Gang Recruitment as Generalized Crime: The Nexus Requirement Reaffirmed in Serpas‑Villalobos v. Bondi (7th Cir. 2025)
I. Introduction
This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential decision in Seidi Maricela Serpas‑Villalobos v. Bondi, No. 24‑3264 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025), where a three‑judge panel (Sykes, St. Eve, and Maldonado, JJ.) denied a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of an asylum application brought by a Salvadoran mother and her two children.
The case sits squarely in the well‑developed but contentious area of Central American gang‑related asylum claims. The decision does not create new doctrine in a formal precedential sense (indeed, it is expressly labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION”), but it reaffirms and sharpens a critical point in asylum law within the Seventh Circuit:
Violence and threats arising from MS‑13’s efforts to recruit youth or to retaliate against those who resist or report them are treated as generalized criminal activity, and absent persuasive evidence that the gang acted “on account of” a statutorily protected ground—here, membership in a “particular social group”—the nexus requirement for asylum cannot be met.
The opinion also reiterates a practical corollary:
When an asylum claim fails for lack of nexus, claims for withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection based on the same factual predicate will almost invariably fail as well, given their higher or comparable standards of proof.
The case therefore matters not because it changes the law, but because it illustrates with unusual clarity how the Seventh Circuit is currently applying—indeed, tightening—the “nexus” analysis in gang‑related claims, and how prior precedents are being operationalized in everyday asylum adjudication.
II. Case Background
A. Parties and Country Context
- Petitioners: Seidi Maricela Serpas‑Villalobos, a citizen of El Salvador, and her two minor children (derivative applicants on her asylum application).
- Respondent: The Attorney General of the United States (at the time of the caption, Pamela J. Bondi).
- Country context: El Salvador, where MS‑13 and the 18th Street Gang are notorious transnational criminal organizations engaged in extortion, violence, and forced recruitment, especially of youth.
B. Factual Allegations
Serpas‑Villalobos’s claim centered on three sets of interactions with MS‑13 in 2015:
-
Initial recruitment of her son (July 2015)
MS‑13 members approached her 10‑year‑old son, Jonathan, and tried to recruit him to:- Spy on a rival gang, 18th Street Gang; and
- Help MS‑13 collect “rent” (extortion payments).
-
Accusation of informing and threats with a firearm (later July 2015)
Later that month, MS‑13 members were present near the family’s house when police came to arrest a neighbor. Believing Serpas‑Villalobos had called the police, a gang member named “Pantero”:- Pushed a gun into her chest; and
- Threatened to kill her.
-
Continued recruitment efforts after relocation (August 2015)
After these events, Serpas‑Villalobos moved with her children about an hour away within the same city in El Salvador. Nonetheless, in August 2015:- MS‑13 again approached Jonathan; and
- Repeated the death threats if he refused to work for them.
In November 2015, the family left El Salvador for the United States, where Serpas‑Villalobos’s partner was already residing. They were detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement shortly after entry and placed in removal proceedings for entering without documentation.
C. Immigration Court and BIA Proceedings
- Removability: At their hearing, the family conceded removability.
- Applications for relief: In July 2016, Serpas‑Villalobos applied for:
- Asylum;
- Withholding of removal; and
- Protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),
- Immigration Judge’s decision: After a hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision denying all relief. The IJ found:
- She had not demonstrated the elements necessary to qualify as a “refugee,” including the required nexus to a protected ground;
- She had not shown that the Salvadoran government was unwilling or unable to protect her; and
- She failed to meet the standards for withholding of removal and for CAT protection.
- BIA’s decision: The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, adopting the IJ’s reasoning and adding its own analysis.
The family then petitioned the Seventh Circuit for review.
III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision
The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that:
- Although Serpas‑Villalobos proposed three “particular social groups” (PSGs), she failed to establish the required nexus between those groups and the harm she experienced or feared.
- Her experiences with MS‑13 reflected gang recruitment and retaliation for noncooperation and for reporting the gang to the police—forms of generalized criminal activity that do not, without more, satisfy the requirement that persecution be “on account of” a protected ground.
- Given this nexus failure, the court found it unnecessary to address other asylum elements (such as government protection or internal relocation).
- To the extent her withholding of removal and CAT claims were not waived for lack of argument on appeal, they failed on the merits because:
- They require equal or higher standards than asylum; and
- The same deficiencies that undermined asylum (including nexus and the factual findings accepted by the BIA) precluded success on these forms of relief as well.
In reaching this result, the court emphasized the deferential “substantial evidence” standard for reviewing factual findings and leaned heavily on its prior holdings, particularly de Paz‑Peraza v. Bondi, Bueso‑Avila v. Holder, and the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Elias‑Zacarias.
IV. Detailed Analysis
A. Standards of Review and Precedent on Appellate Review of BIA Decisions
The panel begins by setting the procedural frame for its review.
1. Reviewing both the IJ and BIA opinions
Citing Mateo‑Mateo v. Garland, 124 F.4th 470 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Osorio‑Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th 738 (7th Cir. 2023)), the court restates a well‑settled rule:
When the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and adds its own reasoning, the court of appeals reviews both decisions.
This dual‑layer review is central in immigration appeals, as it allows the court to:
- Scrutinize the IJ’s factual findings and reasoning (as effectively embraced by the BIA); and
- Consider any independent legal analysis or refinements added by the BIA.
2. Legal vs. factual review
The panel next distinguishes between standards for legal conclusions and factual findings:
- Legal issues: reviewed de novo (citing Borjas Cruz v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1000 (7th Cir. 2024)). The court owes no deference to the IJ or BIA on pure questions of law, such as the definition of “refugee” or the legal standards for particular social groups and nexus.
- Factual findings: upheld if supported by substantial evidence (citing Mateo‑Mateo and Meraz‑Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2021)). The panel reiterates the very high bar:
- It may reverse only if the evidence “compels a different result,” meaning no reasonable fact‑finder could agree with the IJ/BIA.
This distinction is important because the heart of the case—whether the threats and violence were “on account of” a protected ground—is treated as a factual application of a legal standard. Once the court frames nexus as predominantly factual, the petitioner must show not just that another inference is plausible, but that the IJ’s inference is irrational in light of the record. That is a very demanding burden.
B. Refugee Definition and the Nexus Requirement
1. Statutory definition of “refugee”
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), asylum is available only to those who qualify as “refugees.” The statute, as reiterated through Granados Arias v. Garland, 69 F.4th 454 (7th Cir. 2023), defines a refugee as:
An individual who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality “because of persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Two elements are particularly salient:
- Persecution / well‑founded fear – the seriousness and likelihood of harm; and
- Nexus to a protected ground – the reason why the persecutor inflicts such harm.
The court in Serpas‑Villalobos expressly focuses on the second element—the nexus requirement.
2. Particular social group (PSG) doctrine
The petitioner relied on the protected ground of membership in a particular social group. The Seventh Circuit’s PSG framework, as cited in the opinion, draws on:
- N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2014) and
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) – defining a PSG as a group:
- characterized by a trait that is immutable (unchangeable) or
- so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be required to change it.
- Jonaitiene v. Holder, 660 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2011) – “the fact of persecution cannot itself define the group”; saying “people who are persecuted” (or “people harmed by X gang”) is circular and not a cognizable PSG.
The opinion does not ultimately decide whether any of the petitioner’s suggested groups satisfy these criteria. Instead, it skips directly to nexus, holding that even assuming cognizability, she fails to prove that MS‑13 targeted her or her children because of their membership in those groups.
3. The nexus requirement
To establish nexus, the petitioner must show that persecution was inflicted “on account of” her membership in a PSG (see Dominguez‑Pulido v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016)).
The decision emphasizes several points:
- The protected trait need not be the sole motive of the persecutor, but:
- It cannot be incidental or minor (citing W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018), and Matter of L‑E‑A‑, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 2017)).
- Courts “regularly decline to find nexus where the persecutors aim to recruit or retaliate for refusal to join their criminal enterprise” (citing de Paz‑Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390 (7th Cir. 2025)).
This is the crucial doctrinal move: the Seventh Circuit draws a firm line between motive to recruit or punish noncooperation (viewed as non‑protected, criminal motives) and motive to target someone because they belong to a protected group (which would satisfy nexus).
C. The Proposed Particular Social Groups and the Court’s Response
Serpas‑Villalobos advanced three PSG formulations:
- “Enemies of the MS‑13 Street Gang”;
- “People suspected by the 18th Street Gang to be working for the MS‑13 gang as an informant”; and
- “Juveniles recruited by the MS‑13 gang who resist such recruitment and their families.”
The panel does not squarely hold whether these are cognizable PSGs under Cece, N.L.A., M‑E‑V‑G‑, etc. Instead, it takes a pragmatic approach:
Even assuming these groups are cognizable, there is insufficient evidence that MS‑13 persecuted or threatened the family “on account of” their membership in any of these groups, as opposed to for the gang’s recruitment and retaliation objectives.
This allows the court to resolve the case on narrower evidentiary grounds while avoiding a broader pronouncement on PSG definitions that might conflict with evolving BIA or Board‑of‑Immigration‑Appeals jurisprudence.
D. Generalized Gang Violence and the Role of de Paz‑Peraza
1. Gang recruitment and harassment as generalized crime
The panel expressly agrees with the IJ’s conclusion that “gang recruitment and harassment are the types of generalized crimes that affect large swaths of society throughout El Salvador and do not support a finding of persecution on account of [a] particular protected ground.” The IJ had cited Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2009), and Matter of M‑E‑V‑G‑, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) in support.
This framing echoes a recurring theme in asylum law: generalized violence or widespread criminality—even if severe and life‑threatening—does not, by itself, satisfy the Refugee Convention’s requirement that harm be linked to a protected ground.
2. The significance of Bueso‑Avila and Elias‑Zacarias
The court cites Bueso‑Avila v. Holder, 663 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2011), where the Seventh Circuit held that MS‑13 harmed the petitioner “simply because he was a youth who refused to join their street gang,” and that such a motive did not establish nexus to a protected ground.
It also invokes the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992). In Elias‑Zacarias, the Court held that:
- Evidence that guerrillas forcibly recruit someone is not enough to prove they are doing so “on account of” the victim’s political opinion.
- The applicant must show that the persecutors will harm him because of his actual or imputed political opinion, not merely because he refused to fight.
By citing Elias‑Zacarias, the panel aligns gang‑recruitment cases with guerrilla‑recruitment cases: in both contexts, a refusal to cooperate with armed groups—without more—does not satisfy the nexus requirement.
3. The bridge case: de Paz‑Peraza v. Bondi
The decision repeatedly leans on de Paz‑Peraza v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 390 (7th Cir. 2025). Although we do not have that opinion’s full text, the citations in Serpas‑Villalobos indicate that:
- de Paz‑Peraza “collects cases” in which the Seventh Circuit and other courts declined to find nexus when the persecutors’ motives were recruitment or retaliation for refusal to join their criminal enterprise;
- It underscores that such motives are not, without more, persecution “on account of” a protected ground;
- It also articulates the “compelled evidence” standard: a petitioner’s position may be “possible” or “legitimate,” but unless the record compels that position, appellate courts must defer to the IJ/BIA.
The panel adopts that framework wholesale, using de Paz‑Peraza as a near‑controlling template for evaluating the evidence in Serpas‑Villalobos.
E. Application to the Facts: Why Nexus Fails Here
The panel’s nexus analysis is concise but dense. It distills the record to two core motives for MS‑13’s actions:
- Recruitment of Jonathan – The gang wanted Jonathan to:
- Spy on a rival gang; and
- Assist with collecting extortion payments.
- Retaliation against Serpas‑Villalobos for contacting the police – When Pantero believed she had called the police, he threatened her at gunpoint and again after being released from a short detention.
From this, the court concludes that the family’s harm was connected to:
- MS‑13’s operational goals (recruitment and punishment for noncooperation); and
- Its desire to deter informing or cooperation with law enforcement.
The court then explicitly rejects the notion that these motives are sufficiently tied to the proposed PSGs:
- For “Enemies of MS‑13” and “Suspected informants for MS‑13 vis‑à‑vis 18th Street,” the court implicitly treats these as circular or overbroad—essentially a restatement that the family was targeted because they interfered with MS‑13, not because of an independent protected characteristic.
- For “Juveniles recruited by MS‑13 who resist such recruitment and their families,” the opinion invokes Bueso‑Avila and Elias‑Zacarias to stress that targeting youth for recruitment (and punishing refusal) is precisely the type of motive that falls on the non‑protected, criminal side of the line.
The petitioner did offer a theory to try to bridge the gap: she argued that MS‑13 specifically targets young people because young offenders face more lenient penalties if caught, suggesting a kind of group‑based, age‑related targeting. But the panel sides with the IJ and BIA in finding that this evidence does not compel a nexus finding:
Even if it is “possible” or “legitimate” to argue that youth as such are a targeted PSG, the record is not “so compelling that no reasonable fact‑finder could disagree.”
This is an important reminder: appellate courts are not deciding whether petitioners’ theories are plausible; they decide whether those theories are the only reasonable reading of the record in light of the deferential standard of review.
F. Withholding of Removal and CAT Protection
Having disposed of asylum on nexus grounds, the panel turns briefly to withholding of removal and CAT protection.
1. Potential waiver
Citing Smith v. Garland, 103 F.4th 1244 (7th Cir. 2024), the court notes that these claims may have been waived or forfeited because the petitioner did not meaningfully advance them in her appellate briefing. Even assuming they were preserved, however, the court holds they fail on the merits.
2. Relationship between asylum, withholding, and CAT
The court relies on Rivas‑Jarquin v. Bondi, 149 F.4th 944 (7th Cir. 2025), and de Paz‑Peraza, 140 F.4th at 395, for the proposition that:
Because the asylum claim fails, the petitioner cannot satisfy the higher standards necessary for withholding of removal and CAT protection.
In practice, this rests on two points:
- Withholding of removal requires:
- the same type of nexus to a protected ground as asylum; and
- a higher probability of persecution (“more likely than not,” as opposed to “well‑founded fear”).
- CAT protection does not require a protected ground, but:
- It demands proof that the applicant is more likely than not to be subjected to torture; and
- That the torture will be inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.
Thus, the same evidentiary deficiencies that doom asylum—especially the failure to show protected‑ground nexus and government acquiescence—carry over to the other forms of relief.
V. Key Legal Concepts Explained (Simplified)
1. “Refugee” and Asylum Eligibility
- A “refugee” is someone who cannot return to their country because of persecution or a well‑founded fear of persecution on account of:
- Race;
- Religion;
- Nationality;
- Political opinion; or
- Membership in a particular social group (PSG).
- Asylum is discretionary relief based on this definition.
2. Particular Social Group (PSG)
- A PSG is a group of people who share a characteristic that:
- Is immutable (cannot be changed, like family ties or past experiences), or
- Is so fundamental to identity that a person should not be required to change it (for example, sexual orientation).
- The group must also be:
- Defined clearly enough (particularity); and
- Recognized by society as a distinct group (social distinction), under BIA cases like Matter of M‑E‑V‑G‑.
- Crucially, you cannot define the group only by the fact that it is persecuted—that would be circular.
3. Nexus (“on account of”)
- The harm must be inflicted because of the person’s protected characteristic.
- It is not sufficient that:
- The person is harmed in a context of general violence or criminality; or
- The persecutor has purely criminal motives (money, power, revenge for noncooperation).
- The protected trait does not have to be the only reason, but it must be a central reason, not a minor or incidental factor.
4. Generalized Violence vs. Targeted Persecution
- Generalized violence (e.g., widespread gang violence in El Salvador) is not enough for asylum.
- There must be evidence that:
- The applicant was singled out (or faces a substantial risk of being singled out);
- For a reason tied to a protected ground (e.g., political stance, family membership, gender‑based PSG).
5. Withholding of Removal
- A mandatory form of protection if the person can show it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted on a protected ground if returned.
- Same nexus requirement as asylum, but a higher probability standard.
6. Convention Against Torture (CAT) Protection
- Does not require a protected ground.
- Requires proof that:
- The applicant is more likely than not to be subjected to torture—severe physical or mental pain or suffering; and
- The torture will be inflicted by, or with the consent/acquiescence of, a public official or someone acting in an official capacity.
7. Substantial Evidence Standard
- Appellate courts must accept the agency’s factual findings unless:
- No reasonable fact‑finder could agree with them; and
- The record compels a contrary conclusion.
- This standard heavily favors upholding the BIA/IJ unless there is very strong contrary evidence.
8. Nonprecedential Disposition
- The opinion is labeled “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION – To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.”
- This means:
- It is not binding precedent on future panels; but
- It may still be cited for its persuasive value (subject to court rules), and it is a reliable window into how the court is currently approaching similar cases.
VI. Impact and Broader Significance
A. Reinforcement of a Strict Nexus Approach in Gang Cases
This decision reinforces an increasingly strict nexus analysis for gang‑related asylum claims in the Seventh Circuit. The panel’s reliance on Bueso‑Avila, de Paz‑Peraza, and Elias‑Zacarias confirms a pattern:
- Threats and violence arising from:
- Efforts to recruit youth into gangs; or
- Retaliation for refusing to join or for reporting gangs to police
- Attempts to frame those experiences as PSG‑based persecution (“youth who resist recruitment and their families”) face a steep uphill battle unless there is:
- Specific evidence that the persecutor recognized and targeted a socially distinct group; and
- Clear proof that this group membership, rather than mere availability as recruits or informants, was a central reason for the harm.
B. Strategic Implications for Future Asylum Litigation
For practitioners handling Central American gang cases in the Seventh Circuit, this decision (though nonprecedential) has practical implications:
- Evidence of motive is critical. Mere proof of threats and violence by MS‑13 or similar gangs will not suffice. Petitioners must marshal:
- Direct statements by persecutors linking the harm to a protected trait; or
- Strong circumstantial evidence (e.g., patterns of targeting based on family ties, gender, political opposition, or other recognized PSGs).
- PSG framing must avoid circularity and overbreadth. Groups like “enemies of MS‑13” or “people targeted by MS‑13 because they do not cooperate” risk being rejected as circular or defined by the persecution itself.
- Develop government‑acquiescence facts for CAT claims. Where asylum nexus is weak, CAT can still be viable if there is robust evidence of:
- Systemic collusion or corruption;
- Repeated failures of police to respond; or
- Official policies enabling torture or abuse.
- Appellate preservation matters. The brief note about possible waiver under Smith v. Garland underscores the importance of fully developing all claims (asylum, withholding, CAT) in the court of appeals, not just in the immigration court and BIA.
C. Systemic Concerns and Humanitarian Tensions
At a broader level, the decision highlights a tension embedded in refugee law:
- On one hand, the Refugee Convention and U.S. law are designed to protect people from targeted persecution tied to protected characteristics.
- On the other hand, many of the world’s most dangerous environments—including gang‑controlled neighborhoods in Central America—involve indiscriminate or criminal violence that is not easily mapped onto the Convention grounds.
Serpas‑Villalobos exemplifies the harsh reality that individuals facing serious, life‑threatening harm from criminal gangs may nonetheless fall outside the legal definition of “refugee” if they cannot demonstrate that protected‑ground nexus. The panel’s strict adherence to precedents like Elias‑Zacarias underscores that this is not a gap created by the Seventh Circuit, but rather a structural feature of the asylum framework as currently written and interpreted.
VII. Conclusion
Serpas‑Villalobos v. Bondi does not break new legal ground, but it consolidates and clarifies the Seventh Circuit’s approach to gang‑related asylum claims in three important ways:
- Gang recruitment and retaliation are treated as generalized criminal motives. Without persuasive evidence that MS‑13’s threats were driven by the family’s membership in a cognizable PSG, the court refuses to find the necessary nexus.
- PSG theories built around resistance to gangs face significant skepticism. Echoing Bueso‑Avila and Elias‑Zacarias, the decision underscores that refusal to cooperate with violent actors, standing alone, is not a protected ground.
- Failure of asylum usually sinks withholding and CAT when based on the same factual core. Absent separate, compelling evidence of likely torture with government acquiescence, CAT will fail where the asylum claim fails.
Although nonprecedential, the decision is a clear and instructive example of how the Seventh Circuit is applying the nexus requirement and related precedents in the context of Central American gang violence. For future litigants and advocates, it offers both a cautionary tale and a roadmap: success in similar cases will depend less on the raw severity of gang threats and more on carefully constructed, evidence‑backed theories showing that the persecutor acted because of the applicant’s protected status, not merely to advance its criminal enterprise.
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