Finality of Arbitration Confirmation Judgments Triggers Utah’s Eight‑Year Expiration; Insurers Must Defend Amid Genuine Cancellation Disputes

Introduction

In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Weston, 2025 UT 42 (Utah Oct. 17, 2025), the Utah Supreme Court resolved several far‑reaching issues at the intersection of arbitration finality, judgment expiration, insurance defense obligations, and consequential damages. The case arises from a fatal 2004 automobile collision between Jared H. Weston and LaMoin Larkin. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (the insurer of the decedent Larkin) paid first‑party benefits and, exercising subrogation, sued Weston for negligence. It also sought a declaration that Weston was insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange (the “defendant insurer”) at the time of the accident. Farmers declined to defend Weston, asserting a pre‑accident cancellation of coverage based on nonpayment.

Key issues reached the Court after a lengthy litigation history: whether a 2009 judgment entered upon confirmation of an arbitration award had expired under Utah’s eight‑year judgment‑expiration statute; whether Farmers owed and breached a duty to defend amid a cancellation dispute; what damages flow from any breach; and whether the cancellation question remained justiciable. The Court (Justice Hagen, unanimous) issued holdings that crystallize new Utah precedent on the finality and expiration of judgments entered after arbitration award confirmation and clarify Utah’s duty‑to‑defend jurisprudence when coverage turns on a genuinely disputed cancellation.

Summary of the Opinion

Arbitration confirmation judgments are final and appealable for purposes of Utah’s eight‑year judgment‑expiration statute. A judgment entered after confirmation of an arbitration award under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act is a “final judgment entered pursuant to” the Act (Utah Code § 78B‑11‑129(1)(f)), even if other claims in the civil action remain unresolved. Entry of such a judgment starts the eight‑year expiration period under Utah Code § 78B‑5‑202(1)(a).
The March 26, 2009 arbitration‑award judgment expired on March 26, 2017 because it was neither satisfied, renewed, nor stayed. The Court reversed the court of appeals’ contrary conclusion; efforts to amend or collect on the judgment thereafter were ineffective.
Mootness: Because the underlying judgment expired, the cancellation/coverage dispute (and any indemnity question) became moot. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision on cancellation.
Duty to defend: Farmers breached its duty to defend Weston. Where an otherwise valid policy is alleged and there is a genuine issue of fact regarding proper cancellation, the insurer must defend until the uncertainty is resolved. Farmers did neither defend under a reservation nor promptly seek declaratory relief and thereby breached.
Damages for breach:
- Consequential damages equal to the 2009 judgment are unavailable because the judgment expired; the Court therefore declined to adopt either the “Illinois rule” (estoppel to contest coverage if the insurer breaches the duty to defend) or the competing “majority rule.” That question remains open in Utah.
- Emotional distress: Affirmed the district court’s finding (on clear‑error review) that Weston failed to prove causation—i.e., that his distress was caused by the breach rather than by his potential liability, lack of coverage, or the judgment itself.
- Attorney fees: Vacated the court of appeals’ award of 40% contingency fees based on the expired judgment.

Background and Procedural History

February 15, 2004: Collision involving Weston and Larkin; Larkin dies. Farm Bureau pays property, PIP, and UM benefits to the estate, then sues Weston in subrogation and seeks a declaration that Farmers insured Weston.
2008–2009: Farm Bureau and Weston arbitrate negligence; Weston is found at fault, damages awarded at $684,276.36. On March 26, 2009, the district court confirms the award and, the same day, enters a conforming judgment totaling $747,233.15 with interest and costs.
2014: After a four‑day bench trial, the district court finds Farmers properly canceled coverage before the accident (no coverage on accident day).
Summary judgment: The court rules Farmers owed and breached a duty to defend because the pleadings raised a genuine factual dispute about cancellation.
2016: Farm Bureau obtains a writ of execution on the 2009 judgment; Weston challenges under Jordan Construction; Farm Bureau ceases collection.
Second bench trial on damages for breach of duty to defend: The court initially awards limited emotional distress damages and 40% contingency fees; later amends to $0 after finding insufficient causation.
2018: Farm Bureau seeks to amend the 2009 judgment for accrued interest and costs. The district court holds the 2009 judgment had not expired because it was nonfinal; it amends the total to $934,405.43.
2023: Court of appeals affirms on expiration, cancellation, and breach; denies emotional distress; but, in a split, adopts the “Illinois rule,” awarding damages equal to the judgment plus 40% contingency fees.
2025: Utah Supreme Court reverses on expiration, declares cancellation issue moot, affirms breach, vacates consequential damages and fee awards, and affirms denial of emotional distress damages.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities: How They Shaped the Decision

Judgment expiration and appealability

Utah Code § 78B‑5‑202(1)(a): Judgments “continue for eight years from the date of entry” unless “satisfied, renewed, or … stayed.” The Court treats “judgment” in this statute as a “final” (appealable) judgment—an interpretation drawn from Irving Place Associates v. 628 Park Ave., LLC, 2015 UT 91, ¶¶ 20–23 (tying “finality” for expiration to appealability).
Utah Uniform Arbitration Act:
- § 78B‑11‑126(1): Upon confirming an award, the court “shall enter a judgment conforming to the award.”
- § 78B‑11‑129(1): Parties may appeal certain decisions “as from an order or a judgment in a civil action,” including “an order confirming … an award” (§ 129(1)(c)) and “a final judgment entered pursuant to” the Act (§ 129(1)(f)).
Utah R. App. P. 3(a)(1): Appeals as of right from final orders/judgments; Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a), (b): Definitions and the final‑judgment rule; exceptions recognized in In re Estate of Heater, 2021 UT 66, ¶ 14 (statutory appeals, interlocutory appeals, Rule 54(b) certification).
Statutory interpretation: The Court deploys the surplusage canon (Croft v. Morgan County, 2021 UT 46, ¶¶ 32–33; Buck v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2022 UT 11, ¶ 42) to give § 78B‑11‑129(1)(f) independent operative effect. Reading “final judgment” there to mean only a Rule 54(b)‑final judgment would make § 129(1)(f) redundant because such judgments are already appealable under Rule 3. To avoid surplusage, “final judgment entered pursuant to” the Act must include the judgment entered upon confirmation, even if other claims in the case remain pending.
Policy coherence: The Court harmonizes this reading with § 78B‑6‑203(1), which encourages arbitration as “just, speedy, and inexpensive.” Allowing immediate appeals from confirmation judgments furthers ADR efficiency. It also presents little risk of piecemeal inconsistency given the Act’s narrow judicial review and 90‑day challenge windows (§§ 78B‑11‑125, ‑126).

Mootness and the effect of expiration

Principles: An issue is moot if the court cannot grant effective relief (Roussel ex rel. Natalie R. v. State, 2025 UT 5, ¶ 26; Transportation Alliance Bank v. International Confections Co., 2017 UT 55, ¶ 15). Courts lack power to issue advisory opinions (Roussel, ¶ 47; Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview, L.C., 2024 UT 20, ¶ 19).
Application: Once the 2009 judgment expired, Weston’s liability for it ended; any insurer indemnity obligation tied to that judgment also evaporated. That mooted the cancellation issue. The Court analogized to Timothy v. Pia, Anderson, Dorius, Reynard & Moss, LLC, 2019 UT 69 (UFTA claims became moot upon expiration because plaintiffs were no longer “creditors”).
Bad‑faith exception to expiration: The Court rejected Farm Bureau’s attempt to revive the expired judgment under Free v. Farnsworth, 188 P.2d 731 (Utah 1948), as clarified in Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 UT 11, ¶ 19. That narrow exception requires the judgment debtor’s bad faith to have prevented enforcement. Here, the debtor was Weston, and no such bad faith was shown. Alleged litigation conduct by Farmers did not inhibit Farm Bureau from enforcing, renewing, or seeking a stay while the judgment was alive.

Duty to defend during genuine cancellation disputes

Foundational rule: The duty to defend arises from contract and is generally broader than the duty to indemnify (Fire Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ¶¶ 21–22; Summerhaze Co., L.C. v. FDIC, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 36).
Cancellation disputes: The Court endorsed the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance § 13(3)(e) (2019): an insurer may decline defense on cancellation grounds only if “facts not at issue in the legal action” and “as to which there is no genuine dispute” establish proper cancellation. Otherwise, the insurer must defend “until [the] duty to defend is terminated.” Utah cases already instruct that when in doubt, defend (Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins., 2006 UT 37, ¶ 22; see also Deseret Federal S&L v. USF&G, 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986)).
Scope remains rooted in the policy: This cancellation‑dispute rule does not create a duty absent a policy. The allegations must reference an otherwise valid policy and plead facts that, if proven, bring the claim within the policy’s coverage; a cancellation dispute simply delays termination of the defense obligation until resolved. By contrast, where the allegations fall wholly outside coverage, there is no duty to defend (e.g., McCarty v. Parks, 564 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977)).
Practical options for insurers: If an insurer reasonably doubts its defense obligation, it should promptly (1) seek a declaratory judgment on coverage or (2) defend under a reservation of rights (Summerhaze, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 38). Farmers did neither.

Damages and fees for breach of the duty to defend

Consequential damages equal to the judgment: The court of appeals adopted the “Illinois rule” (estoppel to contest coverage if the insurer breaches the duty to defend). The Supreme Court vacated that ruling as unnecessary because the 2009 judgment had expired, leaving Utah’s choice between the “Illinois rule” and the “majority rule” expressly open.
Emotional distress damages: The Court affirmed (clear‑error review) the district court’s post‑trial finding that Weston failed to prove causation—that his distress was caused by the breach rather than other stressors (Sanpete American, LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, ¶ 72; Gregory & Swapp, PLLC v. Kranendonk, 2018 UT 36, ¶¶ 38, 43; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4)). Weston’s testimony was offset by stipulated facts that the outcome would not have changed had Farmers defended, and by the district court’s view that his distress stemmed from potential liability, lack of coverage, and the judgment itself.
Attorney fees as consequential damages: The court of appeals awarded 40% contingency‑based fees tied to the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed because the award was tethered to an expired judgment. It also declined to reach Weston’s alternative fee theories due to inadequate appellate briefing directed at the court of appeals’ reasoning (In re Interest of A.B., 2022 UT 39, ¶ 39).

2) Legal Reasoning: Why the Court Reached These Results

The Court’s core interpretive move is textual and structural. Starting with the premise that “judgment” in the expiration statute means an “appealable” judgment (Irving Place), the Court asked whether a judgment entered after arbitration award confirmation is appealable even if not Rule 54(b)‑final. Section 78B‑11‑129(1) of the Arbitration Act lists appealable orders and judgments, including an “order confirming” an award and “a final judgment entered pursuant to” the Act. Applying the surplusage canon, the Court reasoned that if “final judgment” in § 129(1)(f) meant only a judgment resolving all claims in the case (the ordinary Rule 54(b) sense), § 129(1)(f) would add nothing new to Utah’s appellate scheme. Thus, to give it effect, the term necessarily includes the judgment entered upon confirmation, notwithstanding unresolved claims elsewhere in the action.

This reading dovetails with the Arbitration Act’s design to promote efficient ADR. The Act permits interlocutory appeals from orders that would thwart arbitration (e.g., staying or denying arbitration) while generally discouraging appeals that would slow the process. Allowing an immediate appeal from a confirmation judgment, and treating it as the “final” judgment for expiration purposes, tracks that legislative purpose. Moreover, the Act’s tight review windows and narrow grounds for vacating or modifying awards mitigate the final‑judgment rule’s anti‑piecemeal concerns.

On the duty to defend, the Court married Utah’s longstanding “compare the complaint to the policy” framework with Restatement‑informed guidance for cancellation disputes. The touchstone remains the contract: if the complaint’s allegations and the policy’s terms present a genuine factual question about coverage (here, a nonfrivolous cancellation contest), the insurer must defend “until those uncertainties can be resolved against coverage” (Benjamin). Farmers’ eventual success on cancellation—years after the merits arbitration and post‑judgment—did not retroactively erase its earlier defense obligation.

Finally, the Court’s mootness analysis is straightforward. Absent a live underlying judgment, there is no indemnifiable liability, so litigating cancellation would produce only an advisory opinion. That conclusion, in turn, mooted the damages controversy predicated on the judgment (including the court of appeals’ “Illinois rule” adoption). Emotional distress failed on ordinary fact‑finding, and fees dependent on the expired judgment necessarily fell away.

3) Impact and Practice Implications

Arbitration and judgment practice

Confirmation judgments now clearly start the eight‑year expiration clock. Judgment creditors who obtain a confirmation judgment must treat it as immediately appealable and expiring eight years from entry unless satisfied, renewed, or stayed (Utah Code § 78B‑5‑202(1)(a); renewal under §§ 78B‑6‑1802, ‑1804). It is no answer that other claims in the underlying litigation remain open.
Collection and amendment strategy: Post‑judgment interest and cost amendments tied to an expired confirmation judgment are unavailable. Practitioners should calendar renewal dates upon entry of the confirmation judgment and take timely action.
Appellate posture: Parties may appeal either the order confirming or the ensuing judgment (both are appealable under § 78B‑11‑129(1)), but the entry of the conforming judgment has independent consequences for expiration. Do not assume nonfinality under Rule 54 controls the expiration analysis.

Insurance defense and coverage litigation

New clarity on cancellation disputes: In Utah, when an otherwise valid policy is alleged and the pleadings raise a genuine factual dispute over proper cancellation, the insurer must defend until the dispute is resolved. Insurers should quickly either:
- File a declaratory judgment action to obtain a prompt coverage determination; or
- Defend under a reservation of rights.
Risk allocation: Failure to do either will constitute a breach of the duty to defend. Although the Court did not decide estoppel/indemnity consequences (Illinois v. majority rule) because of mootness, the warning is evident: delay may amplify exposure. The rule choice remains open in Utah for a live case.
Damages proof: Emotional distress and similar consequential damages require proof of causation, not mere breach. Stipulations that the case outcome would not have changed undercut causation. Careful record development is crucial.

Mootness and preservation of indemnity rights

Coverage claimants dependent on a judgment must keep the judgment alive. If a subrogation or tort judgment expires, indemnity and fraudulent‑transfer remedies will typically be mooted or lost (Timothy; Gildea). Renewal is essential to preserve coverage‑based indemnity claims.
The “bad‑faith” revival doctrine is narrow. It focuses on the debtor’s obstructive conduct preventing enforcement, not on an insurer’s litigation choices absent a showing that enforcement was thwarted.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Eight‑year judgment expiration: In Utah, a judgment is enforceable for eight years from entry unless it is satisfied, renewed, or stayed (§ 78B‑5‑202(1)(a)). Renewal can add another eight years (§§ 78B‑6‑1802, ‑1804). A “final” judgment for expiration is one that is appealable.
Finality in arbitration: The Arbitration Act creates a statutory pathway to appeal (and thus “finality” for expiration) for judgments entered after award confirmation, even if the civil action remains active on other claims.
Duty to defend vs. duty to indemnify: The duty to defend is broader and is triggered by potential coverage based on comparing complaint allegations to policy terms. Indemnity depends on actual coverage and liability, often determined later.
Cancellation disputes: If cancellation validity is genuinely disputed on the pleadings, the insurer must defend until the dispute is resolved (or obtain a declaratory judgment) because potential coverage exists.
Reservation of rights: An insurer’s mechanism to defend while preserving the right to later deny coverage or seek reimbursement if no duty existed.
Mootness: Courts do not decide abstract questions. If an underlying judgment expires, disputes about indemnifying that judgment typically become moot.
“Illinois rule” vs. “majority rule” (not decided): The Illinois rule estops insurers who breach the duty to defend from later asserting coverage defenses to indemnity; the majority rule allows such insurers to contest indemnity. Utah left this question open.

Unanswered Questions and Future Litigation

Estoppel for breach of the duty to defend: Utah expressly left undecided whether the Illinois rule or the majority rule governs. A future case with a live, enforceable judgment will likely present that issue squarely.
Scope of consequential damages for breach: While emotional distress requires specific causation proof, the contours of other consequential damages (e.g., credit harm) remain governed by existing principles but may see application in future duty‑to‑defend disputes.

Practical Checklist

After an arbitration award is confirmed:
- Calendar the eight‑year expiration date from entry of the conforming judgment.
- If collection will not be complete within eight years, file to renew before expiration.
- Consider appealing either the order confirming the award or the judgment; treat both as appealable.
For insurers facing a cancellation defense request:
- Evaluate whether an otherwise valid policy is alleged and whether the pleadings create a genuine factual dispute about cancellation compliance.
- If yes, promptly defend under a reservation or seek a declaratory judgment; do not simply refuse to defend and wait.
For insureds seeking damages for breach of the duty to defend:
- Develop a clear causation record linking specific harms (including emotional distress) to the breach, not to the underlying litigation risks or outcomes.
- Be prepared to prove actual fee obligations if seeking fees as consequential damages; fee awards tied to expired judgments will fail.

Conclusion

Farm Bureau v. Weston sets an important statewide precedent: a judgment entered upon confirmation of an arbitration award is a “final judgment” for appeal and expiration purposes, starting Utah’s eight‑year clock regardless of unresolved claims in the action. This holding reinforces the Legislature’s preference for arbitration’s speed and finality, and it recalibrates judgment‑enforcement and renewal practices across Utah litigation involving arbitration.

The Court also clarifies that when cancellation is genuinely disputed and an otherwise valid policy is alleged, the insurer’s duty to defend is triggered and continues until the uncertainty is resolved. Insurers who neither defend under a reservation nor promptly seek declaratory relief risk breaching this duty. However, damages for breach remain bounded: emotional distress requires proof of causation, and fee awards cannot rest on expired judgments.

Finally, by declaring the cancellation dispute moot once the judgment expired and vacating the court of appeals’ adoption of the “Illinois rule,” the Court leaves for another day—on a live record—the consequential question whether a breaching insurer is estopped from contesting indemnity coverage. For now, the principal lessons are clear: confirmation judgments must be treated as immediately expiring absent renewal, and insurers must “defend when in doubt” during genuine cancellation disputes.