Graduation Severs Continuing Violations Under Title IX: Fifth Circuit Reaffirms Two‑Year Limitations (Texas) and Treats Post‑Graduation Retaliation as a Discrete Act

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s substituted opinion in Jane Doe 1 v. City View Independent School District, No. 24-10592 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025). The court affirmed dismissal of a former high school student’s Title IX claims as time-barred. In doing so, it clarified several recurrent limitations and pleading issues in Title IX litigation:

Title IX claims borrow the forum state’s general personal-injury statute of limitations and state tolling rules (here, Texas’s two-year period), while accrual is governed by federal law.
Graduation is an intervening event that terminates any alleged continuing Title IX violation; post‑graduation conduct is a discrete act that cannot revive pre‑graduation claims.
A plaintiff cannot recharacterize a claim on appeal (e.g., convert an abandoned First Amendment retaliation theory into a Title IX retaliation claim not pleaded below).
Amendment is futile where additional facts cannot cure a legal bar, such as a statute of limitations defect.

The case arose from allegations that a City View ISD teacher sexually abused Jane Doe from 2016 to 2020, that Doe reported the abuse to the principal and superintendent in 2018, and that school officials threatened her with expulsion and reputational harm if she persisted. After public revelations in June 2022 about the teacher and his subsequent suicide, Doe spoke to the press and allegedly received a July 2022 demand letter from the then-superintendent warning her against further public statements. Doe sued the district and several officials on April 4, 2023; by the time of appeal she pursued only Title IX claims against the district.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice. The principal holdings:

Limitations: Doe’s Title IX sexual harassment and retaliation claims accrued no later than 2020 (and by the court’s lights as early as 2018), were tolled only until her eighteenth birthday under Texas law, and expired by May 2022. Her April 2023 lawsuit was untimely.
Post‑graduation letter: Even if the July 2022 letter might have been timely as a new event, Doe did not plead it as a Title IX retaliation claim in the operative complaint, instead framing and later waiving a First Amendment retaliation claim. She could not convert the theory on appeal.
Continuing violation doctrine: Does not save claims where the actionable Title IX conduct ended pre‑graduation. The letter was a discrete, post‑graduation act and, in any event, graduation is an intervening event that breaks any purported continuum.
Equitable tolling: Title IX borrows state tolling rules; Doe forfeited state tolling theories on appeal and offered no basis to apply federal equitable tolling to a Title IX claim borrowing a state limitations period.
Leave to amend: Properly denied as futile because additional factual detail would not cure the limitations bar or the pleading gap for a Title IX retaliation theory.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998): Establishes institutional liability under Title IX for teacher-on-student harassment only when the district has actual knowledge and is deliberately indifferent. Guided the court’s recognition of the underlying legal framework for Doe’s harassment theory, though the case was resolved on limitations grounds.
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005): Confirms retaliation is a form of intentional sex discrimination under Title IX. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the availability of Title IX retaliation but held Doe did not plead this theory as to the 2022 letter and waived the separately pleaded First Amendment claim.
King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 2015): Cornerstone precedent. Title IX borrows the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period (two years in Texas) and state tolling rules; federal law governs accrual. The court followed King-White to determine accrual, tolling, and the limitations bar.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) and Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2020): Distinguish between continuing hostile environment claims and discrete acts. The court used Morgan and Sewell to hold the continuing violation doctrine inapplicable to the letter and to pre‑graduation conduct.
Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ., 850 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 2017) and Wells v. Texas Tech Univ., No. 24‑10518, 2025 WL 673439 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025): Graduation is an “intervening act” that severs any continuing course of conduct. The panel extended that logic to a K‑12 context, holding Doe’s 2020 graduation severed any alleged continuum and that the 2022 letter could not revive time-barred claims.
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001) and Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2010): Define accrual under federal law—when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its causal connection to the defendant. Used to pinpoint accrual as no later than 2018–2020.
Young v. City of Houston, 599 F. App’x 553 (5th Cir. 2015): Courts evaluate Rule 12(b)(6) based on the four corners of the complaint; bolstered the refusal to recharacterize the letter as a Title IX retaliation claim on appeal.
United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of Houston, 523 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2008): Appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, reinforcing the limitations holding and pleading analysis.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2000), Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (Former 5th Cir. 1981), and United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2003): Provide the Rule 15(a) framework for leave to amend and the futility standard. The court found amendment futile because new facts could not overcome the legal time bar.
Carder v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011): Notes that Title IX analysis often tracks Title VII hostile environment doctrine, supporting the use of Morgan/Sewell concepts in the Title IX context.
Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577 (5th Cir. 2020) (also cited on a separate point): Confirms Title IX claims lie only against the federally funded institution, not individual employees—hence the narrowing of the appeal to City View ISD.
Standards and procedural authorities: Twombly, Iqbal, In re Katrina Canal Breaches (Rule 12(b)(6) standard); FDIC v. Dawson and Jenkins v. Tahmahkera (equitable tolling review); Rollins v. Home Depot USA (forfeiture); and FRAP 42(b) (stipulated dismissal of appellate claims against an individual).

Legal Reasoning

Accrual and limitations. Under federal accrual rules, the clock starts when a plaintiff knows of the injury and its causal link to the defendant; Texas supplies the two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003). The court assumed arguendo that Doe’s Title IX injury was the district’s deliberate indifference, not the abuse itself, yet still found accrual by 2018 when Doe reported to administrators and was met with alleged threats rather than relief. Texas tolls limitations for minors until age 18 (§ 16.001). Doe turned 18 in February 2020, and the abuse ended by her May 2020 graduation. Thus, the lawsuit had to be filed no later than May 2022; filing in April 2023 was untimely.
Continuing violation doctrine. The court distinguished hostile-environment “continuing violations” from “discrete acts” (Morgan; Sewell). Doe’s actionable Title IX period ended by graduation in May 2020. The July 2022 letter was an isolated, discrete act and, even if it were not, Doe’s graduation was an intervening event that severed any continuing pattern (Heath; Wells). Discrete acts within the period do not revive time-barred acts outside the period.
Post‑graduation letter and pleading. Doe framed the July 2022 letter as a First Amendment retaliation claim in the operative complaint. The district court found that claim timely but insufficiently pleaded; Doe then expressly waived it on appeal. She attempted to recast the letter as Title IX retaliation, but the court refused to consider a theory not pleaded below and noted she had not plausibly alleged all elements of a Title IX retaliation claim. Appellate review is confined to the complaint’s four corners.
Equitable tolling. Because Title IX borrows state limitations, it borrows state tolling rules as well (King‑White). Doe did not pursue on appeal the district court’s rejection of Texas tolling doctrines (discovery rule and fraudulent concealment) and thus forfeited them. Her reliance on federal equitable tolling lacked support; the panel declined to graft federal tolling principles onto a claim governed by state tolling rules.
Leave to amend. Although Rule 15(a) favors liberal amendment, the court affirmed denial because Doe did not specify with particularity what new allegations would be added and, in any event, no additional facts could cure the limitations defect. Amendment would be futile.

Impact and Significance

Limitations discipline in Title IX suits. The opinion reaffirms King‑White’s two-year clock for Texas Title IX claims and emphasizes that accrual often occurs when institutional indifference becomes clear, not when broader public knowledge emerges. For minors, Texas tolling ends at age 18; counsel must calendar accordingly.
Graduation as a legal breakpoint. By expressly relying on Heath and Wells, the court cements that graduation is an “intervening act” that severs any alleged continuing violation. This is especially consequential for K–12 cases: pre‑graduation harassment and the institution’s response do not continue indefinitely post‑graduation, and later communications are discrete acts analyzed separately.
Retaliation pleading precision. Plaintiffs must plead Title IX retaliation expressly, with facts meeting each element (protected activity, adverse action, and causation). Attempting to relabel a waived constitutional claim as a Title IX claim on appeal will fail under the “four corners” rule.
State tolling, not federal. Litigants cannot avoid a time bar by appealing to generalized federal equitable tolling where Title IX borrows a state limitations regime. Texas’s discovery rule and fraudulent concealment must be pleaded and preserved with specific facts if they are to apply.
Institution-only liability. The case quietly reinforces that Title IX claims lie only against the federally funded entity, not individual administrators or teachers. Strategic focus belongs on institutional policies, knowledge, and responses.
Practical litigation guidance:
- File Title IX claims within two years of the plaintiff turning 18 or of the last actionable pre‑graduation event—whichever controls under accrual principles.
- Preserve and develop state tolling arguments early; specify facts supporting discovery rule or fraudulent concealment if they apply.
- Plead retaliation theories distinctly under Title IX if pursued; do not rely on later recharacterization.
- Consider parallel state-law claims where available and not barred by governmental immunity or notice requirements, but do not assume longer special sexual-assault statutes will govern Title IX claims; King‑White indicates the general personal-injury period controls.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual: The legal moment when the claim “arises” for limitations purposes—when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its causal connection to the defendant’s conduct. You need not know you have a legal claim; knowing the facts that support a claim is enough.
Statute of limitations: The deadline to sue. Title IX borrows the state’s personal-injury period (two years in Texas).
Tolling: A pause in the limitations clock. In Texas, limitations for personal-injury claims are tolled for minors until they turn 18. Title IX also borrows state tolling rules—so plaintiffs must rely on Texas’s tolling doctrines, not generalized federal tolling, unless a federal statute says otherwise.
Continuing violation doctrine: In hostile-environment contexts, related acts can be treated as one unlawful practice if at least one act occurs within the limitations period. It does not apply to discrete acts like a specific letter, termination, or threat; and graduation breaks the chain even for environments that otherwise might be continuous.
Discrete act: A single, identifiable incident (e.g., a demand letter or specific threat) that has its own limitations clock and does not revive older, time-barred conduct.
Deliberate indifference (Title IX): A school district’s response to known harassment that is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. Liability attaches to the district only with actual knowledge by an appropriate official and deliberate indifference.
Retaliation (Title IX): Adverse actions taken because someone engaged in protected activity (e.g., reporting sex discrimination). Requires pleading protected activity, adverse action, and a causal link.
Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (e.g., expressly abandoning a claim on appeal). Forfeiture is the failure to timely raise an argument (e.g., not appealing adverse tolling rulings), resulting in loss of the issue.
Four corners of the complaint: On a motion to dismiss, courts evaluate only the allegations actually pleaded—not new theories raised at oral argument or on appeal.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Whether Doe could have prevailed on the merits of her harassment or retaliation claims if timely filed.
Whether the July 2022 letter, if properly pleaded as a Title IX retaliation theory, would satisfy each element of such a claim.
The applicability, on a fully briefed record, of Texas’s discovery rule or fraudulent concealment; those arguments were not pursued on appeal.

Conclusion

In its substituted opinion, the Fifth Circuit reinforces a rigorous limitations framework for Title IX claims: the two-year Texas personal-injury period applies, tolling follows Texas rules, and accrual is pegged to when the plaintiff knows the facts of injury and causation. The court further clarifies that graduation is a decisive intervening event that severs any alleged continuing violation, and that post‑graduation communications (like a demand letter) are discrete acts that cannot resuscitate time‑barred claims. Finally, the opinion underscores the importance of precise pleading: retaliation theories must be pleaded as Title IX claims in the operative complaint, and appellate recharacterizations will not be entertained.

For practitioners, the message is direct: calendar aggressively from the client’s eighteenth birthday or graduation, preserve and substantiate state tolling doctrines early, plead Title IX retaliation distinctly when warranted, and recognize that institution-only liability narrows the proper defendant. For schools, the decision highlights the exposure that flows from actual knowledge and inadequate responses, and the importance of robust compliance by Title IX coordinators. In the broader legal landscape, the ruling provides a clear, administrable timing rule and further harmonizes Title IX limitations doctrine with Title VII concepts, especially regarding the treatment of discrete acts and the severing effect of graduation.