily interaction time equating to ~2 minutes per chicken, and a Facebook post advertising “farm-fresh eggs.” Under North Carolina’s forgiving sufficiency standard, this easily surpassed “raw suspicion” and entitled the HOA to go to the jury. Conversely, the Court of Appeals had erred by re-weighing credibility and treating the record as undisputed.

c) Jury-Instruction Philosophy

Because the court had already resolved the legal meaning of “household pet,” additional instructions on dictionary definitions or covenant-interpretation presumptions risked confusing the jurors or nudging them toward legal conclusions outside their province. The decision re-affirms trial judges’ discretion to streamline issues and avoid “mini-law-lectures.”

d) Evidentiary & Closing-Argument Rulings

• Reading case excerpts to jurors is improper advocacy because it imports appellate fact patterns and risks undue influence (Gardner).
• The Union County ordinance, although incorporated into another clause, was irrelevant to the “livestock” clause at issue and potentially misleading.
• Any error would have been harmless given the verdict form’s clear question: “Were the chickens…household pets?”.

3.3 Likely Impact on North Carolina Law

• Re-affirmation of the Jury’s Province – Trial and appellate judges must resist the temptation to convert factual ambiguity into legal determinations, even in technical HOA contexts. Future directed-verdict or JNOV motions premised on “no dispute” will face a steep climb where any testimonial inconsistency exists.
• Covenant Drafting Incentives – HOAs now have clear notice: if they desire automatic exclusion of a species (e.g., chickens) they must say so unequivocally. Vague exceptions (household pets, hobby farming, etc.) will be read liberally and fact-sensitively.
• Litigation Strategy – Parties will marshal lay-witness testimony and social-media evidence that speak to the “pet-ness” of atypical animals. Defendants opposing summary judgment need only highlight minimal inconsistencies to secure jury consideration.
• Instructional Economy – The Court implicitly encourages pattern instructions and disfavors overloaded submissions, particularly where legal disputes have been resolved in pre-trial rulings.
• Disparity Debate – Justice Riggs’ dissent plants a developing concern over power imbalances in HOA contracts. While not controlling, it may inform future cases involving adhesive community covenants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Restrictive Covenant / Community Interest Covenant (CIC)

A private contractual promise placed in a deed or subdivision declaration that limits how owners may use their property (e.g., architectural style, livestock bans).

Directed Verdict (Rule 50(a))

A request made at the close of evidence asking the judge to decide the case because the opponent’s proof is legally insufficient.

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) (Rule 50(b))

A post-verdict motion arguing that no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict it did. The standard is identical to a directed-verdict motion but reviewed after the jury has spoken.

“More than a Scintilla” of Evidence

A tiny quantum—any evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn. If it exists, the case must go to the jury.

Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition

A procedure requiring an organization to designate a spokesperson to testify on its behalf regarding specified topics.

Rule 403 Exclusion

A judge may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks of confusion, prejudice, or waste of time.

5. Conclusion

Schroeder does not answer the philosophical question “Can a chicken ever be a pet?” Instead, it cements two pragmatic lessons. First, North Carolina juries—grounded in community norms—remain the ultimate fact finders in land-use disputes where evidentiary conflicts exist. Second, ambiguous HOA covenants will be construed favorably to homeowners only at the legal-interpretation stage; once the interpretive hurdle is cleared, homeowners still must persuade a jury on the facts.

The ruling encourages sharper drafting by HOAs and sharper trial strategies by litigants, all while safeguarding the constitutional right to trial by jury. The dissent’s reminders about power differentials and jury-instruction precision foreshadow future debates, but for now the controlling precedent is clear: where chickens, goats, bees, or other non-traditional companions are claimed as “household pets,” their fates lie not in appellate ivory towers but in the collective common sense of twelve peers.