Forensic Child Interviews, Hearsay, and Cross‑Examination Limits in Article 10 Proceedings: Commentary on Matter of Emily RR. (Daniel QQ.)

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Emily RR. (Daniel QQ.), 2025 NY Slip Op 07254 (Dec. 24, 2025), is a significant contribution to New York’s jurisprudence on child protective proceedings under Family Court Act article 10. While the underlying petition involved allegations of sexual abuse of two stepchildren and derivative abuse of all four children in the home, the appeal turned exclusively on evidentiary questions, not on the sufficiency of the abuse findings themselves.

The decision clarifies three critical aspects of practice in article 10 abuse and neglect proceedings:

• The standards governing sanctions for late or imperfect disclosure of recorded forensic interviews of child witnesses and the high threshold for preclusion as a remedy.
• The interaction between the Family Court Act’s special hearsay rule in child abuse cases (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [vi]) and the general “bolstering” doctrine—particularly when a child’s sworn testimony is used to corroborate that child’s own recorded forensic interview.
• The scope of permissible cross-examination of alleged child victims, including limits on inquiries into sexual history and mental health, and the Family Court’s broad discretion to balance effective advocacy against the need to protect vulnerable witnesses from harassment and irrelevant probing.

These issues are of recurring importance. Forensic interviews have become routine in child sexual abuse investigations, and article 10 proceedings often feature complex evidentiary battles about their admissibility and use. Similarly, questions about how far cross-examination of child witnesses may go—especially in areas like sexual history or mental health—are highly sensitive and legally fraught. The Third Department’s opinion gives Family Courts and practitioners clearer guidance on these points.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Ulster County Department of Social Services commenced an article 10 proceeding alleging that the respondent father sexually abused his two stepdaughters (born in 2006 and 2008) and derivatively abused and neglected both them and his two biological children (born in 2012 and 2013). The case was triggered by an incident reported in October 2022 involving the younger stepdaughter. Both stepchildren were interviewed in separate, recorded forensic interviews observed in real time by a DSS caseworker.

After a six-day fact‑finding hearing, Family Court (Ricciani, J.) found that each stepdaughter had been abused and neglected and that all four children had been derivatively abused. On appeal, the father did not challenge the substantive abuse and neglect findings. Instead, he raised two categories of evidentiary claims:

1. Recorded forensic interviews:
   • The Family Court erred in how it handled the admission of the recorded interviews (including the court’s review of the recordings prior to formal admission and the timing of disclosure).
   • The recording of the older stepdaughter’s forensic interview constituted improper “bolstering” of her trial testimony and therefore should have been excluded.
2. Cross‑examination limits: The Family Court improperly restricted the father’s cross-examination of petitioner’s witnesses, particularly regarding:
   • the older stepdaughter’s sexual history; and
   • inquiries about the younger stepdaughter’s medications and mental health.

The Third Department affirmed the Family Court’s order in all respects, holding that:

• The father failed to preserve his challenge to Family Court’s pre-admission review of the recordings.
• There was no willful or contumacious discovery misconduct by petitioner that would justify the “drastic” remedy of preclusion.
• The older stepdaughter’s recorded forensic interview was admissible under Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (vi) and was properly corroborated by her sworn testimony; the use of her own testimony as corroboration did not constitute impermissible bolstering.
• The recording was also admissible to rebut the father’s claim that the allegations were fabricated.
• The Family Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination into the older stepdaughter’s sexual history and the younger stepdaughter’s mental health, given the lack of relevance, foundation, and the potential for intimidation or embarrassment.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent father is the biological parent of two younger children and the stepfather of two older girls. After an October 2022 report of an incident between the father and the younger stepdaughter, DSS initiated an investigation. Each stepchild participated in a recorded forensic interview conducted by an independent forensic interviewer, with a DSS caseworker observing from another room. These interviews formed a key part of the evidentiary foundation for the article 10 petition filed in November 2022.

At the outset of the fact‑finding hearing, the father objected to the admission of the recorded interviews on several grounds, centrally focusing on:

• the timing and manner of disclosure, and
• whether the recordings would improperly “bolster” in-court testimony.

The Family Court overruled his objections, admitted the recordings (in relevant part), and ultimately issued findings of sexual abuse and derivative abuse. The Appellate Division’s review is thus framed entirely around whether the Family Court’s evidentiary rulings fell within its broad discretion.

B. Discovery, Sanctions, and Judicial Handling of Forensic Interview Recordings

1. Standard: Broad discretion and the “drastic” nature of preclusion

The Court begins by restating a familiar principle: trial courts have “broad discretion in controlling discovery and disclosure, and generally [their] determinations will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion” (Lisa I. v Manikas, 183 AD3d 1096, 1097 [3d Dept 2020]). Within that framework, courts may impose sanctions for noncompliance with disclosure orders, including preclusion of evidence (Matter of Jesse E. v Lucia F., 145 AD3d 1373, 1374 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 905 [2017]).

But preclusion is characterized as a “drastic” remedy, reserved for cases where a party’s failure to comply with discovery is:

• willful,
• deliberate, and
• contumacious (i.e., stubbornly disobedient or defiant of the court’s authority).

The Court underscores this with citations to recent Third Department authority:

• Tardi v Casler‑Bladek, 216 AD3d 1267, 1270 (3d Dept 2023)
• Matter of Tara DD. v Seth CC., 180 AD3d 1194, 1196 (3d Dept 2020)

This “willful, deliberate and contumacious” standard is crucial: without proof that the discovery lapse was intentional and defiant, an appellate court will rarely disturb a trial court’s refusal to preclude evidence.

2. Preservation: Objection to the judge’s pre-admission review

The father argued that Family Court improperly viewed the recordings before ruling on admissibility and before they were played at the hearing. The Third Department disposed of this argument on preservation grounds.

Footnote 1 explains that:

• The recordings were several hours long and were not going to be played in full.
• Family Court announced in advance that it would watch the recordings before the next hearing day to decide admissibility and to resolve substantive objections.
• Defense counsel expressly acknowledged that the court would do this and did not object at that time.
• Counsel first objected only on the second day of the hearing—after the judge had already viewed the recordings.

Because the father did not object when the court announced its plan, the claim was deemed unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of Tibor I. [Tibor H.], 239 AD3d 1074, 1076 n 2 [3d Dept 2025]). This reinforces a standard practice point: to preserve a claim of error, counsel must contemporaneously object, on the record, at the time the court makes or announces the ruling.

3. Late disclosure and the refusal to preclude

The father’s main discovery-based argument was that:

• The recordings were exchanged after the discovery deadline; and
• His attorney did not have a meaningful opportunity to review them before the hearing.

The Court found that these circumstances, even if inconvenient, did not remotely satisfy the willful/contumacious standard:

• Petitioner’s counsel lacked authority to duplicate the recordings and therefore had to secure them via subpoena from the entity that held them (likely a Child Advocacy Center or similar forensic interviewing program).
• The subpoena was issued on notice to the father’s counsel. Counsel did not object, move to quash, or complain that the subpoena return date fell after the discovery deadline.
• Approximately two weeks before the hearing, petitioner’s counsel invited the father’s counsel to review the recordings; defense counsel did not do so.
• When defense counsel objected to admission on the first hearing day, Family Court gave her an additional week to watch the recordings; she then watched only a portion of one recording.

Given that:

• the petitioner was constrained by the realities of third‑party control over the recordings;
• there was no showing of bad faith or intentional noncompliance (as Footnote 2 emphasizes, the father never argued in Family Court that petitioner acted in bad faith); and
• defense counsel had multiple opportunities to review the materials and to seek relief before the hearing,
  

the court held there was no abuse of discretion in denying preclusion. The opinion cites:

• Armstrong v Armstrong, 72 AD3d 1409, 1410–1411 (3d Dept 2010) (party had access to documents before trial and could not show prejudice);
• Seale v Seale, 149 AD3d 1164, 1167 (3d Dept 2017) (declining drastic preclusion absent showing of willfulness); and
• Contrasts Matter of Tara DD. v Seth CC., 180 AD3d at 1196, where the sanctions issue had a different factual posture.

The subtext is important: the prejudice here was largely self-inflicted by the defense’s failure to avail itself of opportunities to review the recordings or seek timely relief. Appellate courts are understandably reluctant to reward such inaction with the drastic sanction of excluding critical child abuse evidence.

C. Hearsay, Bolstering, and Video‑Recorded Forensic Interviews

1. The “bolstering” doctrine and prior consistent statements

The father next argued that the recorded forensic interview of the older stepdaughter was improper “bolstering” of her in-court testimony and should have been excluded. The Court thus had to confront the interplay between:

• the general rule against using prior consistent statements to fortify a witness’s credibility; and
• the special statutory hearsay regime applicable in child protective cases.

Drawing on People v Spicola, 16 NY3d 441, 452 (2011), the Court explains that one form of bolstering occurs when a party tries to “fortif[y] a witness’s testimony and credibility through the use of a prior consistent statement.” Such statements are generally inadmissible hearsay in criminal and civil trials unless they fall within a recognized exception (for example, to rebut a claim of recent fabrication under People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10 [1993]).

2. Family Court Act § 1046 (a) (vi): A statutory hearsay exception

Article 10 proceedings, however, are governed by a more permissive hearsay rule. Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (vi) provides:

“previous statements [of a child] relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence, but if uncorroborated, such statements shall not be sufficient to make a fact-finding of abuse or neglect” (emphasis added).

The Third Department correctly characterizes this as a “statutory hearsay exception” (Matter of Kristie GG. v Sean GG., 168 AD3d 25, 28 [3d Dept 2018]). It applies broadly to:

• oral out-of-court statements of a child;
• written statements; and
• as the Court emphasizes here, video-recorded statements, including forensic interviews (see Matter of K.H. [J.H.], 241 AD3d 1640, 1642–1643 [3d Dept 2025]).

Because such statements are hearsay, they cannot alone support a finding of abuse or neglect unless they are corroborated. That is where Matter of Christina F., 74 NY2d 532 (1989), comes into play: the Court of Appeals held that a child’s own sworn testimony can serve as the required corroboration of the child’s prior out-of-court statements (id. at 537).

Thus, in article 10 practice, it is entirely permissible—and common—for:

• a child’s out-of-court statement (including a forensic interview) to be admitted under § 1046 (a) (vi); and
• that same child’s sworn hearing testimony to supply the corroboration needed to convert that hearsay into sufficient proof.

3. Application in Matter of Emily RR.: No impermissible bolstering

In this case, the older stepdaughter testified in court and the video of her forensic interview was admitted. The father argued that the video merely repeated her story, thereby improperly fortifying her credibility.

The Third Department rejected this argument on two overlapping grounds:

1. The statutory framework authorizes this structure.
   The older stepdaughter’s recorded forensic interview was a “previous statement[]” relating to abuse, squarely covered by § 1046 (a) (vi). The Court reiterates that “the use of her own sworn testimony to [corroborate the recording] was permissible and did not constitute bolstering.”
   
   In other words, what might be termed “bolstering” in a conventional evidentiary regime is, in child protective practice, the regular operation of § 1046’s hearsay exception and corroboration mechanism. The Court is explicit that this structure is not forbidden; it is authorized by statute and endorsed in prior appellate decisions like Christina F.
2. The recording rebutted a claim of fabrication.
   The Court also emphasizes that the father’s own litigation strategy made the prior consistent statement “doubly” admissible. The father called his sister-in-law to testify that the stepdaughters’ mother had concocted a scheme “to get his money,” implying that the allegations were fabricated.
   
   New York evidentiary law recognizes that prior consistent statements may be admitted to rebut a claim of fabrication (People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10, 19 [1993]; People v Moore, 223 AD3d 1085, 1094 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 41 NY3d 1003 [2024]). In such circumstances, as Spicola and its progeny explain, prior consistent statements can be used not simply as hearsay, but as non-hearsay—to negate the inference that the story was recently invented.
   
   The Court notes that, “based on the father’s strategy,” the older stepdaughter’s recorded interview “also served the additional purpose of rebutting the father’s claim of fabrication.” Thus, even apart from § 1046 (a) (vi), the recording served a legitimate evidentiary function within the classic McDaniel framework.

Finally, the Court reminds us that Family Court has “broad discretion in determining the parameters for proof to be accepted at the hearing” (Matter of Andreija N. [Michael N.–Tiffany O.], 206 AD3d 1081, 1084 [3d Dept 2022]), and finds no error under that deferential standard, citing:

• Matter of K.H. [J.H.], 241 AD3d at 1643; and
• Matter of Kristina S. [Michael S.], 160 AD3d 1057, 1058 (3d Dept 2018).

In practical terms, this ruling confirms that video-recorded forensic interviews of child witnesses are not excludable simply because the child also testifies in court. In abuse and neglect proceedings, such recordings are not seen as improper “bolstering” when:

• they are admitted under the explicit hearsay exception of § 1046 (a) (vi); and
• they are corroborated—often by the child’s own sworn testimony.

D. Limits on Cross‑Examination: Sexual History and Mental Health

1. Governing principles: Relevance and judicial control

The father’s second major issue on appeal concerned the Family Court’s restrictions on his cross-examination of petitioner’s witnesses, particularly:

• questions about the older stepdaughter’s sexual history; and
• questions to the older stepdaughter regarding the younger stepdaughter’s medications and mental health.

Two statutory and doctrinal anchors guide the Court’s analysis:

• Family Ct Act § 1046 (b) (iii) – “only competent, material and relevant evidence may be admitted.”
• The trial court’s broad discretion to control the scope of examination of witnesses (Matter of Dustin JJ. [Clyde KK.], 114 AD3d 1050, 1052 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 901 [2014]; Matter of Aiden J. [Armando K.], 197 AD3d 798, 799 [3d Dept 2021]).

At the same time, parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to test the credibility of opposing witnesses through cross-examination. The key question is where to draw the line between probative impeachment and harassing or irrelevant interrogation.

2. Limits on sexual history probing

The Court affirms Family Court’s handling of questioning about the older stepdaughter’s sexual history. Citing Lisa I. v Manikas, 183 AD3d 1096, 1098 (3d Dept 2020), the Court reiterates that there is “limited value to testimony concerning the sexual past of a victim of a sexual assault.”

Here, Family Court:

• Allowed the father to make “certain inquiries into the specific allegations,” including a “shower incident with a cell phone,” which presumably went to the details of the alleged abusive conduct.
• But shielded the older stepdaughter from questions about her broader sexual history that:
  • served no legitimate evidentiary purpose,
  • were not connected to the allegations at issue, and
  • appeared designed primarily to “intimidate and embarrass” her.

This approach mirrors, in civil child-protective context, the policy behind New York’s criminal “rape shield” statute (CPL 60.42), which generally bars evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct except in narrowly defined circumstances. The Third Department’s reaffirmation of Lisa I. signals a consistent unwillingness to allow sweeping exploration of a child victim’s sexual history as a credibility tool, absent a clear, case-specific rationale.

3. Limits on cross-examination about mental health and medications

The father also sought to question the older stepdaughter about:

• the younger stepdaughter’s medications; and
• the younger stepdaughter’s mental health.

This kind of inquiry can sometimes be relevant to credibility—for example, where there is a properly supported theory that a mental health condition or medication side effect might affect perception or memory. But here, the Court emphasizes several problems:

• The father was permitted “limited inquiry” but could not provide an adequate offer of proof tying the proposed questions:
  • to the relevant time period;
  • to issues within the older stepdaughter’s personal knowledge; or
  • to a non-speculative nexus with the allegations.
• His questions were “repeatedly overbroad in form,” and when Family Court instructed him to narrow or rephrase, he “failed to appropriately rephrase them.”
• Ultimately, he “cho[se] to rely on the father’s testimony” instead of laying an adequate foundation through this witness.

On this basis, the Court concludes that Family Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination. The opinion cites:

• Matter of Akcay v Ayar, 184 AD3d 634, 635 (2d Dept 2020) (speculative, unfounded questions properly curtailed);
• Matter of Romoan RR., 209 AD2d 861, 862 (3d Dept 1994) (broad discretion to limit cross when questions are outside witness’s knowledge or irrelevant);
• Matter of Mi-Kell V., 226 AD2d 810, 811 (3d Dept 1996); and
• Matter of Devanand S., 188 AD2d 533, 534 (2d Dept 1992) (similar principles in child protective cases).

In sum, the Court holds that the Family Court appropriately:

• Balanced the father’s right to probe credibility and alternative explanations; against
• The statutory requirement to admit only relevant, competent evidence, and the need to avoid speculative or harassing questioning.

On appellate review, such discretionary evidentiary calls are rarely overturned absent a clear showing that the limitations materially compromised the ability to present a defense. The Third Department saw no such showing here.

E. Broader Impact and Doctrinal Significance

1. Consolidating the law on forensic interviews in article 10 proceedings

Taken together with other recent Third Department decisions—such as Matter of K.H. [J.H.], 241 AD3d 1640 (3d Dept 2025), and Matter of Tibor I. [Tibor H.], 239 AD3d 1074 (3d Dept 2025)—Matter of Emily RR. helps crystallize a coherent approach to forensic interviews in child protective litigation:

• Admissibility: Video-recorded forensic interviews are fully within the scope of § 1046 (a) (vi) and can be admitted even when the child also testifies.
• Corroboration: The child’s own sworn testimony can supply the corroboration necessary to make those out-of-court statements sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect (Christina F.).
• Bolstering concerns: What might normally look like impermissible bolstering (repeating the same story through multiple statements) is not barred in this context, because the Legislature has explicitly authorized admission of prior child statements subject to corroboration.
• Fabrication rebuttal: When a respondent alleges that accusations are fabricated or coached, prior consistent statements may also be used to rebut that claim, consistent with McDaniel and Moore.

For practitioners, the message is clear: attacks on forensic interviews as “bolstering” will almost never succeed in article 10 cases if:

• the statements are clearly within § 1046 (a) (vi); and
• there is some corroboration—often the child’s own sworn testimony.

2. Discovery disputes and preclusion: Strong disincentives to gamesmanship

The decision also underscores the Third Department’s continued reluctance to endorse preclusion of key evidence in child protection matters absent:

• a clear record of willful, deliberate noncompliance with discovery orders; and
• demonstrable prejudice that is not attributable to the complaining party’s own inaction.

In forensic interview contexts, agencies often must work through third-party providers with strict confidentiality rules. The Court’s willingness to excuse some delay in production—as long as counsel are promptly notified, placed on notice of subpoenas, and given opportunities to review—reflects a practical understanding of that reality. Defense counsel who choose not to use those opportunities will find it difficult to claim reversible prejudice later.

3. Cross-examination boundaries in child abuse cases

Finally, the decision reinforces a line of cases limiting invasive, stigmatizing, or poorly grounded cross-examination of child witnesses. It provides several practice pointers:

• Sexual history questions are disfavored. Counsel should assume that general questions about a child’s sexual past will be barred unless:
  • they go directly to a material theory (e.g., an alternative source of sexual knowledge that is clearly and specifically tied to the issue); and
  • counsel can articulate a concrete, non-speculative nexus on the record.
• Mental health and medication inquiries require specificity and foundation.
  • Identify the particular condition or medication;
  • Explain how it bears on perception, memory, or credibility;
  • Show that the witness has personal knowledge of the facts being explored; and
  • Confine the inquiry to the relevant time period.
• Vague or exploratory cross-examination will be curtailed. Overbroad, “fishing expedition” questions—especially when directed at children—are unlikely to be allowed. If the court signals a need to rephrase or narrow, counsel must adapt or risk forfeiting the line of inquiry.

The combined result is a framework that:

• preserves the respondent’s right to probe credibility and factual detail, but
• empowers Family Courts to stop questioning that is irrelevant, speculative, or needlessly traumatizing to child witnesses.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

To make the opinion more accessible, this section briefly defines several key legal concepts used in the decision.

1. Abuse, neglect, and derivative abuse (Family Ct Act article 10)

• Abuse: Generally, acts by a parent or caregiver that cause or create a substantial risk of serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or emotional harm to a child.
• Neglect: Failure to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing proper supervision or guardianship, or in supplying adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, in a way that harms or risks harm to the child’s condition.
• Derivative abuse/neglect: When abuse or neglect of one child in a household is so serious or pervasive that it supports a finding that other children in the same home are also at risk, even if they were not directly abused. Here, the sexual abuse of the stepdaughters supported derivative abuse findings for all four children.

2. Hearsay and statutory hearsay exceptions

• Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered at trial for the truth of what it asserts. Example: “The child told the caseworker that her stepfather touched her inappropriately.”
• General rule: Hearsay is usually not admissible unless it fits a recognized exception, because the opposing party cannot cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.
• Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (vi): A special statutory exception that allows a child’s out-of-court statements about abuse or neglect (including recorded forensic interviews) to be admitted in article 10 proceedings, as long as they are corroborated by some other evidence.

3. Corroboration

• Corroboration means additional evidence that tends to support the truth of a statement.
• In article 10 cases, a child’s out-of-court statement alone is not enough for a finding of abuse or neglect; there must be independent evidence that “tends to support” the child’s account.
• Per Matter of Christina F., that corroboration can be the child’s own sworn testimony at the hearing.

4. Bolstering and prior consistent statements

• Bolstering (in this context): Using a prior consistent statement of a witness to make that witness appear more credible, by showing that they told the same story before.
• General rule: In most civil and criminal cases, prior consistent statements are not admissible simply to bolster credibility.
• Exceptions:
  • To rebut a charge of recent fabrication (if the prior statement was made before the alleged motive to lie arose);
  • In article 10 cases, under § 1046 (a) (vi), where the Legislature has explicitly permitted prior child statements about abuse, subject to corroboration.

5. Preclusion and “willful, deliberate, and contumacious” conduct

• Preclusion: A sanction whereby a party is barred from using specific evidence at trial because of discovery violations (failure to comply with disclosure orders, late disclosure, etc.).
• “Drastic remedy” standard: New York appellate courts repeatedly state that preclusion is a drastic remedy, appropriate only when the noncompliance with discovery is:
  • willful (intentional, not accidental),
  • deliberate (not inadvertent or negligent), and
  • contumacious (reflecting disobedience or defiance of the court’s authority).
• Absent that level of misconduct—and especially if the complaining party contributed to the problem by inaction—preclusion will almost never be ordered, especially in child protection cases where the stakes are high.

6. Preservation of error

• Preservation means that an issue has been properly raised in the trial court so that an appellate court may review it.
• To preserve an evidentiary objection, counsel generally must:
  • object clearly on the record;
  • state the grounds for the objection; and
  • do so at the time the ruling is made or proposed, not for the first time after the fact.
• If a party fails to do this, appellate courts typically decline to consider the claim, as happened here with the objection to the judge’s pre-admission review of the recordings.

V. Conclusion

Matter of Emily RR. (Daniel QQ.) is an important reaffirmation and refinement of New York law governing the use of forensic child interviews and the scope of cross-examination in Family Court abuse proceedings. The Third Department:

• Reaffirmed that video-recorded forensic interviews are admissible hearsay under Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (vi), even when the child also testifies, and that a child’s own sworn testimony can lawfully serve as the corroboration for those prior statements without constituting impermissible bolstering.
• Clarified that such recordings may also be used as prior consistent statements to rebut claims of fabrication, knitting together article 10 doctrine with the general rule in McDaniel and Moore.
• Emphasized that the sanction of preclusion for late disclosure of forensic interviews is reserved for willful, deliberate, and contumacious discovery violations, not for logistical delays compounded by a party’s own failure to act.
• Confirmed that Family Courts may and should limit cross-examination of child witnesses where proposed questions are irrelevant, speculative, outside the witness’s knowledge, or designed primarily to harass, embarrass, or intimidate—particularly in areas such as sexual history and mental health.

For practitioners, the decision sends a clear message: evidentiary and discovery challenges in article 10 proceedings will be reviewed under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, especially where the record shows that the Family Court:

• communicated its evidentiary approach clearly;
• gave both sides fair opportunities to prepare and respond; and
• carefully balanced the respondent’s due process rights with the statutory and ethical obligation to protect child witnesses.

In the broader legal context, Matter of Emily RR. reinforces a child‑protective framework in which:

• the Legislature’s explicit relaxation of hearsay rules in article 10 cases is given full effect; and
• trial judges are empowered to manage both forensic evidence and witness examination in ways that promote accuracy, fairness, and the welfare of children involved in abuse and neglect proceedings.

This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.