Foster Parents’ Permissive Intervention in Neglect Proceedings Is Not Jurisdictionally Barred

Introduction

In In re Andrew C. (Supreme Court of Connecticut, May 19, 2025), the court addressed whether nonrelative foster parents may permissively intervene in the dispositional phase of child neglect proceedings under General Statutes § 46b‐129(p) and Practice Book § 35a‐4. The case arose when Andrew’s foster parents, Morgan A. and Alberto A., who had cared for him since infancy, successfully obtained a transfer of guardianship in 2021. Two years later, relying on an Appellate Court decision in In re Ryan C., the biological father moved to open and vacate that transfer, claiming the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to allow the foster parents to intervene. The trial court and Appellate Court agreed—until this court’s decisions in In re Jewelyette M. and In re Andrew C. clarified that § 46b‐129(p) does not strip trial courts of their discretion to permit foster parent intervention.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s decision that vacated the 2021 guardianship transfer. It held:

Section 46b‐129(p) grants foster parents a statutory “right to be heard” but does not prohibit a trial court from granting them permissive‐intervenor status under Practice Book § 35a‐4.
The trial court’s authority to allow such intervention is a discretionary matter, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the trial court validly exercised that discretion in 2021, the father’s 2023 motion to open the guardianship order—filed more than four months after notice—was untimely and improper.
The case was remanded with direction to reinstate the foster parents’ intervention order and the 2021 guardianship transfer.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

In re Ryan C. (220 Conn. App. 507, 2023) – The Appellate Court held that § 46b‐129(p) precluded nonrelative foster parents from intervening, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. This decision was later overruled.
In re Jewelyette M. (351 Conn. 51, 2025) – Connecticut Supreme Court overruled Ryan C., holding that subsection (p) does not limit a trial court’s authority to grant permissive intervention under Practice Book § 35a‐4.
Schoenhorn v. Moss (347 Conn. 501, 2023) – Established that a court may open a judgment beyond four months only when lack of subject matter jurisdiction is “entirely obvious.” The court applied that standard but rejected any jurisdictional defect here.
Practice Book § 35a‐4 – Authorizes “other persons unrelated to the child” to move for permissive intervention in dispositional proceedings if it is in the best interests of the child or the interests of justice.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning turned on distinguishing subject matter jurisdiction from the trial court’s discretionary power to allow intervention:

Statutory Text: Section 46b‐129(p) says only that foster parents “have the right to be heard and comment” in neglect proceedings. It contains no language that repeals or restricts Practice Book § 35a‐4’s grant of discretionary intervention to “other persons.”
Practice Book Authority: Under § 35a‐4(c)–(d), any nonrelative with a direct and immediate interest may seek intervention, which the trial court may grant if it serves the child’s best interests or the interests of justice.
Legislative History: The 2001 amendment that replaced “standing” with a “right to be heard” did not intend to eviscerate trial‐court discretion. Committee reports and floor debates demonstrate support for broadened participation, not a jurisdictional bar.
Jurisdiction vs. Discretion: Permissive intervention is a question of judicial authority or discretion, not one of subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, any flaw in granting permissive intervention does not render a judgment void for want of jurisdiction.

3. Impact

The decision clarifies the landscape of child welfare proceedings in Connecticut:

It reaffirms that foster parents—who often know the child’s needs best—may participate as full parties when their involvement serves the child’s welfare.
It prevents collateral attacks on dispositional orders based on disputed interpretations of § 46b‐129(p), thereby promoting finality and stability for children placed in foster care.
It underscores the difference between procedural bars and jurisdictional defects, limiting postjudgment motions to open orders to true jurisdictional deprivations or timely filings.
Future neglect cases will look to this ruling to resolve challenges to foster parent participation and to distinguish statutory rights from court‐rule permissions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: A court’s power to hear a category of cases. If lacking, its orders are void and may be attacked any time.
Permissive Intervention: A procedural device (under court rules) allowing a nonparty with a stake in the outcome to join an ongoing case, subject to the judge’s approval.
Statutory “Right to Be Heard”: A guarantee in § 46b‐129(p) that foster parents may present views on the child’s best interest, but it does not displace the broader intervention rules.
Four‐Month Bar to Opening Judgments: General Statutes § 52-212a limits motions to open or set aside civil judgments to within four months of notice, unless a court plainly lacked jurisdiction from the start.

Conclusion

In re Andrew C. cements the principle that foster parents, far from being shut out by § 46b-129(p), enjoy both a statutory right to be heard and, when appropriate, permissive‐intervenor status under Practice Book § 35a-4. It clarifies that questions of fostering intervention are discretionary, not jurisdictional, and it limits untimely collateral attacks on long‐settled dispositional orders. In so doing, the court protected the stability of foster placements and promoted the best interests of vulnerable children in Connecticut’s juvenile system.