Extending the Williamson-County “Finality” Requirement to ADA and Rehabilitation Act Zoning Claims
A Comprehensive Commentary on Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of Highland, Indiana, 7th Cir., 1 Aug 2025

1. Introduction

Background. In 2019, Chosen Consulting (“Chosen”) acquired a former nursing-home property in Highland, Indiana, intending to operate it primarily as a residential addiction-treatment (sub-acute) facility. Indiana licensing officials required Chosen to submit a municipal letter confirming that the proposed use was zoning-compliant. Local officials instead advised Chosen to request either (i) a use variance or (ii) rezoning, procedures that Chosen never pursued. After a draft, non-final zoning-compliance letter failed to materialise, Chosen sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, claiming disability-based zoning discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town, holding Chosen’s claim for injunctive relief unripe because Chosen had not obtained a “final decision” from local zoning authorities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Key Issue on Appeal. Whether the so-called Williamson County “finality” prerequisite to federal review applies to ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims arising from local land-use disputes, thereby rendering Chosen’s request for an injunction unripe.

Parties. • Plaintiffs-Appellants: Chosen Consulting, LLC and related entities (collectively “Chosen”) – would-be operators of the treatment facility.
• Defendants-Appellees: Town Council of Highland, Indiana; Highland Municipal Plan Commission; Town of Highland (collectively “the Town”).

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Ripple held that:

• The Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank “finality requirement,” as preserved post-Knick and clarified in Pakdel, extends beyond takings cases to ADA and Rehabilitation Act zoning-related discrimination claims.
• Because Chosen had not sought a use variance, rezoning, an administrative appeal, or any other local procedure capable of yielding a definitive municipal position, the Town had not issued a final, conclusive decision. Thus, the claim for injunctive relief was unripe.
• Consequently, summary judgment for the Town was proper, and the district court’s decision was affirmed.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) – Finality Requirement
  Originated the dual ripeness hurdles for takings claims: (i) final decision by local authority; (ii) “state-litigation” requirement. Chosen concerns only the first.
• Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019) – Abolition of State-Litigation Prong
  Overruled Williamson’s second prong but left finality intact. Reinforced that the latter is jurisdictional, not prudential.
• Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021) – “Relatively Modest” Finality Test
  Held that finality exists once “there is no question” how regulations apply to the land. Circuit relied on Pakdel’s emphasis that further avenues of administrative relief preclude ripeness.
• United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994) – FHA Parallel
  Extended finality to Fair Housing Act reasonable-accommodation claims; direct template for present case.
• Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014) – ADA Context
  Adopted finality for ADA discrimination claim in zoning. Seventh Circuit deemed Sunrise persuasive.
• Other supportive Seventh Circuit land-use precedents: Sprint Spectrum (Telecommunications Act), Forseth (substantive due-process), emphasising broad applicability of finality.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Framing the Claim. Though couched as disability discrimination, Chosen effectively sought forced recognition of a land use through an injunction compelling issuance of a zoning-compliance letter. Therefore, the court categorized the dispute as a land-use decision within finality doctrine.
2. Applicability of Williamson. Drawing on Village of Palatine, the panel held that ADA/Rehab Act claims paralleling FHA cases warrant identical treatment: plaintiffs must obtain a final local determination before federal court intervention. The absence of substantive difference between ADA/FHA justifies extension.
3. Determining Finality. Under Pakdel, the question is whether the government’s position is “final and conclusive.” Highland officials never ruled—formally or informally—on whether Chosen’s proposed use qualified as a legal non-conforming use because Chosen declined to file any required application. The draft letter and politician emails were non-binding; avenues (variance, rezoning, BZA appeal, state declaratory action) remained open. Ergo, no final decision.
4. Rejection of “Futility” Argument. Chosen’s suggestion that further process would be futile was unsupported; the Town “may give back with one hand what it has taken with the other.” Courts avoid speculation.
5. Result. Without finality, Chosen’s claim for injunctive relief was unripe, and summary judgment proper. (Note: Damages claim already foreclosed by 7th Cir.’s own precedent Discovery House.)

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Closes a Circuit Gap. Explicitly holds—for the first time within the Seventh Circuit—that the finality requirement governs ADA and Rehabilitation Act zoning discrimination claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
• Forum-Selection Consequences. Plaintiffs must now exhaust local zoning procedures or secure a definitive municipal denial before invoking federal ADA/Rehab Act remedies in this Circuit, even when discriminatory motive is alleged.
• Strategic Re-orientation. Disability-rights advocates will need to integrate traditional land-use tactics (variance applications, state court declaratory actions, administrative appeals) into litigation strategy.
• Potential Spill-Over. Expect litigants to test whether other federal civil-rights statutes (e.g., RLUIPA, § 1983 equal protection) likewise trigger finality in land-use guise; Chosen supports broader view.
• Local Government Leverage. Municipalities can insist that aggrieved applicants first utilize variance and appeal mechanisms, mitigating sudden federal intervention.
• Possibility of Supreme Court Review. National divergence is still embryonic (cf. 2d Cir.). If other circuits disagree, finality’s footprint in disability-rights zoning could reach the Supreme Court.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Finality Requirement. A doctrine of ripeness: federal courts will not decide land-use disputes until the local government’s decision is “final” – meaning no further administrative steps could still change the outcome.
• Ripeness vs. Exhaustion. “Finality” concerns whether a controversy is mature; “exhaustion” asks whether a plaintiff has pursued all administrative remedies. Pakdel instructs courts not to conflate the two; yet, when local processes remain, both concepts overlap.
• Legal Non-Conforming Use. A use that lawfully existed before a zoning regulation changed and, although now non-conforming, may continue unless abandoned or intensified.
• Use Variance. A discretionary approval allowing land to be used in a way not ordinarily permitted in the zoning district, subject to standards such as hardship and compatibility.
• ADA Title II & Rehabilitation Act § 504. Both prohibit public entities from discriminating on the basis of disability; § 504 extends to any program receiving federal funds. The statutes often travel together and share substantive standards.

5. Conclusion

Chosen Consulting cements within the Seventh Circuit a clear rule: litigants challenging allegedly discriminatory zoning actions under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act must first obtain a final local decision. The judgment harmonises disability-rights land-use disputes with longstanding takings-jurisprudence, reinforcing federalism by ensuring municipal processes operate unimpeded before federal courts intervene. For municipalities, the decision affirms the protective cloak of ripeness; for plaintiffs, it is a cautionary roadmap—utilise local procedures, build a complete administrative record, and only then seek federal relief. The ruling’s broader implication is the ever-expanding reach of the Williamson County finality doctrine across the civil-rights spectrum, underscoring that in land-use conflicts, process truly precedes principle.