General Verdicts by Instruction and Text: Sixth Circuit Endorses Rule 49(b)(3) and Recognizes Budget and Market Forces as Valid “Other Than Sex” Factors in Equal Pay Cases

General Verdicts by Instruction and Text: Sixth Circuit Endorses Rule 49(b)(3) and Recognizes Budget and Market Forces as Valid “Other Than Sex” Factors in Equal Pay Cases

Introduction

In Marina Debity v. Monroe County Board of Education, No. 24-5137 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025), the Sixth Circuit tackled two thorny trial-law and employment-law questions:

  • How to classify and reconcile a jury’s verdict form under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49 when the form and jury instructions do not neatly align; and
  • Whether an employer’s “factor other than sex” defense under the Equal Pay Act (EPA) is satisfied by evidence of budget constraints and market forces (supply and demand).

The plaintiff, a long-serving educator who sought a school psychologist position, claimed she was offered less than a male comparator was paid for the same job and that her offer was withdrawn in retaliation after she asked to be paid at the comparator’s level. A jury answered “yes” to both (i) the existence of a pay disparity in equal work and (ii) the employer’s affirmative defense that the disparity was due to a legitimate, non-sex-based factor; it also found against the plaintiff on retaliation. Despite those findings, the jury awarded damages—almost certainly because of a confusing verdict form. The magistrate judge dismissed the jury and then entered judgment for the Board, treating the jury’s answers as special verdicts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment but refined the governing law in two important ways.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Bush (Judge Kethledge concurring; Judge Griffin concurring in the judgment), held:

  • Rule 49 classification: When read together with the jury instructions, the verdict form presented the discrimination claims as a general verdict with interrogatories and the retaliation claim as a general verdict. The jury’s answers to the interrogatories on the discrimination claims were consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict (the damages award). Under Rule 49(b)(3), the court could—and did—enter judgment on the interrogatory answers notwithstanding the general verdict.
  • Affirmative defense under EPA/Title VII/THRA: The Board’s reasons—(1) budget constraints and (2) supply-and-demand market conditions—each independently qualify as a legitimate “factor other than sex.” There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to credit those reasons here. The judgment for the Board was therefore affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Key Facts

  • Monroe County used a step system with negotiable starting steps for school psychologists.
  • In 2019, while “desperate” to fill a vacancy, the district hired Matthew Ancel (male) at Step 5 after negotiations.
  • In 2021, with four full-time psychologists already on staff, the district created a fifth position and offered plaintiff Marina Debity (female) Step 3, citing a tight budget and reduced urgency. Debity sought Step 5, pointing to Ancel as a comparator.
  • During negotiations, the district decided it needed to fill a different teaching position, squeezing the budget further. Debity accepted a higher-paying job elsewhere.

Trial and Verdict Form

  • The magistrate judge (with parties’ consent) submitted a verdict form that materially differed from a stipulated form and was not shown to counsel before submission.
  • The jury:
    • Found a pay disparity on equal work (Q1(a) “Yes”);
    • Found the Board proved a legitimate “factor other than sex” (Q1(b) “Yes”);
    • Rejected retaliation (Q2(a) “No”);
    • Nonetheless awarded damages of just over $195,000 on Q3.
  • After dismissing the jury, the court acknowledged the inconsistency and entered judgment for the Board, treating the answers as special verdicts under Rule 49(a) and disregarding damages.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

The opinion situates the Rule 49 analysis within a long line of authority distinguishing the three verdict types and the court’s duties for each:

  • Rule 49 and verdict taxonomy:
    • Turyna v. Martam Constr. Co. (7th Cir.) and Blackstone’s Commentaries: general verdict = “who wins/how much.”
    • Bills v. Aseltine (6th Cir.); Portage II v. Bryant Petroleum (6th Cir.): special verdicts require fact findings for the court to apply law; interrogatories accompany a general verdict and “check” it.
    • Moody v. United States (6th Cir.); Stanton v. Astra Pharm. (3d Cir.); Team Contractors v. Waypoint Nola (5th Cir.); Knoedler (3d Cir.): verdict classification turns on whether the jury was asked to decide ultimate liability, assessed in context of instructions and form.
    • Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co. (2d Cir.): labels used on a verdict form do not control; content and instructions do.
    • Gallick v. B&O R.R. (U.S. Sup. Ct.); American Cas. v. B. Cianciolo (7th Cir.): courts must harmonize verdict answers if possible; no “priority” among inconsistent answers.
  • EPA/Title VII/THRA “factor other than sex” doctrine:
    • EEOC v. J.C. Penney (6th Cir.): “other than sex” must be a legitimate business reason.
    • Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati (6th Cir.); Kirkland v. City of Maryville (6th Cir.): harmonizing EPA and Title VII/THRA frameworks on legitimate reasons in pay cases.
    • Lissak v. United States (Ct. Fed. Cl.); Lauderdale v. Ill. DHS (7th Cir.): cost-saving/budget constraints can be legitimate if not sex-based.
    • Stanley v. USC (9th Cir.); Taylor v. White (8th Cir.); Horner v. Mary Institute (8th Cir.): market forces and negotiation may justify differences when not sex-based.
    • Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (U.S. Sup. Ct.): employers cannot disguise systemic sex-based differentials as “market” where women are paid less because men refuse low wages.
    • Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of Commerce (6th Cir.): even mistakes can underpin a valid “other than sex” defense if unrelated to sex; the EPA outlaws sex discrimination, not incompetence.
    • Tennant (U.S. Sup. Ct.) and Barnes (6th Cir.): JMOL standard; courts must defer to any reasonable view of the evidence supporting the verdict.

2) Legal Reasoning

2.1 Rule 49: From Form to Function—Reading the Verdict Form with the Instructions

The court emphasizes that verdict classification is functional, not formal. A verdict form need not contain a stand-alone “for plaintiff/for defendant” prompt to be a general verdict if, when read with the instructions, the jury is tasked with deciding ultimate liability.

Two features drove the classification:

  • Instructions repeatedly told jurors to decide liability: e.g., “You must decide for yourselves if plaintiff has proven her claims,” and “consider damages if you return a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.”
  • Damages prompt tied to liability: Question 3 asked for damages “[i]f your verdict is for the plaintiff” on either claim—an indicator the jury was to render ultimate liability determinations.

On that reading:

  • Discrimination claims: Q1(a) (pay disparity in equal work) and Q1(b) (affirmative defense—factor other than sex) are “questions of ultimate fact” that, standing alone, do not fully determine liability and thus function as interrogatories accompanying a general verdict.
  • Retaliation claim: Q2(a), coupled with the instructions that recited and directed jurors to decide all elements, operated as the general verdict on retaliation. The jury’s “No” on Q2(a) was therefore a general-verdict finding for the Board on retaliation.

2.2 Resolving Inconsistency Under Rule 49(b)

The interrogatories on the discrimination claims were internally consistent: the jury found a disparity but also found the Board proved its affirmative defense. However, those interrogatories were inconsistent with the general verdict (the damages award).

Under Rule 49(b)(3), where interrogatory answers are consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may:

  • Enter judgment on the interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict;
  • Resubmit the matter to the jury; or
  • Order a new trial.

Although the magistrate judge misclassified the questions as special verdicts under Rule 49(a), she effectively chose the first Rule 49(b)(3) option by entering judgment based on Q1(a) and Q1(b) and disregarding the damages award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on that (correct) ground, obviating remand. As to retaliation, the jury’s “No” on Q2(a) formed a consistent general verdict for the Board; the court harmonized the damages entry as pertaining only to the discrimination theory to avoid an irreconcilable conflict.

2.3 The EPA/Title VII/THRA “Factor Other Than Sex” Defense

The court next addressed the plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) challenging the sufficiency of the Board’s affirmative defense. Applying de novo review and the deferential standard for JMOL, the court held that a reasonable juror could find for the Board on either of two independent grounds:

  • Budget constraints: Cost-saving and budgetary prioritization are legitimate business reasons so long as they are not sex-based. Testimony showed the district could “barely” fund the fifth psychologist position at Step 3 and later had to prioritize filling a different teaching role. Whether the employer might have shuffled funds otherwise is not the court’s inquiry under the EPA; the question is whether sex-based motives drove the differential.
  • Market forces (supply and demand): Differences tied to hiring urgency and market scarcity may justify differential pay when unconnected to sex. In 2019, the district was “desperate,” facing imminent shortage, and negotiated to secure Ancel at a higher step; in 2021, demand was lower, supply sufficient, and the employer offered Debity less. The record permitted a reasonable juror to credit this explanation. The court cautioned that “market” cannot be a pretext for generalized sex-based underpayment (as in Corning Glass), but the evidence here supported a sex-neutral rationale.

Because either rationale sufficed, the jury’s verdict rejecting liability on the discrimination claims stood.

2.4 The Concurrence’s Different Path

Judge Griffin concurred in the judgment but would have affirmed solely under Rule 49(a). In his view, the verdict form did not ask for ultimate liability; the jury supplied special verdicts (fact findings) and a damages quantification that the judge could ignore when applying law to facts. Invoking Freeman v. Chicago Park District (7th Cir.), the concurrence treated the damages entry as merely a calculation of loss, not a liability finding. The majority, by contrast, emphasized the instructions-plus-form approach and the “if your verdict is for the plaintiff” phrasing to identify a general verdict with interrogatories on the discrimination theory and a general verdict on retaliation.

3) Practical Impact

3.1 Trial Practice and Verdict Management

  • Classification by function: In the Sixth Circuit, courts and litigants should expect verdict classification to turn on the all-in context of instructions and form. A damages prompt conditioned on “if your verdict is for the plaintiff” powerfully signals a general verdict.
  • Rule 49(b)(3) clarified: When interrogatories are internally consistent but conflict with the general verdict, district courts may enter judgment on the interrogatory answers notwithstanding a damages award. New trials are not required unless interrogatories conflict with each other (Rule 49(b)(4)) or the court chooses that route.
  • Preserving objections: Where a verdict form departs from the stipulated version and is not shared in advance, objections raised post-reading may be timely under Rule 51(c)(2)(B). Nonetheless, this case shows appellate courts may affirm if the outcome is proper under Rule 49 even when the trial court used the wrong label.
  • Drafting verdict forms: Ambiguous gating language (“If you answer ‘No’ to Question 1(a) and Question 2, you do not need to answer Question 3”) invites confusion. Clearer directions and an express liability question reduce risk.

3.2 Equal Pay Litigation

  • Budget and market forces recognized: Within the Sixth Circuit, employers may rely on documented budget constraints and bona fide market conditions (including urgency and supply constraints) as “factors other than sex.” This aligns the Sixth Circuit with persuasive authority from other jurisdictions and sharpens the EPA defense locally.
  • Temporal context matters: Pay decisions made at different times and under different market pressures may legitimately differ. Plaintiffs will need evidence that budget or market rationales are pretext for sex discrimination, not merely that higher pay was granted to a comparator in a different year.
  • Documentation is critical: Employers should contemporaneously record fiscal constraints, hiring urgencies, and negotiation histories. Such records will be potent evidence to withstand JMOL and to persuade juries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • General verdict: The jury decides who wins the claim and, if the plaintiff wins, how much she gets.
  • Special verdict: The jury makes written factual findings; the judge then applies the law to those facts to enter judgment.
  • General verdict with interrogatories: The jury returns a general verdict and also answers specific factual questions. If the answers conflict with the general verdict, Rule 49(b) tells the court how to proceed.
  • Rule 49(b)(3) vs. 49(b)(4):
    • (b)(3): Interrogatories are consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict—court may enter judgment on the answers, resubmit, or order a new trial.
    • (b)(4): Interrogatories are inconsistent with each other and also with the general verdict—court must not enter judgment; it must resubmit or order a new trial.
  • “Factor other than sex” (EPA): An employer’s reason for a pay differential must be legitimate, job-related, and not based on sex. Budget realities and market conditions can qualify; generalized “women accept less” logic cannot.
  • JMOL (Judgment as a Matter of Law): A court may set aside a jury verdict only if no reasonable juror could have reached it; evidence is viewed in the non-movant’s favor.

Conclusion

Debity clarifies two consequential areas of law in the Sixth Circuit. First, verdict classification is a functional inquiry guided by the verdict form and the jury instructions read together. Where interrogatories are internally consistent but clash with a general verdict, Rule 49(b)(3) authorizes entry of judgment on the interrogatory answers notwithstanding a damages award. Second, on the merits of equal pay claims, the court confirms that budget constraints and market forces (supply and demand) each independently qualify as legitimate “factors other than sex,” if credibly established and not a proxy for sex bias. The decision equips trial courts with a clear roadmap for handling mixed verdict forms and gives employers and employees alike sharper guidance on what evidence will make—or defeat—an EPA/Title VII/THRA pay discrimination case.

Key Takeaways

  • Expect courts to read verdict forms through the lens of jury instructions; “if your verdict is for the plaintiff” damages prompts most often indicate a general verdict.
  • When interrogatories conflict with a damages award, courts can enter judgment on the interrogatories under Rule 49(b)(3) if those answers are internally consistent.
  • Budget constraints and genuine market conditions are valid “other than sex” factors under the EPA/Title VII/THRA in the Sixth Circuit, but they must be real, documented, and not sex-based.
  • Temporal differences and negotiation context can legitimately produce different starting pay for otherwise similar roles.

Practice Pointers

  • For judges: Circulate the final verdict form to counsel and align it tightly with the instructions; avoid ambiguous skip-logic; consider adding an express liability line for each claim.
  • For plaintiffs: When faced with a “budget/market” defense, develop evidence of pretext (e.g., inconsistent application, sex-skewed outcomes, departures from policy, or contemporaneous documents contradicting the asserted constraints).
  • For defendants: Preserve records of budget decisions, hiring urgency, market scarcity, and negotiation rationales; memorialize how these factors—not sex—drove pay decisions.
  • For trial counsel: Object promptly to unexpected verdict-form changes; if the court withholds the form, Rule 51(c)(2)(B) can preserve objections raised after the reading.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

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