Failure to Attend Successor Onboarding Is Not an Adverse Action by the Outgoing Employer: The Tenth Circuit’s ADA Baseline in Swepson v. Aimbridge

Introduction

In Swepson v. Aimbridge Employee Service Corp. (10th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025), the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims brought by a pro se plaintiff, Awntwanay Swepson. The case arose from a short-term hotel position that ended when a new management company replaced the defendant employer. The appellate court held that the record showed the employer provided the accommodations requested, there was no disability-based adverse employment action, and the alleged workplace conflicts were not shown to be motivated by disability-related animus or severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.

The opinion also rejects claims of judicial bias and reiterates the limits on appointing counsel in civil cases, emphasizing that district courts can request but cannot compel or fund counsel for indigent litigants. Although issued as a nonprecedential order and judgment, the decision is citable for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 and provides clear guidance, particularly on ADA claims in the context of a management transition and successor onboarding.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Chief Judge Holmes, joined by Judges Tymkovich and Moritz) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Aimbridge Employee Service Corporation and the denial of the plaintiff’s post-judgment motions under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). The court:

Agreed that the employer accommodated the plaintiff’s requests (including a chair at the front desk and flexible shift lengths with breaks), and the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony confirmed she was “working well having those accommodations being met” (R. at 135).
Concluded the plaintiff failed to show an adverse employment action by the defendant. In particular, when a new management company took over, Aimbridge texted a specific onboarding date and time for the successor employer; the plaintiff acknowledged this message but did not attend and never applied to the successor. The court held the record did not tie any termination or other adverse action to disability-based discrimination by Aimbridge.
Held the alleged co-worker incidents were not shown to be motivated by disability-related animus and were neither severe nor pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment under the ADA.
Rejected assertions of judicial bias, noting that adverse rulings rarely indicate bias and the magistrate judge properly applied the factors governing requests for appointed counsel.
Explained the structural limits on court-appointed counsel in civil cases: courts may request, but cannot compel or fund, representation for pro se litigants.

The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment de novo and the denial of the Rule 59(e)/60(b) motions for abuse of discretion and adopted the district court’s reasoning in its December 5, 2024 and January 15, 2025 orders.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Iweha v. Kansas, 121 F.4th 1208, 1220 (10th Cir. 2024): Cited for the standard of review; summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. This underscores that the appellate court looked afresh at the record but still found no genuine issues of material fact for trial.
Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008): Establishes that denials of Rule 59(e)/60(b) relief are reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frame set a high bar for overturning the district court’s post-judgment rulings.
Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009): Courts liberally construe pro se filings but do not act as a litigant’s advocate. This principle explains why the district court afforded procedural leniency yet required evidence and proper legal support at summary judgment.
Scheer v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Sys., Inc., 144 F.4th 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 2025): Quoted for the definition of an adverse employment action: a plaintiff must show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” The panel relied on this standard to conclude that, on the undisputed facts, the plaintiff did not suffer a cognizable adverse action by Aimbridge tied to disability discrimination.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994): Judicial rulings alone almost never establish bias. This precedent was decisive in rejecting the plaintiff’s generalized claims that adverse procedural rulings evidenced partiality.
Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995): Addresses the factors for recruiting counsel in civil cases and sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for review. The opinion confirms the magistrate judge weighed the proper considerations.
Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 397 (10th Cir. 2016): Clarifies that courts can request, but cannot compel or fund, legal representation for civil litigants; demand for pro bono counsel far exceeds supply. This directly answers the plaintiff’s systemic fairness concerns and frames the court’s institutional limits.
Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 763 (7th Cir. 2022): Offered for persuasive support regarding the scarcity of attorneys available for recruitment, reinforcing Rachel.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) and § 12102(1): Statutory anchors for the ADA discrimination claim and the definition of “disability.”

Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds along three ADA theories the district court construed from the complaint: failure to accommodate, disparate treatment, and hostile work environment. It also addresses post-judgment motions and allegations of judicial bias.

1) Failure to Accommodate

The undisputed facts showed Aimbridge provided the accommodations the plaintiff requested: a chair at the front desk and flexible seven-hour shifts that included breaks and lunch, tracking her request for shorter shifts (R. at 135). While there was a single disagreement during cross-training for bartending—where a trainer told her she could not sit—the manager responded to her complaint and permitted her to go home. On these facts, there was no breakdown in the interactive process attributable to Aimbridge, and no denial of a reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff’s own testimony that she was “working well having those accommodations being met” was dispositive.

2) Disparate Treatment (Adverse Employment Action and Causation)

The court invoked the now-controlling Tenth Circuit articulation from Scheer that an adverse employment action requires “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” The record did not show that Aimbridge took a disability-based action affecting the plaintiff’s terms or conditions of employment. Rather, Aimbridge ceased managing the hotel as of November 1, 2021. The assistant general manager texted the plaintiff a specific onboarding time and date with the incoming management company—“3:30 pm Tuesday the 26th”—and underscored the consequences of not attending, to which the plaintiff responded, “Okay thank you” and “Yes ma’am” (R. at 209). She then did not attend, did not apply to the successor, and did not work after October 18.

On these facts, the court concluded there was no adverse action by Aimbridge that harmed a term or condition of employment, much less because of disability. The non-renewal of work following a management transition, where the employee fails to pursue successor onboarding despite clear notice, does not transform the transition into a disability-based adverse employment action by the outgoing employer. The plaintiff also presented no evidence linking any decision by Aimbridge to her alleged disabilities.

3) Hostile Work Environment

The plaintiff identified discrete conflicts with co-workers: a cross-training incident in July 2021 and two altercations in mid-October (one involving alleged pushing and a “ghetto” comment; the second a dispute after her hair allegedly made contact with a co-worker). The court affirmed on two independent grounds:

No evidence of disability-related animus. The plaintiff did not show that the co-workers even knew of a claimed disability, and the comments/altercations—while potentially rude or offensive—were not tied to disability.
Not severe or pervasive. The incidents, while unpleasant, were too limited and episodic to meet the ADA’s severe-or-pervasive threshold for altering the terms and conditions of employment.

4) Post-Judgment Motions (Rules 59(e) and 60(b))

The district court denied reconsideration despite the plaintiff’s additional evidence of impairments. The Tenth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. While Rule 59(e) can correct manifest error or consider newly discovered evidence, and Rule 60(b) offers extraordinary relief for specific reasons, neither rule permits a party to relitigate or present evidence that could have been offered earlier absent the rule-specific predicates. The district court thoroughly addressed the arguments and identified no basis for disturbing its judgment.

5) Alleged Judicial Bias and Requests for Appointed Counsel

The court rejected claims of bias. Per Liteky, adverse rulings are not evidence of partiality. The magistrate judge assessed the request for counsel under the appropriate factors (Rucks) and denied it; the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. The opinion reinforces that district courts cannot conscript or pay attorneys for civil litigants (Rachel), and that, in light of limited pro bono resources (Watts), the district court’s procedural assistance to the plaintiff (extensions, clear notice on summary judgment practice, and efforts to marshal facts) satisfied its obligations. The difficulties faced by pro se litigants do not, by themselves, warrant reversal.

Impact

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers salient, practical guidance in several areas:

Management transitions and ADA claims: Where an employer’s management contract ends and successor onboarding is clearly communicated, an employee’s failure to attend that onboarding or to apply to the successor does not create an adverse employment action by the outgoing employer. This will be particularly relevant in hospitality and other industries with third-party management transitions.
Failure-to-accommodate baselines: Employers that promptly provide requested accommodations—and whose efforts are corroborated by the employee’s own testimony—stand on strong ground at summary judgment.
Hostile work environment under the ADA: Harassment must be disability-based and severe or pervasive. General workplace friction, even involving police calls, is insufficient without a disability nexus and an alteration of the work environment’s conditions.
“Adverse employment action” after Scheer: The court’s reliance on Scheer’s “some harm” standard shows that ADA disparate treatment claims must be grounded in a concrete, disability-linked change to terms or conditions of employment—not merely a business transition or an employee’s decision not to pursue successor employment.
Pro se litigants and appointed counsel: The opinion underscores institutional limits: courts cannot compel or fund civil counsel and must balance many requests against scarce volunteer resources. District courts can, and should, mitigate burdens through notices, scheduling accommodations, and fair construction of filings—as occurred here.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ADA “disability” (42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)): A person is “disabled” if they have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, have a record of such an impairment, or are regarded as having such an impairment. Not every impairment qualifies; it must substantially limit, not just inconvenience, a major life activity (e.g., walking, standing, working).
Reasonable accommodation: Changes to the work environment or schedule that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the job’s essential functions, unless doing so would cause undue hardship. If the employer provides the requested accommodation and it works, the claim generally fails.
Adverse employment action: A materially meaningful harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment (e.g., pay, assignments, hours, job status). Under Tenth Circuit law, it requires “some harm,” not just trivial inconvenience.
Hostile work environment (ADA): Harassment based on disability must be severe or pervasive enough to alter working conditions. It must be “because of” disability; unrelated insults or friction will not suffice.
Pro se litigant: A person representing themselves without a lawyer. Courts liberally read their filings but still require evidence and adherence to procedural rules; judges cannot act as their attorneys.
Rule 59(e)/Rule 60(b): Tools to seek relief from a judgment. Rule 59(e) corrects clear errors or considers genuinely new evidence; Rule 60(b) offers narrow, extraordinary relief for specified reasons (e.g., newly discovered evidence that could not have been found earlier, or fraud). They are not vehicles to reargue or present evidence that could have been offered before judgment without justification.
Nonprecedential decision (FRAP 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1): An order and judgment that is not binding precedent but may be cited for persuasive value. It binds only under law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Conclusion

Swepson v. Aimbridge confirms foundational ADA litigation principles in a transition-of-management setting. The Tenth Circuit found no triable failure-to-accommodate claim where the employer provided the requested chair and flexible schedule; no disparate treatment where the end of a management contract and clearly noticed successor onboarding, which the employee declined to attend, did not constitute a disability-based adverse action by the outgoing employer; and no hostile work environment where co-worker incidents lacked a disability nexus and were not severe or pervasive. The court also reaffirmed that adverse judicial rulings are not bias, that denials of counsel in civil cases are constrained by law and resources, and that district courts’ reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants do not require reversal when litigants ultimately fail to substantiate claims.

Practically, the decision signals that ADA plaintiffs must marshal evidence linking workplace harms to disability and to the defendant employer, especially in contexts involving successor employers. For defendants, the case illustrates the value of contemporaneous documentation of accommodations and clear communication during management transitions. While nonprecedential, Swepson offers persuasive guidance likely to influence ADA disputes across the Tenth Circuit, particularly in industries where operations frequently change hands.