Finality Before Flexibility: Indiana Supreme Court Holds Trial Rule 15(A) Inapplicable After Final Judgment in Brooks v. USA Track & Field

I. Introduction

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Taliyah Brooks v. USA Track & Field, Inc., 25S‑PL‑103 (Dec. 17, 2025), squarely addresses a deceptively simple but crucial procedural question: may a plaintiff amend a complaint after the trial court has entered final judgment?

Against the backdrop of an elite athlete’s thwarted Olympic aspirations and a broad sports liability waiver, the Court uses this case to announce a bright-line procedural rule: Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) does not apply once a final judgment has been entered. After final judgment, there is no “live” pleading to amend; a party must first obtain relief from the judgment under Trial Rules 59 or 60, or initiate a new action (subject to limitations defenses and preclusion principles).

The dispute pits:

• Appellant – Taliyah Brooks, a world-class heptathlete who collapsed from heat-related illness during the 2020 (held in 2021) Olympic Trials,
• Appellee – USA Track & Field, Inc. (USATF), the national governing body for track and field headquartered in Indianapolis, which required Brooks to sign a comprehensive waiver and indemnity agreement as a condition of competing.

Brooks first pursued a declaratory judgment to invalidate the waiver before asserting tort claims. When the trial court granted summary judgment to USATF on the declaratory claim, Brooks attempted—two days later but after that ruling—to amend her complaint to assert negligence and related claims. The key issue on transfer was whether the trial court erred in denying that motion to amend.

The majority (Massa, J., joined by Rush, C.J., Slaughter, and Molter, JJ.) holds the trial court had no discretion to grant the amendment after final judgment, and therefore correctly denied it. Justice Goff dissents, not on the finality rule itself, but on the premise that summary judgment should have been entered at all; he would hold the USATF agreement void as against public policy and allow Brooks to proceed on her negligence claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Brooks suffered severe heat-related injuries during the heptathlon portion of the Olympic Trials in Eugene, Oregon, where track-surface temperatures exceeded 140°F. She had signed USATF’s standard online waiver and indemnity agreement to enter the competition. The waiver broadly released and indemnified USATF and a long list of related entities and individuals from liability for injuries connected to participation, except for claims caused by “gross negligence and/or willful misconduct.”

Concerned that the indemnity provision could expose her to “ruinous” financial liability if she filed tort claims while the waiver remained in force, Brooks filed a declaratory judgment action in Marion Superior Court on November 29, 2022. She sought:

• a declaration that the Agreement was unenforceable, and
• a permanent injunction preventing USATF from enforcing it.

As the statute of limitations on her tort claims approached (June 2023), Brooks moved for partial summary judgment (first under Oregon law, later also under Indiana law) to invalidate the agreement. USATF responded and cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing the agreement was enforceable under Indiana law and expressly did not bar claims for gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct.

On June 21, 2023, the trial court:

• granted USATF’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and
• denied Brooks’s motion for partial summary judgment.

That ruling disposed of Brooks’s only operative claim (declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the agreement). No tort claims had yet been pled. The court’s orders therefore constituted a final judgment.

Two days later, on June 23, Brooks:

• moved to certify the orders for interlocutory appeal,
• moved to amend her complaint to add negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and willful and wanton misconduct claims and additional parties, and
• moved to stay proceedings on the proposed tort claims.

USATF opposed, arguing that the motions were moot because the case had already reached final judgment. The trial court denied Brooks’s motions. Brooks then appealed both the summary judgment and the denial of her post-judgment motions.

The Court of Appeals:

• affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for USATF, finding the Agreement enforceable; but
• reversed the denial of Brooks’s motion to amend, holding—under Trial Rule 15(A)—that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow amendment.

On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court took up only the amendment issue, summarily affirming the Court of Appeals’ analysis of the Agreement’s enforceability. Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A)(2) makes that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion binding as intermediate appellate authority.

B. Holdings

The Supreme Court’s central holdings are:

1. Finality rule applied: The trial court’s June 21, 2023 summary judgment orders were a final judgment because they disposed of all claims as to all parties. Once those orders issued, there was “no longer a live complaint to amend.”
2. No amendments after final judgment: Under long-standing Indiana and federal precedent, a party may not amend a complaint after final judgment unless the judgment is first vacated or set aside under:
   • Trial Rule 59 (motion to correct error) or
   • Trial Rule 60 (relief from judgment).
3. Trial Rule 15(A) inapplicable post-judgment: Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) “does not apply after final judgment.” Its liberal amendment standard operates only while a case is pending and before final judgment has been entered.
4. No discretion to grant amendment: Because Rule 15(A) was inapplicable, the trial court had no discretion to grant Brooks’s motion to amend after final judgment. Denial of the motion was therefore the “only appropriate outcome.”
5. Affirmance: The Supreme Court affirms the trial court’s denial of Brooks’s motion to amend. The Court does not revisit the substantive enforceability of the USATF Agreement, having summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on that point.

C. The Dissent

Justice Goff agrees with the general proposition that a party cannot amend after final judgment, but dissents on the premise that a proper final judgment existed. He concludes:

• the USATF waiver and indemnity agreement is void as against public policy, and
• the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to USATF in the first place.

Because Brooks moved to amend before the statute of limitations expired, Justice Goff would allow her to proceed to trial on her negligence claim once the Agreement is declared unenforceable. He focuses heavily on Indiana’s public policy governing exculpatory and indemnity clauses, especially in mass-participation athletic contexts.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Background in Context

Brooks, as a heptathlete, competed in a grueling seven-event competition over two days. After a strong first day—standing second overall—she collapsed from heat on day two and could not finish, losing a realistic shot at the Olympic team. She attributes her injuries, at least in part, to USATF’s conduct in running the event under extreme conditions.

Before competing, Brooks executed USATF’s standard “Waiver and Release of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement” online. Two provisions are central:

1. Section 2 – Waiver / Assumption of Risk:
   Brooks acknowledged:

   participation in [USATF] Events is inherently dangerous and represents an extreme test of a person's physical and mental limits.

   She expressly assumed all enumerated “Risks”—including severe bodily injury, extreme weather, imperfect conditions, inadequate safety measures, and “other undefined, not readily foreseeable and presently unknown risks”—and accepted responsibility for resulting damages,

   except to the extent caused by the gross negligence and/or willful misconduct of any of the Released Parties.

2. Section 4 – Release and Indemnity:
   Brooks agreed to:
   • “release, waive and covenant not to sue” USATF and a wide range of “Released Parties” (USATF, USOC, event directors, hosts, venue owners, organizers, sponsors, coaches, officials, law enforcement, other public entities, and their affiliates and personnel), and
   • “indemnify, defend and hold harmless” those parties with respect to any “Liability” arising out of or relating to her participation, again “except to the extent caused by the gross negligence and/or willful misconduct of any of the Released Parties.”
   If she or anyone on her behalf made a claim against a Released Party, she agreed to indemnify them for Liabilities (including attorneys’ fees) incurred as a result, except to the extent of their gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Faced with this broad indemnity obligation, Brooks structured her litigation in two stages:

1. Stage one – a declaratory judgment lawsuit to invalidate the Agreement (and enjoin its enforcement), in order to clear away the indemnity risk; then,
2. Stage two – tort claims for negligence and related wrongs if she prevailed in stage one.

The trial court signaled that nothing formally prevented Brooks from amending her complaint to add tort claims before the summary judgment ruling, and it explored the possibility of a tolling agreement to ease the statute of limitations pressure. USATF refused to toll, citing strategic concerns about naming nonparties. Brooks, in turn, insisted on first obtaining a declaration that she was not bound by the indemnity clause before risking exposure through tort litigation.

Ultimately, that strategic choice ran head-on into the final judgment rule once the court granted USATF summary judgment on the declaratory claim.

B. The Court’s Treatment of the Final Judgment Rule

1. What is a “final judgment” in Indiana?

Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) defines a “final judgment” as:

• one disposing of all claims as to all parties, or
• a judgment certified as final under Trial Rule 54(B) or 56(C) as to fewer than all claims or parties, or
• a judgment deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C) or other law, or
• a ruling on certain post-judgment motions (e.g., Trial Rule 59 or Criminal Rule 16).

The majority draws on several appellate decisions to reinforce the classic hallmarks of finality:

• Bueter v. Brinkman: a final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all parties” and “puts an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues.”
• Thompson v. Thompson: a final judgment “reserves no further question or direction for future determination.”
• Montgomery, Zukerman, Davis, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.: even if an order “lacks some of the details or formalities generally required,” it is still final if it disposes of all claims of all the parties.

The Court emphasizes policy reasons for respecting finality, quoting its recent decision in Automotive Finance Corp. v. Liu:

“Respect for the finality of judgments is . . . crucial to the efficient functioning of our legal system. Finality conserves limited resources, provides certainty and stability, and protects the interests of parties by enabling closure and reducing prolonged litigation.”

2. Application to Brooks’s case

The trial court’s summary judgment orders:

• granted USATF judgment as a matter of law on the enforceability of the Agreement, and
• disposed of all relief Brooks had actually requested (declaratory and injunctive).

Brooks had not yet asserted any tort causes of action. No claim—negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, or willful/wanton misconduct—remained pending. Thus, when the court ruled that USATF was “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” and found no genuine issues of material fact on the only operative claim, the entire case was resolved.

Both in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court, Brooks’s counsel conceded that the June 21, 2023 orders constituted a final judgment. That concession, coupled with the legal analysis above, made the case a textbook illustration of when final judgment has been entered.

C. Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) and Post‑Judgment Amendments

1. Text and purpose of Rule 15(A)

Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) governs amendment of pleadings:

• Before a responsive pleading is served, a party may amend “once as a matter of course,” without leave of court.
• After a responsive pleading, amendment requires leave of court or consent of the adverse party, and “leave shall be given when justice so requires.”

The Court identifies two “twin aims” of Rule 15(A):

1. Predictability and early amendment: It encourages parties to refine or expand their pleadings early, before the opposing party responds, with minimal procedural friction.
2. Flexibility during ongoing litigation: It allows courts to permit later amendments when discovery or developments reveal new facts or theories, so that meritorious claims are heard while avoiding undue prejudice or delay.

Critically, these aims presuppose that the case is still pending—i.e., that there is an existing pleading and an ongoing controversy before the court.

2. The majority’s bright-line rule

The majority holds that these policies “cease to apply after final judgment,” because:

• after final judgment, there is no pending case in which flexibility is needed, and
• the judicial system’s countervailing interest in finality becomes dominant.

Accordingly, the Court adopts the following rule:

“Rule 15(A) is not applicable where final judgment has been entered…. At that point, the flexibility and discretion Rule 15(A) affords trial judges ends and a plaintiff may only amend his complaint if the judgment has been set aside or vacated under T.R. 59 or T.R. 60.”

In practical terms:

• A motion to amend filed after final judgment cannot be granted under Rule 15(A).
• The trial court has no discretion to treat Rule 15(A) as a vehicle for reopening a closed case.
• If the party wants to litigate additional claims in the same cause, it must first:
  • file a proper post-judgment motion under Rule 59 or 60, and
  • obtain an order vacating or setting aside the judgment.

The Court stresses that this is a bright-line rule. The result would be the same whether Brooks had moved to amend two days, one day, or two years after final judgment.

3. Supporting Indiana precedent

The majority shows that this bright-line rule is consistent with existing Indiana appellate authority:

• Jackson v. Russell, 491 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986): held that amendment is unavailable after final judgment unless the judgment is vacated or set aside.
• Leeper Elec. Servs., Inc. v. City of Carmel, 847 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006): articulated the principle that “a plaintiff may not seek to amend his complaint after judgment unless he first has that judgment vacated or set aside under either T.R. 59 or T.R. 60.”
• Starsiak v. Starsiak, 246 N.E.3d 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024): recently reaffirmed the Leeper rule under “principles of finality of judgments.”

By explicitly endorsing this line of authority, the Supreme Court removes any doubt: Trial Rule 15(A) simply does not operate in the post-judgment context.

4. Alignment with federal practice

The Court also aligns Indiana law with federal civil procedure:

• Johnson v. Levy Organization Development Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986): upheld denial of a motion to amend after summary judgment where “there was no case or controversy pending before the court.”
• BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204 (2025): the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) “does not govern when, following a final judgment, the case is closed and there is no pending pleading to amend.”
• Boyd v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 114 F.4th 1232 (11th Cir. 2024): once final judgment enters, “Rule 15(a) no longer applies and no amendment is possible unless the judgment is first set aside.”

Quoting BLOM, the Court notes that allowing post-judgment amendments under a liberal Rule 15(A) standard:

“would enable the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation.”

Indiana thus deliberately tracks both the conceptual and doctrinal framework of federal practice: Rule 15 is a pre‑judgment, not a post‑judgment, tool.

D. Strategic Alternatives Highlighted by the Court

The majority acknowledges that the outcome is “harsh” in Brooks’s particular circumstances but insists it was “not inevitable.” It points to several alternative strategies that were available to Brooks before the final judgment:

1. Amend pre-judgment: She could have moved to amend her declaratory complaint to add tort counts (including gross negligence and willful misconduct) before the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. The trial court specifically inquired at an earlier hearing why this had not been done.
2. Separate tort action before limitations ran: After final judgment and before the statute of limitations expired, she still had “several days” to file a separate tort lawsuit under a new cause number.
3. Rely on contractual carve-out: Because the Agreement expressly did not bar claims for gross negligence and willful misconduct, Brooks could have proceeded directly with such claims regardless of whether the waiver was enforceable as to ordinary negligence.

The Court essentially characterizes Brooks’s decision to await a favorable declaratory judgment before asserting tort claims as a strategic choice that carried known risks under the doctrine of finality. Those risks, in the Court’s view, cannot justify relaxing the final judgment rule.

E. Precedents and Their Doctrinal Role

1. Finality and the scope of appealable orders

The opinion consolidates several strands in Indiana law on final judgments:

• Bueter v. Brinkman and Hudson v. Tyson – define the outer bounds of what counts as a final judgment and reinforce that complete disposition of all issues and parties ends the case.
• Thompson and Montgomery, Zukerman – underscore that formal imperfections do not prevent an order from being final if it functionally resolves everything.
• Automotive Finance Corp. v. Liu – provides an express policy articulation of why finality matters: resource conservation, stability, and closure.

Brought together, these authorities make clear that once the trial court granted USATF’s summary judgment motion (and denied Brooks’s) on her only claim, the case was over for purposes of Rule 15(A).

2. Post-judgment amendments: from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

The Supreme Court elevates prior Court of Appeals decisions—Jackson, Leeper, Starsiak—to firmly settled statewide doctrine, resolving any tension created by the Court of Appeals’ contrary approach in Brooks’s own intermediate appeal (where it applied Rule 15(A) post-judgment and found an abuse of discretion).

The message is explicit: trial courts have no latitude to treat Rule 15(A) as an avenue for post-judgment amendments. The only permissible route is through Rules 59 or 60 (or separate litigation where still possible).

F. The Dissent: Public Policy Limits on Exculpatory and Indemnity Clauses

Justice Goff’s dissent targets a different fulcrum: he accepts the majority’s finality rule but disputes the propriety of the underlying summary judgment. His analysis is important because it:

• develops a detailed public policy critique of broad exculpatory and indemnity clauses in mass-participation athletics, and
• may influence future litigation and legislative discourse, even though it is not controlling law.

1. Contract enforceability: presumption and limits

Indiana generally adheres to a “very strong presumption of enforceability” for freely bargained contracts (Trotter v. Nelson), but recognizes two principal grounds for refusal to enforce:

1. Unconscionability or contract of adhesion, and
2. Contravention of public policy.

Brooks argued both. Justice Goff:

• rejects the claim that the Agreement is an unconscionable contract of adhesion, noting Brooks’s education and experience and her ability to understand or reject the terms, and
• accepts the argument that the Agreement violates Indiana public policy.

2. Public policy analysis under Trotter and Ransburg

Drawing on Trotter and Ransburg v. Richards, Justice Goff applies five factors to determine whether a contract term contravenes public policy:

1. the nature of the contract’s subject matter,
2. the strength of the underlying public policy,
3. the likelihood that refusing to enforce the clause will further that policy,
4. the seriousness of the forfeiture for the enforcing party, and
5. the parties’ relative bargaining power and freedom to contract.

In Ransburg, the Court of Appeals invalidated an exculpatory clause in residential leases that insulated landlords from liability for their own negligence, citing the vast number of affected tenants, inherent inequality of bargaining power, and the public interest in safe housing and responsible maintenance.

3. Applying those principles to the USATF Agreement

Justice Goff emphasizes several features of the USATF waiver and indemnity agreement:

• Extremely hazardous subject matter: USATF itself describes its events as “inherently dangerous” and “an extreme test of a person’s physical and mental limits.”
• “Blanket release” from negligence “without limitation”: The clause purports to bar recovery for virtually any injury related to USATF events, not only for USATF but for a sweeping array of other entities and individuals.
• Overbroad set of protected parties: The “Released Parties” include:
  • USATF and its affiliates and members,
  • the USOC,
  • event directors, host organizations, venue owners,
  • organizers, promoters, sponsors, advertisers, coaches, officials,
  • law enforcement agencies and “other public entities,” and
  • their parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, volunteers, etc.
• Hypothetical but realistic extremes: Read literally, the provision could bar:
  • a medical malpractice action by an athlete injured by event medical providers, or
  • a civil action for sexual assault by a law enforcement officer or volunteer at the event,
  by characterizing such harms as arising from “inadequate safety measures,” “situations beyond the immediate control of the Event Organizers,” or other “not readily foreseeable and presently unknown risks and dangers.”

In Justice Goff’s view, this breadth:

“contravenes the long established common law rules of tort liability.”

He relies on Beckett v. Clinton Prairie School Corp., which holds that those conducting or supervising a sporting event owe a general duty of ordinary and reasonable care to participants and spectators. While courts may consider “ordinary hazards incidental to a sporting activity,” those considerations do “not operate to diminish the required standard of ordinary and reasonable care.”

By insulating a wide cast of actors from liability for their own negligence, the Agreement, in his view, “destroys the concept of negligence” in this context—echoing the language used in Ransburg.

4. Indemnity structure and chilling effect on claims

Although the Agreement carves out claims based on “gross negligence and/or willful misconduct,” Justice Goff stresses that its fee-shifting and indemnity mechanics are structured to deter even those claims. Because:

• Brooks would have to indemnify USATF for “Liability” of any kind, including attorneys’ fees, unless she could establish gross negligence or willful misconduct,
• an athlete who brings such a claim but fails to meet that elevated standard could face an “insurmountable” financial exposure.

Unlike a mutual “prevailing party” fees clause (common in many contracts, as in Harrison v. Thomas), this indemnity operates one‑way in favor of USATF, materially increasing the risk to would-be plaintiffs.

5. Scope of impact and public interest

Justice Goff also stresses that:

• this is not a one-off, privately negotiated agreement; in 2021 alone, 93,354 USATF members signed the same form, and that figure was depressed due to COVID,
• the widespread use of this exculpatory language affects “thousands of potential athletes,”
• enforcement thus implicates a “matter of public interest,” not merely a private bargain.

He also invokes Pfenning v. Lineman, which recognizes a “strong public policy” favoring participation in athletic activities. In his view, a regime where athletes must essentially waive all negligence-based protection to compete in high-risk events runs counter to that policy.

Finally, although he does not find the contract unconscionable, he notes that athletes have “zero bargaining power” to negotiate the indemnity terms, amplifying concerns about fairness and public policy.

On this analysis, Justice Goff would hold the Agreement void as against public policy, reverse summary judgment in USATF’s favor, and permit Brooks’s negligence claims to proceed, given that her motion to amend was filed before the statute of limitations expired.

G. Majority vs. Dissent: Tension Points

The core tension between the majority and dissent lies in the relationship between procedural finality and substantive justice.

• The majority:
  • focuses squarely on procedure: once the trial court entered final judgment, it lacked authority under Rule 15(A) to entertain an amendment;
  • treats Brooks’s strategic decision to delay tort claims as the dispositive cause of her predicament;
  • declines to revisit whether the Agreement should have been enforced, summarily affirming the Court of Appeals’ analysis on that point.
• The dissent:
  • accepts the majority’s procedural rule in the abstract,
  • argues that enforcing this Agreement undermines core tort principles and public policy,
  • contends that because the Agreement should have been declared unenforceable, summary judgment was improper and there was no valid final judgment to bar amendment.

Procedurally, the majority’s bright-line holding on Rule 15(A) will govern future cases. Substantively, Justice Goff’s critique of expansive exculpatory and indemnity provisions in high-risk, mass-participation contexts may influence trial courts, future litigants, and potentially the legislature, even though it is not binding.

IV. Clarification of Key Legal Concepts

1. Final Judgment Rule

The final judgment rule generally allows appeals only from judgments that end the case in the trial court. A judgment is “final” if:

• it resolves all issues as to all parties, and
• leaves nothing for further decision except enforcement.

Once final judgment enters:

• the trial court loses authority to act in most respects, except as permitted by post-judgment rules (e.g., correcting errors, granting relief from judgment), and
• the appellate timeline begins.

2. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a mechanism to decide cases without trial when:

• there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and
• the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

When summary judgment is entered on all claims for or against a party, it often functions as a final judgment.

3. Trial Rule 15(A): Amendments

Rule 15(A) governs amendment of pleadings while the case is pending. It:

• permits one amendment as of right before a responsive pleading, and
• allows further amendments with court permission or consent of the opposing party, which “shall be given when justice so requires.”

After this decision, litigants must understand that:

• Rule 15(A) cannot be used once final judgment enters;
• to amend after final judgment, the judgment must first be vacated under Rule 59 or 60.

4. Trial Rules 59 and 60

• Trial Rule 59 (motion to correct error) allows a party to seek reconsideration or correction of a final judgment based on alleged legal or factual mistakes, within specified time limits.
• Trial Rule 60 provides for relief from judgment in limited circumstances (e.g., mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud), often on a stricter standard and sometimes beyond the Rule 59 period.

Only after a judgment is set aside under one of these rules can a party invoke Rule 15(A) to amend the pleadings in that cause.

5. Declaratory Judgment vs. Tort Claims

A declaratory judgment action asks a court to declare the parties’ rights under a contract or statute without necessarily awarding damages. A tort action (e.g., negligence) seeks compensatory damages for injury caused by wrongful conduct.

Brooks’s litigation strategy separated these:

• first, declaratory/injunctive relief to void the waiver and indemnity clause; then
• only if successful, a tort suit seeking damages.

The case illustrates the risk of such sequencing when the statute of limitations on tort claims is running: if the declaratory action ends in a final adverse judgment before tort claims are filed, Rule 15(A) will not rescue late-added claims.

6. Exculpatory and Indemnity Clauses

• An exculpatory clause attempts to release a party from liability for its own conduct (often negligence).
• An indemnity clause requires one party to reimburse another for losses, including possibly judgments and attorneys’ fees, arising out of certain events or claims.

Indiana generally enforces such clauses, but, as the dissent emphasizes, they may be void if:

• they violate a statute, or
• they are contrary to a clearly declared public policy (e.g., undermining common-law duties central to public safety or affecting large numbers of people with no bargaining power).

In Brooks, the majority, by summarily affirming the Court of Appeals, effectively treats the USATF Agreement as enforceable under Indiana law (subject to its gross-negligence/willful-misconduct carve-outs). The dissent, however, offers a detailed blueprint for challenging similarly broad waivers on public policy grounds.

V. Likely Impact of the Decision

1. Civil Procedure: Cementing Finality Over Post‑Judgment Flexibility

The most immediate impact is on Indiana civil procedure:

• Litigants and trial courts now have an authoritative state supreme court pronouncement that Rule 15(A) stops at the gate of final judgment.
• Post-judgment motions to amend—filed without a concurrent and successful Rule 59 or 60 motion—must be denied as a matter of law.
• Courts cannot treat a Rule 15(A) motion as an implicit request to reopen judgment; a party must clearly and properly invoke post-judgment remedies.

2. Litigation Strategy: “File It or Lose It” Before Judgment

The decision strongly encourages plaintiffs to:

• Plead all plausible claims early, particularly where a release or limitation-of-liability clause is being challenged.
• Use pre-judgment amendments under Rule 15(A) to add tort or statutory claims rather than waiting on a declaratory ruling.
• Consider parallel or protective filings—for example, combining declaratory and damages claims in a single action, or filing declaratory and tort actions concurrently (though claim-splitting and preclusion issues must be managed carefully).
• Monitor statutes of limitation closely, ensuring that waiting on a declaratory judgment does not effectively forfeit damages claims.

3. Sports and Mass‑Participation Agreements

Substantively, the Court:

• endorses the enforceability (via summary affirmance) of a very broad waiver and indemnity agreement used by a national governing body for tens of thousands of athletes each year,
• signals that Indiana courts will generally uphold well‑drafted releases in sports contexts, at least as to ordinary negligence,
• preserves the possibility of claims for gross negligence or willful misconduct where such clauses expressly carve them out.

Justice Goff’s dissent, however, shines a bright spotlight on the public policy stakes of such contracts. Even though not controlling, his analysis may:

• encourage plaintiffs to develop robust factual records on the breadth and practical effects of such clauses,
• persuade some trial courts to scrutinize the outer margins of exculpatory agreements, especially where they affect large populations and core safety obligations,
• prompt athletic organizations to revisit the scope and symmetry of indemnity and fee-shifting provisions, and
• motivate legislative attention to liability releases in high-risk sporting events.

4. Access to Justice and Risk Allocation

Brooks also underscores the tension between:

• finality and efficiency in civil justice, and
• substantive access to remedies where contract clauses, combined with procedural rules, may effectively bar even colorable claims.

The majority explicitly separates its procedural holding from any judgment about the merits of Brooks’s potential tort claims, acknowledging the “gravity” of her allegations and the shattering of her Olympic dreams. But the outcome demonstrates that:

• procedural missteps (or aggressive contracting) can completely foreclose merits adjudication, and
• indemnity structures can powerfully dissuade injured parties from seeking redress, particularly where the financial downside of an unsuccessful suit is extreme.

VI. Conclusion

Brooks v. USA Track & Field makes a significant and clarifying contribution to Indiana civil procedure:

• It definitively holds that Indiana Trial Rule 15(A) does not apply after final judgment. Once a trial court enters a final judgment disposing of all claims as to all parties, there is no pending pleading to amend, and the court has no discretion under Rule 15(A) to allow amendment.
• Any post-judgment attempt to amend must proceed through the narrow gateways of Trial Rules 59 and 60 (vacating or setting aside the judgment) or by filing a new action where limitations and preclusion rules permit.

The case also showcases a deep division over the public policy treatment of expansive waivers and indemnity agreements in mass-participation sports. While the majority leaves intact the enforceability of USATF’s agreement, Justice Goff’s dissent warns that such clauses may erode fundamental tort principles and deter legitimate claims in ways that are incompatible with Indiana’s public policy.

For litigants and counsel, the key practical lessons are:

• Assert all necessary claims before final judgment, using Rule 15(A) proactively while the case is still live.
• Do not rely on post-judgment amendments to salvage unpled claims; instead, promptly pursue relief under Rules 59/60 or file a separate action if time remains.
• Scrutinize the breadth and structure of exculpatory and indemnity clauses, especially in contexts involving large populations and substantial power imbalances.

In sum, the decision reinforces a central message of civil procedure: finality is a structural value that procedural rules protect even at the cost of harsh results in individual cases. Going forward, Indiana practitioners must navigate that reality with careful pleading strategy and a clear understanding that the window for flexible amendment closes the moment final judgment is entered.