Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key precedents to establish the framework for summary judgment and the standard of review:

• Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970): Establishes that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of any material fact.
• Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986): Highlights that in summary judgment, all inferences must favor the non-moving party.
• BARWICK v. CELOTEX CORP., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984): Clarifies that conflicting testimonies do not necessarily create a genuine issue of material fact if one party's version cannot be rationally supported over the other.
• CROSS v. UNITED STATES, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975): Discusses the standard of review for administrative determinations regarding the amount of civil penalties, emphasizing that courts should not defer to agency expertise unless there is an abuse of discretion.

Legal Reasoning

The court's legal reasoning can be dissected into two main components: Miller's liability under the Act and the appropriate standard of review for the civil penalty assessed.

Liability Under the Change in Banking Control Act

The FDIC alleged that Miller willfully violated the Act by acquiring a controlling interest in CBW without providing the required sixty days' notice. Miller contended that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his intent. However, the court found that Miller's admissions, such as his deposition testimony acknowledging the violation and the lack of credible evidence supporting his claim of acting solely as an agent for McCamic, negated any genuine dispute. The court referenced BARWICK v. CELOTEX CORP. to support the notion that conflicting testimonies do not inherently create a material factual dispute if one version is untenable.

Standard of Review for Civil Penalties

Miller challenged the district court's review standard for the penalty amount, arguing that it did not apply a de novo standard as required by 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(16). The district court had applied a standard borrowed from CROSS v. UNITED STATES, which pertains to the Food Stamp Act and involves a more deferential review. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the language of the Change in Banking Control Act explicitly mandates a de novo review for the penalty, thereby requiring the court to independently assess the appropriateness of the penalty without deferring to the FDIC's discretion.

Conclusion of Legal Reasoning

The court concluded that while the FDIC was justified in being granted summary judgment on Miller's liability due to lack of material factual disputes regarding willfulness, the district court erred in its approach to reviewing the penalty amount. Consequently, the case was remanded for a de novo review of the civil money penalty.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for administrative enforcement actions under the Change in Banking Control Act:

• Affirmation of Summary Judgment Standards: The decision reinforces the stringent criteria for granting summary judgment, especially concerning the willfulness of violations in administrative law contexts.
• De Novo Review Mandate: By mandating a de novo review of the amount of civil penalties, the court ensures that penalties are subject to independent judicial scrutiny, potentially limiting arbitrary or excessive penalties imposed by administrative agencies.
• Agency Accountability: The ruling emphasizes that agencies like the FDIC must provide justifiable and well-documented reasons for the penalties they impose, enhancing transparency and accountability in administrative proceedings.

Future cases involving similar statutory frameworks will likely follow this precedent, ensuring that both liability and penalty assessments undergo appropriate judicial evaluations.