Fourth Circuit sets damages blueprint for “uninsurability” claims: face value of life insurance is not the measure; plaintiffs must prove expected lifespan to quantify increased premiums with reasonable certainty

Introduction

In Malcolm Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s post-trial reduction of a jury’s $16 million damages award to nominal damages of $1 in a negligence action arising from erroneous Medical Information Bureau (MIB) coding. The Court held that, under North Carolina law’s “reasonable certainty” requirement for damages, a plaintiff alleging “uninsurability” (or inability to obtain insurance at a reasonable cost) must supply evidence permitting a non-speculative calculation of the economic loss. Crucially, because the measure of loss is the incremental premiums the insured would have to pay over the remainder of his life, the record must contain competent evidence of expected remaining lifespan as of the time of injury. Absent that second data point, the jury’s award was necessarily speculative.

The decision provides a clear template for quantifying damages in cases where negligence impairs a policyholder’s ability to obtain life insurance at standard rates. It also distinguishes “uninsurability” damages from termination-of-policy claims, where the face value of the policy may be relevant. Beyond damages, the opinion reiterates law-of-the-case constraints, preservation of error for Rule 50(b) purposes, and the robust presumption of public access to judicial records reflected in a directive to unseal sealed appellate materials absent a timely showing of need.

Summary of the Judgment

The jury had found AXA negligent for transmitting false diagnosis codes to the MIB after Wiener's 2013 policy lapse and 2014 reinstatement review, which in turn caused other insurers to reject or up-rate his applications. At trial, the jury awarded $16 million in damages, later reduced to $8 million based on mitigation. On the first appeal (Wiener I), the Fourth Circuit upheld the jury’s finding of liability but remanded for the district court to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to support the amount of damages. On remand, the district court concluded the $16 million figure lacked evidentiary support and entered judgment for nominal damages; it also conditionally granted a new trial under Rule 59.

In the present decision, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Rule 50(b) ruling. Applying North Carolina’s requirement that damages be proven with “reasonable certainty,” the Court explained that a plaintiff asserting “uninsurability” damages must furnish at least:

The annual incremental premium attributable to the defendant’s negligence; and
The insured’s expected remaining lifespan at the time of the injury (here, in 2014).

While the record contained evidence of the first data point (an extra $400,000 per year per $10 million in coverage; i.e., $640,000 per year for $16 million), there was no competent evidence of Wiener’s expected remaining lifespan in 2014. The jury could not fill that gap by assessing his appearance on a 2020 video or relying on a physician’s general observations about his health; North Carolina law forbids such speculation. Consequently, only nominal damages were appropriate.

The Court rejected three counterarguments: (1) that AXA had waived objections to damages sufficiency, (2) that only the “bottom line” $8 million figure mattered, and (3) that the $16 million face value of the hoped-for policy could serve as a proxy for damages. It also directed that sealed briefing and Volume III of the Joint Appendix be unsealed 10 days after the opinion unless a valid sealing justification is timely presented.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins., 58 F.4th 774 (4th Cir. 2023) (Wiener I): Established law of the case on liability—sufficient evidence supported findings that AXA’s erroneous MIB codes caused Wiener to become “effectively uninsurable or uninsurable at a reasonable cost” and prevented issuance at the standard rate. This precluded relitigation of insurability at standard rates on the second appeal.
Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 845 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1988): Confirmed the law-of-the-case doctrine bound the court to its prior liability determinations.
Ellis v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) and Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016): Articulated the Rule 50 sufficiency standard—view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant without reweighing credibility, asking only whether a reasonable jury could reach the verdict on the evidence presented.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), and Lord & Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, L.P., 849 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2017): Directed the federal court to apply North Carolina’s substantive damages law in this diversity case.
North Carolina damages authorities:
- Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Bus. Sys., Inc., 356 S.E.2d 578 (N.C. 1987): Damages must be proven with “reasonable certainty.”
- Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 234 S.E.2d 605 (N.C. 1977) (quoting Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Prod. Dev. & Sales Co., 131 S.E.2d 9 (N.C. 1963)): Evidence must be “sufficiently specific and complete” to permit a reasonable conclusion; speculation is impermissible.
- Short v. Chapman, 136 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. 1964) and Brown v. Neal, 197 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 1973): Juries may not speculate about the future duration of a condition without competent evidence; by analogy, juries may not speculate about remaining lifespan.
- Lieb v. Mayer, 94 S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1956): Where causation and injury are proven but damages are not shown with adequate facts, nominal damages are appropriate.
Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354 (6th Cir. 1994): Cited to note that properly quantified future losses are ordinarily discounted to present value, though the court did not reach that step because a more foundational data point (lifespan) was missing.
Wiggins v. N. Am. Equitable Life Assurance, 644 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1981), Garland v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins., 101 S.E. 616 (N.C. 1919), and Anderson v. Wilco Life Ins., 943 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2019): Distinguish termination-of-policy damages, where the policy’s face value may be pertinent, from “uninsurability” damages, where it is not.
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), Brown v. Stapleton, 142 F.4th 252 (4th Cir. 2025), and Monsalvo v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 1232 (2025): Addressed preservation-of-error principles; the panel held AXA preserved its damages sufficiency arguments in its Rule 50(b) motion and that exact alignment of appellate arguments with trial theories is not required.
United States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161 (4th Cir. 2024): Emphasized the heavy burden to justify sealing judicial records; informed the court’s directive to unseal appellate materials absent a timely, valid showing.
United States v. Castro-Aleman, 141 F.4th 576 (4th Cir. 2025): Reiterated that the appellate court may affirm on any ground apparent in the record, even if different from the district court’s reasoning.

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit began by fixing the injury definition based on the law of the case from Wiener I: AXA’s erroneous MIB codes caused Wiener to be unable to obtain permanent life insurance at a “reasonable price,” i.e., at the standard rate. The correct damages measure for that injury is the incremental economic burden of higher premiums over the remainder of the insured’s life to obtain the same coverage.

From that premise, the court identified two minimally necessary data points:

Incremental annual premium caused by the negligence. The record contained competent evidence via agent Sanford Robbins: other carriers made only preliminary offers “at double the standard rate,” equating to an extra $400,000 per year per $10 million in coverage—thus $640,000 more per year for a $16 million policy. Given Wiener I, AXA could not re-open whether Wiener would otherwise have qualified at standard rates.
Expected remaining lifespan as of the date of injury (2014). This is essential because the loss is the sum of annual increments over the years Wiener could be expected to pay those higher premiums. The court found the record devoid of competent proof on this point.

The court held that the jury could not derive life expectancy from Wiener’s appearance on a 2020 video call or from his physician’s general comments that he was doing well and his conditions were controlled. North Carolina law, as articulated in Short and Brown, forbids juries from speculating about the future duration of a condition without expert or other competent evidence; by analogy, they may not speculate about remaining lifespan. The proper proof would be medical/actuarial evidence—such as life expectancy testimony or actuarial tables tied to Wiener’s health profile as of 2014—enabling a non-speculative calculation.

The court further explained why the face value of the desired policy cannot serve as a proxy for damages in this context. Insurance is not a money-making asset for policyholders in expectation; by design, expected net present value to a policyholder is negative once premiums (and time value) are considered. The harm here is not the loss of the death benefit, but the increased cost to obtain the same benefit. Cases invoking policy face value concern termination of an existing policy and are not transferable to an “uninsurability” theory.

Addressing alternative theories, the panel noted that one could, in principle, conceptualize the harm as the cost to replace the risk-reallocation service that life insurance provides (i.e., the “peace of mind” and financial protection against premature death). But that theory was not advanced by the parties and the record contained no evidence to support it.

On preservation, AXA had adequately raised the damages-sufficiency issue in its Rule 50(b) motion, specifically noting the need for expert testimony on “the duration of premium payments … in view of [Wiener’s] actuarially predicted lifespan.” The panel also rejected the invitation to focus on the jury’s “bottom-line” $8 million award (after mitigation) rather than the $16 million “actual damages” figure, because regardless of the number chosen, the same evidentiary gap (life expectancy) made any award speculative under North Carolina law.

Because causation and injury were established but damages were not proven with reasonable certainty, the appropriate remedy was nominal damages. The panel therefore affirmed the district court’s grant of AXA’s Rule 50(b) motion and did not reach the conditional new-trial ruling. It also directed that the sealed appellate materials be unsealed after 10 days unless a valid justification for sealing is timely shown.

Impact

This opinion sets out a practical and doctrinally rigorous framework for proving damages in “uninsurability” cases, especially those arising from negligent reporting to the MIB or analogous market-wide impairments.

For plaintiffs:
- Damages must be modeled as the expected present value of incremental premiums over the insured’s remaining life. Plaintiffs should be ready to offer:
  - Evidence of the standard rate they would have obtained but for the negligence and the actual up-rated offers (e.g., underwriting testimony, broker records).
  - Competent proof of life expectancy as of the injury date—typically via actuarial tables and/or expert testimony keyed to the plaintiff’s age and medical condition then.
  - Where appropriate, a discount rate for present-value calculations and any adjustments for mitigation.
- Do not rely on the policy’s face value; it is not a surrogate for “uninsurability” damages.
For defendants:
- Demand proof of the lifespan input and present-value methodology, and challenge speculative damages models that lack actuarial or medical support.
- Distinguish “uninsurability” damages from termination claims to preclude reliance on policy face value.
For trial courts:
- Jury instructions and verdict forms should delineate “actual damages” from mitigation and guide juries to the proper damages metric (incremental premiums × expected duration, discounted as appropriate).
- Enforce the reasonable-certainty standard by requiring competent lifespan evidence before submitting substantial damages to the jury.
For the insurance marketplace:
- The opinion underscores the serious consequences of inaccurate MIB reporting for liability, while simultaneously elevating the evidentiary bar for substantial damages, ensuring alignment with actuarial reality.
Public access to judicial records:
- The directive to unseal appellate materials absent a timely, specific showing reinforces the Fourth Circuit’s strong presumption of access and will likely influence sealing practices in complex civil litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Permanent vs. term life insurance: Term covers a fixed period; if the insured outlives the term, coverage ends with no payout. Permanent insurance remains in force for life, guaranteeing a death benefit; premiums are higher because a payout is certain.
Medical Information Bureau (MIB): A not-for-profit clearinghouse used by most U.S. life insurers. Members can see coded health information submitted by other insurers to help assess risk. Erroneous codes can taint applications with many carriers.
“Standard rate” vs. “double the standard rate”: The standard rate is the baseline premium for a typical, healthy applicant. An “up-rate” at double the standard rate means paying twice the standard premium for the same coverage.
Rule 50(b) (judgment as a matter of law): After a jury verdict, a party may ask the court to set aside the verdict if no reasonable jury could have reached it on the evidence presented. Courts view the evidence in the non-movant’s favor and do not reweigh credibility.
Rule 59 (new trial): Allows a court to order a new trial if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or otherwise unfair. The Fourth Circuit did not reach this issue because it affirmed under Rule 50(b).
Law of the case: Legal determinations made in an earlier stage of the same litigation bind later stages unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Here, liability findings from Wiener I controlled the second appeal.
Reasonable certainty (North Carolina damages law): Plaintiffs need specific, complete proof enabling a non-speculative calculation. Absolute certainty isn’t required, but conjecture is prohibited.
Discounting to present value: Future losses are usually converted to a present sum reflecting the time value of money. The court noted this but did not reach it because lifespan evidence was missing.
Nominal damages: A token amount (often $1) awarded when a legal wrong and injury are proven but substantial damages cannot be quantified with reasonable certainty.
Mitigation: Plaintiffs must take reasonable steps to reduce their losses. Here, the jury reduced damages by 50% for failure to mitigate, but because the base damages were not proven, the reduction was irrelevant to the sufficiency analysis.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion provides a definitive roadmap for proving damages in “uninsurability” negligence cases tied to erroneous MIB reporting or similar market-wide impairments. The key holding is twofold: the face value of a life insurance policy is not a permissible proxy for damages in an “uninsurability” theory, and plaintiffs must present competent evidence of expected remaining lifespan, in addition to the premium differential, to allow a jury to compute losses with reasonable certainty. Without that foundational input, damages are speculative and only nominal damages are available.

By marrying federal procedural standards for sufficiency review with North Carolina’s substantive damages doctrine, the court delivers a clear, actuarially grounded framework that will influence trial strategy and evidence presentation in future insurance-related tort cases. The opinion also reinforces broader principles—the constraining effect of law-of-the-case, the necessity of proper preservation, and the strong presumption of public access to judicial records—that will shape both trial and appellate practice.

Key takeaways:

In “uninsurability” claims, damages are measured by incremental premiums over the insured’s expected remaining life, not by policy face value.
Plaintiffs must supply competent lifespan evidence as of the injury date; general impressions or lay observations will not suffice.
Absent such proof, only nominal damages will be awarded, even where liability and injury are established.