Fifth Circuit Declares §1503(a) Limitation Non-Jurisdictional & Allows Timely Motions to Reopen to Reset the Clock
Commentary on Sarabia v. Noem, No. 24-50750 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025)

1. Introduction

This appeal presented a deceptively narrow procedural question with sweeping practical consequences for litigants seeking a declaration of U.S. citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a): Is the statute’s five-year filing deadline “jurisdictional,” thereby stripping courts of authority once the period lapses, or is it a waivable/non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule? Further, when does the five-year clock start—upon the first denial by the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) or upon the later denial of a timely motion to reopen or reconsider?

Plaintiff-appellant Enrique Villegas Sarabia, born in Mexico to a U.S.-citizen father, exhausted administrative remedies but waited almost five years after the AAO denied his motion to reopen before suing. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, accepting the Government’s view that the time bar is jurisdictional and that the clock began with the AAO’s original dismissal of his appeal.

A panel of Judges Wiener, Douglas (author), and Ramirez reversed, holding that:

• § 1503(a)’s five-year limitation is non-jurisdictional; and
• the denial of a timely motion to reopen/reconsider constitutes the “first final administrative denial,” thereby restarting the five-year period.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying the Supreme Court’s “clear-statement” methodology (Arbaugh, Boechler, Wilkins, Riley, etc.), the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress did not “clearly tie” the filing deadline to the grant of jurisdiction. Accordingly:

1. The five-year limitation is an ordinary claims-processing rule, subject to waiver, forfeiture, and equitable doctrines.
2. When an applicant files a motion to reopen/reconsider within the regulatory 30-day window, the ultimate denial of that motion is the operative “final administrative denial” for limitations purposes.
3. The district court therefore had subject-matter jurisdiction; Sarabia’s suit—filed within five years of the 2018 motion-denial—was timely.
4. The case was remanded for consideration on the merits.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015) & Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. 199 (2022) – established the modern clear-statement rule distinguishing jurisdictional provisions from non-jurisdictional deadlines.
• Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023); Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2023); Harrow v. Dep’t of Defense, 601 U.S. 480 (2024); Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025) – reinforced the Supreme Court’s skepticism toward jurisdictional characterisations of procedural rules.
• Fifth Circuit trio – Gonzalez v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186 (2019); Cambranis v. Blinken, 994 F.3d 457 (2021); and Flores v. Pompeo, 936 F.3d 273 (2019) – previously described § 1503(a)’s deadline as “jurisdictional,” but only in dicta or without conducting the clear-statement analysis.
• Eleventh Circuit’s Sloan v. Drummond Co., 102 F.4th 1169 (11th Cir. 2024) – employed a conflicting three-factor test; the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt Sloan’s approach.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings Rejected. Earlier Fifth Circuit opinions merely assumed the deadline was jurisdictional; such “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” carry no precedential weight after Arbaugh.
2. Textual Dissection of § 1503(a). The final sentence contains three clauses: (i) suits “may be instituted only within five years after the final administrative denial,” (ii) they “shall be filed” in the district where the claimant resides (a venue prescription), and (iii) “jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is conferred upon those courts.” Using the “clear antecedent” rule from Boechler, the panel found that “those courts,” “such officials,” and “such cases” naturally refer to venue and parties—not to the five-year clause. There is no unmistakable link between jurisdiction and the limitation.
3. Sovereign-Immunity Argument Dismissed. Waivers of sovereign immunity define a court’s power, but attaching a limitation to a waiver does not automatically render the limitation jurisdictional (Wilkins).
4. Finality & Motions to Reopen. Relying on Gonzalez, the court distinguished between (a) repetitive, untimely follow-on filings (which do not reset limitations) and (b) a single, timely motion to reopen or reconsider within the same administrative docket (which does postpone finality). This strikes a balance between “finality” and “fair opportunity” for applicants whose evidence genuinely improves.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• Lower Barriers for § 1503(a) Litigants. District courts in the Fifth Circuit must now treat the five-year period as an affirmative defense, subject to waiver and equitable tolling (e.g., fraudulent concealment, extraordinary circumstances).
• Administrative Strategy. Applicants may safely pursue a timely motion to reopen without forfeiting judicial review, reducing the need for protective district-court filings.
• Alignment with Supreme Court Doctrine. The ruling harmonises Fifth Circuit law with the Court’s modern skepticism of jurisdictional labels, which may deter further certiorari or be cited by other circuits confronting similar statutory structures.
• Potential Uptick in Litigation. Because missed deadlines no longer automatically doom suits, immigration-related declaratory actions could increase, compelling agencies and courts to litigate on the merits.
• Signal Beyond Immigration. Statutes pairing a limitations clause and venue plus the word “jurisdiction” in the same sentence will now be read narrowly; federal litigants may invoke Sarabia to challenge jurisdictional characterisations elsewhere.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Jurisdictional Requirement – A rule that determines a court’s power to hear a case. If absent, the case must be dismissed and the defect cannot be waived.
• Claims-Processing Rule – A procedural deadline or step governing litigation conduct. It can be waived, forfeited, or equitably tolled.
• Clear-Statement Test – Doctrine requiring Congress to “speak clearly” if it intends a procedural rule to have jurisdictional consequences.
• Drive-By Jurisdictional Ruling – An earlier judicial statement calling a requirement “jurisdictional” without analysis; accorded little precedential weight.
• Final Administrative Denial – The agency decision that concludes administrative review. Under Sarabia, if a motion to reopen/reconsider is timely, denial of that motion is the final denial.
• Motion to Reopen vs. Motion to Reconsider – Reopen introduces new facts/evidence; reconsider challenges legal or factual errors in the prior decision. Both must ordinarily be filed within 30 days under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

5. Conclusion

Sarabia v. Noem cements two critical propositions:

1. The five-year filing deadline in § 1503(a) is not jurisdictional; it is subject to waiver, forfeiture, and equitable exceptions.
2. A timely motion to reopen or reconsider extends the limitations period, and its denial becomes the operative “final administrative denial.”

The ruling realigns Fifth Circuit precedent with recent Supreme Court guidance, enhances procedural fairness for individuals asserting derivative citizenship, and offers a cautionary tale: courts must scrutinise statutory language before branding a rule “jurisdictional.” Going forward, litigants and district courts alike must treat the § 1503(a) deadline as an ordinary, albeit important, procedural requirement, not a jurisdictional bar.