Generic Objections Don’t Preserve §3553(c)(2) Challenges; Omission of a Written Statement of Reasons Is Plain but Harmless When Oral Reasons Are Clear — United States v. Alexander (11th Cir. 2025)

Generic Objections Don’t Preserve §3553(c)(2) Challenges; Omission of a Written Statement of Reasons Is Plain but Harmless When Oral Reasons Are Clear — United States v. Alexander (11th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. John Henry Alexander, No. 25-10095 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025). The case addresses two recurring themes in federal sentencing appeals:

  • Procedural reasonableness challenges to an upward variance, focusing on the district court’s obligations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) to state specific reasons both orally in court and in a written Statement of Reasons (SOR); and
  • Substantive reasonableness challenges premised on alleged underweighting of mitigating evidence.

Alexander pleaded guilty to distributing at least five grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), after selling 27.7 grams to a confidential informant. At sentencing, the district court excluded three unindicted sales from the Guidelines calculation. With those excluded, the advisory range was 60–71 months; the court then imposed an upward-variance sentence of 80 months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. On appeal, Alexander argued that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to state specific reasons for varying upward orally and in a written SOR, and substantively unreasonable because the court insufficiently credited mitigation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Alexander’s sentence on both procedural and substantive reasonableness grounds.

  • Preservation and Standard of Review: Alexander’s statement, “we do object to the upward variance,” was too general to preserve a specific § 3553(c)(2) challenge (i.e., the adequacy of the court’s explanation). The panel therefore reviewed for plain error.
  • Oral Explanation (No Error): The district court adequately explained the upward variance in open court by citing Alexander’s “very troubling” and “widespread” criminal history, recidivism, and the need for specific deterrence and protection of the public. No procedural error occurred with respect to the oral explanation.
  • Written Statement of Reasons (Plain Error, But No Reversal): The district court did not file a written SOR for its upward variance. That omission was plain error under § 3553(c)(2). But the error did not affect substantial rights because the court’s oral reasons provided a clear record allowing meaningful appellate review. Consequently, reversal was unwarranted under plain-error review.
  • Substantive Reasonableness (No Abuse of Discretion): The district court sufficiently considered the § 3553(a) factors and permissibly placed substantial weight on recidivism, deterrence, and public protection. The 80-month sentence—above the 60–71 month Guidelines range—was not an abuse of discretion.
  • Other Request (Reassignment): The panel noted that reassignment is an “extraordinary” remedy and, because no remand was warranted, it was unnecessary.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir.), on reh’g, 804 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2016), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024): These cases frame the preservation requirement: objections must apprise the court of the particular grounds. A generic “we object” to an upward variance does not preserve a specific § 3553(c) explanation challenge. The panel used this line of cases to move Alexander’s § 3553(c)(2) claim into plain-error review.
  • United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024): Steiger supplies the current Eleventh Circuit blueprint for § 3553(c) errors under plain-error review. It reiterates that when a district court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines range, § 3553(c)(2) requires the court to state “the specific reason” for the variance both orally at sentencing and in a written SOR. Crucially, Steiger holds that a § 3553(c) error warrants reversal on plain-error review only when the court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record (i.e., the record does not permit meaningful appellate review). The panel’s conclusion—that the written omission was plain but harmless because the oral record was clear—tracks Steiger exactly.
  • United States v. Cornog, 945 F.2d 1504 (11th Cir. 1991): Cited to illustrate that a party can challenge an upward adjustment or variance on various grounds (e.g., lack of notice for upward departures in the pre-Booker regime). The panel used Cornog to show that a generic “I object” fails to identify which of many possible grounds is being asserted; specificity is required to preserve a particular procedural claim.
  • United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2024): These decisions collectively articulate the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential substantive-reasonableness review. A district court need not give equal weight to all § 3553(a) factors, may assign great weight to one factor (e.g., criminal history and deterrence), and is not required to explicitly address every factor or every piece of mitigation so long as the record shows consideration. The panel relied on this body of law to uphold the upward variance.
  • United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for the proposition that appellate reassignment is an extraordinary remedy, unnecessary here without a remand.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Preservation Determination: The court first addressed whether Alexander preserved his procedural reasonableness claim. He stated only, “we do object to the upward variance.” Because many distinct procedural challenges could apply to an upward variance (e.g., lack of notice, inadequate reasons, improper consideration of certain facts), this general objection did not alert the district court to the specific § 3553(c)(2) issue (failure to provide adequate reasons orally or in writing). Applying Straub/Dennis/Parks, the panel held the claim unpreserved and proceeded under plain-error review.
  2. Two Separate § 3553(c)(2) Obligations, Analyzed Separately: The panel parsed the district court’s dual duties:
    • Oral Reasons: The sentencing judge explained that the upward variance was warranted because of Alexander’s “very troubling” and “widespread” criminal history, his “very troubling act of recidivism,” and the need for specific deterrence and protection of the public. The court also stated it had considered the applicable statutory factors (§ 3553(a)) and that the sentence was “reasonable and appropriate” to serve those purposes. The panel held there was no error on the oral-reasons prong.
    • Written Statement of Reasons: The district court did not file the written SOR required by § 3553(c)(2). That omission was plain error. But following Steiger, the panel affirmed because the oral record was sufficiently clear to allow meaningful appellate review, so the omission did not affect substantial rights.
  3. Substantive Reasonableness Under Deferential Review: The court cataloged what the sentencing judge considered: Alexander’s allocution, his letter, his educational efforts while incarcerated, his family background, his business endeavors and setbacks, and—importantly—his extensive criminal history and recidivism, including committing the instant offense while on supervised release. The judge expressly emphasized specific deterrence and public protection. Because district courts may place great weight on those concerns and need not discuss every factor or piece of mitigation in detail, the panel found no clear error of judgment in imposing an 80-month sentence—an upward variance but still reasonably tethered to the § 3553(a) purposes articulated on the record.

What This Decision Clarifies and Why It Matters

  • Preservation Requires Specificity: A bare objection to an “upward variance” does not preserve a procedural challenge to the adequacy of the sentencing court’s explanation under § 3553(c)(2). Counsel must identify the particular ground (e.g., “We object under § 3553(c)(2) that the court failed to state specific reasons orally and in the written Statement of Reasons.”).
  • Written SOR Omission Is Not Automatically Reversible: The absence of a written SOR for an upward variance is a plain error, but it will not warrant reversal if the oral record supplies sufficiently specific reasons to enable appellate review. This application of Steiger signals that appellants cannot rely solely on the missing SOR without demonstrating prejudice.
  • Upward Variances Can Rest on Recidivism and Public-Safety Aims: Even after excluding certain alleged conduct from the Guidelines calculation (here, three unindicted sales), a court may still vary upward based on permissible § 3553(a) considerations—especially extensive criminal history, commission of a new drug crime while on supervised release, and the need for specific deterrence and protection of the public.
  • Record-Building Matters: The court’s detailed oral explanation insulated the sentence from procedural attack despite the missing written SOR. For sentencing judges, robust on-the-record reasoning is the best safeguard against procedural-reasonableness challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the process was correct—e.g., correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a) factors, and compliance with § 3553(c)’s explanation requirements. Substantive reasonableness asks whether, given the totality of circumstances, the sentence is within the range of reasonable outcomes—not whether the appellate court would have imposed a different sentence.
  • § 3553(a) Factors: Statutory sentencing purposes and considerations, including the nature of the offense, defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence and to protect the public, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.
  • § 3553(c)(2) and the Statement of Reasons (SOR): When a court imposes a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range, it must state the specific reason for doing so both orally at sentencing and in a written SOR. The written SOR facilitates transparency and review by appellate courts and other system actors.
  • Plain-Error Review: Applies to unpreserved claims. The appellant must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights. Even then, reversal is discretionary and occurs only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Under Steiger, § 3553(c) errors are reversible under plain-error review only if the district court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record.
  • Variance vs. Departure: A “variance” is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) factors; a “departure” is an adjustment under the Guidelines’ policy statements. Post-Booker, variances are common and reviewed for reasonableness.
  • Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and Duty of Candor: Probation prepares a PSR summarizing offense conduct and background. The government has a duty of candor to probation and may report suspected conduct even if it will not charge or prove it. The sentencing court decides what information to credit and what, if any, role it can play in the Guidelines and § 3553(a) analysis.
  • Supervised Release: A post-incarceration monitoring period. Violations can result in additional imprisonment; committing new crimes while on supervision heavily aggravates sentencing under § 3553(a).

Practical Implications and Practice Pointers

  • For Defense Counsel:
    • Preserve with specificity. If challenging the adequacy of reasons, say so explicitly and cite § 3553(c)(2).
    • Object to PSR content that lacks sufficient proof. Here, the court excluded three unindicted sales from the Guidelines—an important baseline victory for the defense—because the government agreed not to argue them and could not prove them by a preponderance.
    • Develop mitigation thoroughly, but be prepared for courts to place substantial weight on recidivism and public-protection needs, especially where the offense occurred on supervised release.
  • For Prosecutors:
    • When agreeing not to “argue or present evidence” of certain conduct, be prepared that the court may exclude it from the Guidelines calculation absent proof.
    • Ensure the record contains concrete, case-specific reasons that support any request for an upward variance—recidivism, supervision status, and public safety carry particular weight.
  • For Sentencing Judges:
    • Provide a clear oral explanation tied to § 3553(a) purposes; it is critical for meaningful appellate review.
    • File the written SOR for any non-Guidelines sentence. While omission may be harmless in some cases, compliance avoids avoidable plain-error issues.
  • For Appellate Strategy:
    • Do not rely on a missing SOR alone. Under Steiger and Alexander, appellants must demonstrate that the oral record is too unclear to support review.
    • Frame substantive-reasonableness challenges around clear errors of judgment in weighing § 3553(a) factors; mere disagreement with the district court’s weighing is unlikely to succeed.

Case-Specific Observations

  • Guidelines Baseline: After excluding the three unindicted sales, the court calculated an offense level of 23 and Criminal History Category III, yielding an advisory range of 60–71 months and 4–5 years of supervised release. The court then varied upward to 80 months and imposed four years of supervision.
  • Grounding the Variance: The court stressed similarity to Alexander’s prior federal cocaine-distribution conviction, commission of the instant offense while on supervised release, and a criminal history beginning at age 17. These findings supported needs for specific deterrence and public protection under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).
  • Limiting Considerations: The court stated it did not consider the three unindicted sales or “pending charges or other arrests or dismissed charges,” underscoring that the upward variance rested on permissible, supported grounds rather than on disputed or unproven allegations.

Conclusion

United States v. Alexander reinforces two practical sentencing rules in the Eleventh Circuit: first, counsel must make specific objections to preserve § 3553(c)(2) explanation challenges; second, while failing to file a written Statement of Reasons for an upward variance is plain error, that omission will not warrant reversal if the district court provides a clear and specific oral explanation enabling meaningful appellate review. On the merits, the decision also illustrates how courts may reasonably impose upward variances grounded in recidivism, supervised-release violations, and the need for deterrence and public safety—even after excluding certain unproven conduct from the Guidelines calculation. Though unpublished and non-precedential, Alexander’s methodical application of Steiger and long-settled substantive-reasonableness principles offers a detailed, practical roadmap for sentencing courts and advocates alike.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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