Fourth Department Clarifies PLCAA Boundaries: Aftermarket Magazine Locks Are “Component Parts,” But New York’s Deceptive Marketing Statutes (GBL §§ 349–350) And Aiding-and-Abetting SAFE Act Violations Can Trigger the Predicate Exception

Introduction

This commentary examines the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s decision in Salter v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (2025 NY Slip Op 04384), an appeal that, despite the caption, centers on claims against MEAN L.L.C. (MEAN)—the manufacturer of a “magazine lock” installed on the Bushmaster XM-15 rifle used in the 2022 racially motivated mass shooting at a Buffalo grocery store.

The case arises from four consolidated appeals brought by victims, estates, and other affected individuals. Plaintiffs alleged that MEAN designed, marketed, and sold a magazine lock as a permanent, New York SAFE Act–compliant device, but packaged and posted instructions showing how to remove it—enabling the use of detachable high-capacity magazines prohibited in New York. Plaintiffs asserted negligence, public nuisance, and deceptive marketing claims under General Business Law (GBL) §§ 349 and 350.

MEAN moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211, arguing: (1) no personal jurisdiction (CPLR 3211[a][8]); (2) federal immunity under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), 15 USC § 7901 et seq.; (3) lack of standing on the GBL claims (CPLR 3211[a][3]); and (4) failure to state a claim (CPLR 3211[a][7]). Supreme Court (Erie County) denied the motions. The Fourth Department unanimously affirmed.

On its face, the ruling preserves plaintiffs’ causes of action at the pleadings stage. More importantly, the Court lays down two significant legal propositions:

As a matter of PLCAA scope, MEAN’s magazine lock is a “component part” of a firearm—thus a “qualified product”—bringing MEAN within PLCAA’s framework.
As a matter of PLCAA exceptions, New York’s GBL §§ 349 and 350 can qualify as “predicate statutes” applicable to the sale or marketing of a qualified product; and allegations of aiding and abetting a SAFE Act violation may also satisfy the predicate exception.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department affirmed the denial of MEAN’s CPLR 3211 motions to dismiss:

Personal Jurisdiction: New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction because MEAN purposefully availed itself of the New York market by promoting its lock as a compliance device for New York law, creating an “articulable nexus” between MEAN’s in-state business activity and plaintiffs’ claims (CPLR 302[a][1]).
PLCAA Coverage and Exceptions:
- MEAN qualifies as a PLCAA “manufacturer” of a “qualified product” because the lock, once installed, is a component part of a firearm.
- Nevertheless, plaintiffs plausibly invoked PLCAA’s predicate exception (15 USC § 7903[5][A][iii]) by alleging that MEAN knowingly violated GBL §§ 349 and 350 through deceptive marketing, and (for certain plaintiffs) aided and abetted violations of the New York SAFE Act.
- At this stage, proximate cause cannot be resolved against plaintiffs as a matter of law.
GBL §§ 349/350: Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded consumer-oriented, materially misleading conduct and injury, and have standing as the actually injured parties.
Negligence and Public Nuisance: Both causes of action are plausibly pleaded; a third party’s criminal act does not necessarily sever causation on a motion to dismiss.

Bottom line: PLCAA may apply to aftermarket component manufacturers, but deceptive marketing and aiding-and-abetting theories tied to state law can keep claims alive under the predicate exception.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pleading and Jurisdiction Standards

Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 100 AD3d 143 (4th Dept 2012), amended 103 AD3d 1191 (2013): Reaffirmed the CPLR 3211 standard—accept allegations as true, afford favorable inferences, and ask only whether they fit any cognizable legal theory. The Court repeatedly draws on Williams for causation and public nuisance as well.
Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 (1994): Classic articulation of CPLR 3211 principles, reinforcing a plaintiff-friendly lens at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327 (2012): Provides the “articulable nexus”/“substantial relationship” test for specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945): The jurisdictional due process touchstone—minimum contacts and purposeful availment.
Aybar v. US Tires & Wheels of Queens, LLC, 211 AD3d 40 (2d Dept 2022): Supports jurisdiction where a defendant purposefully directs representations to a state’s market, even if the particular product unit was not sold in that state.

PLCAA Scope and “Component Part” Doctrine

Statutory framework: 15 USC § 7901 et seq.; definitions at § 7903; “engaged in the business” via 18 USC § 921(a)(21).
Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F3d 1126 (9th Cir 2009), cert denied 560 US 924 (2010): Found PLCAA generally bars claims based on general negligence/criminal statutes; cited by MEAN but distinguished here.
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F3d 384 (2d Cir 2008), cert denied 556 US 1104 (2009): Similarly restrictive approach to PLCAA predicates; distinguished because GBL §§ 349/350 specifically regulate product sale/marketing.
Prescott v. Slide Fire Solutions, L.P., 341 F Supp 3d 1175 (D. Nev. 2018) and 410 F Supp 3d 1123 (D. Nev. 2019): Pivotal for classifying bump stocks as “component parts,” not mere accessories, and for recognizing state consumer-protection statutes as potential predicates.
Duncan v. Bonta, 133 F.4th 852 (9th Cir 2025): Used here for the “integral to operation” test distinguishing component parts from accessories.
Sambrano v. Savage Arms, Inc., 338 P3d 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014): Cable locks are not component parts—used to contrast with MEAN’s lock, which became part of the firing mechanism.
Lowy v. Daniel Defense, LLC, 2024 WL 3521508 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2024): Replacement magazines and grips, when substituted in, become component parts—supports treating MEAN’s lock as a component when it replaces the magazine release.
United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F3d 534 (5th Cir 2015): Cited for component-substitution logic.

Predicate Exception and State-Law Pathways

Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 331 Conn 53, 202 A3d 262 (2019), cert denied 140 S Ct 513 (2019): Landmark holding that a state unfair trade practices act (CUTPA) targeting marketing can serve as a PLCAA predicate—strongly persuasive to the Fourth Department’s treatment of GBL §§ 349/350.
Doyle v. Combined Systems, Inc., 2023 WL 5945857 (N.D. Tex. 2023), and Goldstein v. Earnest, 2021 WL 12321922 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2021): Additional support for using consumer-protection statutes as predicates.
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 145 S Ct 1556 (2025): Supreme Court recognized that a PLCAA predicate can be established via aiding and abetting someone else’s firearms offense; though Mexico’s particular allegations were found insufficient there, the principle clears a path here.
People v. Steinmetz, 177 AD3d 1292 (4th Dept 2019): Guidance on “knowing” violations relevant to false advertising and deceptive practices.

Causation and Nuisance

Bell v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944 (1997); Hain v. Jamison, 28 NY3d 524 (2016): Foreseeability and intervening criminal acts—proximate cause often unsuitable for dismissal at the pleadings stage.
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 NY2d 222 (2001): Cited “cf.”—distinguishable here because plaintiffs allege MEAN’s own instructions were used to remove the lock.
Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 (1977): Standards for public nuisance—conduct endangering a considerable number of persons and special injury.

2) Legal Reasoning and Application

A. Personal Jurisdiction (CPLR 302[a][1])

The Court held that MEAN purposefully availed itself of New York’s market by promoting its lock as a New York SAFE Act compliance device to New York consumers. Even if the specific unit at issue was not sold in New York, MEAN’s targeted marketing created the required “articulable nexus” between its in-state business activity and plaintiffs’ claims. This comfortably satisfies CPLR 302(a)(1) and due process as framed by Licci and International Shoe.

B. PLCAA Coverage: Is the MEAN Lock a “Qualified Product”?

The PLCAA defines a “qualified product” to include “a component part of a firearm.” Although MEAN argued for a sweeping industry-wide manufacturer immunity, the Court correctly tethered the term “manufacturer” to the making of a “qualified product.” It then proceeded to find that MEAN’s lock, once installed, replaced the magazine release and became integral to the rifle’s firing mechanism, thus an “essential” or “integral” component—not a mere accessory:

By dictionary meaning and functional analysis (following Prescott and Duncan), an installed replacement that is necessary to ordinary operation is a component part.
Sambrano is distinguished: cable locks are external, temporary safety devices; MEAN’s lock is integrated into operation once installed.

Because MEAN both engaged in the business of manufacturing this qualified product and held a federal firearms manufacturing license, the Court treated MEAN as a PLCAA “manufacturer.”

C. PLCAA Predicate Exception: Two Independent Routes

Deceptive Marketing Under GBL §§ 349 and 350. The predicate exception applies to actions where the “manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product.” The Court held that:
- GBL §§ 349 (deceptive acts or practices) and 350 (false advertising) are statutes applicable to product sale and marketing in New York, distinguishing them from general negligence or criminal statutes addressed in Beretta and Ileto.
- Plaintiffs adequately alleged MEAN knowingly and falsely marketed the lock as making rifles SAFE Act–compliant while providing instructions for its removal—a factual basis sufficient at the pleadings stage.
Aiding and Abetting a SAFE Act Violation. Even assuming only firearm-specific statutes can serve as predicates, the SAFE Act is firearm-specific, and certain plaintiffs (Jones and the Stanfield plaintiffs) pleaded that MEAN aided and abetted a violation by distributing removal instructions. The Court relied on Smith & Wesson v. Mexico to confirm that a predicate violation may be established through aiding-and-abetting liability. The allegations here were more concrete than those rejected in Mexico, and thus survive CPLR 3211.

D. Proximate Cause at the Pleadings Stage

MEAN’s argument that the shooter’s criminal modification was a superseding cause fails at this juncture. New York’s foreseeability doctrine (e.g., Hain, Bell, Williams) recognizes that intervening acts, including criminal ones, do not automatically sever causation—especially where the alleged harm is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s marketing or design choices. Whether MEAN’s conduct was a substantial factor is a fact-intensive issue inappropriate for dismissal on the pleadings.

E. GBL §§ 349/350: Sufficiency and Standing

Plaintiffs pleaded:

Consumer-oriented conduct (marketing to New York customers, including the shooter);
Materially misleading statements (claims of permanent compliance while providing removal instructions); and
Injury (the shooting and resulting harms) causally linked to the alleged deception.

On standing, the Court rejected MEAN’s suggestion that only directly deceived “consumers” may sue. New York requires only that the party “actually injured” bring suit (see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris USA Inc.). The victims’ injuries are not merely derivative of another consumer’s exposure; they are the alleged direct and foreseeable consequence of the deceptive marketing campaign aimed at New York.

F. Negligence and Public Nuisance

The negligence claims survive because plaintiffs plausibly allege that MEAN’s packaging and online instructions were used to remove the lock, setting in motion foreseeable misuse. Public nuisance claims similarly survive; plaintiffs allege unlawful conduct that endangered a considerable number of people and that they suffered special injuries beyond those suffered by the community at large (see Copart; Williams).

3) Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Firearms-Adjacent Manufacturers and Marketers

Component Classification: Aftermarket products that replace original firearm parts and are integral to operation may be treated as component parts for PLCAA purposes, bringing manufacturers within PLCAA’s framework—but not insulating them from suits if an exception applies.
Marketing Liability Exposure: New York’s broad consumer-protection laws (GBL §§ 349/350) can serve as PLCAA predicates if plaintiffs plausibly allege “knowing” deceptive marketing about a product’s compliance or safety implications.
Aiding-and-Abetting Theories: Post–Smith & Wesson v. Mexico, providing instructions or tools that facilitate unlawful firearm configurations can support predicate claims based on aiding-and-abetting violations of firearm-specific statutes like the SAFE Act.

B. For Jurisdiction and E-Commerce Strategy

Targeted “compliance” marketing to New York residents (e.g., “NY compliant” labels, state-specific web pages, instructions) can ground specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1), even without a New York sale of the particular unit at issue.
Risk management: National sellers should evaluate state-targeted compliance claims and remove materials that effectively coach users in unlawful modifications.

C. For Litigation Strategy

Pleading Pathways: Plaintiffs in New York now have a clearer route around PLCAA via:
- GBL §§ 349/350 (deceptive acts/false advertising) as PLCAA predicates; and
- Aiding-and-abetting claims tied to specific firearm statutes (e.g., the SAFE Act).
Discovery Focus: Expect probing into marketing strategies, internal knowledge about removability and misuse, user analytics, packaging/website content, and intent evidence relevant to “knowing” violations and foreseeability.
Causation: Defense arguments on superseding causation are unlikely to succeed at the pleadings stage; they are more apt for summary judgment after a factual record is developed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLCAA (Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act): A federal law that generally shields firearm and ammunition manufacturers/sellers from civil suits when harm is caused by the criminal misuse of their products—as long as the product functioned as designed. The shield has exceptions.
Qualified Product: A firearm, ammunition, or a component part of either. If your product replaces an original part and is integral to the weapon’s operation, it may be a component part—not a mere accessory.
Predicate Exception (15 USC § 7903[5][A][iii]): PLCAA immunity does not apply where a manufacturer/seller knowingly violates a state or federal statute that applies to the sale or marketing of the product, and that violation proximately causes the harm.
GBL §§ 349 and 350: New York’s general consumer-protection laws prohibiting deceptive acts and false advertising. They broadly regulate product marketing and can, per this decision, function as PLCAA predicates.
Aiding and Abetting (as a Predicate): Per the U.S. Supreme Court, a predicate violation can stem from aiding someone else’s firearms offense—e.g., providing instructions that facilitate illegal modifications.
SAFE Act: New York’s 2013 gun-safety statute. Among other things, it restricts detachable high-capacity magazines and certain “assault weapon” features. Aiding a violation can support a PLCAA predicate claim.
CPLR 302(a)(1) (Long-Arm Jurisdiction): New York can exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident who transacts business in New York—such as marketing a product to New York consumers—if the claims arise from that activity.
Proximate Cause and Foreseeability: Even criminal acts by third parties may be foreseeable results of a defendant’s conduct; whether they break the causal chain is typically a factual issue not resolved on a motion to dismiss.
Public Nuisance: Unlawful conduct that endangers a considerable number of people. A plaintiff must show a special injury different from the general public’s harm.

Conclusion

The Fourth Department’s decision in Salter v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (as to MEAN L.L.C.) refines the PLCAA landscape in three consequential ways:

It classifies certain aftermarket devices—like a replacement magazine lock integral to the firing mechanism—as “component parts,” bringing their makers within PLCAA’s ambit.
It confirms that New York’s deceptive marketing statutes, GBL §§ 349 and 350, are “statutes applicable to the sale or marketing” and thus can support the PLCAA predicate exception when knowingly violated.
It embraces the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that aiding and abetting a firearms offense can establish a predicate violation, opening a separate pathway via alleged facilitation of SAFE Act violations.

Beyond PLCAA, the decision underscores permissive standards for specific jurisdiction based on state-targeted compliance marketing and reiterates that proximate cause and intervening criminal acts are generally unsuited for resolution on the pleadings. Negligence and public nuisance claims grounded in allegedly unlawful marketing or design choices will frequently proceed to discovery where plaintiffs plausibly connect those choices to foreseeable criminal misuse.

Taken together, this opinion is both a caution to firearms-adjacent manufacturers about compliance messaging and a roadmap for plaintiffs seeking to navigate PLCAA’s exceptions. It harmonizes with Soto’s marketing-focused approach while clarifying the “component part” category, and it signals that New York courts will scrutinize marketing that purports to achieve statutory compliance while simultaneously enabling easy evasion of the law.

Note: This commentary provides analysis of a published appellate decision and is not legal advice. Parties facing similar issues should consult counsel about the application of these principles to their specific facts.