"Hands-On" Is Not "Hands-In": Permanent Ban for Boundary Violations, Favoritism, and Conflicts in Problem-Solving Courts

Introduction

In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court of Indiana permanently barred the Honorable Matthew J. Elkin, Judge of the Howard Superior Court, from judicial service. The Court approved a joint conditional agreement for discipline submitted by Judge Elkin and the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission). The agreed disposition requires Elkin’s resignation by September 30, 2025, and imposes a lifetime prohibition against serving in any judicial capacity, while allowing him to retain his law license.

This judicial discipline case centers on misconduct in Howard County’s Problem-Solving Courts (PSCs)—specifically Drug Court and Re-Entry Court—where Elkin’s “hands-on” approach crossed ethical boundaries. The Court found violations across multiple provisions of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, arising from:

• Failure to disqualify from matters involving former clients after taking the bench;
• Injudicious comments and intimidation tactics toward PSC participants;
• Favoritism toward certain participants and disparagement of others;
• Inadequate supervision of court staff and team members;
• Possible misuse of public funds (later resolved by repayment as part of the agreement).

The Court’s opinion clarifies a critical principle for PSCs: the collaborative and therapeutic nature of these courts does not relax the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judicial impartiality, decorum, and the appearance of propriety remain non-negotiable. “Hands-on” engagement cannot become “hands-in” personal involvement or coercive behavior.

Summary of the Opinion

Judge Elkin, a former public defender and previously the appointed public defender for Howard County’s PSCs, took office in January 2023. He presided over PSC cases involving individuals he had previously represented and failed to disqualify himself in at least eleven such matters until after the Commission’s inquiry began.

During PSC proceedings, Elkin used intimidation and demeaning comments, including a “Game or Jail” ruse in which he threatened to jail one participant based on another’s honesty, and crude analogies when addressing a domestic violence survivor. He publicly ridiculed participants, discussed sensitive medical issues on the record, used derogatory language, and displayed props to mock participants. He also made injudicious comments in a criminal sentencing-modification hearing, telling a defendant he was among the “worst people on the planet.”

Off the bench, Elkin held a meeting with a PSC participant at his former law office, disparaged other participants and PSC team members, hinted at surveillance of team members, and suggested there were “moles” within PSC teams. He also showed favoritism, including:

• Arranging housing with his wife’s rental property and providing material assistance to one participant;
• Transporting participants in his personal vehicle and allowing a participant to drive his car to accrue driving hours;
• Involvement in participants’ personal affairs, including facilitating car storage and coordinating landlord arrangements.

A probation officer under his supervision rented property to a PSC participant—an arrangement Elkin was responsible for overseeing—underscoring his failure to ensure staff adhered to judicial ethics standards.

The Commission identified potential misuse of funds for PSC trainings; it agreed to halt further investigation following Elkin’s repayment, resignation, and acceptance of the permanent ban.

The Court held that Elkin violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8(A), 2.8(B), 2.11, and 2.12(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It emphasized the gravity of his conduct, particularly the harm to PSC integrity and operations, including the temporary suspension of new intakes to the county’s Drug and Re-Entry Courts and the risk of decertification under Indiana Problem-Solving Courts Rule 7(a)(4).

Balanced against these were mitigating factors: Elkin’s acceptance of responsibility, cooperation, completion of demeanor-focused training, a long public-service career without prior discipline, and evidence of reform capacity. The Court concluded that a permanent bar from judicial service was necessary to protect judicial integrity, but that Elkin could retain his law license.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Matter of Bennington, 24 N.E.3d 958 (Ind. 2015): The Court cited Bennington to support the appropriateness of a permanent ban where misconduct is broad-ranging and includes injudicious behavior, misuse of judicial authority, and procedural failures. Elkin’s conduct mirrored these features, particularly the abuse of judicial power and procedural improprieties in PSC contexts.
• Matter of Cichowicz, 213 N.E.3d 1022 (Ind. 2023): The Court referenced this case to note the significance of timing and pervasiveness—misconduct beginning immediately on taking office and continuing until a disciplinary probe—factors present in Elkin’s case.
• Matter of Brown, 4 N.E.3d 619 (Ind. 2014): Brown stands for the proposition that mitigating circumstances can be weighed in determining sanction severity, but the primary aim remains protection of judicial integrity. The Court applied this balancing framework here.
• Matter of Hawkins, 251 N.E.3d 1062 (Ind. 2025): Cited for recognizing a respondent’s capacity for reform as a mitigator influencing whether to revoke or preserve a law license, even when barring future judicial service.
• Indiana Problem-Solving Courts Rule 7(a)(4): Authorizes decertification if a PSC operates in a manner that adversely affects the health and safety of participants. The Court highlighted that Elkin’s conduct put PSC certification at risk and led to a suspension of new intakes.
• Statutory context: I.C. §§ 33-23-16-5 and -9, defining PSC purposes, services, and operations. The Court juxtaposed PSC’s collaborative, non-adversarial aims with Elkin’s coercive and demeaning practices.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along three tracks: conflict-of-interest disqualification, decorum and impartiality duties in PSCs, and supervisory and administrative obligations—each measured against the Code of Judicial Conduct and PSC regulatory framework.

1) Disqualification for Prior Representation (Rule 2.11)

Judges must disqualify themselves from proceedings in which their impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” expressly including matters involving former clients. Elkin’s incomplete conflicts list and continued presiding over PSC matters involving former clients violated both the letter and spirit of Rule 2.11. The fact that he only disqualified after being notified of an inquiry exacerbated the breach and underscored the appearance-of-impropriety concerns (Rule 1.2).

2) Decorum, Dignity, and Impartiality in PSCs (Rules 1.2, 2.2, 2.8(A)–(B))

PSCs are therapeutic and collaborative; however, that model does not diminish a judge’s obligation to uphold dignity, patience, and courtesy. Elkin’s intimidation (“Game or Jail”), crude and demeaning rhetoric toward participants (including a domestic violence survivor), public discussion of sensitive medical issues, and mocking props all violated Rules 2.8(A) and (B) and undermined fair and impartial adjudication (Rule 2.2). The Court stressed that PSC judges’ demeanor has an “outsized impact” on participant success, making such conduct particularly harmful in this setting.

The Court resolved a recurring ambiguity in PSC practice: benevolent intent or a “hands-on” philosophy does not excuse conduct that creates partiality or humiliation. Even seemingly helpful acts (rides, housing arrangements, gifts, or personal financial assistance) are ethically fraught when performed by the presiding judge because they compromise actual and perceived impartiality (Rules 1.2 and 2.2) and blur boundaries foundational to judicial neutrality.

3) Supervisory Responsibility and Administrative Competence (Rules 2.5, 2.12(A))

As presiding judge, Elkin had a duty to ensure that court staff and PSC team members complied with ethical obligations. A probation officer’s rental arrangement with a PSC participant, occurring under Elkin’s watch, spotlighted supervisory lapses under Rule 2.12(A). The Court also faulted Elkin for administrative failures tied to PSC operations, which ultimately disrupted service delivery county-wide.

4) Possible Misuse of Funds; Compliance with Law (Rules 1.1, 1.2)

Although the Court did not make formal findings beyond noting the issue, it emphasized that the Commission’s agreement to end further investigation into possible unauthorized reimbursements was contingent on repayment and the agreed sanction. This episode reinforced the importance of compliance with law and avoidance of impropriety or its appearance.

5) Sanction Analysis: Protection of Integrity, Not Punishment

The Court framed sanctions as protective of the judiciary’s integrity rather than punitive. Aggravating factors included the immediacy and breadth of misconduct, coercive and demeaning conduct contrary to PSC principles, the risk to PSC certification and participant safety, and continuation of misconduct until the disciplinary inquiry began. Mitigating factors included Elkin’s cooperation, acceptance of responsibility, remedial training focused on demeanor, long public-service career without prior discipline, and potential for reform. The Court held that a permanent ban from judicial service was necessary to safeguard public confidence, while preservation of the law license appropriately reflected the mitigators.

Impact and Implications

A. For Problem-Solving Courts and Their Judges

The opinion sends a clear message: PSCs demand professional distance and consistent adherence to the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judicial goodwill cannot take the form of personal transportation, gifts, housing arrangements (including via family), or other individualized favors. Nor can a judge use humiliation, intimidation, or theatricality to shape behavior. Such conduct degrades impartiality, invites conflicts of interest, and imperils PSC certification.

Practical implications include:

• Robust conflict screening at intake, especially for judges who previously practiced in the same dockets (e.g., former public defenders);
• Strict boundaries: no personal assistance, transportation, housing, gifts, or financial involvement with participants;
• Tone and decorum: no shaming, profanity, or public airing of sensitive medical or personal information;
• Team oversight: train staff and providers on ethics and prohibit personal business relationships with participants;
• Documentation and transparency: ensure all PSC actions align with rules, participant rights, and due process norms.

B. For Judicial Discipline Jurisprudence

Elkin reinforces that wide-ranging and immediate misconduct—especially where it threatens program integrity and participant welfare—warrants the system’s most severe status sanction: a permanent ban from judicial service. At the same time, the opinion exemplifies calibrated discipline: mitigation can preserve a law license where the record shows capacity to reform, aligning with Hawkins and Brown.

C. For Court Administration and Access to Services

The Court connected judicial behavior to systemic consequences: Elkin’s conduct led to a pause in new PSC admissions and risked decertification under Rule 7(a)(4), thereby constraining access to vital treatment and reintegration services. Administrators should treat judicial ethics as a core component of program continuity and public health outcomes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Problem-Solving Courts (PSCs): Specialized courts (e.g., Drug Court, Re-Entry Court) that combine treatment, monitoring, and judicial oversight to address underlying issues such as substance use and reentry challenges. They are collaborative and non-adversarial but still bound by all judicial ethics rules.
• Disqualification/Recusal (Rule 2.11): A judge must step aside from any case where impartiality could reasonably be questioned, including cases involving the judge’s former clients.
• Appearance of Impropriety (Rule 1.2): Judges must avoid conduct that undermines public confidence, even if no actual bias exists. Perception matters.
• Decorum and Dignity (Rule 2.8): Judges must be patient, dignified, and courteous; demeaning language, threats, or public shaming violate this duty.
• Supervisory Duty (Rule 2.12): Judges are responsible for ensuring that court staff and team members act consistently with judicial ethics standards.
• Permanent Ban from Judicial Service: A lifetime disqualification from serving as a judge in any capacity (including judge pro tempore, temporary judge, or private judge). It does not automatically revoke a law license unless separately ordered.
• Per Curiam: An opinion issued in the name of the entire court rather than a single justice, signaling institutional consensus.

Key Takeaways

• PSC judges remain fully bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct; the therapeutic model does not soften standards of impartiality, decorum, or supervisory responsibility.
• Benevolent intentions cannot justify personal involvement or favoritism; such conduct compromises fairness and public confidence.
• Failure to promptly recuse from cases involving former clients is a direct, serious violation of Rule 2.11.
• Injudicious comments and intimidation tactics are incompatible with PSC goals and violate Rules 2.8 and 1.2.
• Supervisory lapses over staff dealings with participants are sanctionable under Rule 2.12.
• Where misconduct is immediate, pervasive, and harmful to program integrity, the appropriate remedy may be a permanent bar from the judiciary, even if the law license is retained due to mitigation.

Conclusion

In the Matter of Matthew John Elkin establishes a bright-line principle for Indiana’s Problem-Solving Courts: the judge’s “hands-on” role in therapeutic justice does not permit boundary crossing, favoritism, or coercive behavior. The Court’s permanent ban underscores that the integrity, impartiality, and decorum demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct are indispensable in PSCs, where judicial demeanor can make or break participant outcomes and program legitimacy.

By pairing a lifetime judicial ban with preservation of Elkin’s law license—grounded in acceptance of responsibility, cooperation, and remediation—the Court reaffirms a dual commitment: unwavering protection of judicial integrity and measured recognition of potential for reform. Going forward, Elkin serves as a cautionary and clarifying precedent: hands-on engagement must always be bounded by ethical lines that safeguard fairness, dignity, and public confidence in the courts.

References Noted in the Opinion

• Indiana Code §§ 33-23-16-5, -9 (Problem-Solving Courts framework)
• Indiana Problem-Solving Courts Rule 7(a)(4) (Decertification authority): https://rulesqa.incourts.gov/Content/problem-solving/section7/current.htm
• Howard County PSC application materials: https://www.in.gov/counties/howard/files/ps-application_7.pdf
• Howard County Drug Court Participant Manual: https://www.in.gov/counties/howard/files/adultParticipantManual.pdf