Fee-Shifting in Police Disability Benefit Termination Cases: Commentary on Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago

I. Introduction

The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131305, clarifies a recurring and practically important question in Illinois pension and administrative law: when may a disabled police officer recover attorney fees and litigation costs after successfully challenging the Retirement Board’s decision in court?

The case lies at the intersection of several provisions of the Illinois Pension Code governing disability benefits for Chicago police officers:

Section 5-154: duty disability benefits (injury in the performance of an act of duty)
Section 5-154.1: occupational disease disability benefits
Section 5-155: ordinary disability benefits (non-duty related)
Section 5-156: proof of disability and periodic re-examinations
Section 5-228(b): fee-shifting provision for officers who prevail in administrative review challenging the denial of certain disability benefits

The central dispute was interpretive: does section 5-228(b), which awards attorney fees to a policeman whose “application” for a duty or occupational disease disability benefit “has been denied” and who “prevails” on administrative review, apply only to the initial denial of an application, or also to situations where the Board later discontinues already-awarded duty or occupational disease disability benefits following a status review?

The Board argued for a narrow reading: fees only when an original application under section 5-154 or 5-154.1 is denied in the first instance, not when previously granted benefits are cut off. The officer, Tamica N. Rainey, contended that the statute’s text and structure support a broader reading that includes reversals of terminations of ongoing duty disability benefits.

The Illinois Supreme Court sided with Rainey, holding that section 5-228(b) authorizes attorney fees and costs when a police officer successfully challenges, on administrative review, either:

the initial denial of duty or occupational disease disability benefits, or
the discontinuation of such benefits after they have been awarded.

The decision is significant because it ensures that disabled officers with duty-related or occupational disease disabilities can obtain fee-shifting protection not only when their initial applications are wrongly denied but also when their established benefits are improperly terminated at status reviews.

II. Case Background

A. The Parties

Plaintiff/Appellee: Tamica N. Rainey, a Chicago police officer who suffered duty-related injuries in on-duty car accidents in 2013 and 2015.
Defendant/Appellant: The Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the “Board”), the entity administering disability benefits for Chicago police officers under Article 5 of the Illinois Pension Code.

B. Factual and Procedural History

Rainey was injured in car accidents while performing her duties as a Chicago police officer. In 2016, she applied for duty disability benefits under section 5-154 of the Illinois Pension Code. In 2017, the Board awarded her duty disability benefits at 75% of salary based on duty-related neck and shoulder injuries.

Under section 5-156, a disabled officer receiving duty, occupational disease, or ordinary disability benefits must submit to annual medical examinations and continuing proof of disability. In Rainey’s case, that led to a series of Board status hearings:

March 24, 2022: Status hearing to review whether Rainey's duty disability benefits should be continued, modified, or discontinued. She requested and received a continuance to obtain counsel and medical records.
June 30, 2022: Further hearing; Rainey submitted additional medical records. The Board continued the matter to review the new submissions.
August 25, 2022: Rainey requested another continuance. The Board instead offered her an ordinary disability benefit (50% salary under section 5-155) without a hearing, which she declined. The Board then proceeded with the hearing and voted to discontinue her duty disability benefits.

The Board’s written decision (October 27, 2022) concluded Rainey was “no longer disabled as a result of her duty-related injuries.” However, when she reported to the police department for an assignment, the department found her physically unable to perform her duties, could not clear her for full duty, and had no position available within her medical limitations.

Rainey sought judicial review under the Administrative Review Law in the Cook County circuit court. The circuit court:

Reversed the Board’s decision to discontinue duty disability benefits, relying in part on Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446 (2009), which held that an officer remains disabled if the department cannot provide a position with necessary accommodations; and
Awarded Rainey attorney fees and costs in the amount of $33,981.94 under section 5-228(b).

The Board appealed. The appellate court:

Affirmed the reversal of the discontinuation of duty disability benefits, and
Affirmed the award of attorney fees and costs under section 5-228(b). (2024 IL App (1st) 231993)

The Board then petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, but challenged only the attorney fee and cost award, not the determination that Rainey’s duty disability benefits must be restored.

III. Summary of the Illinois Supreme Court’s Holding

The Illinois Supreme Court held that:

Section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code authorizes recovery of attorney fees and costs by a police officer who prevails on administrative review when challenging either:
- the denial of an initial application for duty (section 5-154) or occupational disease (section 5-154.1) disability benefits; or
- the discontinuation of previously granted duty or occupational disease disability benefits, when that discontinuation is reversed on administrative review.
Section 5-228(b) does not authorize attorney fees and costs for officers whose benefits are only under section 5-155 (ordinary disability) for non-duty-related disabilities.
The Court affirmed the appellate court and circuit court judgments and reversed the Board’s decision, as to the fee issue, thus upholding Rainey’s fee award.

The Court explicitly rejected the Board’s interpretation that the fee-shifting provision applies only to initial denials and not to status-review terminations, and it disapproved of the reasoning in two prior nonprecedential appellate orders (Warner and Koniarski) that had limited section 5-228(b) to initial applications.

IV. The Statutory Framework

A. Types of Disability Benefits

Article 5 of the Illinois Pension Code creates three principal types of disability benefits for Chicago police officers:

Duty Disability Benefit — Section 5-154 Available to an “active policeman who becomes disabled ... as the result of injury incurred ... in the performance of an act of duty.”
Key features:
- Benefit level: 75% of salary at time the disability is allowed.
- Injury must be duty-related.
Occupational Disease Disability Benefit — Section 5-154.1 Available where an officer with at least 10 years of service suffers a disabling heart attack or heart disease (or other qualifying occupational disease) arising out of employment but not qualifying under section 5-154.
Key features:
- Benefit level: 65% of salary at time of removal from payroll.
- Still a job-related disability (occupational disease rather than specific act-of-duty injury).
Ordinary Disability Benefit — Section 5-155 Available to officers less than age 63 who become disabled “as the result of any cause other than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty.”
Key features:
- Benefit level: lower than duty disability (e.g., 50% salary).
- Disability is not job-related.

Sections 5-154, 5-154.1, and 5-155 establish substantive entitlement to three distinct benefit types, keyed to the cause and type of disability.

B. Proof of Disability and Annual Review — Section 5-156

Section 5-156, titled “Proof of disability—Physical examinations,” is a procedural section that governs:

The proof required to obtain disability benefits (duty, occupational disease, or ordinary);
The Board’s authority to require medical examinations and additional evidence;
The obligation of a disabled policeman receiving benefits to undergo at least annual examination(s); and
The Board’s authority to discontinue benefits when “the disability ceases.”

Crucially, section 5-156:

Applies explicitly to all three disability categories (duty, occupational disease, ordinary);
Uses the same basic proof structure both for the initial award and the continuation of benefits; and
Authorizes the Board to discontinue payments when it concludes the disability has ended, at which point the officer is to be returned to active service.

The Supreme Court treats section 5-156 as setting out a single continuous process by which disability status is established and monitored, rather than two separate and distinct “applications” — one for initiation and another for continuation.

C. Fee-Shifting in Administrative Review — Section 5-228(b)

Section 5-228, titled “Administrative Remedies,” includes at subsection (b) a limited fee-shifting provision. In substance, it provides:

If a policeman’s application for:
- a duty disability benefit under section 5-154, or
- an occupational disease disability benefit under section 5-154.1
has been denied by the Board, and
the policeman brings an action for administrative review challenging the denial and prevails in that action,
then the officer is entitled to recover from the Fund:
- court costs,
- litigation expenses, and
- reasonable attorney fees,
as part of the costs of the action.

By its terms, section 5-228(b) addresses only duty and occupational disease disability benefits, and does not mention ordinary disability under section 5-155. This textual omission becomes central to the Court’s reasoning about who gets fee-shifting protection and who does not.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Approach to Statutory Interpretation

The Court applied familiar Illinois interpretive principles:

Primary goal: ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.
Best evidence of intent: the statutory text, read in its plain language and as a whole. (Citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 455, 461 (2010); DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006).)
No surplusage: No term is to be rendered meaningless; courts should not read into statutes exceptions or limitations that the legislature did not express.
Standard of review: Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. (Citing State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow, Inc., 2018 IL 122487, ¶ 18.)

Within this framework, the core interpretive disputes were:

Whether section 5-154 (substantive entitlement) and section 5-156 (proof and examination procedures) create distinct legal processes — initial application vs. continuation — or instead operate as parts of a unified process.
Whether the terms “denied” (in section 5-228(b)) and “discontinue” (in section 5-156) indicate mutually exclusive categories of decisions (initial denial vs. later termination) for purposes of fee-shifting.

B. Unified View of Sections 5-154 and 5-156: Ongoing Entitlement and Process

The Court agreed with the appellate court that:

Section 5-154 confers an ongoing right to duty disability benefits for officers who are disabled due to a duty-related injury.
Section 5-156 defines the procedural mechanism for both:
- obtaining the initial award of disability benefits, and
- continuing or discontinuing those benefits over time.

The appellate court had described Rainey's status review as an “ongoing section 5-154 application,” emphasizing that there is only one process to obtain and retain disability benefits. The Supreme Court endorsed that characterization.

Key reasoning:

Section 5-156 applies to “proof of duty, occupational disease, or ordinary disability” and refers both to:
- “applicant[s]” — those initially seeking benefits, and
- “disabled policeman[s]” — those already receiving benefits.
In both contexts, the subject is the same: establishing or maintaining proof of disability status.
The type of evidence required to continue benefits is “the same type” as that required initially: medical proof that the officer remains disabled due to the duty-related injury.
There is no textual distinction in section 5-156 between the evidentiary burden for an initial award and for continuation; nor is there any suggestion that a separate, qualitatively different “application” process exists for continuation.

On this view, when the Board held a status hearing in 2022 and decided to discontinue Rainey’s duty disability benefits, it effectively determined that she was no longer entitled to benefits under section 5-154. That decision is functionally indistinguishable from an initial denial of an application under section 5-154 in terms of its legal effect: it denies the officer ongoing duty disability benefits.

C. “Denied” vs. “Discontinued”: The Court Rejects a Semantic Divide

The Board argued that section 5-228(b) only applies when an “application” is “denied,” whereas section 5-156 speaks of benefits being “discontinue[d]” when the disability ceases. From this, the Board sought to draw a sharp line:

“Denied” — applies only to the initial application.
“Discontinued” — applies only to terminations after a status review.

The Court found this distinction “without a difference” for purposes of section 5-228(b):

Section 5-228(b) refers to an officer “whose application ... has been denied” and who challenges the “denial.” Nothing in that language limits the denial to first-time applications.
If the legislature had intended such a limitation, it could have expressly differentiated section 5-154 (initial entitlement) from section 5-156 (continued proof) within section 5-228(b), just as it did distinguish between:
- section 5-154 (duty disability),
- section 5-154.1 (occupational disease), and
- section 5-155 (ordinary disability).
Its failure to do so indicated no intention to withhold fee-shifting from officers challenging terminations.
The Board’s own written decision stated that Rainey was not “entitled to continuation of duty disability pension benefits pursuant to section 5-154” of the Pension Code. This framing undercut the Board’s attempt to conceptually segregate the termination decision from entitlement under section 5-154.

Thus, the Court treated “denial” in section 5-228(b) as embracing decisions where the Board concludes an officer is not entitled to duty or occupational disease disability benefits, whether at the application stage or at a later status review.

D. Purpose and Policy: Leveling the Playing Field for Duty-Related Disabilities

Although the Court declared the statutory text “unambiguous,” it also articulated a policy rationale that reinforces its reading:

The legislature created fee-shifting in section 5-228(b) specifically for officers with duty-related (section 5-154) or occupational disease (section 5-154.1) disabilities — i.e., injuries tied to public service.
The apparent legislative objective is to:
- Assist disabled officers who must litigate against the Board’s more substantial resources, and
- “level the playing field” for officers compelled to defend their eligibility for benefits that arise from performing their public duties.
Interpreting fee-shifting to apply only to initial denials, but not to improper terminations, would frustrate this purpose. It would:
- Provide fee protection if the Board mishandles the claim at the front end, but
- Withhold protection if the Board mishandles the same disability question later at a status review — a result the Court described as making “no sense.”

The Court concluded that limiting fee-shifting to initial denials would contradict “the legislative intent to assist disabled officers who successfully challenge the denial of their disability benefits, including their continuation.”

E. Distinguishing Duty/Occupational Disease Disabilities from Ordinary Disabilities

A separate but important element of the Court’s reasoning is its treatment of officers with ordinary disability benefits under section 5-155. Section 5-228(b) covers:

Only applications for:
- duty disability under section 5-154, and
- occupational disease disability under section 5-154.1.

It does not mention section 5-155 at all. The Court read this omission as intentional and substantive:

The statute “limits attorney fees and costs awards to police officers whose disabilities are duty related and does not authorize an award to officers obtaining an ordinary disability benefit.”
The legislature “clearly and logically prioritized officers who were wrongly denied job-related disability benefits” (duty and occupational disease), as opposed to those whose disabilities are unrelated to their work as officers.
The policy is that officers disabled by their public service should not have to “foot the bill” to correct improper denials or terminations of those job-related disability benefits.

Accordingly:

Officers seeking or defending duty or occupational disease disability benefits are entitled to fee-shifting when they prevail on administrative review.
Officers seeking or defending ordinary disability benefits are not entitled to fee-shifting under section 5-228(b), regardless of whether the denial or termination is reversed.

F. Rejection of the Board’s Reliance on Legislative Inaction

The Board pointed to proposed, but unsuccessful, legislation which would have:

Extended attorney fee awards to officers who successfully challenge the denial of ordinary disability benefits; and
Explicitly allowed fee awards in cases involving the termination of continued disability benefits (including duty and occupational disease benefits).

The Board argued that the legislature’s failure to enact this proposal signaled its acceptance of interpretations like those in Warner and Koniarski, limiting section 5-228(b) to initial denials of duty/occupational disease benefits. It relied on Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369, 380 (2008), which notes that legislative failure to amend a statute can sometimes evidence legislative approval of judicial interpretations.

The Court was “not persuaded”:

The proposed legislation would have done more than simply codify a judicial interpretation:
- It would have expanded fee-shifting to ordinary disability cases, which section 5-228(b) currently does not cover at all.
The failure to enact such a broadening amendment does not strongly indicate agreement with any particular prior construction of the narrower, existing language.
Moreover, the prior appellate decisions relied on by the Board (Warner and Koniarski) were unpublished Rule 23 orders, expressly nonprecedential and nonbinding, weakening any inference that the legislature was endorsing them.

The Court thus declined to infer legislative approval of the Board’s restrictive interpretation based on legislative inaction.

VI. Treatment of Prior Case Law and Authorities

A. Kouzoukas and the Underlying Disability Determination

Although the Supreme Court did not revisit the merits of Rainey’s disability status (since the Board did not appeal that aspect), it is important to note the role of Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policeman's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446 (2009), in the case’s background.

In Kouzoukas, the Court held that a police officer remains “disabled” for duty disability benefit purposes when:

The officer’s medical condition prevents her from returning to full, regular police duties, and
The police department cannot provide a position with adequate accommodations consistent with her physical limitations.

The circuit court relied on Kouzoukas in reinstating Rainey’s duty disability benefits, reasoning that the police department’s inability to provide her with a suitable position meant her disability had not “ceased” within the meaning of section 5-156. While the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rainey focuses solely on fees, the substantive standard from Kouzoukas is part of the backdrop: the premise of the fee award is that Rainey did prevail on her administrative review challenge to the discontinuation of benefits under the governing legal test for disability.

B. Warner and Koniarski: Nonprecedential and Unpersuasive

The Board cited two unpublished First District Rule 23 orders — Warner v. Retirement Board of the Policeman's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2022 IL App (1st) 200833-U, and Koniarski v. Retirement Board of the Policeman's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2021 IL App (1st) 200501-U — for the proposition that section 5-228(b) applies only to initial applications under section 5-154, not to continuation proceedings under section 5-156.

In both cases, the appellate panels:

Framed the dispute as involving “continuing proof of disability” under section 5-156, not an “application” under section 5-154; and
Concluded, with little elaboration, that section 5-228(b) did not authorize fee awards for successful challenges to terminations of benefits.

The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court below that these decisions were:

Nonprecedential and nonbinding under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23;
Conclusory — they recited statutory language and reached an outcome without meaningful textual or structural analysis; and
Incorrect in their interpretation of section 5-228(b), given the Court’s now-authoritative reading of the statute.

In effect, Rainey definitively rejects the restrictive interpretations in Warner and Koniarski and replaces them with a clear statewide rule.

C. General Statutory Interpretation Authorities

The Court anchored its interpretive method in several earlier decisions:

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. 2d 455 (2010) Cited for the principle that statutory interpretation begins with the plain language and that clear language must be applied as written.
DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49 (2006) Cited in support of the same plain language approach and the prohibition on adding conditions the legislature did not include.
State ex rel. Schad, Diamond & Shedden, P.C. v. My Pillow, Inc., 2018 IL 122487 Cited for the standard that statutory interpretation is a matter of law reviewed de novo.
Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill. 2d 369 (2008) Cited by the Board (and acknowledged by the Court) for the idea that legislative failure to enact an amendment may sometimes suggest legislative approval of a judicial interpretation — but ultimately found inapplicable or unconvincing in this context.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Administrative Review

In Illinois, when a person is aggrieved by a final decision of an administrative agency (like the Retirement Board), they can seek judicial review under the Administrative Review Law. This:

Is not a brand-new lawsuit but a court review of the existing agency record;
Allows the court to affirm, reverse, or modify the agency’s decision; and
Is the exclusive method for challenging many administrative decisions.

In Rainey, the officer used administrative review to challenge the Board’s termination of her duty disability benefits under section 5-156. She prevailed at the circuit and appellate court levels; the Supreme Court then addressed only whether she could recover her litigation expenses under section 5-228(b).

B. Fee-Shifting vs. the American Rule

Under the general “American Rule,” each party to litigation pays their own attorney fees, unless:

A statute explicitly authorizes fee shifting, or
A contract between the parties provides for fee recovery, or
A narrow equitable exception applies (e.g., bad faith).

Section 5-228(b) is a statutory fee-shifting provision: it requires the Fund to pay an officer’s reasonable attorney fees, costs, and litigation expenses if the officer meets the statutory conditions (duty/occupational disease application denied, officer prevails in administrative review).

Rainey clarifies that these protections extend to officers who prevail in undoing improper terminations of duty or occupational disease benefits, not just initial denials.

C. Duty vs. Ordinary Disability

Understanding the distinction between these benefit types is essential:

Duty Disability (Section 5-154): The disability stems directly from an “act of duty” (e.g., injuries incurred while making an arrest, responding to a call, or otherwise in the line of duty). Benefit levels are higher, and officers are recognized as being disabled due to work-related risks.
Occupational Disease Disability (Section 5-154.1): The disability is an occupational disease (like heart disease) that arises from employment, not a discrete “act of duty” injury but still job-related.
Ordinary Disability (Section 5-155): The disability arises from “any cause other than injury incurred in the performance of an act of duty” — for example, off-duty injuries, illnesses, or conditions unrelated to the specific performance of duty.

Section 5-228(b) only protects the first two categories (duty and occupational disease) in terms of fee-shifting. Officers whose disabilities are non-duty-related (ordinary disability) must typically pay their own attorney fees, even if they successfully challenge the Board’s decision.

D. Nonprecedential (Rule 23) Orders

In Illinois, some appellate decisions are issued as Rule 23 orders:

They are nonprecedential — they do not create binding legal rules for future cases, except in limited contexts (like law of the case).
They may be persuasive but are not binding on other panels or the Supreme Court.

Warner and Koniarski, on which the Board relied, were such Rule 23 orders. The Supreme Court in Rainey emphasized both their nonbinding status and the lack of substantive analysis in them, reducing their persuasive force.

E. “Prevailing” in Administrative Review

Section 5-228(b) grants fees to a policeman who “prevails” in administrative review. In Rainey, this meant:

The circuit court reversed the Board’s discontinuation of duty disability benefits and reinstated them; and
The appellate court affirmed that decision.

Thus, Rainey clearly “prevailed” — she obtained the judicial relief she sought. The Court did not address more nuanced scenarios (e.g., partial success), which may be litigated in future cases.

VIII. Impact and Implications

A. Practical Effects for Disabled Officers

The decision has clear practical significance for Chicago police officers with duty-related or occupational disease disabilities:

Officers who already receive duty or occupational disease benefits and face termination at a status hearing can:
- Challenge the decision via administrative review without bearing the full burden of litigation costs if they are vindicated in court; and
- Expect recovery of reasonable attorney fees and costs if they prevail.
This may:
- Encourage officers with meritorious claims to seek judicial review rather than abandoning their benefits due to cost concerns; and
- Improve access to experienced legal counsel willing to undertake these cases, knowing that a fee award is available if they succeed.

B. Effects on the Retirement Board and the Fund

For the Board and the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund:

The risk of paying attorney fees and costs in both initial denial and termination cases may:
- Incentivize more careful, evidence-based decision-making at status reviews; and
- Discourage arbitrary or weakly supported terminations of duty or occupational disease benefits.
At the same time, the Fund faces potential increases in expenditures on:
- Fee awards in successful administrative review challenges; and
- Defending more challenges, as officers may be more willing to litigate.

The Court’s opinion effectively acknowledges these trade-offs but emphasizes the legislature’s policy choice to prioritize support for officers disabled in the course of public service.

C. Clarification of Illinois Pension and Administrative Law

Rainey provides authoritative guidance in several respects:

It definitively resolves a statutory ambiguity that had produced divergent lower-court interpretations about the reach of section 5-228(b).
It confirms that:
- Section 5-154 confers an ongoing right to duty disability benefits; and
- Section 5-156 is the unified procedural mechanism for both the award and continuation of all disability benefits (duty, occupational disease, and ordinary).
It underscores the Court’s willingness to:
- Disregard nonprecedential decisions that lack thorough analysis; and
- Reject arguments based on legislative inaction when those arguments rest on weak inferences.

D. Implications for Future Litigation and Legislation

Looking ahead:

Officers and their counsel will likely:
- Invoke Rainey to seek fees not only after initial denials but also after wrongful terminations of duty/occupational disease benefits.
- Frame their claims clearly under section 5-154 or 5-154.1 to fall within the fee provision.
The legislature may revisit the scope of fee-shifting. Potential directions include:
- Codifying Rainey explicitly; and/or
- Deciding whether to extend fee-shifting to ordinary disability cases, which Rainey confirms are currently outside section 5-228(b).

While the Court refrained from drawing inferences from failed legislative proposals, its clear resolution of the current statutory scheme gives the legislature a stable foundation for any future amendments.

IX. Critical Reflections and Open Questions

Rainey is a relatively focused decision, but it raises or leaves open some nuanced points:

Scope of “prevailing”: The opinion assumes a straightforward win (benefits reinstated). Future cases may address:
- Whether partial success (e.g., benefits reinstated for some period but not others) qualifies as “prevailing,” and
- How courts should apportion fees in mixed-outcome cases.
Extent of coverage of litigation stages: Section 5-228(b) speaks of costs and fees “as part of the costs of the action” in administrative review. While nothing in Rainey limits recovery to a particular court level, future disputes may clarify:
- Whether fees incurred on appeal (including to the Supreme Court) are recoverable; and
- How trial courts should calculate and allocate such fees.
Border cases involving benefit conversions: For example:
- Where the Board terminates duty disability benefits but grants ordinary disability; or
- Where a court orders a change from ordinary to duty disability. Under Rainey, an officer who ultimately secures duty or occupational disease benefits after challenging a Board decision that downgraded those benefits would appear to fall under section 5-228(b), but specific fact patterns may invite further clarification.

Nonetheless, the opinion’s core holding on the availability of fee-shifting in termination cases is clear and robust.

X. Conclusion

Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago establishes an important precedent in Illinois public pension law:

Section 5-228(b) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a police officer who prevails on administrative review when challenging:
- the denial of duty disability benefits under section 5-154 or occupational disease disability benefits under section 5-154.1, or
- the discontinuation of such benefits following a status review under section 5-156.
This fee-shifting does not extend to officers dealing solely with ordinary disability benefits under section 5-155.

By reading the statutory scheme as a coherent whole and giving weight to the legislature’s evident concern for officers disabled in the line of duty, the Court ensures that those officers are not unfairly burdened with the costs of vindicating their right to disability benefits — whether at the initial claim stage or when benefits are wrongly cut off later. Rainey thus strengthens both the procedural protections for disabled officers and the clarity of the Illinois Pension Code’s fee-shifting framework.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.