Foster Parents’ Procedural Role Refined: Presence as Part of the § 46b‑129(p) “Right to Be Heard,” But Party Intervention Should Be Exceptional — Commentary on In re Jewelyette M. (Mullins, C.J., Concurrence & Dissent)

Foster Parents’ Procedural Role Refined: Presence as Part of the § 46b‑129(p) “Right to Be Heard,” But Party Intervention Should Be Exceptional — Commentary on In re Jewelyette M. (Mullins, C.J., Concurrence & Dissent)

Introduction

In In re Jewelyette M. (Supreme Court of Connecticut, April 1, 2025), the Court addressed two significant and recurring questions in child protection practice: (1) whether foster parents may intervene in neglect proceedings, and (2) what the statutory “right to be heard” under General Statutes § 46b‑129(p) entails for foster parents who are not parties.

The majority opinion (not reproduced here) held that permissive intervention by foster parents is not statutorily barred and that the “right to be heard” ordinarily includes the right to be present throughout the proceeding, subject to the trial court’s ability to limit that right “for good cause shown and within reasonable limits.”

Chief Justice Mullins, joined by Justice Alexander as to Part I, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that intervention is not categorically prohibited, but emphasized that foster parents will rarely satisfy the standards for permissive intervention. He dissented from the majority’s reading of § 46b‑129(p), contending that the “right to be heard” is a right to provide a statement—oral or written, sworn or unsworn—at a time and in a manner left to the trial court’s broad discretion, and not a right to be present throughout proceedings. In doing so, he aligned with Judge Elgo’s dissent in the Appellate Court on this point.

Summary of the Opinion

Chief Justice Mullins’ separate writing advances two principal propositions:

  • Permissive intervention is theoretically available but should be rare. Although the statutory scheme does not forbid intervention by foster parents, the governing multi-factor standard for permissive intervention sets a high bar—especially given the existing parties who represent both the child’s expressed wishes and best interests, as well as the public interest through the Commissioner. The availability of a statutory right to be heard further reduces the necessity and value of party intervention by foster parents.
  • The § 46b‑129(p) “right to be heard” is a statement right, not a presence right. In sharp contrast to the majority, Chief Justice Mullins reads § 46b‑129(p) to guarantee foster parents an opportunity to make an oral or written statement regarding the child’s best interests. He argues that nothing in the text or legislative history suggests that nonparty foster parents are entitled to remain present throughout the proceeding. Instead, he grounds courtroom access for nonparties in the general juvenile confidentiality and access statutes, which vest broad discretion in the presiding judge.

On both points, he underscores the primacy of expeditious resolution and the constitutional rights of the child and parents—interests that, in his view, counsel against broadening foster parents’ procedural footprint beyond the statutory statement right and limited, discretionary attendance.

Analysis

Precedents and Statutes Cited

  • In re Santiago G., 325 Conn. 221 (2017): Chief Justice Mullins relies on Santiago G. for the familiar multi-factor test governing permissive intervention. Those factors include timeliness, the proposed intervenor’s interest, adequacy of representation by existing parties, prejudice/delay, and the necessity or value of intervention to resolving the controversy (325 Conn. at 226–27 n.6). He emphasizes that, in child protection matters, these factors will usually cut against intervention by foster parents because the child’s interests—both expressed wishes and best interests—are already represented by counsel for the child and, often, a guardian ad litem, while the Commissioner advances a permanency plan in the child’s best interests.
  • Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146 (1996): Hunte is cited for the proposition that foster parents do not have a constitutional liberty interest in the integrity of their family unit (238 Conn. at 164). That limits the constitutional weight of foster parents’ claims to party status and supports the conclusion that their inclusion as parties should be exceptional.
  • In re Zakai F., 336 Conn. 272 (2020) and In re Teagan K.-O., 335 Conn. 745 (2020): These decisions are cited to reiterate that child protection matters involve the constitutional rights of the child and parents. That constitutional landscape, Chief Justice Mullins argues, heightens the need for expeditious resolution and careful management of who participates as a party to avoid undue delay and prejudice.
  • General Statutes § 46b‑129(p): The statute affords “eligible foster parents” a “right to be heard.” While the majority reads this to include presence throughout proceedings, Chief Justice Mullins reads it as a right to provide information—by oral or written statement—about the child’s best interests, with the trial court retaining broad control over timing and format.
  • Public Acts 2024, No. 24‑126, § 6: Although the statute has been amended, Chief Justice Mullins notes that those amendments do not affect the issues presented. He therefore analyzes the current version of § 46b‑129(p).
  • General Statutes § 51‑30(b) and § 46b‑122(c): These provisions anchor the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and confer broad discretion on the presiding judge to permit attendance by nonparties who have a legitimate interest, expressly including foster parents. Chief Justice Mullins reads these statutes as inconsistent with any default right of nonparty presence; rather, presence remains subject to the judge’s gatekeeping authority.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why permissive intervention should be rare

Applying the Santiago G. factors, Chief Justice Mullins highlights two hurdles that, in practice, will be difficult for foster parents to overcome:

  • Adequacy of representation: In typical neglect matters, the following parties are already present: parents; the Commissioner of Children and Families (charged with advancing a permanency plan in the child’s best interests); the child’s attorney (expressed wishes); and often a guardian ad litem (best interests). Given this structure, it will be “difficult—although perhaps not impossible—for foster parents to demonstrate that they have an interest relative to the child's best interest that would not already be represented.” Put differently, if foster parents seek to speak for the child’s best interests, that voice already exists in the proceeding.
  • Necessity and value of intervention: Because § 46b‑129(p) provides a direct statutory vehicle for foster parents to convey information about the child’s best interests, the “necessity” or “value” of adding them as parties is usually minimal. Intervention risks “unwarranted delay,” which is especially harmful in child protection cases where permanency and stability are urgent needs.

The result is a pragmatic presumption: although not prohibited, foster parent intervention should be “quite rare,” reserved for exceptional cases in which the statutory statement right is truly inadequate to protect a distinct, otherwise unrepresented interest that adds concrete value to resolution without undue delay or prejudice.

2) The scope of the § 46b‑129(p) “right to be heard”

Chief Justice Mullins squarely rejects the majority’s reading that the right “ordinarily will include the right to be present throughout the proceeding.” His reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  • Text and structure: The phrase “right to be heard” in § 46b‑129(p) naturally refers to the opportunity to make a statement or present information to the court, not a broad attendance right. He endorses Judge Elgo’s view that the statute guarantees foster parents the ability to submit an oral or written statement—sworn or unsworn—regarding the child’s best interests.
  • Juvenile confidentiality statutes: Section 51‑30(b) provides that in juvenile matters “no person may be allowed in the room except as permitted by the presiding judge in accordance with section 46b‑122.” Section 46b‑122(c) authorizes the judge to permit attendance by persons with a “legitimate interest,” expressly including foster parents. Chief Justice Mullins reads these provisions as affirming judicial discretion over attendance, which would be undermined by converting the § 46b‑129(p) statement right into an across-the-board presence right.
  • Management of proceedings and protection of rights: Trial courts must balance confidentiality, scheduling, and the constitutional rights at stake. A categorical or presumptive presence right for nonparties risks complicating hearings, elongating proceedings, and intruding on privacy interests. A discretionary framework—allowing presence in whole or in part when appropriate—better serves the objectives of fairness, efficiency, and child-centered outcomes.

Chief Justice Mullins does not deny that a trial court may permit foster parents to remain for some or all of a hearing under § 46b‑122(c). His point is that presence is not what § 46b‑129(p) guarantees. The statute guarantees a meaningful opportunity to provide information, and the general juvenile statutes give the judge the levers to control attendance.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. What is now binding and why this concurrence/dissent matters

The majority’s holdings (as described by Chief Justice Mullins) set the controlling rule: permissive intervention is not barred, and the § 46b‑129(p) right “ordinarily” includes presence, subject to reasonable, good-cause limitations. Chief Justice Mullins’ writing, while not precedential on those points, will likely influence how trial courts exercise discretion and how practitioners frame future arguments:

  • On intervention: Expect trial courts to cite the Santiago G. factors and to probe the “adequacy of representation” and “necessity/value” prongs with rigor. The concurrence underscores that the mere desire to advance the child’s best interests will usually be insufficient because that interest is already represented. The statutory statement right will often be deemed adequate to convey foster parents’ input.
  • On presence: Even under the majority’s rule, the trial court can restrict presence “for good cause shown and within reasonable limits.” Chief Justice Mullins’ analysis supplies a roadmap for what counts as good cause: confidentiality, scheduling, efficiency, and the protection of constitutional rights. His statutory analysis of §§ 51‑30(b) and 46b‑122(c) will likely guide how trial courts articulate and document such limitations.

B. Likely downstream issues

  • Defining “good cause” to limit presence: Trial courts will need to craft records that specify the confidentiality concerns, prejudice, or inefficiencies that justify partial or complete exclusions of foster parents from specific portions of hearings.
  • Calibrating the statement right: Courts may develop local practices for when and how foster parents present statements—e.g., at the start or close of hearings, by written submissions in advance, or through sworn testimony if the court deems it helpful.
  • Interaction with guardians ad litem and child’s counsel: As courts limit duplicative advocacy, they may encourage coordination so that foster parents’ information is presented efficiently and without conflict with the child’s expressed wishes or best-interest positions already in the record.
  • Appeals and preservation: If presence is limited or intervention denied, parties and foster parents may litigate whether the record sufficiently reflects the court’s reasons and whether the foster parents’ statement right was meaningfully afforded.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Permissive intervention: A procedural mechanism allowing a nonparty to join a case if certain factors weigh in favor. It is not a right; courts balance interests such as timeliness, unique stake in the outcome, whether existing parties already cover that stake, potential delay/prejudice, and whether the intervenor’s participation would help resolve the case.
  • “Right to be heard” (in § 46b‑129(p)): A statutory entitlement for eligible foster parents to provide information to the court about the child’s best interests. Chief Justice Mullins interprets this as a right to make an oral or written statement, sworn or unsworn, at a time set by the judge. The majority reads it more expansively to include presence throughout proceedings absent good cause to limit.
  • Child’s attorney vs. guardian ad litem (GAL): The child’s attorney advocates for what the child wants (expressed wishes). A GAL, when appointed, advocates for what is in the child’s best interests, even if that differs from the child’s wishes. This dual representation is a key reason courts often find that the child’s interests are already adequately represented.
  • Juvenile confidentiality: By default, juvenile protection hearings are closed to the public. Nonparties may attend only with the presiding judge’s permission if they have a legitimate interest. This confidentiality regime protects the child’s privacy and can justify limiting who is present and when.
  • “Good cause shown” and “within reasonable limits”: Standards that allow the trial court to tailor attendance and participation to the needs of the case—e.g., restricting presence during sensitive testimony, minimizing delay, or avoiding duplicative or prejudicial participation.
  • Permanency and stability: Central objectives of child protection law; delays in case resolution can harm children. Courts therefore scrutinize interventions or participation that may slow proceedings without adding clear value.

Conclusion

In re Jewelyette M. clarifies the procedural role of foster parents in Connecticut’s child protection system. The binding bottom line, as described by Chief Justice Mullins, is twofold: foster parents are not categorically barred from intervening, and their statutory “right to be heard” ordinarily includes the right to be present, subject to good-cause limitations. Chief Justice Mullins’ concurrence and dissent importantly cautions, however, that intervention should be truly exceptional under the Santiago G. factors, given the robust existing party structure and the statutory statement right afforded by § 46b‑129(p).

On the scope of the “right to be heard,” Chief Justice Mullins advances a narrower, text- and structure-based view: the statute guarantees a meaningful opportunity to present an oral or written statement regarding the child’s best interests, while the general juvenile statutes leave attendance to the trial court’s discretion. His approach foregrounds confidentiality, efficiency, and the primacy of the child’s and parents’ constitutional rights.

Going forward, trial courts will likely:

  • Apply Santiago G. with vigor to keep intervention rare and targeted;
  • Afford foster parents a reliable avenue to be heard through statements;
  • Exercise documented, case-specific discretion to expand or limit presence based on good cause, consistent with §§ 51‑30(b) and 46b‑122(c); and
  • Strive to protect permanency and stability by avoiding undue delay or duplication.

The decision thus refines the delicate balance between valuing foster parents’ experiential insights and preserving the efficiency, confidentiality, and constitutional integrity of child protection proceedings.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

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