Eyman v. Hobbs: No Mandamus Duty to Process Referenda Against Facial “Emergency” Legislation in Washington

I. Introduction

In Eyman v. Hobbs, No. 104117-9 (Wash. Nov. 6, 2025), the Washington Supreme Court addressed a recurring tension in Washington’s system of direct democracy: how far the people’s referendum power extends when the legislature invokes an “emergency clause” to exempt a statute from popular review.

Petitioner Tim Eyman sought an extraordinary writ of mandamus compelling Secretary of State Steve Hobbs to accept and process a referendum petition targeting § 501 of Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1296, Laws of 2025, ch. 369. Section 501 concerns parental and student rights in public schools and was part of a broader student safety and rights package. The legislature attached an emergency clause in § 603, making the act effective immediately and, under article II, section 1(b) of the Washington Constitution, purporting to exempt it from referendum.

The Secretary refused to file the referendum, taking the position that he lacked authority to disregard the legislature’s emergency declaration. Eyman argued that:

• the Secretary has a mandatory ministerial duty to accept any properly filed referendum, and
• the emergency clause in § 603 is invalid and cannot bar his referendum.

Sitting en banc and on an expedited basis, the Court denied the petition. The decision clarifies both (1) the Secretary of State’s duty when a referendum challenges a bill facially declared an “emergency” and (2) the highly deferential standard for judicial review of legislative emergency clauses.

Chief Justice Stephens authored the lead opinion, joined by a majority. Justice Johnson concurred separately, emphasizing the availability of adequate remedies in superior court as grounds to deny mandamus. Justice González concurred in the result but warned that the lead opinion risks unnecessary pronouncements about the Secretary’s duties and the Court’s own original jurisdiction, and could inadvertently constrain executive discretion in future cases.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holding

The Court’s core holdings are:

1. No clear mandatory duty to process facially exempt referenda: The Secretary of State has no mandatory duty to process a proposed referendum that, on its face, targets legislation constitutionally exempt from referendum under article II, section 1(b)—specifically, legislation containing a valid emergency clause.
2. The emergency clause in ESHB 1296 is valid: Applying the long-standing, highly deferential standard of review for legislative emergency declarations, the Court holds that § 603’s emergency clause is valid. ESHB 1296 addresses urgent and ongoing harms to students’ safety, mental health, and equal educational access, and the record does not show the emergency clause is “obviously false” or a mere ruse to evade referendum.
3. Mandamus denied: Because the Secretary had no clear and mandatory duty to process the referendum, and because the underlying law is, by virtue of a valid emergency clause, exempt from referendum, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

B. Structure of the Court’s Reasoning

The lead opinion proceeds in three principal steps:

1. Mandamus framework: It reiterates the demanding standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus and focuses on the “clear duty to act” element.
2. Secretary’s role and the referendum power: It interprets article II, section 1(b) and the implementing statutes (chapter 29A.72 RCW) together, concluding the Secretary’s statutory “shall” duties do not extend to measures the constitution itself places outside the referendum power.
3. Validity of the emergency clause: It then, in the interests of judicial economy, reaches and upholds the validity of § 603’s emergency clause using prior precedent (especially CLEAN and Farm Bureau) and legislative materials as “judicial knowledge.”

The concurrences endorse the result but take different tacks. Justice Johnson would deny mandamus primarily because Eyman had adequate alternative judicial remedies in superior court. Justice González agrees there is no clear duty justifying mandamus, but criticizes the lead opinion for reaching beyond what is necessary by effectively suggesting the Secretary has an opposite clear duty—to reject the petition—raising concerns about separation of powers and the Court’s original jurisdiction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Mandamus and the Court’s Original Jurisdiction

• Article IV, section 4 (Washington Constitution) – Grants the Supreme Court nonexclusive and discretionary original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against state officers. The lead opinion grounds its authority to hear the case here, while noting mandamus is “rare and extraordinary” because it directs another branch to act.
• Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 467 P.3d 953 (2020) – Reaffirmed the three-part test for mandamus:
  1. no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,
  2. beneficial interest in the subject matter, and
  3. a clear duty to act on the part of the respondent.
  The lead opinion adopts this framework and notes that failure to satisfy any element is dispositive. The Court ultimately resolves this case on the “clear duty” prong.
• RCW 7.16.160, .170 – Statutory codification of mandamus standards. These statutes reinforce that mandamus compels performance of a “duty resulting from an office, trust, or station” and is unavailable when another adequate remedy exists.
• American Property Casualty Insurance Association v. Kreidler, 200 Wn.2d 654, 520 P.3d 979 (2022) – Emphasizes that mandamus remains discretionary even if the formal elements are met. The Court cites this to underscore its broad remedial discretion.
• Freeman v. Gregoire, 171 Wn.2d 316, 256 P.3d 264 (2011) and Washington State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wn.2d 48, 65 P.3d 1203 (2003) – Both decisions clarify that mandamus may be used not only to compel action but also to prohibit an officer from acting. The lead opinion uses these cases to rebut Justice González’s suggestion that the substance of this case might properly involve a writ of prohibition instead.

Justice Johnson’s concurrence also leans on Colvin, but emphasizes the other prong: petitioners must show no adequate alternative remedy. He notes that Eyman could have proceeded in superior court under the Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW) or the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (chapter 7.24 RCW), both of which can provide full relief. On that basis alone, in his view, mandamus was properly denied.

2. The Referendum Power and “Emergency” Exceptions

• Article II, section 1(b) (Washington Constitution) – Core constitutional text. It provides that voters may seek referendum on:

  “any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, or for the support of the state government and its existing public institutions.”

  The Court describes this as a substantive limit, not a mere procedural condition. Laws in these categories are simply beyond the reach of the referendum power.
• Washington State Farm Bureau Federation v. Reed, 154 Wn.2d 668, 115 P.3d 301 (2005) – Interprets article II, section 1(b) as creating two distinct exceptions:
  1. a “public safety” (or “emergency”) exception – laws deemed necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety, and
  2. a “support” exception – laws necessary for the support of state government and its existing public institutions.
  The Court often refers to both collectively as “emergency clauses.” In Farm Bureau, it upheld an emergency clause attached to revenue legislation that temporarily suspended a supermajority requirement for tax increases, emphasizing deference and absence of evidence of a sham emergency.
• Washington State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wn.2d 48 (2003) – Among other things, it interprets the “public peace, health or safety, or support of the state government” language as containing an “or,” confirming that either basis independently suffices to exempt a law from referendum.

3. Administrative Processing of Initiatives and Referenda

• Chapter 29A.72 RCW (Elections Act – Initiatives and Referendums) – The Court summarizes the statutory process for referenda:
  • RCW 29A.72.010 – Sponsor must submit affidavit of sponsorship, a clear copy of the legislation, and filing fee.
  • RCW 29A.72.040 – “The secretary of state shall give a serial number” and “forthwith transmit” a copy to the attorney general.
  • RCW 29A.72.060 – The attorney general has five days to formulate the ballot title and summary.
  • RCW 29A.72.070, .050, .130 – The secretary then notifies the sponsor; petitions are prepared; signatures must be filed within 90 days after adjournment of the legislative session.
  Eyman relies heavily on this mandatory “shall” language to argue that the Secretary lacks discretion to refuse a properly formatted filing.
• Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 128 Wn.2d 707, 911 P.2d 389 (1996) – A foundational initiative case. An initiative seeking to restructure governance at multiple levels (including purported effects on federal and international law) was submitted; the Secretary accepted it and transmitted it to the Attorney General, who then refused to draft a ballot title on the ground the initiative was outside the scope of the initiative power. The Supreme Court held:
  • the initiative indeed exceeded the state’s legislative power, but
  • the Attorney General had a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to prepare the ballot title and summary for any facially proper initiative; only courts may decide whether a measure exceeds the people’s article II, section 1 power.
  Here, Eyman invokes Philadelphia II to argue by analogy that the Secretary likewise must process his referendum and leave questions of constitutional scope to the courts.

The lead opinion agrees Philadelphia II is instructive but distinguishes it. There, the question was whether the proposed initiative exceeded the people’s power, and the Attorney General impermissibly made a constitutional judgment. The Secretary in that case had, in fact, already performed his statutory duty to file and transmit the initiative.

In contrast, Eyman concerns a proposed referendum on a statute the legislature has already enacted, with an express emergency clause. The Court reasons that while only courts may ultimately determine the validity of the emergency clause, the Secretary has no clear duty to process a referendum on a law that is, on its face, designated as nonreferendable by the constitution itself.

4. Judicial Review of Emergency Clauses

• State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wn.2d 772, 380 P.2d 735 (1963) – Holds that the validity of a legislative emergency declaration is a judicial question. The Court in Eyman relies on this to assert its authority to review § 603’s emergency clause, even while denying that the Secretary may do so.
• State ex rel. McLeod v. Reeves, 22 Wn.2d 672, 157 P.2d 718 (1945) – Reinforces that whether an emergency exists is “in the ultimate, a judicial question.”
• State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915) – The Court’s first major emergency-clause case, decided only three years after the referendum amendment. The legislature had changed the composition of the Board of State Land Commissioners and attached an emergency clause; the governor vetoed the emergency clause, but the legislature overrode the veto. Challengers sought review, and the Court:
  • narrowly construed the emergency exception, rejecting the idea that the legislature’s power to exempt bills from referendum is “unlimited” or extends to measures of mere convenience or economy;
  • held that replacing one officer with another on a board was not “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” as the board’s functions would not be seriously impaired by a short delay;
  • declared the emergency clause invalid, thereby preserving the referendum right.
  Brislawn is invoked as an early example where the Court invalidated an emergency clause but is also partly overruled in other respects by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019).
• CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996) – Perhaps the most significant modern precedent on emergency clauses. The “Stadium Act” to finance a new baseball stadium for the Seattle Mariners included an emergency clause. The Court:
  • acknowledged that the statute itself did not clearly explain the emergency,
  • nonetheless took judicial notice of surrounding facts (e.g., special session, legislative debates, risk of the team’s sale) showing that immediate enactment was necessary to avoid defeating the statute’s purpose,
  • adopted a highly deferential standard: the legislature’s emergency determination is upheld unless “obviously false” or a “palpable attempt at dissimulation.”
  Eyman heavily relies on CLEAN for standard of review, method (face of the act plus judicial knowledge), and deference.
• Farm Bureau (discussed above) – Reiterated CLEAN’s deference and upheld emergency legislation that enabled timely state revenue measures. The Court emphasized that the burden is on the challenger to show the emergency is a sham.
• Other emergency-clause cases – The lead opinion references several cases where emergency clauses were invalidated, demonstrating that judicial review is real though rarely outcome-determinative:
  • State ex rel. Satterthwaite v. Hinkle, 152 Wash. 221, 277 P. 837 (1929)
  • State ex rel. Burt v. Hutchinson, 173 Wash. 72, 21 P.2d 514 (1933)
  • State ex rel. Robinson v. Reeves, 17 Wn.2d 210, 135 P.2d 75 (1943), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wn.2d 320, 363 P.2d 121 (1961)
  • State ex rel. Kennedy v. Reeves, 22 Wn.2d 677, 157 P.2d 721 (1945)
  • Humiston, McLeod, etc.
  The lead opinion cites scholarship (Bryan L. Page, “State of Emergency,” 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 219 (2008)) noting at least seven such invalidations over a century, underscoring that some legislative declarations fail but most survive.
• City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992) – Supplies the “palpable attempt at dissimulation” formulation that CLEAN and the lead opinion use when describing bad-faith emergency clauses.

5. Separation of Powers and the People’s Direct Democracy Powers

• Hale v. Wellpinit School District No. 49, 165 Wn.2d 494, 198 P.3d 1021 (2009) and State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 114 P.3d 627 (2005) – Quoted by Justice González for the metaphor of the Constitution as a “tapestry of checks and balances.” He situates the referendum power as one thread in that tapestry, balanced against other structural features, such as legislative plenary authority and emergency exceptions.
• Historical context (via secondary authority): Justice González references scholarly work (Jeffrey T. Even, “Direct Democracy in Washington,” 32 Gonz. L. Rev. 247 (1996/97)) explaining that Washington’s emergency exception was, in part, a response to historical abuse of the referendum power elsewhere (e.g., small minorities thwarting construction of the University of Oregon). This context informs the constitutional compromise: robust direct democracy, but limited when immediate governance needs are at stake.
• Article IV, section 4 (writ of prohibition) – Justice González stresses that the Court’s original jurisdiction does not include writs of prohibition, and that the lead opinion’s suggestions about a duty to refuse petitions could be read as treading into that territory. He cautions that the Court should not decide broader questions (such as a universal duty not to file certain referenda) that are neither squarely presented nor jurisdictionally proper in this original action.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Mandamus and the “Clear Duty to Act”

The decisive question for the lead opinion is whether the Secretary is under a clear, mandatory legal duty to process the referendum under RCW 29A.72.040, despite the legislature’s emergency clause.

The statutory process does use mandatory language: the Secretary “shall give a serial number” and “shall forthwith transmit” the measure to the Attorney General. Eyman argues that once he has filed a referendum in the correct form, the Secretary’s role is purely ministerial, akin to the Attorney General’s role in Philadelphia II with respect to drafting ballot titles.

The Court rejects this reading on constitutional grounds:

• Article II, section 1(b) itself defines the scope of the referendum power, expressly carving out laws necessary for the immediate preservation of peace, health, or safety, or for the support of state government. Those laws are simply not subject to referendum.
• Statutes implementing the referendum process must be interpreted consistently with those constitutional limits. They cannot be read to require the Secretary to process measures that fall outside the people’s reserved power.
• When the legislature attaches an emergency clause asserting such necessity, the law is, on its face, within the constitutional exception. Unless and until a court invalidates the emergency clause, the measure is not a proper subject for referendum and thus not one the Secretary is under a clear legal duty to process.

The lead opinion emphasizes separation of powers: the Secretary, as an executive officer, lacks authority to adjudicate the validity of a legislative emergency clause. Determining the meaning and constitutionality of legislative acts is a judicial function. To require the Secretary to ignore or override an emergency clause would force him into a quasi-judicial role he is not constitutionally empowered to perform.

Thus, the Court concludes there is no “clear duty to act” under RCW 29A.72.040 when the underlying law bears a facially valid emergency clause. Without such a duty, mandamus cannot issue.

2. Distinguishing Philadelphia II

The Court’s handling of Philadelphia II is central to the doctrinal development. The opinion accepts Philadelphia II’s premise that executive officers cannot themselves decide constitutional scope questions; that function is reserved to the judiciary. But it distinguishes the roles and the timing:

• In Philadelphia II, the Secretary had already accepted the initiative and transmitted it to the Attorney General. The Attorney General then refused to perform his specific, clearly assigned statutory duty—drafting the ballot title and summary—based on his own assessment of constitutional scope. That refusal was impermissible.
• In Eyman, the question arises earlier: whether the Secretary must accept a referendum at all when the target legislation is facially declared an emergency. Here, the Court holds the duty never arises, because the constitution does not extend the referendum power to such laws absent a judicial invalidation of the emergency clause.

Put differently: in Philadelphia II, the measure was within the general class of matters the initiative power covers (a proposed law), and the Attorney General could not self-police the boundary. In Eyman, the measure is plainly directed at a law initially labeled (by the constitution’s terms) as outside the referendum class, and the Secretary has no obligation to push that facial boundary without a court first removing it.

3. Review and Validation of the Emergency Clause in § 603

Having concluded the Secretary has no clear duty unless the emergency clause is invalidated, the Court then decides, for reasons of judicial economy, to address the validity of § 603 directly.

a. Standard of Review

Following CLEAN and Farm Bureau, the Court restates the standard:

• The legislature’s determination that an emergency exists is entitled to “considerable deference” and “every favorable presumption.”
• The Court will uphold an emergency clause unless it is “obvious that the declaration of emergency is false” or a “mere ruse” or “palpable attempt at dissimulation.”
• The Court does not undertake a factual evidentiary inquiry; instead, it looks at the face of the act, assisted by “judicial knowledge”—facts capable of accurate and immediate demonstration from reliable, publicly available sources (e.g., legislative history, official reports, recorded legislative debates).

The burden rests on the challenger (Eyman) to show invalidity. If there is any reasonable doubt, the Court resolves it in favor of the legislature’s judgment.

b. Substantive Content of ESHB 1296

The Court then examines ESHB 1296 itself, with particular focus on:

• The bill’s stated purposes and provisions relating to student safety and rights:
  • Policies that “prioritize the protection of every student’s safety” and ensure an “academic environment free of discrimination.” (§ 101)
  • A “statement of student rights,” including:
    • “[t]he right to learn in a safe, supportive learning environment, free from harassment, intimidation, or bullying,” and
    • “[t]he right to access an academic environment free of discrimination.” (§ 202(2)(b)(ii)-(iii))
  • Parental rights provisions, including immediate notification for:
    • shootings on school property,
    • reports that a child is the victim, target, or recipient of physical or sexual abuse, sexual misconduct, or assault by a school employee or contractor. (§ 501(2)(c), (d))
• The bill’s integration with Washington’s constitutional “paramount duty” under article IX, section 1 to amply provide for the education of all children. The Court emphasizes that creating a safe, nondiscriminatory learning environment is part of that core duty, not merely a matter of administrative convenience.

The Court rejects Eyman’s argument that an “emergency” must be tied to something “unforeseen,” citing Porter but clarifying the concept: an emergency can include legislation designed to “immediately mitigate and address significant and ongoing harm,” such as continuing risks of bullying, violence, discrimination, mental health crises, and student self-harm.

c. Judicial Knowledge and Legislative Record

The Court supplements the face of the act with “judicial knowledge” drawn from legislative materials:

• Bill Reports and Public Testimony: Senate Bill Reports reflect testimony that:
  • the bill is “student-centered,” focusing on creating welcoming, inclusive environments where students feel they belong;
  • existing legal frameworks had “spread disinformation, stoked fear among parents, and caused division between schools and families,” which the bill aimed to remedy.
• Legislative Debates: The Court notes that:
  • every version of the bill since introduction included an emergency clause, indicating deliberateness;
  • amendments to remove the emergency clause were explicitly proposed and rejected after floor debate;
  • during debate, at least one legislator directly described student depression, self-harm, and suicide as an “emergency,” urging colleagues to act to provide a safe and supportive system immediately.

These materials parallel the kind of evidence the Court accepted in CLEAN (special session, urgent timing, risk of losing the Mariners) and Farm Bureau (need to enable immediate revenue measures to support government functions).

d. Conclusion on Validity

On this record, the Court concludes:

• ESHB 1296 addresses issues at the heart of public “peace, health or safety,” particularly in the school context;
• immediate effectiveness is reasonably seen as necessary to prevent or ameliorate ongoing harms to student well-being, mental health, and equal educational access;
• there is no evidence that the emergency clause was inserted as a sham to avoid referendum or that the legislative determination is “obviously false.”

Therefore, the emergency clause in § 603 is valid. Consequently, § 501 is constitutionally exempt from referendum. In turn, the Secretary had no clear legal duty to process Eyman’s referendum, and mandamus is unavailable.

4. The Concurring Opinions’ Additional Perspectives

a. Justice Johnson (Concurring)

Justice Johnson concurs in the judgment but emphasizes a different mandamus element. He would deny relief based primarily on the first prong—lack of necessity for the extraordinary writ:

• Eyman had “plain, speedy, and adequate” alternative remedies via the Administrative Procedure Act or the Declaratory Judgments Act in superior court.
• Those avenues could provide full relief (including review of the Secretary’s refusal and the emergency clause’s validity).
• Given this, the petition for an original writ in the Supreme Court was properly denied, without needing to fully resolve the Secretary’s duty or the emergency clause’s validity at this level.

b. Justice González (Concurring in Result)

Justice González agrees that Eyman is not entitled to mandamus—the Secretary does not have a clear, mandatory duty to accept the referendum petition. But he raises three key concerns:

1. Scope of the Court’s holding: He worries the lead opinion “has gone too far” by effectively concluding that the Secretary has a duty to do the opposite of what Eyman seeks—to reject the petition. Such a holding is not necessary to decide whether mandamus should issue and risks creating unforeseen problems.
2. Jurisdictional concerns: He notes that a writ directing the Secretary not to accept a petition would be akin to a “writ of prohibition,” and the Court’s original jurisdiction does not extend to prohibition (article IV, section 4). While the Court can issue such writs in its appellate capacity, this case is an original action for mandamus, and the Court should not stray into dicta suggesting prohibitory relief or permanent duties.
3. Executive discretion and future cases: He cautions against suggesting the Secretary never has discretion to accept a referendum petition where an emergency clause is present. He can “imagine situations” where:
   • the legislative emergency declaration is vague or incomplete,
   • the necessity for immediate governmental action is obvious but not clearly stated, or
   • the declaration is a “palpable attempt at dissimulation.”
   He would wait for a concrete case before deciding whether the Secretary must accept or reject such petitions categorically.

González also expresses discomfort with the “considerable deference” standard but acknowledges that the petitioner has not shown that existing precedent (CLEAN, Farm Bureau, etc.) is clearly wrong and harmful, so those cases remain binding.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Secretary of State’s Role in the Referendum Process

Eyman v. Hobbs articulates a significant clarification (and practical limitation) on the Secretary of State’s obligations:

• When a bill bears a facially valid emergency clause under article II, section 1(b), the Secretary does not have a clear, mandatory duty to process a referendum targeting that law.
• The statutory “shall” language in RCW 29A.72.040 is implicitly conditioned on the measure falling within the class of laws that the constitution makes subject to referendum.
• The appropriate path for challengers to such an emergency clause is to seek judicial invalidation (typically in superior court), not to compel the Secretary via mandamus to process the referendum as though the clause did not exist.

Practically, this means:

• Referendum sponsors cannot force the Secretary to “err on the side of filing” when an emergency clause is present.
• The first battle in such cases will be a constitutional challenge to the emergency clause itself, not signature-gathering.
• The Secretary’s refusal to process such a referendum is protected from mandamus unless and until a court invalidates the emergency clause.

2. Reinforcement of Deference to Legislative Emergency Declarations

The decision reinforces Washington’s already deferential approach to emergency clauses:

• The “obviously false” / “palpable attempt at dissimulation” standard remains the operative test.
• Courts rely on the face of the statute and “judicial knowledge” from legislative materials, not live evidence or discovery-intensive factual records.
• Given that the Court has invalidated only a small number of clauses in more than a century, this case confirms that legislative emergency declarations will rarely be overturned, particularly where the subject matter plainly relates to public health, safety, education, or core government support.

This strengthens legislative incentives and ability to use emergency clauses to shield major policy changes from referendum, particularly in areas framed as protecting vulnerable populations or fulfilling constitutional duties such as education. Challenges will therefore tend to succeed only in cases of obvious overreach—e.g., where a law’s subject is plainly remote from peace, health, safety, or governmental support, and no plausible urgency is evident on the record.

3. Implications for Direct Democracy in Washington

The decision subtly rebalances the interplay between representative and direct democracy:

• It preserves judicial review of emergency clauses but confirms that, absent egregious misuse, the legislature’s emergency declaration will close off the referendum route.
• It ensures that executive officers cannot unilaterally “liberalize” the referendum power by disregarding emergency clauses, reinforcing the legislature’s primacy in deciding which laws require immediate effect—subject to limited judicial policing.
• It maintains, but further narrows in practice, the space in which citizen referenda can be used against controversial statutes, particularly those addressing urgent or sensitive policy issues (public safety, education, revenues, etc.) that legislatures can plausibly label as “emergencies.”

4. Procedural Channels and Litigation Strategy

The concurrences, especially Justice Johnson’s, have procedural implications:

• Future challengers to emergency clauses are likely to be directed to superior court under the APA or UDJA, rather than via original mandamus in the Supreme Court.
• Judicial economy concerns—invoked here to justify reaching the emergency clause’s validity—may in future be balanced against the preference for building factual and legal records at the trial-court level.
• Practitioners seeking to challenge emergency clauses should frame their claims directly as requests for declaratory and injunctive relief against the clause itself, rather than as efforts to compel the Secretary to process referenda.

5. Substantive Understanding of “Emergency”

Finally, the decision contributes to the substantive meaning of “emergency”:

• An “emergency” need not be an unforeseen disaster or a newly arisen crisis; it can encompass ongoing, serious harms that require prompt action (e.g., student suicides, bullying, discrimination, unsafe school environments).
• The Court links emergency legislation concerning education directly to the state’s “paramount duty” under article IX, section 1, reinforcing the idea that education-related emergencies carry particular weight.
• By framing student safety and mental health as urgent concerns justifying immediate legislative effect, the Court potentially broadens the category of educational and child-protection measures that can legitimately be insulated from referendum by emergency clauses.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is a special court order compelling a government officer to do something the law clearly requires them to do. To obtain it, a petitioner must show:

1. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.
2. They have a real stake (“beneficial interest”) in the issue.
3. The officer has a clear and mandatory duty under the law to perform the requested act.

Even if all three are met, the court still has discretion to deny the writ. It is “extraordinary” because it directs a different branch of government (often the executive) to act in a specific way, implicating separation of powers.

2. Referendum Power and Emergency Clause

Washington’s constitution lets voters approve or reject laws passed by the legislature through referendum. But there is an exception:

• Laws that are “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety,” or
• Laws necessary for “the support of the state government and its existing public institutions”

are not subject to referendum. When the legislature includes an “emergency clause” stating that a bill is such a law, the bill:

• goes into effect immediately (not after 90 days), and
• cannot be put to a referendum unless a court later finds the emergency clause invalid.

3. “On Its Face” Constitutional Exemption

When the Court says a law is “on its face” exempt from referendum, it means that simply by reading the law itself (without looking at how it is applied), it is clear the constitution places that law outside the referendum power—for example, because it includes an emergency clause that, if valid, fits within article II, section 1(b).

4. Judicial Knowledge (Judicial Notice)

“Judicial knowledge” refers to facts a court can accept without formal evidence because they are:

• commonly known and not reasonably in dispute, or
• easily verified from reliable sources (like official legislative records, public reports, recorded floor debates).

In emergency-clause cases, courts look at the text of the statute and such judicially noticeable materials to understand whether an emergency designation plausibly reflects real urgency.

5. Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duties

A ministerial duty is a simple, non-discretionary obligation: the officer must do it when certain conditions are met (e.g., stamping a properly completed form). A discretionary duty involves judgment about whether and how to act.

In Eyman, the statutory language suggests the Secretary’s role in assigning serial numbers and transmitting measures is ministerial. But the Court holds that this ministerial duty arises only for measures within the referendum power; where the constitution itself excludes a law (via a valid emergency clause), no ministerial duty ever attaches.

6. Writ of Prohibition

A writ of prohibition is the opposite of mandamus: instead of ordering an official to act, it orders an official or lower court to stop acting beyond its lawful power. Justice González worries that by suggesting the Secretary may have a duty not to accept referenda on emergency bills, the lead opinion edges toward prohibition-like language, which is outside the Court’s original jurisdiction under article IV, section 4.

V. Conclusion

Eyman v. Hobbs occupies an important place in Washington’s direct-democracy jurisprudence. It reaffirms that:

• The people’s referendum power, though robust, is subject to constitutionally embedded emergency and support exceptions.
• Executive officers like the Secretary of State are not compelled by statute to process referenda that, on the face of the legislation, target laws declared to be emergencies under article II, section 1(b), unless a court first invalidates the emergency clause.
• Judicial review of emergency clauses remains available but is highly deferential, focusing on the statutory text and judicially knowable legislative context, and overturning legislative determinations only when clearly false or sham.

By holding that ESHB 1296’s emergency clause is valid, the Court confirms that student safety and rights legislation, closely tied to the state’s “paramount duty” to provide education, may legitimately be insulated from referendum through emergency enactment when designed to address ongoing serious harm.

At the same time, the concurring opinions signal continuing unease with both the breadth of deference and the Court’s role in original mandamus actions. They hint that future challenges to emergency clauses should ordinarily proceed through trial courts and that the boundaries of the Secretary’s discretion under various emergency scenarios remain open for further development.

In combination, these strands of reasoning solidify a doctrinal baseline: so long as the legislature’s emergency declaration is not obviously spurious, and absent a prior judicial invalidation of that declaration, the Secretary of State cannot be compelled by mandamus to file and process a referendum against such legislation. This principle will shape the strategic landscape for both lawmakers and referendum proponents whenever emergency clauses are invoked in Washington state.