First Circuit Clarifies INA Parole Authority: “Case‑by‑Case” Limits Grants, Not Termination; DHS May Categorically End and Revoke Parole Programs

Introduction

Doe v. Noem addresses the scope of the Executive Branch’s power under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to end, on a categorical basis, immigration parole programs and to truncate existing grants of parole. The case arises from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) March 2025 Termination Notice that dissolved the Biden Administration’s parole processes for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (the “CHNV” programs) and revoked existing grants within 30 days.

Plaintiffs—individual CHNV parolees and allied organizations—challenged the termination in the District of Massachusetts, which stayed DHS’s revocation as arbitrary and capricious. On appeal, the First Circuit vacated that stay, holding that the INA’s “case‑by‑case” constraint applies to granting parole, not to terminating it, and that Plaintiffs failed to make a strong showing of likely success on their Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims at the stay stage.

Parties:

Plaintiffs/Appellees: CHNV parole recipients and supporters (including Haitian Bridge Alliance and individual parolees).
Defendants/Appellants: The Secretary of Homeland Security; heads of CBP, USCIS, ICE; and the President, all in their official capacities.

Core issues:

Reviewability: Whether judicial review is barred by INA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) or the APA’s “committed to agency discretion” clause.
Statutory interpretation: Does INA § 212(d)(5)(A) require case‑by‑case termination of parole, or only case‑by‑case grants?
APA merits: Was DHS’s categorical early revocation arbitrary and capricious, including in light of humanitarian considerations and reliance interests?
Stay standard: Did Plaintiffs show a strong likelihood of success on the merits as required by Nken v. Holder?

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit vacated the district court’s stay of DHS’s termination directive. Exercising the doctrine that permits courts to assume statutory (not Article III) jurisdiction when the merits favor the party contesting jurisdiction, the court bypassed complex reviewability questions and ruled on the merits of the stay. It held:

INA § 212(d)(5)(A) requires case‑by‑case consideration for granting parole but does not impose the same requirement for terminating parole. Congress used limiting language in the grant clause, not in the termination clause, and courts must respect that choice.
On the APA claim, Plaintiffs did not make a strong showing that DHS’s rationale—especially its reading of the expedited removal statute—was a clear legal error. Competing readings of “have been paroled” are plausible, undermining the “obvious legal error” premise.
DHS provided a reasoned explanation for terminating the CHNV programs, including addressing reliance interests and humanitarian concerns sufficiently for stay purposes. Under the change‑in‑position doctrine, an agency need only provide good reasons, not necessarily better reasons than before.
Because Plaintiffs failed the “likelihood of success” prong—the most critical under Nken—the stay could not stand, even acknowledging serious potential harms to parolees.

Factual and Procedural Background

The CHNV Parole Programs (2022–2025)

Beginning in October 2022 (Venezuela) and January 2023 (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua), DHS created parole processes allowing eligible nationals to seek discretionary, individual parole for up to two years, citing urgent humanitarian reasons and significant public benefit (e.g., enhancing border security, improving vetting, relieving strain on border communities, and aligning with migration management goals). About 532,000 individuals received parole by early 2025. In October 2024, DHS announced it would not renew beyond the initial two‑year grants.

Executive Direction and DHS Policy Shift (January–March 2025)

Executive Order 14165 (Securing Our Borders) directed DHS to terminate categorical parole programs, including CHNV.
Executive Order 14159 mandated strict case‑by‑case parole consistent with § 212(d)(5).
DHS Acting Secretary issued a memorandum concluding § 212(d)(5)(A) does not authorize categorical parole programs and ordering a review to phase them out.
March 25, 2025: DHS published a Termination Notice (90 Fed. Reg. 13611) ending the CHNV programs and revoking existing grants effective April 24, 2025, absent individualized contrary determinations. DHS cited multiple reasons, including preservation of expedited removal, border security, resource impacts, and foreign policy considerations. It discussed reliance interests and rejected a longer wind‑down.

District Court Stay and Appeal

The district court stayed DHS’s early revocation, finding Plaintiffs likely to succeed on the APA claim because: (1) DHS’s reliance on expedited removal law rested on legal error; (2) § 212(d)(5)(A) purportedly requires individualized termination decisions; and (3) DHS insufficiently addressed humanitarian underpinnings and reliance interests. The First Circuit denied a stay pending appeal; the Supreme Court granted one, allowing DHS’s termination to take effect pending appellate review. The First Circuit has now vacated the district court’s stay and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005): Parole permits temporary entry pending admissibility investigation; parole is not an admission.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020); Shaughnessy v. Mezei: Parolees are treated, for due process purposes, as if stopped at the border, underscoring executive primacy over admission/exclusion procedures.
Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring): Every administration in recent decades has used parole—contextual support for robust executive discretion.
INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): Authorizes DHS to parole “only on a case‑by‑case basis” for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” and to return the alien “when the purposes of such parole … have been served, in the opinion of the Secretary.”
IIRIRA (1996) and House Report 104‑469: Congress inserted “only on a case‑by‑case basis” to curb categorical grants of parole, not to restrict termination authority.
Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1: Singular includes plural unless context indicates otherwise—undercutting arguments that singular phrasing in § 212(d)(5)(A) demands individualized terminations.
Gallardo ex rel. Vassallo v. Marstiller, 596 U.S. 420 (2022): Courts must give effect to Congress’s decision to include limiting language in one provision and not in another.
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009); Hilton v. Braunskill: Four stay factors; likelihood of success and irreparable harm are most critical.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009): Change‑in‑position doctrine—agency need only supply good reasons and acknowledge the change; not necessarily better reasons.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020): Agencies must consider serious reliance interests when changing policy.
FDA v. Wages & White Lion Investments, LLC, 145 S. Ct. 898 (2025): Reaffirms change‑in‑position principles and reliance‑interest assessment.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983): Arbitrary‑and‑capricious standard requires reasoned decision‑making.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Mahoney v. Del Toro, 99 F.4th 25 (1st Cir. 2024): Agency action premised on legal error is invalid.
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Hewitt v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2165 (2025): Present perfect tense can denote completed action or continuing condition—relevant to interpreting “have been paroled.”
River St. Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009): Narrow APA review; courts may not substitute judgment for the agency’s.
Johansen v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 118 F.4th 142 (1st Cir. 2024); Cowels v. FBI, 936 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2019): Courts may assume statutory jurisdiction when merits favor the party contesting jurisdiction.

Legal Reasoning

1) Reviewability Deferred

The Government argued that INA § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and APA § 701(a)(2) bar review of discretionary parole termination decisions. The First Circuit assumed statutory jurisdiction without deciding, because the merits favored the Government—a permissible approach for complex statutory (not Article III) jurisdiction issues. This sets no binding precedent on reviewability but signals the court’s preference to resolve the stay on merits grounds when possible.

2) Statutory Interpretation: Case‑by‑Case Applies to Grants, Not Terminations

Text. Section 212(d)(5)(A) expressly limits grants of parole to “only on a case‑by‑case basis,” but the termination clause contains no such restriction, instead authorizing termination when “in the opinion of the Secretary” the purposes of parole have been served. Under Gallardo, courts must respect Congress’s targeted use of limiting language.

Singular vs. plural. The district court reasoned that singular phrasing (“an alien,” “such parole”) implies individualized termination. The First Circuit rejected that inference in light of the Dictionary Act’s instruction to read singular to include plural absent a contrary context, and in light of Congress’s deliberate placement of “case‑by‑case” in the grant clause only.

History. IIRIRA’s legislative history confirms Congress’s aim to curtail categorical grants of parole, not to constrain termination authority. The House Report criticized the use of parole to “admit entire categories of aliens,” and inserted the “case‑by‑case” limit to correct that perceived misuse.

Bottom line. Because the statute and history demonstrate the “case‑by‑case” constraint applies to granting, not terminating, Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their argument that mass termination is ultra vires.

3) APA Arbitrary‑and‑Capricious Review: No “Obvious Legal Error” and Adequate Explanation

Legal error claim. Plaintiffs argued DHS’s early termination was driven by a misreading of the expedited removal statute (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)), specifically the phrase “have been … paroled.” Plaintiffs read that to categorically exclude any prior parolee from expedited removal, even if parole later ends. DHS read it to exclude only those currently in parole status. The First Circuit found both interpretations plausible—parole can be both a mode of entry and a status; the present perfect tense can denote completed or continuing conditions—undercutting the district court’s conclusion that DHS committed an “obvious legal error.” Without clear legal error, Plaintiffs lacked a strong showing of likely success on this APA theory.

Reasoned explanation, reliance interests, and humanitarian factors. Applying Fox and Regents, the court held DHS offered sufficient reasons for the policy reversal and addressed reliance interests and humanitarian considerations adequately for purposes of a stay. DHS discussed:

Why CHNV no longer served significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons as a categorical program.
Border security and resource strains, including immigration court backlogs and the role of expedited removal.
Reliance interests of supporters, applicants, and current parolees, concluding those interests were tempered by the programs’ temporary, discretionary nature and repeated government warnings that parole might be terminated at any time.
Alternatives (letting grants expire naturally; a longer wind‑down) and why they were rejected.

While the discussion of humanitarian considerations and reliance was not lengthy, the court emphasized that the original justifications for creating CHNV were also concise; thus, a brief but reasoned explanation can suffice under Fox and State Farm, particularly at the stay stage and under a deferential standard of review.

4) Stay Factors: Likelihood of Success Controls

Although the district court identified serious irreparable harms to parolees, Nken makes likelihood of success and irreparable harm the “most critical” factors—and a strong merits showing is indispensable. Because Plaintiffs failed to make that showing, the First Circuit vacated the stay without reaching the remaining factors.

Impact and Implications

Immediate Effects

DHS may categorically terminate parole programs and truncate existing parole periods (within the First Circuit) without individualized termination decisions, so long as it provides a reasoned explanation that addresses reliance and humanitarian considerations.
The CHNV Termination Notice’s early revocation stands (subject to further district court proceedings on claims not at issue here, including any constitutional claims).

Guidance for Future Agency Action

Drafting termination notices: Agencies should provide clear, multi‑factor explanations, explicitly weigh reliance interests, and address humanitarian considerations, even concisely.
Use of legislative history and textual asymmetry: Courts will give effect to Congress’s choice to cabin some powers (grants) while leaving others (termination) without the same express constraints.
Expedited removal rationale: Agencies can advance policy justifications even amid statutory ambiguities, but should recognize competing readings; careful, transparent statutory analysis helps insulate against “legal error” claims.

Broader Legal Landscape

Parole program stability: Large‑scale, categorical parole initiatives (e.g., for country‑specific populations) are vulnerable to executive reversal without individualized termination proceedings.
Reliance interests: While serious reliance must be considered, temporary, discretionary statuses created with express revocability warnings may receive less protective weight than, for example, programs like DACA where reliance was not confronted initially (Regents).
Reviewability unresolved: The First Circuit left open whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) or APA § 701(a)(2) bar review—an issue ripe for future litigation and potential Supreme Court clarification.
Separation of powers and deference: The decision underscores judicial deference to executive judgments in immigration administration, particularly where Congress has conferred broad discretionary language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Parole vs. Admission: Parole allows temporary physical presence without “admission” into the U.S. for immigration law purposes. It is discretionary, time‑limited, and does not by itself confer permanent status.
“Case‑by‑Case” Requirement: This phrase in § 212(d)(5)(A) limits how parole may be granted (individualized judgments), but the First Circuit held it does not constrain how parole may be terminated.
Dictionary Act: A default rule that singular words in statutes can include the plural, preventing over‑reading of singular phrasing as demanding individualized decisions.
Expedited Removal: A streamlined removal process for certain inadmissible noncitizens without full immigration court proceedings. Whether prior (but terminated) parole bars expedited removal is textually debatable.
APA Arbitrary‑and‑Capricious Review: Courts require agencies to explain decisions reasonably, consider important factors (including reliance), and acknowledge policy changes, but do not second‑guess policy choices if reasonably explained.
Stay Standard (Nken): To pause government action pending litigation, a party must make a strong showing of likely success on the merits and show irreparable harm, among other factors. A weak merits showing dooms a stay even if harms are serious.

Practice Pointers

For agencies: When reversing a prior discretionary immigration program, memorialize a multi‑pronged rationale; directly confront reliance interests and humanitarian considerations; discuss alternatives and why they were rejected.
For litigants challenging termination: Develop a clear, unambiguous statutory error; quantify reliance harms; and show the agency ignored or inadequately weighed serious interests. At the stay stage, emphasize why success on the merits is “strongly” likely, not merely plausible.
For courts: When statutory reviewability is complex and the merits favor the party contesting jurisdiction, it may be efficient to assume jurisdiction and resolve the stay on the merits, preserving final review for a fuller record.

Conclusion

Doe v. Noem establishes a significant interpretive rule for immigration parole: the INA’s “case‑by‑case” requirement expressly cabins the Secretary’s authority to grant parole, but not to terminate it. On the APA front, the First Circuit reiterates that agencies reversing policy must provide “good reasons” and weigh serious reliance interests; detailed treatises are unnecessary, particularly when the initial policy was justified briefly. Because Plaintiffs did not make a strong showing of likely success on either their statutory or APA theories, the stay could not stand.

The decision empowers DHS to sunset categorical parole initiatives and revoke extant grants en masse, provided it supplies a minimally adequate, reasoned explanation that addresses reliance and humanitarian factors. It also signals that, at least within the First Circuit, the executive retains broad agility to recalibrate parole policy in response to shifting priorities and statutory interpretations. Future litigation may revisit reviewability and the expedited removal statute’s precise contours, but for now, this opinion marks a consequential recalibration of the legal baseline for designing—and unwinding—categorical parole programs.